Appellees, large-family recipients of benefits under the Aid to
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, brought this suit
to enjoin the application of Maryland's maximum grant regulation as
contravening the Social Security Act of 1935 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the program,
which is jointly financed by the Federal and State Governments, a
State computes the "standard of need" of eligible family units.
Under the Maryland regulation, though most families are provided
aid in accordance with the standard of need, a ceiling of about
$250 per month is imposed on an AFDC grant regardless of the size
of the family and its actual need. The District Court held the
regulation "invalid on its face for overreaching," and thus
violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
Held:
1. The Maryland regulation is not prohibited by the Social
Security Act. Pp.
397 U. S.
476-483.
(a) A State has great latitude in dispensing its available
funds,
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309,
392 U. S.
318-319, and, given Maryland's finite resources
available for public welfare demands, it is not prevented by the
Act from sustaining as many families as it can and providing the
largest families with somewhat less than their ascertained per
capita standard of need. Pp.
397 U. S.
478-480.
(b) The statutory standard in § 402(a)(10) of the Act that aid
"shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
indiiduals," is not violated by the regulation, which does not
deprive children of the largest families of aid, but reduces the
family grant as a whole, and the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare has approved the Maryland scheme. Pp.
397 U. S.
480-482.
(c) In its Social Security Amendments of 1967, Congress fully
recognized that maximum grant regulations are permissible. Pp.
397 U. S.
482-483.
Page 397 U. S. 472
2. The regulation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Pp.
397 U. S.
483-487.
(a) The concept of overbreadth, though relevant where First
Amendment considerations are involved, is not pertinent to state
regulation in the social and economic field. Pp.
397 U. S.
484-485.
(b) The regulation is rationally supportable and free from
invidious discrimination, since it furthers the State's legitimate
interest in encouraging employment and in maintaining an equitable
balance between welfare families and the families of the working
poor. Pp.
397 U. S.
486-487.
297 F.
Supp. 450, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the validity of a method used by Maryland, in
the administration of an aspect of its public welfare program, to
reconcile the demands of its needy citizens with the finite
resources available to meet those demands. Like every other State
in the Union, Maryland participates in the Federal Aid to
Families
Page 397 U. S. 473
With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 42 U.S.C. § 601
et
seq. (1964 ed. and Supp. IV), which originated with the Social
Security Act of 1935. [
Footnote
1] Under this jointly financed program, a State computes the
so-called "standard of need" of each eligible family unit within
its borders.
See generally Rosado v. Wyman, ante, p.
397 U. S. 397.
Some States provide that every family shall receive grants
sufficient to meet fully the determined standard of need. Other
States provide that each family unit shall receive a percentage of
the determined need. Still others provide grants to most families
in full accord with the ascertained standard of need, but impose an
upper limit on the total amount of money any one family unit may
receive. Maryland, through administrative adoption of a "maximum
grant regulation," has followed this last course. This suit was
brought by several AFDC recipients to enjoin the application of the
Maryland maximum grant regulation on the ground that it is in
conflict with the Social Security Act of 1935 and with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge
District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281, held that
the Maryland regulation violates the Equal Protection Clause.
297 F.
Supp. 450. This direct appeal followed, 28 U.S.C. § 1253, and
we noted probable jurisdiction, 396 U.S. 811.
The operation of the Maryland welfare system is not complex. By
statute, [
Footnote 2] the State
participates in the AFDC program. It computes the standard of need
for each eligible family based on the number of children in the
family and the circumstances under which the family lives. In
general, the standard of need increases with each additional person
in the household, but the increments
Page 397 U. S. 474
become proportionately smaller. [
Footnote 3] The regulation here in issue imposes upon the
grant that any single family may receive an upper limit of $250 per
month in certain counties and Baltimore City, and of $240 per month
elsewhere in the State. [
Footnote
4] The appellees all
Page 397 U. S. 475
have large families, so that their standards of need, as
computed by the State, substantially exceed the maximum grants that
they actually receive under the regulation. The appellees urged in
the District Court that the maximum grant limitation operates to
discriminate against them merely because of the size of their
families, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed further that the regulation is
incompatible with the purpose of the Social Security Act of 1935,
as well as in conflict with its explicit provisions.
In its original opinion, the District Court held that the
Maryland regulation does conflict with the federal statute, and
also concluded that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection guarantee. After reconsideration on motion, the court
issued a new opinion resting its determination of the regulation's
invalidity entirely on the constitutional ground. [
Footnote 5] Both the statutory and
constitutional issues have been fully briefed and argued here, and
the judgment of the District Court must, of course, be affirmed if
the Maryland regulation is in conflict with either the federal
statute or the Constitution. [
Footnote 6] We consider the statutory question first,
because,
Page 397 U. S. 476
if the appellees' position on this question is correct, there is
no occasion to reach the constitutional issues.
Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U. S. 288,
297 U. S.
346-347 (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Rosenberg v.
Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449.
I
The appellees contend that the maximum grant system is contrary
to § 402(a)(10) of the Social Security Act, as amended, [
Footnote 7] which requires that a state
plan shall
"provide . . . that all individuals wishing to make application
for aid to families with dependent children shall have opportunity
to do so, and that aid to families with dependent children shall be
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals."
The argument is that the state regulation denies benefits to the
younger children in a large family. Thus, the appellees say, the
regulation is in patent violation of the Act, since those younger
children are just as "dependent"
Page 397 U. S. 477
as their older siblings under the definition of "dependent
child" fixed by federal law. [
Footnote 8]
See King v. Smith, 392 U.
S. 309. Moreover, it is argued that the regulation, in
limiting the amount of money any single household may receive,
contravenes a basic purpose of the federal law by encouraging the
parents of large families to "farm out" their children to relatives
whose grants are not yet subject to the maximum limitation.
It cannot be gainsaid that the effect of the Maryland maximum
grant provision is to reduce the per capita benefits to the
children in the largest families. Although the appellees argue that
the younger and more recently arrived children in such families are
totally deprived of aid, a more realistic view is that the lot of
the entire family is diminished because of the presence of
additional children without any increase in payments.
Cf. King
v. Smith, supra, at
392 U. S. 335 n. 4
(DOUGLAS, J., concurring). It is no more accurate to say that the
last child's grant is wholly taken away than to say that the grant
of the first child is totally rescinded. In fact, it is the
family grant
Page 397 U. S. 478
that is affected. Whether this per capita diminution is
compatible with the statute is the question here. For the reasons
that follow, we have concluded that the Maryland regulation is
permissible under the federal law.
In
King v. Smith, supra, we stressed the States'
"undisputed power," under these provisions of the Social Security
Act, "to set the level of benefits and the standard of need."
Id. at
392 U. S. 334.
We described the AFDC enterprise as "a scheme of cooperative
federalism,"
id. at
392 U. S. 316,
and noted carefully that
"[t]here is no question that States have considerable latitude
in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set
its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by
the amount of funds it devotes to the program."
Id. at
392 U. S.
318-319.
Congress was itself cognizant of the limitations on state
resources from the very outset of the federal welfare program. The
first section of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964 ed., Supp. IV),
provides that the Act is
"For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children
in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each
State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other
services,
as far as practicable under the conditions in such
State, to needy dependent children and the parents or
relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen
family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or
retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal
independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the starting point of the statutory
analysis must be a recognition that the federal law gives each
State great latitude in dispensing its available funds.
Page 397 U. S. 479
The very title of the program, the repeated references to
families added in 1962, Pub.L. 87-543, § 104(a)(3), 76 Stat. 185,
and the words of the preamble quoted above, show that Congress
wished to help children through the family structure. The operation
of the statute itself has this effect. From its inception, the Act
has defined "dependent child" in part by reference to the relatives
with whom the child lives. [
Footnote 9] When a "dependent child" is living with
relatives, then "aid" also includes payments and medical care to
those relatives, including the spouse of the child's parent. 42
U.S.C. § 606(b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Thus, as the District Court
noted, the amount of aid
"is . . . computed by treating the relative, parent or spouse of
parent, as the case may be, of the 'dependent child' as a part of
the family unit."
297 F. Supp. at 455. Congress has been so desirous of keeping
dependent children within a family that, in the Social Security
Amendments of 1967, it provided that aid could go to children whose
need arose merely from their parents' unemployment, under federally
determined standards, although the parent was not incapacitated. 42
U.S.C. § 607 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
The States must respond to this federal statutory concern for
preserving children in a family environment. Given Maryland's
finite resources, its choice is either to support some families
adequately and others less adequately or not to give sufficient
support to any family. We see nothing in the federal statute that
forbids a State to balance the stresses that uniform insufficiency
of payments would impose on all families against the greater
ability of large families -- because of the inherent
Page 397 U. S. 480
economics of scale -- to accommodate their needs to diminished
per capita payments. The strong policy of the statute in favor of
preserving family units does not prevent a State from sustaining as
many families as it can, and providing the largest families
somewhat less than their ascertained per capita standard of need.
[
Footnote 10] Nor does the
maximum grant system necessitate the dissolution of family bonds.
For even if a parent should be inclined to increase his per capita
family income by sending a child away, the federal law requires
that the child, to be eligible for AFDC payments, must live with
one of several enumerated relatives. [
Footnote 11] The kinship tie may be attenuated, but it
cannot be destroyed.
The appellees rely most heavily upon the statutory requirement
that aid "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
But since the statute leaves the level of benefits within the
judgment of the State, this language cannot mean that the "aid"
furnished must equal the total of each individual's standard of
need in every family group. Indeed, the appellees do not deny that
a scheme of proportional reductions for all families could be used
that would result in no individual's receiving aid equal to his
standard of need. As we have
Page 397 U. S. 481
noted, the practical effect of the Maryland regulation is that
all children, even in very large families, do receive some aid. We
find nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) that
requires more than this. [
Footnote 12] So long as some aid is provided to all
eligible families and all eligible children, the statute itself is
not violated.
This is the view that has been taken by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW), who is charged with the
administration of the Social Security Act and the approval of state
welfare plans. The parties have stipulated that the Secretary has,
on numerous occasions, approved the Maryland welfare scheme,
including its provision of maximum payments to any one family, a
provision that has been in force in various forms since 1947.
Moreover, a majority of the States pay less than their determined
standard of need, and 20 of these States impose maximums on family
grants of the kind here in issue. [
Footnote 13] The Secretary has not disapproved any state
plan because of its maximum grant
Page 397 U. S. 482
provision. On the contrary, the Secretary has explicitly
recognized state maximum grant systems. [
Footnote 14]
Finally, Congress itself has acknowledged a full awareness of
state maximum grant limitations. In the Amendments of 1967,
Congress added to § 402(a) a subsection, 23:
"[The State shall] provide that, by July 1, 1969, the amounts
used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have
been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such
amounts were established, and
any maximum that the State
imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been
proportionately adjusted."
