The Social Security Amendments of 1967 added § 402(a)(23), which
reads:
"[The States shall] provide that, by July 1, 1969, the amounts
used by the State to determine needs of individuals will have been
adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such
amounts were established and any maximums that the State imposes on
the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately
adjusted."
In 1969, New York, by § 131-a of its Social Services Law,
altered its standard of need computation under the federally
supported Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program,
and adopted a system fixing maximum allowances per family based on
the number of persons in the family and the age of the oldest
child, and eliminated a "special grants" program. The state statute
resulted in decreased benefits to many New York City recipients.
This controversy involving the compatibility of the two statutes
arose out of a pendent claim included in petitioners' complaint
bringing a class action challenging § 131-a as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause by virtue of its provision for lesser
payments to AFDC recipients in Nassau County than those allowed for
New York City residents. A three-judge court was convened, but,
before a decision was rendered, § 131-a was amended to permit
Nassau County grants equal to those in New York City. The
three-judge court concluded that the equal protection issue was "no
longer justiciable," dissolved itself, and remanded the matter to
the single District Judge. The District Judge issued an injunction
prohibiting the reduction or discontinuance of "regular and
recurring grants and special grants" payable under the predecessor
welfare law. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
three-judge court had properly dissolved itself, but that the
District Judge should no have ruled on tho merits of petitioners'
statutory claim.
Held:
1. The District Judge had jurisdiction to decide this federal
statutory challenge to the New York welfare law. Pp.
397 U. S.
402-407.
(a)Jurisdiction over the primary claim at all stages of the
litigation is not a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent
Page 397 U. S. 398
claim, and the mootness of the equal protection claim does not
eliminate the jurisdiction of the District Judge over the pendent
statutory claim. Pp.
397 U. S.
402-405.
(b) The District Judge properly did not decline jurisdiction to
allow the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to
resolve the controversy, as neither the "exhaustion of
administrative remedies" nor the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine is
applicable here. Petitioners do not seek review of an
administrative ruling, nor could they have obtained such a ruling,
since HEW does not permit welfare recipients to trigger or
participate in its review of state welfare programs. Pp.
397 U. S.
405-407.
2. New York's program is incompatible with § 402(a)(23), and
petitioners are entitled to an injunction by the District Court
against payment of federal monies according to the State's new
schedules, should New York not develop a conforming plan within a
reasonable time. Pp.
397 U. S.
407-420.
(a) Congress, in § 402(a)(23), required the States to face up to
the magnitude of the public assistance requirement, prodded them
more equitably to apportion their payments, and spoke in favor of
increases in AFDC payments. Pp.
397 U. S.
412-414.
(b) The evidence supports the District Judge's finding that New
York has, in effect, impermissibly lowered its standard of need by
deleting items that were previously included. Pp.
397 U. S.
415-417.
(c) While § 402(a)(23) does not prevent New York from pursuing a
goal of administrative efficiency, it does foreclose the State from
achieving this purpose by reducing significantly the content of its
standard of need. Pp.
397 U. S.
417-419.
(d) Section 402(a)(23) invalidates any state program that
decreases the content of the standard of need unless the State can
demonstrate that the items formerly included (here, the system of
special grants, not the system of maximum grants based upon average
age of the oldest child) no longer constituted part of the reality
of existence for the majority of welfare recipients. Pp.
397 U. S.
419-420.
3. Congress has not foreclosed judicial review to welfare
recipients who are most directly affected by the administration of
the program, and it is the duty of the federal courts to resolve
disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the States for
welfare programs are properly expended. Pp.
397 U. S.
420-423.
414 F.2d 170, reversed and remanded.
Page 397 U. S. 399
MR JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The present controversy, which involves the compatibility of the
New York Social Services Law (c. 184, L.1969) with § 402(a)(23) of
the Social Security Act of 193, as amended, 81 Stat. 898, 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(23) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), arises out of a pendent claim
originally included in petitioners' complaint bringing a class
action challenging § 131-a of the same New York statute as
violative of equal protection by virtue of its provision for lesser
payments to Aid to Families With Dependent Children recipients in
Nassau County than those allowed for New York City residents.
Pursuant to the recommendation of Judge Weinstein, a
Page 397 U. S. 400
three-judge court was convened on April 24, 1969, and a hearing
was held. 304 F. Supp. 1350.