81 Stat. 898, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
(Emphasis added.) This specific congressional recognition of the
state maximum grant provisions is not, of course, an approval of
any specific maximum. The structure of specific maximums Congress
left to the States, and the validity of any such structure must
meet constitutional tests. However, the above amendment does make
clear that Congress
Page 397 U. S. 483
fully recognized that the Act permits maximum grant regulations.
[
Footnote 15]
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the Maryland
regulation is not prohibited by the Social Security Act.
II
Although a State may adopt a maximum grant system in allocating
its funds available for AFDC payments without violating the Act, it
may not, of course, impose a regime of invidious discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Maryland says that its maximum grant regulation is
wholly free of any invidiously discriminatory purpose or effect,
and that the regulation is rationally supportable on at least four
entirely valid grounds. The regulation can be clearly justified,
Maryland argues, in terms of legitimate state interests in
encouraging gainful employment, in maintaining an equitable balance
in economic status as between welfare families and those
supported
Page 397 U. S. 484
by a wage-earner, in providing incentives for family planning,
and in allocating available public funds in such a way as fully to
meet the needs of the largest possible number of families. The
District Court, while apparently recognizing the validity of at
least some of these state concerns, nonetheless held that the
regulation "is invalid on its face for overreaching," 297 F. Supp.
at 468 -- that it violates the Equal Protection Clause
"[b]ecause it cuts too broad a swath on an indiscriminate basis
as applied to the entire group of AFDC eligibles to which it
purports to apply. . . ."
297 F. Supp. at 469.
If this were a case involving government action claimed to
violate the First Amendment guarantee of free speech, a finding of
"overreaching" would be significant, and might be crucial. For when
otherwise valid governmental regulation sweeps so broadly as to
impinge upon activity protected by the First Amendment, its very
overbreadth may make it unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479. But
the concept of "overreaching" has no place in this case. For here
we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not
affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment only because the regulation
results in some disparity in grants of welfare payments to the
largest AFDC families. [
Footnote
16] For this Court to approve the invalidation of.state
economic or social regulation as "overreaching" would be far too
reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the Fourteenth
Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws "because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought."
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.
S. 483,
348 U. S. 488.
That
Page 397 U. S. 485
era long ago passed into history.
Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U. S. 726.
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality."
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U. S. 61,
220 U. S.
78.
"The problems of government are practical ones, and may justify,
if they do not require, rough accommodations -- illogical, it may
be, and unscientific."
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
61,
228 U. S. 69-70.
"A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,
366 U. S.
426.
To be sure, the cases cited, and many others enunciating this
fundamental standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have, in
the main, involved state regulation of business or industry. The
administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves
the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We
recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the
cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a
different constitutional standard. [
Footnote 17]
See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.
Supp. 853,
aff'd, 393 U. S. 323. It
is a standard that has consistently been applied to State
legislation restricting the availability of employment
opportunities.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.
S. 464;
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U. S. 552.
See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.
S. 603. And it is a
Page 397 U. S. 486
standard that is true to the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the
States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social
policy. [
Footnote 18]
Under this long-established meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, it is clear that the Maryland maximum grant regulation is
constitutionally valid. We need not explore all the reasons that
the State advances in justification of the regulation. It is enough
that a solid foundation for the regulation can be found in the
State's legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in
avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the families
of the working poor. By combining a limit on the recipient's grant
with permission to retain money earned, without reduction in the
amount of the grant, Maryland provides an incentive to seek gainful
employment. And by keying the maximum family AFDC grants to the
minimum wage a steadily employed head of a household receives, the
State maintains some semblance of an equitable balance between
families on welfare and those supported by an employed breadwinner.
[
Footnote 19]
It is true that, in some AFDC families, there may be no person
who is employable. [
Footnote
20] It is also true that with respect to AFDC families whose
determined standard of need is below the regulatory maximum, and
who therefore receive grants equal to the determined standard, the
employment incentive is absent. But the Equal Protection Clause
does not require that a State must
Page 397 U. S. 487
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not
attacking the problem at all.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U. S. 61. It is
enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination. The regulation before us meets that
test.
We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise,
that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives
that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane
system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and
intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every
measure, certainly including the one before us. But the intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this
Court. The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards
upon systems of welfare administration,
Goldberg v. Kelly,
ante, p.
397 U. S. 254. But
the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential
recipients.
Cf. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.
S. 548,
301 U. S.
584-585;
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.
S. 619,
301 U. S.
644.
The judgment is reversed.
Page 397 U. S. 488
|
397
U.S. 471app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
The following was the schedule for determining subsistence
needs, exclusive of rent, at the time this action was brought. Md.
Manual of Dept. of Pub. Welfare, pt. II, Rule 200, Sched. A, p.
27:
bwm:
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING COST OF SUBSISTENCE NEEDS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I II III IV V
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly costs when
Number of persons in
-----------------------------------------------------------------
assistance unit (include
unborn child as an No heat or Light and/ Heat with Heat, cook-
Heat
additional person) utilities or cooking or without ing fuel and
all
included fuel in- light and water utilities
with cluded included heating included
shelter with with included with
shelter shelter with shelter shelter
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 person living:
Alone . . . . . . . . . $ 51.00 $ 49.00 $ 43.00 $ 40.00 $
38.00
With 1 person . . . . . 42.00 41.00 35.00 36.00 35.00
With 2 persons. . . . . 38.00 37.00 35.00 34.00 33.00
With 3 or more persons 36.00 35.00 34.00 33.00 32.00
2 persons living:
Alone . . . . . . . . . 84.00 82.00 76.00 72.00 70.00
With 1 other person . . 76.00 74.00 70.00 68.00 66.00
With 2 or more other
persons. . . . . . . 72.00 70.00 68.00 66.00 64.00
3 persons living:
Alone . . . . . . . . . 113.00 110.00 105.00 101.00 99.00
With 1 or more other
persons. . . . . . . 108.00 106.00 101.00 99.00 97.00
4 persons. . . . . . . . . 143.00 140.00 135.00 131.00
128.00
5 persons. . . . . . . . . 164.00 162.00 156.00 152.00
150.00
6 persons. . . . . . . . . 184.00 181.00 176.00 172.00
169.00
7 persons. . . . . . . . . 209.00 205.00 201.00 197.00
193.00
8 persons. . . . . . . . . 235.00 231.00 227.00 222.00
219.00
9 persons. . . . . . . . . 259.00 256.00 251.00 247.00
244.00
10 persons . . . . . . . . 284.00 281.00 276.00 271.00
268.00
Each additional person over
10 persons . . . . . . . 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modification of standard for cost of eating in restaurant: add
$15 per individual.
ewm:
Other schedules set the estimated cost of shelter in the various
counties in Maryland.
See id. Sched. B -- Plan A, p. 29;
Sched. B -- Plan B, p. 30. The present schedules, which are
substantially the same, appear in the Md. Manual of Dept. of Social
Services, Rule 200, pp. 33, 35.
Page 397 U. S. 489
[
Footnote 1]
49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964 ed. and
Supp. IV).
[
Footnote 2]
Maryland Ann.Code, Art. 88A, § 44A
et seq. (1969 Repl.
Vol.).
[
Footnote 3]
The schedule for determining subsistence needs is set forth in
an
397
U.S. 471app|>Appendix to this opinion.
[
Footnote 4]
The regulation now provides:
"B.
Amount -- The amount of the grant is the resulting
amount of need when resources are deducted from requirements as set
forth in this Rule, subject to a maximum on each grant from each
category: "
"1. $250 for local departments under any 'Plan A' of Shelter
Schedule"
"2. $240 -- for local departments under any 'Plan B' of Shelter
Schedule"
"
Except that: "
"a. If the requirements of a child over 18 are included to
enable him to complete high school or training for employment
(III-C-3), the grant may exceed the maximum by the amount of such
child's needs."
"b. If the resource of support is paid as a refund (VI-B-6), the
grant may exceed the maximum by an amount of such refund. This
makes consistent the principle that the amount from public
assistance funds does not exceed the maximum."
"c. The maximum may be exceeded by the amount of an emergency
grant for items not included in a regular monthly grant.
(VIII)"
"d. The maximum may be exceeded up to the amount of a grant to a
person in one of the nursing homes specified in Schedule D, Section
a."
"3. A grant is subject to any limitation established because of
insufficient funds."
Md. Manual of Dept. of Social Services, Rule 200, § X, B, p. 23,
formerly Md. Manual of Dept. of Pub. Welfare, pt. II, Rule 200, §
VII, 1, p. 20.
In addition, AFDC recipients in Maryland may be eligible for
certain assistance in kind, including food stamps, public housing,
and medical aid.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396
et
seq. (1964 ed., Supp. IV); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1695-1697. The
applicable provisions of state and federal law also permit
recipients to keep part of their earnings from outside jobs. 42
U.S.C. §§ 630-644 (1964 ed., Supp. IV); Md. Manual of Dept. of
Social Services, Rule 200, § VI, B(8)(c)(2). Both federal and state
law require that recipients seek work and take it if it is
available. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (1964 ed., Supp. IV); Md.
Manual of Dept. of Social Services, Rule 200, § III(D)(1)(d).
[
Footnote 5]
Both opinions appear at
297 F.
Supp. 450.
[
Footnote 6]
The prevailing party may, of course, assert in a reviewing court
any ground in support of his judgment, whether or not that ground
was relied upon or even considered by the trial court.
Compare
Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531,
282 U. S. 538,
with Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U. S. 555,
282 U. S.
567-568. As the Court said in
United States v.
American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U. S. 425,
265 U. S.
435-436:
"[I]t is likewise settled that the appellee may, without taking
a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in
the record, although his argument may involve an attack upon the
reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon matter
overlooked or ignored by it. By the claims now in question, the
American does not attack, in any respect, the decree entered below.
It merely asserts additional grounds why the decree should be
affirmed."
When attention has been focused on other issues, or when the
court from which a case comes has expressed no views on a
controlling question, it may be appropriate to remand the case,
rather than deal with the merits of that question in this Court.
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Flowers, 330 U.
S. 464,
330 U. S. 468;
United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S.
78,
322 U. S. 88.
That is not the situation here, however. The issue having been
fully argued both here and in the District Court, consideration of
the statutory claim is appropriate.
Bondholders Committee v.
Commissioner, 315 U. S. 189,
315 U. S. 192
n. 2; H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 1394 (1953).
See also Jaffke v. Dunham,
352 U. S. 280.
[
Footnote 7]
64 Stat. 550 as amended, 76 Stat. 185, 81 Stat. 881, 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(10) (1964 ed., Supp. V).
[
Footnote 8]
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) provides:
"The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death,
continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity
of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother,
grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother,
stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or
niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such
relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the
age of eighteen, or (b) under the age of twenty-one and (as
determined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by
the Secretary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or
university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or
technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment."
The Act also covers children who have been placed in foster
homes pursuant to judicial order or because they are state charges.
42 U.S.C. § 608 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
[
Footnote 9]
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV),
supra,
n 8, formerly § 406, 49 Stat.
629, as amended, § 321, 70 Stat. 850.
See also S.Rep. No.
628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1935).
[
Footnote 10]
The Maryland Dept. of Social Services, Monthly Financial and
Statistical Report, Table 7 (Nov.1969), indicates that 32,504
families receive AFDC assistance. In the Maryland Dept. of Social
Services, 1970 Fiscal Year Budget, the department estimated that
2,537 families would be affected by the removal of the maximum
grant limitation. It thus appears that only one-thirteenth of the
AFDC families in Maryland receive less than their determined need
because of the operation of the maximum grant regulation. Of
course, if the same funds were allocated subject to a percentage
limitation, no AFDC family would receive funds sufficient to meet
its determined need.
[
Footnote 11]
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV),
n 8,
supra.
[
Footnote 12]
The State argues that, in the total context of the federal
statute, reference to "eligible individuals" means eligible
applicants for AFDC grants, rather than all the family members whom
the applicants may represent, and that the statutory provision was
designed only to prevent the use of waiting lists. There is
considerable support in the legislative history for this view.
See H.R.Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 48, 148
(1949); 95 Cong.Rec. 13934 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Forand). And it
is certainly true that the statute contemplates that actual
payments will be made to responsible adults.
See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 605. For the reasons given above, however, we do not find
it necessary to consider this argument.
[
Footnote 13]
See HEW Report on Money Payments to Recipients of
Special Types of Public Assistance, Oct.1967, Table 4 (NCSS Report
D-4).
See also Hearings on H.R. 5710 before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 118
(1907).
[
Footnote 14]
HEW, State Maximums and Other Methods of Limiting Money Payments
to Recipients of Special Types of Public Assistance, Oct.1962, p.
3:
"When States are unable to meet need as determined under their
standards, they reduce payments on a percentage or flat reduction
basis. . . . These types of limitations may be used in the absence
of, or in conjunction with, legal or administrative maximums. A
maximum limits the amount of assistance that may be paid to persons
whose determined need exceeds that maximum, whereas percentage or
flat reductions usually have the effect of lowering payments to
most or all recipients to a level below that of determined
need."
See also HEW Interim Policy Statement of May 31, 1968,
33 Fed.Reg. 10230 (1968); 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(2)(ii), 34 Fed.Reg.
1394 (1969).
[
Footnote 15]
The provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f) (1964 ed., Supp. IV),
also added by the Amendments of 1967, 81 Stat. 898, are consistent
with this view. That section provides that no medical assistance
shall be given to any family that has a certain level of income.
The section, however, makes an exception, 4 U.S.C. §
1396b(f)(1)(B)(ii) (1964 ed., Supp. IV):
"If the Secretary finds that the operation of a uniform maximum
limits payments to families of more than one size, he may adjust
the amount otherwise determined under clause (i) to take account of
families of different sizes."
These provisions have particular significance in light of the
Administration's initial effort to secure a law forcing each State
to pay its full standard of need.
See Rosado v. Wyman,
supra.
This recognition of the existence of state maximums is not new
with the Amendments of 1967. In reporting on amendments to the
Social Security Act in 1962, 76 Stat. 185, the Senate committee
referred to "States in which there is a maximum limiting the amount
of assistance an individual may receive." S.Rep. No. 1589, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1962).
[
Footnote 16]
Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618, where, by contrast, the Court found state
interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of
interstate travel.
[
Footnote 17]
It is important to note that there is no contention that the
Maryland regulation is infected with a racially discriminatory
purpose or effect such as to make it inherently suspect.
Cf.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184.
[
Footnote 18]
See Developments in the Law -- Equal Protection, 82
Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1082-1087.
[
Footnote 19]
The present federal minimum wage is $52-$64 per 40-hour week, 29
U.S.C. § 206 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). The Maryland minimum wage is
$46-$52 per week, Md.Ann.Code, Art. 100, § 83 (Supp. 1969).
[
Footnote 20]
It appears that no family members of any of the named plaintiffs
in the present case are employable.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
concurring.
Assuming, as the Court apparently does, that individual welfare
recipients can bring an action against state welfare authorities
challenging an aspect of the State's welfare plan as inconsistent
with the provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
601-610 (1964 ed. and Supp. IV), even though the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare has determined, as he has here, that
the federal and state provisions are consistent,
cf. Rosado v.
Wyman, ante, p.
397 U. S. 430
(BLACK, J., dissenting), I join in the opinion of the Court in this
case.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, with one reservation which I deem
called for by certain implications that might be drawn from the
opinion. As I stated in dissent in
Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618,
394 U. S.
658-663 (1969), I find no solid basis for the doctrine
there expounded that certain statutory classifications will be held
to deny equal protection unless justified by a "compelling"
governmental interest, while others will pass muster if they meet
traditional equal protection standards.
See also my
dissenting opinion in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.
S. 641,
384 U. S.
660-661 (1969). Except with respect to racial
classifications, to which unique historical considerations apply,
see Shapiro, at
394 U. S. 659,
I believe the constitutional provisions assuring equal protection
of the laws impose a standard of rationality of classification,
long applied in the decisions of this Court, that does not depend
upon the nature of the classification or interest involved.
Page 397 U. S. 490
It is on this basis, and not because this case involves only
interests in "the area of economics and social welfare,"
ante at
397 U. S. 485,
that I join the Court's constitutional holding.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
Appellees, recipients of benefits under the Aid to Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, brought this suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to have declared invalid and permanently enjoined the
enforcement of the Maryland maximum grant regulation, which places
a ceiling on the amount of benefits payable to a family under AFDC.
They alleged that the regulation was inconsistent with the Social
Security Act and that it denied equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not find it necessary
to reach the constitutional argument in this case, for, in my view,
the Maryland regulation is inconsistent with the terms and purposes
of the Social Security Act.
The Maryland regulation under attack, Rule 200, § X, B, of the
Maryland Department of Social Services, places an absolute limit of
$260 per month on the amount of a grant under AFDC, regardless of
the size of the family and its actual need. [
Footnote 2/1] The effect of this regulation is to deny
benefits to additional children born into a family of six, thus
making it impossible for families of seven persons or more to
receive an amount commensurate with their actual need in accordance
with standards formulated by the Maryland Department of Social
Services, whereas families of six or less can receive the full
amount of their need as so determined. Appellee Williams, according
to the computed need for herself and her eight
Page 397 U. S. 491
children, should receive $296.15 per month. Appellees Gary
should receive $331.50 for themselves and their eight children.
Instead, these appellees received the $250 maximum grant.
In
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309,
392 U. S.
318-319, this Court stated:
"There is no question that States have considerable latitude in
allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set
its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by
the amount of funds it devotes to the program."
That dictum, made in the context of a case that dealt with
Alabama's "substitute father" regulation, does little to clarify
the limits of state authority. The holding in
King was
that the Alabama regulation, which denied AFDC benefits to the
children of a mother who "cohabited" in or outside her home with an
able-bodied man, was invalid because it defined "parent" in a
manner inconsistent with § 406(a) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). The Court rejected the
State's contention that its regulation was "a legitimate way of
allocating its limited resources available for AFDC assistance."
392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 318.
Thus, whatever else may be said of the "latitude" extended to
States in determining the benefits payable under AFDC, the holding
in
King makes clear that it does not include restrictions
on the payment of benefits that are incompatible with the Social
Security Act.
The methods by which a State can limit AFDC payments below the
level of need are numerous. The method used in
King was to
deny totally benefits to a specifically defined class of otherwise
eligible recipients. Another method, which was disapproved by
Congress in 402(a)(10) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
602(a)(10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), was to refuse to take additional
applications pending a decrease in the number of recipients on the
assistance rolls or an increase in available funds. The two methods
most commonly employed
Page 397 U. S. 492
by the States at present, however, are percentage reductions and
grant maximums.
See Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), State Maximums and Other Methods of Limiting Money
Payments to Recipients of the Special Types of Public Assistance,
Oct.1968, Tables 2, 3 (NCSS Report D-3). Grant maximums, in which
payments are made according to need but subject to a stated dollar
maximum, are of two types: individual maximums and family maximums.
Only the latter type is at issue in the present case. Percentage
reductions involve payments of a fixed percentage of actual need as
determined by the State's need standard.
The authority given the States to set the level of benefits
payable under their AFDC plans stems from § 401 of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), which states
the purpose of the federal AFDC appropriations as
"enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and
rehabilitation and other services,
as far as practicable under
the conditions in such State. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) It is significant in this respect that the
Court in
King referred only to a State's determination of
the level of benefits "
by the amount of funds it devotes to
the [AFDC]
program." 392 U.S. at
392 U. S.
318-319 (emphasis added). The language of § 401 and the
language of the Court in
King both reflect a concern that
the Federal Government not require a state legislature to
appropriate more money for welfare purposes than it is willing and
able to appropriate. The use of the matching formula in § 403 of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), supports this
deference to the fiscal decisions of state legislatures. The
question of a State's authority to pay less than its standard of
need, however, has never been expressly decided.
Assuming,
arguendo, that a State need not appropriate
sufficient funds to pay all eligible AFDC recipients the
Page 397 U. S. 493
full amount of their need, it does not follow that it can
distribute such funds as it deems appropriate in a manner
inconsistent with the Social Security Act. The question involved
here is not one of ends; it is one of means. Thus, the United
States Government, in its Memorandum as
Amicus Curiae in
Rosado v. Wyman, decided this day,
ante, p.
397 U. S. 397,
stated, at 6-7:
"Maximums, whether so many dollars per individual or a total
number of dollars per family, have an arbitrary aspect lacking from
ratable reductions, since their application means that one family
or individual will receive a smaller proportion of the amounts he
is determined to need under the state's test than another family or
individual. Where percentage reductions are used, the payment of
every family is reduced proportionately. . . . [T]his aspect
explains why Congress might wish to distinguish between maximums
and ratable reductions as a means of reducing a state's financial
obligation and, at least inferentially, to disfavor the
former."
The District Court, in its initial ruling that the Maryland
regulation was inconsistent with the Social Security Act, relied
primarily on § 402(a)(10) of the Act, which provides that
"all individuals wishing to make application for aid to families
with dependent children shall have opportunity to do so, and that
aid to [families with] dependent children shall be furnished with
reasonable promptness
to all eligible individuals."
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). (Emphasis added.)
This provision was added by the Social Security Act Amendments of
1950, 64 Stat. 549. The House Committee on Ways and Means, where
the provision originated, explained its purpose as follows:
"Shortage of funds in aid to dependent children has sometimes,
as in old-age assistance, resulted in
Page 397 U. S. 494
a decision not to take more applications or to keep eligible
families on waiting lists until enough recipients could be removed
from the assistance rolls to make a place for them. . . . [T]his
difference in treatment accorded to eligible people results in
undue hardship on needy persons, and is inappropriate in a program
financed from Federal funds."