Before a decision was rendered, New York State amended § 131-a
to permit the State Commissioner of Social Services to make, in his
discretion, grants to recipients in Nassau County equal to those
provided for New York City residents. The three-judge panel, in a
memorandum opinion of May 12, 1969, concluded that the equal
protection issue was "no longer justiciable," and that
"[t]he constitutional attack on the provision [§ 131-a] as
originally adopted has been rendered moot, and any attack on the
newly adopted subdivision would not be ripe for adjudication . . .
until there [had] been opportunity for action by state officials. .
. . [
Footnote 1]"
That court further held that, since there existed "no reason for
continuing the three-judge court," the "matter" should be "remanded
to the single judge to whom the complaint was originally presented
for such further proceedings as are appropriate." 304 F. Supp.
1354,
1356.
On the same day as the three-judge court dissolved itself, Judge
Weinstein issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting respondents
from reducing or discontinuing payments of "regular recurring
grants and special grants," payable under the predecessor welfare
law,
304 F.
Supp. 1356, and the State's elimination of which from the
computation of welfare benefits is the subject matter of the
controversy now before this Court.
An interlocutory appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, and
the case was granted a calendar preference. After hearing oral
argument, the Court of Appeals, on June 11, entered an order
staying the preliminary injunction
Page 397 U. S. 401
pending its disposition of the appeal, and later converted its
stay into an order staying the permanent injunction subsequently
issued by the District Court when it granted summary judgment on
June 18, 1969,
304 F.
Supp. 1356, 1381. On July 16, 1969, the Court of Appeals panel
announced its judgment of reversal, accompanied by three opinions.
414 F.2d 170. Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge Hays agreed that the
three-judge panel had properly dissolved itself and were of the
view, for somewhat different reasons, that Judge Weinstein should
not have ruled on the merits of petitioners' statutory claim; they
also expressed their opinion that the single-judge District Court
(hereinafter District Court) erred on the merits. Judge Feinberg
disagreed on all scores, expressing the view that the District
Court properly reached and correctly decided the merits of the
statutory claim.
Petitioners' application to the author of this opinion, as
Circuit Justice, for a stay and an accelerated review was referred
by him to the entire Court, and, on October 13, 1969, certiorari
was granted. 396 U.S. 815. The request for a stay was denied, but
the case was set down for early argument.
We now reverse. For essentially those reasons stated in the
opinion of the District Court and Circuit Judge Feinberg's dissent,
we think the District Court correctly exercised its discretion by
proceeding to the merits. We are also unable to accept the
conclusion, reached by a majority of the Court of Appeals, that §
402(a)(23) does not affect States like New York that place no
limitation on the level of payments of welfare benefits as
determined by their standard of need. For reasons set forth in
397 U. S. we
conclude that the present New York program does not fulfill the
requirements of § 402(a)(23) of the federal statute.
Page 397 U. S. 402
I
A
We consider the threshold question of whether subject matter
jurisdiction was vested in the District Court to decide this
federal statutory challenge to the New York Social Services
Law.
That the three-judge court itself not only had jurisdiction but
would have been obliged to adjudicate this statutory claim in
preference to deciding the original constitutional claim in this
case follows from
King v. Smith, 392 U.
S. 309 (1968), where, on an appeal from a three-judge
court, we decided the statutory question in order to avoid a
constitutional ruling. 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 312
n. 3. In the case before us, the constitutional claim was declared
moot prior to decision by the three-judge court, and the question
arises whether that circumstance removed not only the
obligation, but destroyed the
power, of a federal
court to adjudicate the pendent claim. [
Footnote 2] We think not. Jurisdiction over federal
claims, constitutional or otherwise, is vested, exclusively or
concurrently, in the federal district courts. Such courts usually
sit as single-judge tribunals. While Congress has determined that
certain classes of cases shall be heard in the first instance by a
district court composed of three judges, that does not mean that
the court
qua court loses all
Page 397 U. S. 403
jurisdiction over the complaint that is initially lodged with
it. To the contrary, once petitioners filed their complaint
alleging the unconstitutionality of § 131-a, the District Court,
sitting as a one-man tribunal, was properly seised of jurisdiction
over the case under § 1343(3) and (4) of Title 28, and could
dispose of even the constitutional question either by dismissing
the complaint for want of a substantial federal question,
Ex
parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30
(1933), [
Footnote 3] or by
granting requested injunctive relief if "prior decisions [made]
frivolous any claim that [the] state statute on its face [was] not
unconstitutional."