H.R.Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 48 (1949).
In the court below, the appellants relied upon this legislative
history to argue that the "eligible individuals" to whom aid must
be furnished are the applicants for aid referred to in the
beginning of the provision, and not the individual members of a
family unit. I find nothing in the Act or in the legislative
history of § 402(a)(10) which supports that argument.
The purpose of the AFDC program, as stated in the Act, is to
encourage
"the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the
homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial
assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as
practicable under the conditions in such State,
to needy
dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are
living to help maintain and strengthen family life. . . ."
Social Security Act § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964 ed., Supp. IV)
(emphasis added). The terms "dependent child" and "relative with
whom any dependent child is living" are defined in § 406 of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1964 ed. Supp. IV).
The aid provided through the AFDC program has always been
intended for the individual dependent children, not for those who
apply for the aid on their behalf. The Senate Committee on Finance,
in its report on the Social Security Bill of 1935, stated this
purpose in the following terms:
"The heart of any program for social security must be the child.
All parts of the Social Security
Page 397 U. S. 495
Act are in a very real sense measures for the security of
children. . . ."
"In addition, however, there is great need for special
safeguards for many underprivileged children. Children are in many
respects the worst victims of the depression. . . ."
"Many of the children included in relief families present no
other problem than that of providing work for the breadwinner of
the family. These children will be benefited through the work
relief program, and still more through the revival of private
industry. But there are large numbers of children in relief
families which will not be benefited through work programs or the
revival of industry."
"These are the children in families which have been deprived of
a father's support and in which there is no other adult than one
who is needed for the care of the children. . . ."
"With no income coming in, and with young children for whom
provision must be made for a number of years, families without a
father's support require public assistance, unless they have been
left with adequate means or are aided by friends and relatives. . .
.
Through cash grants adjusted to the needs of the family, it
is possible to keep the young children with their mother in their
own home, thus preventing the necessity of placing the children in
institutions. This is recognized by everyone to be the least
expensive and altogether the most desirable method for meeting the
needs of these families that has yet been devised."
S.Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1935) (emphasis
added).
Prior to 1950, no specific provision was made for the need of
the parent or other relative with whom the dependent child was
living. Although this underscores
Page 397 U. S. 496
the fact that the payments were intended to benefit the
children, and not the applicants who received those payments, the
exclusion from the federal scheme of provision for the need of the
caring relative operated effectively to dilute the ability of the
AFDC payments to meet the need of the child. To correct this latter
deficiency, the 1950 Amendments allowed provision for the needs of
this caring relative. The Report of the House Committee on Ways and
Means stated:
"Particularly in families with small children, it is necessary
for the mother or another adult to be in the home full-time to
provide proper care and supervision. Since the person caring for
the child must have food, clothing, and other essentials, amounts
allotted to the children must be used in part for this purpose if
no other provision is made to meet her needs. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"To correct the present anomalous situation wherein no provision
is made for the adult relative, and to enable States to make
payments that are more nearly adequate, the bill would include the
relative with whom the dependent child is living as a recipient for
Federal matching purposes. . . ."
H.R.Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1949). This
amendment emphasizes the congressional concern with fully meeting
the needs of the dependent children in a given family, and it would
seem to negative the necessity of those children's sharing their
individual allocations with other essential members of the family
unit. There is other evidence that Congress intended each eligible
recipient to receive his fair share of benefits under the AFDC
program. The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 provided that a
state AFDC plan must
"provide for the development and application of a program
Page 397 U. S. 497
for [services to maintain and strengthen family life]
for
each child who receives aid to families with dependent
children. . . ."
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(13). The Social Security Amendments of 1967,
which extended this program of "family services" to relatives
receiving AFDC payments and "essential persons" living in the same
home as the child and relative, retained the emphasis on providing
these services to "
each appropriate individual." Social
Security Act, §§ 402(a)(14), (15), 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(14), (15)
(1964 ed., Supp. IV). The Senate Finance Committee Report on the
1967 Amendments stated:
"Under the Social Security Act Amendments of 1962, an amendment
was added to title IV requiring the State welfare agency to make a
program for each child, identifying the services needed, and then
to provide the necessary services. This has proven a useful
amendment, for it has required the States to give attention to the
children and to provide services necessary to carry out the plans
for the individual child. . . . [T]he committee believes that it is
essential to broaden the requirement for the program of services
for each child to include the entire family. The committee bill
would require, therefore, that the States establish a social
services program for each AFDC family. Thus, there will be a
broadened emphasis to include a recognition of the needs of all
members of the family, including 'essential persons.'"
.Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 155 (1967).
These "family services" provisions are helpful in interpreting
the words "all eligible individuals" in § 402(a)(10) of the Act,
for they reveal Congress' overriding concern with meeting the needs
of each eligible recipient of aid under the AFDC program. The
resources commanded
Page 397 U. S. 498
to meet those needs, as well as the definition of those
individuals eligible to receive this aid, have expanded over the
years. At first, only financial assistance was available. Now
"family services" programs have been added. [
Footnote 2/2] In each case, however, the concern has
been with meeting the needs of each eligible recipient.
Page 397 U. S. 499
A further indication that the phrase "all eligible individuals,"
as used in § 402(a)(10), refers to the individual beneficiaries of
aid, and not those who apply for and receive the payments, lies in
the provisions of the Act that concern the computation of federal
payments to the States. Social Security Act § 403. These payments
are presently computed in relation to the State's contribution to
individual recipients, with federal payment of five-sixths of the
first $18 a month per recipient of state expenditure, and further
payment up to a maximum of $32 a month per recipient. There is no
limitation on federal payments based on family size in the present
provisions, nor has there ever been such a limitation in previous
versions of the Act.
Section 403(d)(1) of the Act imposes a limitation on federal
payments to States as respects children whose eligibility is based
upon the absence from the home of a parent. Under this section, the
number of AFDC children under the age of 18 for whom federal
sharing is available cannot exceed the ratio of AFDC children
eligible because of an "absent parent" to the total child
Page 397 U. S. 500
population of a State as of January 1, 1968. Appellants have
argued that this limitation somehow indicates congressional
approval of the maximum grant concept. The District Court below
properly rejected that contention. The Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means indicates that the purpose of the
limitation is to keep federal financial participation "within
reasonable bounds," and to "give the States an incentive to make
effective use of the constructive programs which the bill would
establish." H.R.Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 110. Keeping
federal participation "within reasonable bounds" was tied to the
fact that the "absent parent" category of AFDC recipients was the
one that was growing most rapidly.
Ibid. This provision,
however, relates only to federal contributions to a State's AFDC
program, and does not authorize the State's termination of aid to
any of the children who would otherwise be eligible for aid because
of an absent parent. Representative Mills explained the purpose of
this limitation to the House in the following terms:
"Finally, Mr. Chairman, the bill would add a provision to
present law which would limit Federal financing for the largest
AFDC category -- where the parent is absent from the home -- to the
proportion of each State's total child population that is now
receiving AFDC in this category. This provision, we believe, would
give the States an additional incentive to make effective use of
the constructive programs which the bill would establish. Moreover,
this limitation on Federal matching will not prevent any deserving
family from receiving aid payments. The States would not be free to
keep any family off the rolls to keep within this limitation,
because there is a requirement in the law that requires equal
Page 397 U. S. 501
treatment of recipients and uniform administration of a program
within a State. . . ."
113 Cong.Rec. 23055.
In sum, the provisions of the Act that compute the amount of
federal contribution to state AFDC programs are related to state
payments to individual recipients and have consistently excluded
any limitation based upon family size. The limitation contained in
§ 403(d)(1) of the Act affects only the amount of federal matching
funds in one category of aid, and in no way indicates congressional
approval of maximum grants.
The purpose of the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act is
not only to provide for the needs of dependent children, but also
"to keep the young children with their mother in their own home,
thus preventing the necessity of placing the children in
institutions." S.Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1935).
Also see Social Security Act § 401. As the District Court
noted, however,
"the maximum grant regulation provides a powerful economic
incentive to break up large families by placing 'dependent
children' in excess of those whose subsistence needs, when added to
the subsistence needs of other members of the family, exceed the
maximum grant, in the homes of persons included in the class of
eligible relatives."
297 F. Supp. at 456. By this device, payments for the "excess"
children can be obtained.
"If Mrs. Williams were to place two of her children of twelve
years or over with relatives, each child so placed would be
eligible for assistance in the amount of $79.00 per month, and she
and her six remaining children would still be eligible to receive
the maximum grant of $250.00. If Mr. and
Page 397 U. S. 502
Mrs. Cary were to place two of their children between the ages
of six and twelve with relatives, each child so placed would be
eligible for assistance in the amount of $65.00 per month, and they
and their six remaining children would still be eligible to receive
the maximum grant of $250.00."
Id. at 453-454. The District Court correctly states
that this incentive to break up family units created by the maximum
grant regulation is in conflict with a fundamental purpose of the
Act.
The history of the Social Security Act thus indicates that
Congress intended the financial benefits, as well as the other
benefits, of the AFDC program to reach each individual recipient
eligible under the federal criteria. It was to this purpose that
Congress had reference when it commanded in § 402(a)(10) of the Act
that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished to
"all eligible individuals."
The Court attempts to avoid the effect of this command by
stating that "it is the family grant that is affected."
Ante at
397 U. S.
477-478. The implication is that, regardless of how the
AFDC payments are computed or to whom they apply, the payments will
be used by the parents for the benefit of all the members of the
family unit. This is no doubt true. But the fact that parents may
take portions of the payments intended for certain children to give
to other children who are not given payments under the State's AFDC
plan does not alter the fact that aid is not being given by the
State to the latter children. And it is payments by the State, not
by the parents, to which the command of § 402(a)(10) is directed.
The Court's argument would equate family
Page 397 U. S. 503
grant maximums with percentage reductions, but the two are, in
fact, quite distinct devices for limiting welfare payments. If
Congress wished to design a scheme under which each family received
equal payments, irrespective of the size of the family, I see
nothing that would prevent it from doing so. But that is not the
scheme of Congress under the present Act.
Against the legislative history and the command of § 402(a)(10),
the appellants cite three provisions of the Social Security Act as
recognizing the validity of state maximum grant regulations.
The first of these provisions is § 402(a) (23) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), which provides:
"[A State plan for aid and services to needy families with
children must] provide that, by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by
the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been
adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such
amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes
on the amount of aid paid to families will have been
proportionately adjusted."
This section had its genesis in an Administration proposal to
require States to pay fully the amounts required by their standard
of need, and also to make cost of living adjustments to that
standard of need by July 1, 1968, and annually thereafter. Hearings
on H.R. 5710 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 59 (1967); House Committee on Ways and
Means, Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Provisions of
H.R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (Comm.Print, 1967). The bill
that emerged from the House as H.R. 12080, however, did not include
any provision relating to an increase in benefit levels or
Page 397 U. S. 504
adjustments to standards of need.