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S.
31,
369 U. S. 33
(1962). Even had the constitutional claim not been declared moot,
the most appropriate course may well have been to remand to the
single district judge for findings and the determination of the
statutory claim, rather than encumber the district court, at a time
when district court calendars are overburdened, by consuming the
time of three federal judges in a matter that was not required to
be determined by a three-judge court.
See Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U. S. 111
(1965).
On remand, the District Court correctly considered mootness a
factor affecting its discretion, not its power, and balanced the
policy considerations that have spawned the doctrine of pendency
and the countervailing policy of federalism: the extent of the
investment of judicial energy and the character of the claim. Not
only had there been hearings and argument prior to dismissal of
Page 397 U. S. 404
the constitutional claim, but the statutory question is so
essentially one "of federal policy that the argument for exercise
of pendent jurisdiction is particularly strong." [
Footnote 4]
United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715,
383 U. S. 727
(1966).
Respondents analogize dismissal for mootness to dismissal for
want of a substantial claim, and rely on language in
United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs to the effect that a federal court
should not pass on a state claim when the federal claim falters at
the threshold and is "dismissed before trial." [
Footnote 5] 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 726.
The argument would appear to be that, once a federal court loses
power over the jurisdiction-conferring claim, it may not consider a
pendent claim. They contend that mootness, like insubstantiality,
is a threshold jurisdictional defect.
Whether or not the view that an insubstantial federal question
does not confer jurisdiction -- a maxim more ancient than
analytically sound -- should now be held to mean that a district
court should be considered without discretion, as opposed to power,
to hear a pendent claim, we think the respondents' analogy fails.
Unlike insubstantiality, which is apparent at the outset, mootness,
frequently a matter beyond the control of the parties, may not
occur until after substantial time and energy have been expended
looking toward the resolution of a dispute that plaintiffs were
entitled to bring in a federal court.
Page 397 U. S. 405
We are not willing to defeat the common sense policy of pendent
jurisdiction -- the conservation of judicial energy and the
avoidance of multiplicity of litigation -- by a conceptual approach
that would require jurisdiction over the primary claim at all
stages as a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent claim.
[
Footnote 6] The Court has
shunned this view.
See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch.,
270 U. S. 593
(1926);
Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238
(1933) (dictum). [
Footnote
7]
B
A further reason given to support the contention that the
District Court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction is
that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was the
appropriate forum, at least in the first instance, for resolution
on the merits of the questions before us, and that, at the time
this action came to Court, HEW was "engaged in a study of the
relationship between Section 602(a)(23) and Section
Page 397 U. S. 406
131-a." 414 F.2d at 176 (opinion of Judge Hays). [
Footnote 8] Petitioners answer, we think
correctly, that neither the principle of "exhaustion of
administrative remedies" nor the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction"
has any application to the situation before us. Petitioners do not
seek review of an administrative order, nor could they have
obtained an administrative ruling, since HEW has no procedures
whereby welfare recipients may trigger and participate in the
Department's review of state welfare programs.
Cf. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136
(1967); K. Davis, Administrative Law § 19.01 (1965); L. Jaffe,
Judicial Control of Administrative Action 425 (1965).
That these formal doctrines of administrative law do not
preclude federal jurisdiction does not mean, however, that a
federal court must deprive itself of the benefit of the expertise
of the federal agency that is primarily concerned with these
problems. Whenever
Page 397 U. S. 407
possible, the district courts should obtain the views of HEW in
those cases where it has not set forth its views, either in a
regulation or published opinion or in cases where there is real
doubt as to how the Department's standards apply to the particular
state regulation or program [
Footnote 9]
The District Court, in this instance, made considerable effort
to learn the views of HEW. The possibility of HEW's participation,
either as a party or an
amicus, was explored in the
District Court, and the Department, at that stage, determined to
remain aloof. We cannot, in these circumstances, fault the District
Court for proceeding to try the case.
II
We turn to the merits, which may be broadly characterized as
involving the interpretation of § 402(a)(23) of the Social Security
Amendments of 1967 and its application to certain changes
inaugurated by New York in its method of computing welfare benefits
that have resulted in reduced payments to these petitioners and, on
a broader scale, decreased by some $40 million the State's public
assistance undertaking.