See Hearings on H.R.
12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, pp. 109-144 (1967). A provision requiring a cost of
living adjustment in the standard of need by July 1, 1969, and
annually thereafter, was added to the House bill by the Senate
Finance Committee, and this provision also required that "any
maximums . . . on the amount of aid" be proportionately adjusted.
S.Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 293 (1967). An amendment of
the bill was proposed in the Senate that would have required a
positive increase in AFDC payments, but that amendment was
rejected. 113 Cong.Rec. 33560. The Senate-House Conference
Committee adopted the Senate AFDC cost of living provision,
omitting only the requirement for annual updating of need standards
after July 1, 1969. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
63 (1967). Nowhere in any of the hearings, committee reports, or
floor debates is there shown a congressional intent to validate
state maximum grant regulations by the provisions of 402(a)(23).
Rather, the legislative history shows that Congress was exclusively
concerned with increasing the income of AFDC recipients. If
Congress had not required cost of living adjustments in
state-imposed grant maximums, the States could easily nullify the
effect of the cost of living adjustments for many AFDC families by
retaining the grant ceilings in force before the adjustment was
made. Congress was, to be sure, acknowledging the existence of
maximum grant regulations. But every congressional reference to an
existing practice does not automatically imply approval of that
practice. The task of statutory construction requires more. It
requires courts to look to the context of that reference, and to
the history of relevant legislation. In the present context, the
reference to maximum
Page 397 U. S. 505
grants was necessary to preserve the integrity of the cost of
living adjustment required by the bill. No further significance can
legitimately be read into that reference.
Appellants also rely on § 108(a) of Pub.L. 87-543, 76 Stat. 189,
a provision of the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 that amended §
406 of the Act. This amendment, which has since been superseded,
authorized "protective payments" to an individual other than the
relative with whom the dependent child is living. The problem which
this amendment was designed to cure was that some payees were
unable to manage their funds so that the dependent children
received the full benefit of the AFDC payments. Hearings on H.R.
10606 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
137 (1962). The House bill required "a meeting of all need as
determined by the State" as a condition to including "protective
payments" within the definition of "aid to families with dependent
children." The Senate Finance Committee changed that requirement,
however, by an amendment which authorized federal funding of
"protective payments" if the state-determined need of individuals
with respect to whom such payments were made was fully met by their
assistance payment and other income or resources. The Senate
Committee explained this provision as follows:
"The effect of this provision is to make it possible for
protective payments to be made in behalf of certain ADC recipients
in States in which there is a maximum limiting the amount of
assistance an individual may receive. These are the cases in which
the statutory maximum does not prevent need from being met in full
according to the State's standards."
S.Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1962).
Page 397 U. S. 506
This reference to a state-imposed maximum can hardly be
interpreted as a congressional approval of a family maximum grant.
If anything, it implicitly disapproves the concept by withholding
federal payments with respect to individuals receiving "protective
payments" when a maximum grant operates to prevent these
individuals from receiving the full amount of their
state-determined need.
The final statutory provision relied upon by appellants is §
220(a) of Pub.L. 90-248, 81 Stat. 898, which added to the Medical
Assistance Title of the Act a new § 1903(f), 42 U.S.C. 1396b(f)
(1964 ed., Supp. IV). This section limits federal financial
participation in medical assistance benefits to those whose incomes
do not exceed 133 1/3% of the highest amount of AFDC assistance
paid to a family of the same size without any income or resources.
This section, however, also provides:
"If the Secretary [of HEW] finds that the operation of a uniform
maximum limits payments to families of more than one size, he may
adjust the amount otherwise determined . . . to take account of
families of different sizes."
The purpose of this provision was to allow qualification as
medically indigent of those individuals who would have qualified
but for the operation of an AFDC grant maximum, and thus prevent
the extension of the operation of grant maximums into the Medical
Assistance Title. Congressional rejection of grant maximums in the
Medical Assistance Title does not infer their approval in the
context of the AFDC provisions. Quite the contrary would seem to be
the case.
In all of the legislative provisions relied upon by the
appellants, the congressional reference to maximum grants has been
made in the context of attempting to alleviate the harsh results of
their application, not in a context of approving and supporting
their operation. The three statutory references cited by appellants
and
Page 397 U. S. 507
discussed above are clearly inadequate to overcome the long
history of concern manifested in the AFDC provisions of the Social
Security Act for meeting the needs of each eligible recipient, and
the command of § 402(a)(10) of the Act to that effect.
Appellants tender one further argument as to the compliance of
the Maryland maximum grant regulation with the Social Security Act.
That argument is that the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare has not disapproved of any of the Maryland plans that have
included maximum grant provisions, and that this lack of
disapproval by HEW is a binding administrative determination as to
the conformity of the regulation with the Social Security Act. That
argument was thoroughly explored by the District Court below in its
supplemental opinion. The District Court accepted the claim that
HEW considers the Maryland maximum grant regulation not to be
violative of the Act, but held:
"In view of the fact, however, that there is no indication from
administrative decision, promulgated regulation, or departmental
statement that the question of the conformity of maximum grants to
the Act has been given considered treatment, we believe that the
various actions and inactions on the part of HEW are not entitled
to substantial, much less to decisive, weight in our consideration
of the instant case."
297 F. Supp. at 460. HEW seldom has formally challenged the
compliance of a state welfare plan with the terms of the Social
Security Act.
See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State
Welfare Practices, 67 Col.L.Rev. 84, 91 (1967). The mere absence of
such a formal challenge, whatever may be said for its constituting
an affirmative determination of the compliance of a state plan with
the Social Security Act, is not such a determination as is entitled
to
Page 397 U. S. 508
decisive weight in the judicial determination of this
question.
On the basis of the inconsistency of the Maryland maximum grant
regulation with the Social Security Act, I would affirm the
judgment below.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In certain counties the applicable maximum grant is $240 per
month. All of the appellees in this case are residents of Baltimore
City, where the $250-per-month maximum grant applies.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The benefits distributed under the AFDC program include
"financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services."
Social Security Act § 401. The term "aid to families with dependent
children" is itself defined in § 406(b) of the Act, as "money
payments with respect to, or . . . medical care in behalf of or any
type of remedial care recognized under State law" in behalf of
dependent children, the relatives with whom they live, and other
"essential persons" residing with the relative and child.
The services provided by the Act for AFDC recipients include
"family services" and "child welfare services." "Family services"
are defined by § 406(d) of the Act, as
"services to a family or any member thereof for the purpose of
preserving, rehabilitating, reuniting, or strengthening the family,
and such other services as will assist members of a family to
attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and
personal independence."
"Child welfare programs" are defined by § 425 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 625 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), as
"public social services which supplement, or substitute for,
parental care and supervision for the purpose of (1) preventing or
remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems which may
result in the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency of
children, (2) protecting and caring for homeless, dependent, or
neglected children, (3) protecting and promoting the welfare of
children of working mothers, and (4) otherwise protecting and
promoting the welfare of children, including the strengthening of
their own homes where possible or, where needed, the provision of
adequate care of children away from their homes in foster family
homes or day care or other child care facilities."
In addition, § 402(a)(15) of the Act requires the State AFDC
plan to provide for the development of a program for each
appropriate relative and dependent child receiving aid under the
plan, and other "essential persons" living with a relative and
child receiving such aid,
"with the objective of -- (i) assuring, to the maximum extent
possible, that such relative, child, and individual will enter the
labor force and accept employment so that they will become
self-sufficient, and (ii) preventing or reducing the incidence of
births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening family life. . .
."
Section 432 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 632 (1964 ed., Supp. IV),
provides for the establishment of work incentive programs for AFDC
recipients, which include the placement of recipients over the age
of 16 in employment, "institutional and work experience training
for those individuals for whom such training is likely to lead to
regular employment," and "special work projects for individuals for
whom a job in the regular economy cannot be found."
See
also Social Security Act 402(a)(19).
The State must also provide foster care in accordance with § 408
of the Act.
See Social Security Act § 402(a)(20). And
whenever the State feels that AFDC payments may not be used in the
best interests of the child, it may provide for counseling or
guidance with respect to the use of such payments and the
management of other funds. Social Security Act § 405, 42 U.S.C. §
605.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, to which I add
some comments of my own, I believe that the Court has erroneously
concluded that Maryland's maximum grant regulation is consistent
with the federal statute. In my view, that regulation is
fundamentally in conflict with the basic structure and purposes of
the Social Security Act.
More important in the long run than this misreading of a federal
statute, however, is the Court's emasculation of the Equal
Protection Clause as a constitutional principle applicable to the
area of social welfare administration. The Court holds today that,
regardless of the arbitrariness of a classification, it must be
sustained if any state goal can be imagined that is arguably
furthered by its effects. This is so even though the
classification's underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness clearly
demonstrates that its actual basis is something other than that
asserted by the State, and even though the relationship between the
classification and the state interests which it purports to serve
is so tenuous that it could not seriously be maintained that the
classification tends to accomplish the ascribed goals.
The Court recognizes, as it must, that this case involves "the
most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," and that
there is therefore a "dramatically real factual difference" between
the instant case and those decisions upon which the Court relies.
The acknowledgment that these dramatic differences exist is
Page 397 U. S. 509
a candid recognition that the Court's decision today is wholly
without precedent. I cannot subscribe to the Court's sweeping
refusal to accord the Equal Protection Clause any role in this
entire area of the law, and I therefore dissent from both parts of
the Court's decision.
I
At the outset, it should be emphasized exactly what is involved
in determining whether this maximum grant regulation is consistent
with and valid under the federal law. In administering its AFDC
program, Maryland has established its own standards of need, and
they are not under challenge in this litigation. Indeed, the
District Court specifically refused to require additional
appropriations on the part of the State or to permit appellees to
recover a monetary judgment against the State. At the same time,
however, there is no contention, nor could there be any, that the
maximum grant regulation is in any manner related to calculation of
need. [
Footnote 3/1] Rather, it
arbitrarily cuts across state-defined standards of need to deny any
additional assistance with respect to the fifth or any succeeding
child in a family. [
Footnote 3/2]
In short, the regulation represents no less than the refusal of the
State to give any aid whatsoever for the support of certain
dependent children who meet the standards of need that the State
itself has established.
Page 397 U. S. 510
Since its inception in the Social Security Act of 1935, the
focus of the federal AFDC program has been to provide benefits for
the support of dependent children of needy families with a view
toward maintaining and strengthening family life within the family
unit. As succinctly stated by the Senate Committee on Finance,
"[t]he objective of the aid to dependent children program is to
provide cash assistance for needy children
in their own
homes." [
Footnote 3/3] In
meeting these objectives, moreover, Congress has provided the
outlines that the AFDC plan is to follow if a State should choose
to participate in the federal program. The maximum grant
regulation, however, does not fall within these outlines or accord
with the purposes of the Act. And the Court, by approving it,
allows for a complete departure from the congressional intent.