A
We begin with a brief review of the general structure of the
Federal Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, one
of the four "categorical assistance"
Page 397 U. S. 408
programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935.
[
Footnote 10]
The general topography of the AFDC program was mapped in part by
this Court in
King v. Smith, 392 U.
S. 309 (1968), and several lower court opinions, in
addition to the opinion below, have surveyed the pertinent
statutory and regulatory provisions. [
Footnote 11] While participating States must comply with
the terms of the federal legislation,
see King v. Smith,
supra, the program is basically voluntary, and States have
traditionally been at liberty to pay as little or as much as they
choose, and there are, in fact, striking differences in the degree
of aid provided among the States.
There are two basic factors that enter into the determination of
what AFDC benefits will be paid. First, it is necessary to
establish a "standard of need," a yardstick for measuring who is
eligible for public assistance. Second, it must be decided how much
assistance will be given, that is, what "level of benefits" will be
paid. On both scores, Congress has always left to the States a
great deal of discretion.
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 318.
Thus, some States include in their "standard of need" items that
others do not take into account. Diversity also exists with respect
to the level of benefits in fact, paid. [
Footnote 12] Some States impose so-called dollar
maximums
Page 397 U. S. 409
on the amount of public assistance payable to any one individual
or family. Such maximums establish the upper limit irrespective of
how far short the limitation may fall of the theoretical standard
of need. Other States curtail the payments of benefits by a system
of "ratable reductions" whereby all recipients will receive a fixed
percentage of the standard of need. [
Footnote 13] It is, of course, possible to pay 100% of
need as defined. New York, in fact, purports to do so.
B
In 1967, the Administration introduced omnibus legislation to
amend the social security laws. The relevant AFDC proposals
provided for more adequate assistance to welfare recipients, and
set up several programs for education and training accompanied by
child care provisions designed to permit AFDC parents to take
advantage of the training programs. In the former respect, the AFDC
proposals paralleled other provisions that put forward amendments
to adjust benefits to recipients of other
Page 397 U. S. 410
categorical aid to reflect the rise in the cost of living.
[
Footnote 14] Thus, in its
embryo stage, the amendment to § 402 was 202(b) of the
Administration bill, H.R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which
would have added to 402(a) of the Social Security Act the following
clause:
"(14) provide (A), effective .July 1, 1969, for meeting (in
conjunction with other income that is not disregarded . . . under
the plan and other resources)
all the need, as determined
in accordance with standards applicable under the plan for
determining need, of individuals eligible to receive aid to
families with dependent children (and such standards shall
be
no lower than the standards for determining need in effect on
January 1, 1967), and (b), effective July 1, 1968, for an annual
review of such standards and (to the extent prescribed by the
Secretary) for updating such standards to take into account changes
in living costs."
(Emphasis added.) Section 202(b), however, was stillborn, and no
such provision was contained in the ultimate bill reported out by
the House Ways and Means Committee.
See H.R. 12080, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess.
The Administration's renewed efforts, on behalf of a mandatory
increase in benefit payments under the categorical assistance
programs, [
Footnote 15] met
with only limited success,
Page 397 U. S. 411
resulting in § 213(a) of the Senate version, which provided for
a mandatory $7.50 per month increase in the standards and benefits
for the adult categories, and § 213(b) which is, in substance, the
present § 402(a)(23). The Committee's comment on § 213(b), to the
effect that States would be required "to price their standards . .
. to reflect changes in living costs," tracks the statutory
language. [
Footnote 16]
Page 397 U. S. 412
The Conference Committee eliminated the Senate provision in §
213, which would have required an annual adjustment for cost of
living, and § 402(a)(23) was enacted. It now provides:
"[The States shall] provide that, by July 1, 1969, the amounts
used by the State to determine the needs of individuals, will have
been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such
amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes
on the amount of aid paid to families will have been
proportionately adjusted."
C
The background of § 402(a)(23) reveals little except that we
have before us a child born of the silent union of legislative
compromise. Thus, Congress, as it frequently does, has voiced its
wishes in muted strains, and left it to the courts to discern the
theme in the cacophony of political understanding. Our chief
resources in this undertaking are the words of the statute and
those common sense assumptions that must be made in determining
direction without a compass.
Reverting to the language of § 402(a)(23), we find two separate
mandates: first, the States must reevaluate the component factors
that compose their need equation, and, second, any "maximums" must
be adjusted.