The phrase "aid to families with dependent children," from which
the AFDC program derives its name, appears in 402(a)(10) of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), and is defined in
42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) as,
inter alia,
money payments "
with respect to . . . dependent children."
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, the term "dependent child" is also
extensively defined in the Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)
(1964 ed., Supp. IV). Nowhere in the Act is there any sanction or
authority for the State to alter those definitions -- that is, to
select arbitrarily from among the
Page 397 U. S. 511
class of needy dependent children those whom it will aid. Yet
the clear effect of the maximum grant regulation is to do just
that, for the regulation creates, in effect, a class of otherwise
eligible dependent children with respect to whom no assistance is
granted.
It was to disapprove just such an arbitrary device to limit AFDC
payments that Congress amended § 402(a)(10) in 1950 to provide that
aid "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness
to all
eligible individuals." (Emphasis added.) Surely, as my Brother
DOUGLAS demonstrates, this statutory language means at least that
the State must take into account the needs of, and provide aid with
respect to, all needy dependent children. Indeed, that was our
assessment of the congressional design embodied in the AFDC program
in
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309,
392 U. S.
329-330,
392 U. S. 333
(1968).
The opinion of the Court attempts to avoid this reading of the
statutory mandate by the conclusion that parents will see that all
the children in a large family share in whatever resources are
available so that all children "do receive some aid." And "[s]o
long as some aid is provided to all eligible families and all
eligible children, the statute itself is not violated." The Court
also views sympathetically the State's contention that the "all
eligible individuals" clause was designed solely to prevent
discrimination against new applicants for AFDC benefits. I am
unpersuaded, however, by the view that Congress simultaneously
prohibited discrimination against one class of dependent children
-- those in families not presently receiving benefits -- and at the
same time sanctioned discrimination against another class -- those
children in large families. Furthermore, the Court's interpretation
would permit a State to impose a drastically reduced maximum grant
limitation -- or, indeed, a uniform payment of, say, $25 per family
per month -- as long as all families were subject to the rule.
Page 397 U. S. 512
Thus, merely by purporting to compute standards of need and
granting some benefits to all eligible families, the State would
comply with the federal law -- in spite of the fact that the needs
of no or very few dependent children would thereby be taken into
account in the actual assistance granted. I cannot agree that
Congress intended that a State should be entitled to participate in
the federally funded AFDC program under such circumstances.
Moreover, the practical consequences of the maximum grant
regulation in question here confirm my view that it is invalid.
Under the complicated formula for determining the extent of federal
support for the AFDC program in the various States, the federal
subsidy is based upon "the total number of recipients of aid to
families with dependent children." 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1964 ed.,
Supp. IV). "Recipients" is defined in the same provision to include
both dependent children and the eligible relative or relatives with
whom they live. There is, however, no limitation upon the number of
recipients per family unit for whom the federal subsidy is paid to
the States. Thus, when a maximum family grant regulation is in
effect, the State continues to receive a federal subsidy for each
and every dependent child even though the State passes
none of this subsidy on to the large families for the use
of the additional dependent children.
Specifically, in Maryland, the record in this case indicates
that the State spends an average of almost $40 per recipient per
month. Under the federal matching formula, federal funds provide
$22 of the first $32 per recipient, with anything above $32 being
supplied by the State. [
Footnote
3/4] However, the Federal Government provides a
Page 397 U. S. 513
maximum of $22 for every dependent child, although none of that
amount is received by the needy family in the case of the fifth or
sixth and succeeding children. The effect is to shift a greater
proportion of the support of large families from the State to the
Federal Government as the family size increases. Indeed, if the
size of the family should exceed 11, the State would succeed in
transferring the entire support burden for the family to the
Federal Government, and even make a "profit" in the sense that it
would receive more from the Federal Government with respect to the
family than the $250 maximum that is actually paid to that family.
It is impossible to conclude that Congress intended so incongruous
a result. On the contrary, when Congress undertook to subsidize
payments on behalf of each recipient -- including each dependent
child -- it seems clear that Congress intended each needy dependent
child to receive the use and benefit of at least the incremental
amount of the federal subsidy paid on his account.
A second effect of the maximum family grant regulation further
demonstrates its inconsistency with the federal program. As
administered in Maryland, the regulation serves to provide a strong
economic incentive to the disintegration of large families. This is
so because a family subject to the maximum regulation can, merely
by placing the ineligible children in the homes of other relatives,
receive additional monthly payments for the support of these
additional dependent children. [
Footnote 3/5] When families are receiving support that
is concededly far below their bare minimum subsistence needs, the
economic incentive that the maximum grant regulation provides to
divide up large families can hardly be viewed as speculative or
negligible. The opinion of this Court
Page 397 U. S. 514
does not even dispute this effect. [
Footnote 3/6] The Court answers by saying that the
family relationship "may be attenuated, but it cannot be
destroyed." Yet it was just this kind of attenuation that, as the
legislative history conclusively demonstrates, [
Footnote 3/7] Congress was concerned with
eliminating in establishing the AFDC program. The Court's rationale
takes a long step backward toward the time when persons were
dependent upon the charity of their relative -- the very situation
meant to be remedied by AFDC.
Page 397 U. S. 515
Despite its denial of the principle that payments should be made
with regard to all eligible individuals and its conflict with the
basic purposes of the Act, the Maryland regulation is nevertheless
found by the Court to be consistent with the federal law because
the existence of such regulations has been recognized by Congress.
To bolster this view, the Court argues that the same conclusion has
been reached by the department charged with administering the Act.
On neither score is the Court convincing.
With regard to the position of the Secretary of HEW, about all
that can be said with confidence is that we do not know his views
on the validity of family maximum regulations within the federal
structure. [
Footnote 3/8] The
reason is simple -- he has not been asked. Thus, contrary to our
admonition given today to the district courts, in considering cases
in this area, that, whenever possible, they "should obtain the
views of HEW in those cases where it has not set forth its views,"
Rosado v. Wyman, ante at
397 U. S. 407,
the Government was not invited to file a brief in this case.
Perhaps the reason is that this Court is fully versed in the
complexities of the federal AFDC program. I am dubious, however,
when
Page 397 U. S. 516
the Court explicitly relies on the failure of the Secretary to
disapprove the Maryland welfare scheme. For if anything at all is
completely clear in this area of the law, it is that the failure of
HEW to cut off funds from a state program has no meaning at all.
See Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at
397 U. S. 426
(DOUGLAS, J., concurring).
Finally, the Court tells us that Congress has said that the Act
permits maximum grant regulations. If it had, this part of the case
would he obvious; but, of course, it has not. There is no
indication Congress has focused on the family maximum, as opposed
to individual or other maximums or combinations of such limiting
devices. [
Footnote 3/9] And, to the
extent that it could be said to have done so, as my Brother DOUGLAS
fully demonstrates, it was in the context of disapproving all
maximums, and ameliorating the harshness of their effects.
See
also Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at
397 U. S.
413-414. These slender threads of legislative comment
simply cannot be woven into a conclusion of legislative sanction.
Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618,
394 U. S.
638-640 (1969). Furthermore,
Page 397 U. S. 517
it is fundamental that, in construing legislation,
"we must not he guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law, and
to its object and policy."
Richards v. United States, 369 U. S.
1,
369 U. S. 11
(1962). We concluded in
King v. Smith, supra, after an
extensive review of the AFDC program, that Congress "intended to
provide programs for the economic security and protection of
all children," and did not intend "arbitrarily to leave
one class of destitute children entirely without meaningful
protection." 392 U.S. at 3
392 U. S. 30. (Emphasis in original.) That reasoning is
likewise applicable to the instant case, in which the maximum grant
regulation excludes consideration of the needs of a certain class
of dependent children in large families. It is apparent, therefore,
that Maryland's maximum grant regulation is not consistent with the
Social Security Act, and hence appellees were entitled to the
injunction they obtained against its operation.
II
Having decided that the injunction issued by the District Court
was proper as a matter of statutory construction, I would affirm on
that ground alone. However, the majority has, of necessity, passed
on the constitutional issues. I believe that, in overruling the
decision of this and every other district court that has passed on
the validity of the maximum grant device, [
Footnote 3/10] the Court both
Page 397 U. S. 518
reaches the wrong result and lays down an insupportable test for
determining whether a State has denied its citizens the equal
protection of the laws.
The Maryland AFDC program, in its basic structure, operates
uniformly with regard to all needy children by taking into account
the basic subsistence needs of all eligible individuals in the
formulation of the standards of need for families of various sizes.
However, superimposed upon this uniform system is the maximum grant
regulation, the operative effect of which is to create two classes
of needy children and two classes of eligible families: those small
families and their members who receive payments to cover their
subsistence needs and those large families who do not. [
Footnote 3/11]
This classification process effected by the maximum grant
regulation produces a basic denial of equal treatment. Persons who
are concededly similarly situated (dependent children and their
families), are not afforded equal, or even approximately equal,
treatment under the maximum grant regulation. Subsistence benefits
are paid with respect to some needy dependent children; nothing is
paid with respect to others. Some needy families receive full
subsistence assistance as calculated by the State; the assistance
paid to other families is grossly below their similarly calculated
needs.
Page 397 U. S. 519
Yet, as a general principle, individuals should not be afforded
different treatment by the State unless there is a relevant
distinction between them, and "a statutory discrimination must be
based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of
the Act in which it is found."
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.
S. 457,
354 U. S. 465
(1957).
See Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Ellis,
165 U. S. 150,
165 U. S. 155
(1897). Consequently, the State may not, in the provision of
important services or the distribution of governmental payments,
supply benefits to some individuals while denying them to others
who are similarly situated.
See, e.g., Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.
S. 218 (1964).
In the instant case, the only distinction between those children
with respect to whom assistance is granted and those children who
are denied such assistance is the size of the family into which the
child permits himself to be born. The class of individuals with
respect to whom payments are actually made (the first four or five
eligible dependent children in a family), is grossly underinclusive
in terms of the class that the AFDC program was designed to assist,
namely, all needy dependent children. Such underinclusiveness
manifests "a
prima facie violation of the equal protection
requirement of reasonable classification," [
Footnote 3/12] compelling the State to come forward
with a persuasive justification for the classification.
The Court never undertakes to inquire for such a justification;
rather, it avoids the task by focusing upon the abstract dichotomy
between two different approaches to equal protection problems that
have been utilized by this Court.
Under the so-called "traditional test," a classification is said
to be permissible under the Equal Protection Clause unless it is
"without any reasonable basis."
Page 397 U. S. 520
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 78
(1911). [
Footnote 3/13] On the
other hand, if the classification affects a "fundamental right,"
then the state interest in perpetuating the classification must be
"compelling" in order to be sustained.
See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, supra; Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.
S. 663 (1966);
McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U. S. 184
(1964).
This case simply defies easy characterization in terms of one or
the other of these "tests." The cases relied on by the Court, in
which a "mere rationality" test was actually used,
e.g.,
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.