We think two broad purposes may be ascribed to § 402(a)(23):
first, to require States to face up realistically to
Page 397 U. S. 413
the magnitude of the public assistance requirement and lay bare
the extent to which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual
need; second, to prod the States to apportion their payments on a
more equitable basis. Consistent with this interpretation of §
402(a)(23), a State may, after recomputing its standard of need,
pare down payments to accommodate budgetary realities by reducing
the percent of benefits paid or switching to a percent reduction
system, but it may not obscure the
actual standard of
need.
The congressional purpose we discern does not render §
402(a)(23) a meaningless exercise in "bookkeeping." Congress
sometimes legislates by innuendo, making declarations of policy and
indicating a preference while requiring measures that, though
falling short of legislating its goals, serve as a nudge in the
preferred directions. In § 402(a)(23), Congress has spoken in favor
of increases in AFDC payments. While Congress rejected the
mandatory adjustment provision in the administration bill, it
embodied in legislation the cost of living exercise, which has both
practical and political consequences.
It has the effect of requiring the States to recognize and
accept the responsibility for those additional individuals whose
income falls short of the standard of need as computed in light of
economic realities, and to place them among those eligible for the
care and training provisions. Secondly, while it leaves the States
free to effect downward adjustments in the level of benefits paid,
it accomplishes within that framework the goal, however modest, of
forcing a State to accept the political consequence of such a
cutback and bringing to light the true extent to which actual
assistance falls short of the minimum acceptable. Lastly, by
imposing on those States that desire to maintain "maximums" the
requirement of an appropriate adjustment, Congress has introduced
an incentive to abandon a flat "maximum" system,
Page 397 U. S. 414
thereby encouraging those States desirous of containing their
welfare budget to shift to a percentage system that will more
equitably apportion those funds in fact allocated for welfare, and
also more accurately reflect the real measure of public assistance
being given.
While we do not agree with the broad interpretation given §
402(a)(23) by the District Court, [
Footnote 17] we cannot accept the conclusion -- reached
by the two-judge majority in the Court of Appeals -- that §
402(a)(23) does not affect New York. [
Footnote 18] It follows from what we fathom to
Page 397 U. S. 415
be the congressional purpose that a State may not redefine its
standard of need in such a way that it skirts the requirement of
reevaluating its existing standard. This would render the cost of
living reappraisal a futile, hollow, and, indeed, a deceptive
gesture, and would avoid the consequences of increasing the numbers
of those eligible and facing up to the failure to allocate
sufficient funds to provide for them.
These conclusions, if not compelled by the words of the statute
or manifested by legislative history, represent the natural blend
of the basic axiom -- that courts should construe all legislative
enactments to give them some meaning -- with the compromise origins
of § 402(a)(23), set forth above. This background, we think,
precludes the more adventuresome reading that petitioners and the
District Court would give the statute.
See n 17,
supra. This reading is also
buttressed by the fact that this construction has been placed on
the statute by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
[
Footnote 19] While, in view
of Congress' failure to track the Administration proposals and its
substitution without comment of the present compromise section,
HEW's construction commands less than the usual deference that may
be accorded an administrative interpretation based on its
expertise, it is entitled to weight as the attempt of an
experienced agency to harmonize an obscure enactment with the basic
structure of a program it administers.
Cf. Zuber v. Allen,
396 U. S. 168,
396 U. S. 192
(1969);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1 (1965).
D
While the application of the statute to the New York program is
by no means simple, we think the evidence adduced supports the
ultimate finding of the District
Page 397 U. S. 416
Court, unquestioned by the Court of Appeals, that New York has,
in effect, impermissibly lowered its standard of need by
eliminating items that were included prior to the enactment of §
402(a)(23).
Prior to March 31, 1969, New York computed its standard of need
on an individualized basis. Schedules existed showing the cost of
particular items of recurring need, for example, food and clothing
required by children at given ages. Payments of "recurring" grants
were made to families based on the number of children per household
and the age of the oldest child. Additional payments, designated as
"special needs grants," were also made. Under an experiment in New
York City instituted August 27, 1968, many allowances for special
needs were eliminated, and a flat grant of $100 per person was
substituted.
Chapter 184 of the Session Laws, the present § 131-a, radically
altered the New York approach. In lieu of individualized grants for
"recurring," needs to be supplemented by special grants or the flat
$100 grant, New York adopted a system fixing maximum allowances per
family based on the number of individuals per household. The
maximum dollar amounts were established by ascertaining "[t]he mean
age of the oldest child in each size family."
See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment 9-10
While these family maximums are exclusive of rent and fuel
costs, the District Court found that
"[s]pecial grants were seemingly not included in these
computations. No attempt was made to average them out across the
state, and then to add that figure to that of the basic recurring
grant."
304 F. Supp. at 1368.
The impact of the new system has been to reduce substantially
benefits paid to families of these petitioners and of those
similarly situated, and to decrease benefits to New York City
recipients by almost $40,000,000. 304
Page 397 U. S. 417
F.Supp. at 136-1370. The effect of the new program on upstate
cases is less severe, with gains to some families apparently
cancelling out losses to others, but the net effect is a drastic
reduction in overall payments, since New York City recipients
compose approximately 72% of the State's welfare clientele. 304 F.
Supp. at 1369.
E
Notwithstanding this $40,000,000 decrease in welfare payments
after adjustment for increases in the cost of living, the State
argues that the present § 131-a represents neither an attempt to
circumvent federal requirements nor a reduction in the content of
its former standard. The conversion to a flat grant maximum system
is justified as an advance in administrative efficiency. [
Footnote 20]
While § 402(a)(23) does not prevent the States from pursuing
what is, beyond dispute, the laudable goal of administrative
efficiency, [
Footnote 21] we
think Congress has foreclosed them from achieving this purpose at
the expense of significantly reducing the content of their standard
of need. The findings and conclusions of the District
Page 397 U. S. 418
Court, undisturbed by the Court of Appeals and supported by the
record, clearly demonstrate that a significant reduction has here
occurred. It is conceded by respondents that the present program
does not include allowances for the items formerly covered by the
so-called "special" grants.
We have no occasion to decide on the record before us whether we
agree with that part of HEW's interpretation of § 402(a)(23) that
might approve elimination of grants for particular needs, without
some averaging or other provision therefor such as direct payments
to the provider of services. It suffices in this case that
particular items, such as laundry and telephones, had formerly been
deemed essential by New York, and were considered regular recurring
expenses to a significant number of New York City welfare
residents. We need look no farther than the state social service
department's own regulations, and the action taken by the state
administrators in providing the $25 per quarter cyclical grant to
city residents in the 1968 pilot project.
Thus, the state social service department's own regulations
provided:
"An individual or family shall be deemed 'in need' when a budget
deficit exists or when the budget surplus is inadequate to meet one
or more nonbudgeted
special needs required by the case
circumstances and included in the
standards of
assistance."
18 NYCRR § 353.1(c). [
Footnote 22] (Emphasis added.)
This persuasive, if not conclusive, evidence of what constituted
the standard of need is further supported by
Page 397 U. S. 419
testimony of the administrators of New York's welfare program to
the effect that these grants covered costs for essentials of life
for numerous welfare residents in New York City.
F
We reach our conclusions without relying on the finding made by
the court below that, in § 131-a, New York was attempting to
constrict its welfare payments. Speculation as to legislative and
executive motive is to be shunned. Section 402(a)(23) invalidates
any state program that substantially alters the content of the
standard of need in such a way that it is less than it was prior to
the enactment of § 402(a)(23), unless a State can demonstrate that
the items formerly included no longer constituted part of the
reality of existence for the majority of welfare recipients. We do
not, of course, hold that New York may not, consistently with the
federal statutes, consolidate items on the basis of statistical
averages. Obviously, such averaging may affect some families
adversely and benefit others. Moreover, it is conceivable that the
net payout, assuming no change in the level of benefits, may be
somewhat less under a streamlined program. Providing all factors in
the old equation are accounted for and fairly priced, and providing
the consolidation on a statistical basis reflects a fair averaging,
a State may, of course, consistently with 402(a)(23), redefine its
method for determining need. A State may, moreover, as we have
noted, accommodate any increases in its standard by reason of "cost
of living" factors to its budget by reducing its level of benefits.
What is at the heart of this dispute is the elimination of special
grants in the New York program, not the system of maximum grants
based on average age. Lest there be uncertainty, we also reiterate
that New York is
Page 397 U. S. 420
not foreclosed from accounting for basic and recurring items of
need formerly subsumed in the special grant category by an
averaging system like that adopted in the 1968 New York City
experiment with cyclical grants.