S. 483 (1955), are most accurately described as
involving the application of equal protection reasoning to the
regulation of business interests. The extremes to which the Court
has gone in dreaming up rational bases for state regulation in that
area may, in many instances, be ascribed to a healthy revulsion
from the Court's earlier excesses in using the Constitution to
protect interests that have more than enough power to protect
themselves in the legislative halls. This case, involving the
literally vital interests of a powerless minority -- poor families
without breadwinners -- is far removed from the area of business
regulation, as the Court concedes. Why then is the standard used in
those cases imposed here? We are told no more than that this case
falls in "the area of economics and social welfare," with the
implication that, from there, the answer is obvious.
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not
appreciably advanced by the
a priori definition of a
"right," fundamental or otherwise. [
Footnote 3/14] Rather, concentration
Page 397 U. S. 521
must be placed upon the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class
discriminated against of the governmental benefit that they do not
receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the
classification. As we said only recently,
"In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal
Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances
behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be
protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the
classification."
Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.
S. 621,
395 U. S. 626
(1969), quoting
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S.
23,
393 U. S. 30
(1968). [
Footnote 3/15]
Page 397 U. S. 522
It is the individual interests here at stake that, as the Court
concedes, most clearly distinguish this case from the "business
regulation" equal protection cases. AFDC support to needy dependent
children provides the stuff that sustains those children's lives:
food, clothing, shelter. [
Footnote
3/16] And this Court has already recognized several times that,
when a benefit, even a "gratuitous" benefit, is necessary to
sustain life, stricter constitutional standards, both procedural
[
Footnote 3/17] and substantive,
[
Footnote 3/18] are applied to
the deprivation of that benefit.
Page 397 U. S. 523
Nor is the distinction upon which the deprivation is here based
-- the distinction between large and small families -- one that
readily commends itself as a basis for determining which children
are to have support approximating subsistence and which are not.
Indeed, governmental discrimination between children on the basis
of a factor over which they have no control -- the number of their
brothers and sisters -- bears some resemblance to the
classification between legitimate and illegitimate children which
we condemned as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68
(1968).
The asserted state interests in the maintenance of the maximum
grant regulation, on the other hand, are hardly clear. In the early
stages of this litigation, the State attempted to rationalize the
maximum grant regulation on the theory that it was merely a device
to conserve state funds, in the language of the motion to dismiss,
"a legitimate way of allocating the State's limited resources
available for AFDC assistance." Indeed, the initial opinion of the
District Court concluded that the sole reason for the regulation,
as revealed by the record, was
"to fit the total needs of the State's dependent children, as
measured by the State's standards of their subsistence
requirements, into an inadequate State appropriation."
297 F. Supp. at 458. The District Court quite properly rejected
this asserted justification, for
Page 397 U. S. 524
"[t]he saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise
invidious classification."
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at
394 U. S. 633.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, at
397 U. S.
266.
In post-trial proceedings in the District Court, and in briefs
to this court, the State apparently abandoned reliance on the
fiscal justification. In its place, there have now appeared several
different rationales for the maximum grant regulation, prominent
among them being those relied upon by the majority -- the notions
that imposition of the maximum serves as an incentive to welfare
recipients to find and maintain employment, and provides a
semblance of equality with persons earning a minimum wage.
With regard to the latter, Maryland has urged that the maximum
grant regulation serves to maintain a rough equality between wage
earning families and AFDC families, thereby increasing the
political support for -- or perhaps reducing the opposition to --
the AFDC program. It is questionable whether the Court really
relies on this ground, especially when, in many States, the
prescribed family maximum bears no such relation to the minimum
wage. [
Footnote 3/19] But the
Court does not indicate that a different result might obtain in
other cases. Indeed, whether elimination of the maximum would
produce welfare incomes out of line with other incomes in Maryland
is itself open to question on this record. [
Footnote 3/20]
Page 397 U. S. 525
It is true that government in the United States, unlike certain
other countries, has not chosen to make public aid available to
assist families generally in raising their children. Rather, in
this case, Maryland, with the encouragement and assistance of the
Federal Government, has elected to provide assistance at a
subsistence level for those in particular need -- the aged, the
blind, the infirm, and the unemployed and unemployable, and their
children. The only question presented here is whether, having once
undertaken such a program, the State may arbitrarily select from
among the concededly eligible those to whom it will provide
benefits. And it is too late to argue that political expediency
will sustain discrimination not otherwise supportable.
Cf.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1
(1958).
Vital to the employment incentive basis found by the Court to
sustain the regulation is, of course, the supposition that an
appreciable number of AFDC recipients are, in fact, employable. For
it is perfectly obvious that limitations upon assistance cannot
reasonably operate a a work incentive with regard to those who
cannot work or who cannot be expected to work. In this connection,
Maryland candidly notes that "only a very small percentage of the
total universe of welfare recipients are employable." The State,
however, urges us to ignore the "total universe," and to
concentrate attention instead upon the heads of AFDC families. Yet
the very purpose of the AFDC program since its inception has been
to provide assistance for dependent children. The State's position
is thus that the State may deprive certain needy children of
assistance to which they would otherwise be entitled in order to
provide an arguable work incentive for their parents. But the State
may not wield its economic whip in this fashion when the effect is
to cause a deprivation to needy dependent children in order to
correct an arguable fault of their parents.
Page 397 U. S. 526
Cf. Levy v. Louisiana, supra; King v. Smith, supra, at
392 U. S.
334-336 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring);
Doe v.
Shapiro, 302 F.
Supp. 761 (D.C. Conn.1969),
appeal dismissed,
396 U. S. 488
(1970).
Even if the invitation of the State to focus upon the heads of
AFDC families is accepted, the minimum rationality of the maximum
grant regulation is hard to discern. The District Court found that,
of Maryland's more than 32,000 AFDC families, only about 116 could
be classified as having employable members, and, of these, the
number to which the maximum grant regulation was applicable is not
disclosed by the record. The State objects that this figure
includes only families in which the father is unemployed, and fails
to take account of families in which an employable mother is the
head of the household. At the same time, however, the State itself
has recognized that the vast proportion of these mothers are, in
fact, unemployable because they are mentally or physically
incapacitated, because they have no marketable skills, or, most
prominently, because the best interests of the children dictate
that the mother remain in the home. [
Footnote 3/21] Thus, it is clear, although the record
does not disclose precise figures, that the total number of
"employable" mothers is but a fraction of the total number of AFDC
mothers. Furthermore, the record is silent as to what proportion of
large families subject to the maximum have "employable" mothers.
Indeed, one
Page 397 U. S. 527
must assume that the presence of the mother in the home can be
less easily dispensed with in the case of large families,
particularly where small children are involved, and alternative
provisions for their care are accordingly more difficult to
arrange. In short, not only has the State failed to establish that
there is a substantial or even a significant proportion of AFDC
heads of households as to whom the maximum grant regulation
arguably serves as a viable and logical work incentive, but it is
also indisputable that the regulation, at best, is drastically
overinclusive, since it applies with equal vigor to a very
substantial number of persons who, like appellees, are completely
disabled from working.
Finally, it should be noted that, to the extent there is a
legitimate state interest in encouraging heads of AFDC households
to find employment, application of the maximum grant regulation is
also grossly underinclusive, because it singles out and affects
only large families. No reason is suggested why this particular
group should be carved out for the purpose of having unusually
harsh "work incentives" imposed upon them. Not only has the State
selected for special treatment a small group from among similarly
situated families, but it has done so on a basis -- family size --
that bears no relation to the evil that the State claims the
regulation was designed to correct. There is simply no indication
whatever that heads of large families, as opposed to heads of small
families, are particularly prone to refuse to seek or to maintain
employment.
The State has presented other arguments to support the
regulation. However, they are not dealt with specifically by the
Court, and the reason is not difficult to discern. The Court has
picked the strongest available; the others suffer from similar and
greater
Page 397 U. S. 528
defects. [
Footnote 3/22]
Moreover, it is relevant to note that both Congress and the State
have adopted other measures that deal specifically with exactly
those interests the State contends are advanced by the maximum
grant regulation. Thus, for example, employable AFDC recipient are
required to seek employment through the congressionally established
Work Incentive Program, which provide an elaborate system of
counseling, training, and incentive payments for heads of AFDC
families.
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 63644 (1964 ed.,
Supp. IV). [
Footnote 3/23] The
existence of these alternatives does not, of course, conclusively
establish the invalidity of the maximum grant regulation. It is
certainly relevant, however, in appraising the overall interest of
the State in the maintenance of the regulation.
In he final analysis, Maryland has set up an AFDC program
structured to calculate and pay the minimum standard of need to
dependent children. Having set up that program, however, the State
denies some of those
Page 397 U. S. 529
needy children the minimum subsistence standard of living, and
it does so on the wholly arbitrary basis that they happen to be
members of large families. One need not speculate too far on the
actual reason for the regulation, for, in the early stages of this
litigation, the State virtually conceded that it set out to limit
the total cost of the program along the path of least resistance.
Now, however, we are told that other rationales can be manufactured
to support the regulation and to sustain it against a fundamental
constitutional challenge.
However, these asserted state interests, which are not
insignificant in themselves, are advanced either not at all or by
complete accident by the maximum grant regulation. Clearly they
could be served by measures far less destructive of the individual
interests at stake. Moreover, the device assertedly chosen to
further them is, at one and the same time, both grossly
underinclusive -- because it does not apply at all to a much larger
class in an equal position -- and grossly overinclusive -- because
it applies so strongly against a substantial class as to which it
can rationally serve no end. Were this a case of pure business
regulation, these defects would place it beyond what has heretofore
seemed a borderline case,
see, e.g., Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U. S. 106
(1949), and I do not believe that the regulation can be sustained
even under the Court's "reasonableness" test.
In any event, it cannot suffice merely to invoke the spectre of
the past and to recite from
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co. and
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. to decide the
case. Appellees are not a gas company or an optical dispenser; they
are needy dependent children and families who are discriminated
against by the State. The basis of that discrimination -- the
classification of individuals into large and small families -- is
too
Page 397 U. S. 530
arbitrary and too unconnected to the asserted rationale, the
impact on those discriminated against -- the denial of even a
subsistence existence -- too great, and the supposed interests
served too contrived and attenuated to meet the requirements of the
Constitution. In my view, Maryland's maximum grant regulation is
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.
[
Footnote 3/1]
The Court is thus wrong in speaking of
"the greater ability of large families -- because of the
inherent economics of scale -- to accommodate their needs to
diminished per capita payments."
Those economics have already been taken into account once in
calculating the standard of need. Indeed, it borders on the
ludicrous to suggest that a large family is more capable of living
on perhaps 50% of its standard of need than a small family is on
95%.
[
Footnote 3/2]
Because of minor variations in the calculation of the
subsistence needs of particular families, and because the maximum
grant varies between $240 and $250 per month, depending upon the
county in which a particular family resides, the cut-off point
between families that receive the full subsistence allowance and
those that do not is not precisely families of more than six
members. In practice, it appears that the subsistence needs of a
family of six members are fully met. The needs of the seventh
member (
i.e., the fifth or sixth child, depending upon
whether one or both parents are within the assistance unit), as
defined by the State, are met, if at all, only to a very small
extent. In the usual situation, no payments whatever would be made
with respect to any additional eligible dependent children.
[
Footnote 3/3]
S.Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1961). (Emphasis
added.)
[
Footnote 3/4]
More technically, the Federal Government supplies five-sixths of
the overall amount spent per recipient up to $18, plus one-half of
the amount from $18 to $32, to a total of $22.
See 42
U.S.C. § 603 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
[
Footnote 3/5]
For example, in the case of the appellee Mrs. Williams, if she
were to place two of her children over 12 years of age with
relatives, payments of $7 per month would be paid with respect to
each child. Thus, a total of $408 per month, or $158 above the
maximum, would be available for the support of Mrs. Williams and
her eight children. Similarly, if appellees Mr. and Mrs. Cary were
to place with relatives two of their children who are between the
ages of 6 and 12 years, each child would be eligible to receive
$65. Hence, Mr. and Mrs. Gary and their eight children would
receive support in the amount of $380 per month, or some $130 above
the family maximum.
[
Footnote 3/6]
The State has contended that the economic incentive to the
disintegration of large families that the maximum grant regulation
provides is merely speculative. However, serious doubt is cast upon
this view by the stipulation of facts entered in the District Court
which states in part that, despite the strong desire to keep their
families together, appellees in this case were having great
difficulty in doing so because of the limitations on their
grants.
[
Footnote 3/7]
In S.Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1935), the
original goals of the AFDC program are stated as follows:
"With no income coming in, and with young children for whom
provision must be made for a number of years, families without a
father's support require public assistance unless they have been
left with adequate means or are aided by friends and relatives. . .
. Through cash grants
adjusted to the needs of the family,
it is possible to keep the young children
with their mother in
their own home, thus preventing the necessity of placing the
children in institutions. This is recognized by everyone to be the
least expensive, and altogether the most desirable, method for
meeting the needs of these families that has yet been devised."
(Emphasis added.)
See also H.R.Rep. No. 615, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935).
These goals remain the same today.
See 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1964 ed., Supp. IV).
See generally Note, Welfare's
"Condition X," 6 Yale L.J. 1222, 1232-1233 (1967).
[
Footnote 3/8]
In various briefs submitted both to this Court and to other
courts in analogous litigation, the Secretary of HEW and the
Solicitor General have taken the occasion to label family maximum
grant regulations as "arbitrary," oppressive of large families, as
resulting in "patently different treatment of individuals," and
having received, at least inferentially, the disfavor of Congress.
See, e.g., Memorandum for the United States as
Amicus
Curiae, Rosado v. Wyman, ante, p
397 U. S. 397;
Brief of Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare as
Amicus Curiae, Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F.
Supp. 336,
304 F.
Supp. 1384 (D.C.E.D.La.1969); Brief of Robert H. Finch,
Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F.
Supp. 1332 (D.C.N.D.Tex.1969). Hence, the views of HEW on the
precise issue presented in he instant case are, at the very best,
ambiguous, and quite possibly the opposite of what the Court
ascribes to it.
[
Footnote 3/9]
The maximum may be expressed in terms of a flat dollar amount,
as a percentage of the individual's budgetary deficit
(
i.e., the difference between need and other income), or
in both ways. A system of individual maximums may, or may not, be
combined with a family maximum, or, alternatively, a family maximum
may be imposed in the absence of individual maximums.
See
generally HEW, State Maximums and Other Methods of Limiting
Money Payments to Recipients of the Special Types of Public
Assistance, Oct.1968 (NCSS Report D-3); Sparer, Social Welfare Law
Testing, 12 Prac.Law. (No. 4) 13, 21 (1966). In addition, there are
differing methods by which family maximums may be related to other
resources available to the family. Some States, including Maryland,
subtract available resources from the state-calculated need; in
other jurisdictions, available resources are subtracted from the
family maximum.
See, e.g., Dews v. Henry, 297 F.
Supp. 587 (D.C. Ariz.1969), involving litigation with respect
to the Arizona family maximum.
[
Footnote 3/10]
The lower courts have been unanimous in the view that maximum
grant regulations such as Maryland's are invalid.
See Dews v.
Henry, supra; Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F.
Supp. 1109 (D.C. Me.1969);
Lindsey v.
Smith, 303 F.
Supp. 1203 (D.C.W.D. Wash.1969);
Kaiser v. Montgomery,
___ F.Supp. ___ (D.C.N.D. Cal.1969).
See also Collins v. State
Board of Social Welfare, 248 Iowa 369,
81 N.W.2d 4
(1957) (family maximum invalid under equal protection clause of
state constitution);
Metcalf v. Swank, 293 F.
Supp. 268 (D.C.N.D.Ill.1968) (dictum).
[
Footnote 3/11]
In theory, no payments are made with respect to needy dependent
children in excess of four or five, as the case may be. In
practice, of course, the excess children share in the benefits that
are paid with respect to the other member of the family. The result
is that support for the entire family is reduced below minimum
subsistence levels. However, for purposes of equal protection
analysis, it makes no difference whether the class against which
the maximum grant regulation discriminates is defined as eligible
dependent children in excess of the fourth or fifth, or,
alternatively, as individuals in large families generally, that is,
those with more than six members.
[
Footnote 3/12]
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
Calif.L.Rev. 341, 348 (1949).
[
Footnote 3/13]
See generally Developments in the Law -- Equal
Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1076-1087 (1969).
[
Footnote 3/14]
See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv.L.Rev.
1439 (1968). Appellees do argue that their "fundamental rights" are
infringed by the maximum grant regulation. They cite, for example,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535
(1942), for the proposition that the "right of procreation" is
fundamental. This statement is no doubt accurate as far as it goes,
but the effect of the maximum grant regulation upon the right of
procreation is marginal and indirect, at best, totally unlike the
compulsory sterilization law that was at issue in
Skinner.
At the same time, the Court's insistence that equal protection
analysis turns on the basis of a closed category of "fundamental
rights" involves a curious value judgment. It is certainly
difficult to believe that a person whose very survival is at stake
would be comforted by the knowledge that his "fundamental" rights
are preserved intact.
On the issue of whether there is a "right" to welfare
assistance,
see generally Graham, Public Assistance: The
Right To Receive; the Obligation To Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 451
(1968); Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance,
31 Albany L.Rev. 210 (1967); Note, Welfare Due Process: The Maximum
Grant Limitation on the Right To Survive, 3 Ga.L.Rev. 459 (1969).
See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art.
25.
[
Footnote 3/15]
This is essentially what this Court has done in applying equal
protection concepts in numerous cases, though the various aspects
of the approach appear with a greater or lesser degree of clarity
in particular cases.
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, supra;
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305
(1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S.
89 (1965);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.
S. 353 (1963);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra.
For an application of this approach to several welfare
questions,
see Comment, Equal Protection as a Measure of
Competing Interests in Welfare Litigation, 21 Me.L.Rev. 175
(1969).
[
Footnote 3/16]
See also Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F.
Supp. 339, 346-347 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1969); Harvith,
supra,
397
U.S. 471fn3/14|>n. 14, 31 Albany L.Rev. at 222-226.
[
Footnote 3/17]
See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.
S. 337,
395 U. S.
340-342 (1969) (relying on devastating impact of wage
garnishment to require prior hearing as a matter of due process);
Goldberg v. Kelly, ante at
397 U. S.
264:
"Thus, the crucial factor in this context -- a factor not
present in the case of the blacklisted government contractor, the
discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax
exemption, or virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements
are ended -- is that termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits."
[
Footnote 3/18]
Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at
394 U. S. 627,
striking down one-year residency requirement for welfare
eligibility as violation of equal protection, and noting that the
benefits in question are "the very means to subsist -- food,
shelter, and other necessities of life,"
with Kirk v. Board of
Regents, 273 Cal. App.
2d 430, 439-440, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266-267 (1969),
appeal
dismissed, 396 U. S. 554
(1970), upholding one-year residency requirement for tuition-free
graduate education at state university, and distinguishing
Shapiro on the ground that it
"involved the immediate and pressing need for preservation of
life and health of persons unable to live without public
assistance, and their dependent children."
These cases and those cited in
397
U.S. 471fn3/17|>n. 17,
supra, suggest that, whether
or not there is a constitutional "right" to subsistence (as to
which
see 397
U.S. 471fn3/14|>n. 14,
supra), deprivations of
benefits necessary for subsistence will receive closer
constitutional scrutiny, under both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, than will deprivations of less essential forms
of governmental entitlements.
[
Footnote 3/19]
See HEW Report on Money Payments to Recipients of
Special Types of Public Assistance, Oct.1967, Table 4 (NCSS Report
D-4).
[
Footnote 3/20]
The State of Maryland has long spoken with at least two voices
on the issue of the maximum grant regulation. The Department of
Public Welfare has taken the position, over a number of years, that
the regulation should be abolished, and has made several proposals
to that effect. In so doing, the Department has taken the position
that its proposals would not set welfare benefits out of line with
household incomes throughout the State.
See, e.g., Minutes
of State Board of Public Welfare Meeting, September 26, 1958, App.
130-132.
[
Footnote 3/21]
Indeed, Rule 200, § IX A(2)(b)(5) of the Manual of the Md. Dept.
of Social Services prohibits the referral for employment of AFDC
mothers who are needed in the home. And the unsuitability of many
AFDC mothers has been well chronicled in Md. Dept. of Social
Services, Profile of Caseloads, Research Report No. 5, p. 6 (1969).
See also Carter, The Employment Potential of AFDC Mothers,
6 Welfare in Review, No. 4, pp. 1, 4 (1968).
[
Footnote 3/22]
Thus, the State cannot single out a minuscule proportion of the
total number of families in the State as in need of birth control
incentives. Not only is the classification effected by the
regulation totally underinclusive if this is its rationale, but it
also arbitrarily punishes children for factors beyond their
control, and overinclusively applies to families, like appellees',
that were already large before it became necessary to seek
assistance. For similar reasons, the argument that the regulation
serves as a disincentive to desertion does not stand scrutiny.
[
Footnote 3/23]
Likewise, the State, with the encouragement of Congress.
see 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (21), 610 (1964 ed., Supp. IV),
has developed extensive statutory provisions to deal specifically
with the problem of parental desertion.
See generally
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, §§ 88-96 (1967 Repl. Vol.). And Congress has
mandated, with respect to family planning, that the States provide
services to AFDC recipients with the objective of "preventing or
reducing the incidence of births out of wedlock and otherwise
strengthening family life." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15) (1964 ed., Supp.
IV).