III
New York is, of course, in no way prohibited from using only
state funds according to whatever plan it chooses,
providing it violates no provision of the Constitution. It follows,
however, from our conclusion that New York's program is
incompatible with 402(a)(23), that petitioners are entitled to
declaratory relief and an appropriate injunction by the District
Court against the payment of
federal monies according to
the new schedules, should the State not develop a conforming plan
within a reasonable period of time.
We have considered and rejected the argument that a federal
court is without power to review state welfare provisions or
prohibit the use of federal funds by the States in view of the fact
that Congress has lodged in the Department of HEW the power to cut
off federal funds for noncompliance with statutory requirements. We
are most reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue of
effective judicial review to those individuals most directly
affected by the administration of its program.
Cf. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136
(1967);
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp, ante, p.
397 U. S. 150;
Barlow v. Collins, ante, p.
397 U. S. 159. We
adhere to
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309
(1968), which implicitly rejected the argument that the statutory
provisions for HEW review of plans should be read to curtail
judicial relief, and held Alabama's "substitute father" regulation
to be inconsistent with the federal statute. While
King
did not advert specifically to the remedial problem, the
unarticulated premise was that the State had alternative choices
of
Page 397 U. S. 421
assuming the additional cost of paying benefits to families with
substitute fathers or not using federal funds to pay welfare
benefits according to a plan that was inconsistent with federal
requirements.
The prayer in the District Court in
Smith v. King, as
in the case before us, was for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the enforcement of the invalid provision.
277 F. Supp.
31 (D.C.M.D.Ala.1967). We see no justification in principle for
drawing a distinction between invalidating a single nonconforming
provision or an entire program. In both circumstances, federal
funds are being allocated and paid in a manner contrary to that
intended by Congress. In
King, the withholding of benefits
based on the invalid state regulation resulted in overpayments to
some recipients, assuming a constant state welfare budget and a
corresponding misallocation of matching federal resources. In the
case before us, noncompliance with § 402(a)(23) may result in
limiting the welfare rolls unduly, and thus channeling the matching
federal grants in a way not intended by Congress. We may also
assume that Congress would not countenance the circumnavigation of
the political consequences of § 402(a)(23),
see
397 U. S.
supra, by permitting States to use federal funds while
obscuring the actual extent to which their programs fall short of
the ideal.
Unlike
King v. Smith, however, any incremental cost to
the State, assuming a desire to comply with § 402(a)(23), is
massive; nor is there a discrete and severable provision whose
enforcement can be prohibited. Accordingly, we remand the case to
the District Court to fix a date that will afford New York an
opportunity to revise its program in accordance with the
requirements of § 402(a)(23) if the State wishes to do so. The
District Court shall retain jurisdiction to review, taking into
account the views of HEW should it care to offer its
recommendations,
Page 397 U. S. 422
any revised program adopted by the State, or, should New York
choose not to submit a revamped program by the determined date,
issue its order restraining the further use of federal monies
pursuant to the present statute.
In conclusion, we add simply this. While we view with concern
the escalating involvement of federal courts in this highly
complicated area of welfare benefits, [
Footnote 23] one that should be formally placed under
the supervision of HEW, at least in the first instance, we find not
the slightest indication that Congress meant to deprive federal
courts of their traditional jurisdiction to hear and decide federal
questions in this field. It is, of course, no part of the business
of this Court to evaluate, apart from federal constitutional or
statutory challenge, the merits or wisdom of any welfare programs,
whether state or federal, in the large or in the particular. It is,
on the other hand, peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no
less in the welfare field than in other areas of the law, to
resolve disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to
Page 397 U. S. 423
the States are being expended in consonance with the conditions
that Congress has attached to their use. As Mr. Justice Cardozo
stated, speaking for the Court in
Helvering v. Davis,
301 U. S. 619,
301 U. S. 645
(1937):
"When [federal] money is spent to promote the general welfare,
the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not
the states."
Cf. Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Dept.,
385 U. S. 458
(1967).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
A separate action was subsequently brought, again challenging
the disparity in payments between New York and Nassau County
welfare recipients.
See Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F.
Supp. 339 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1969),
prob.juris. noted,
post, p. 903.
[
Footnote 2]
Judge Hays expressed the view:
"Since the single judge at no time had jurisdiction over the
constitutional claim, there was never a claim before him to which
the statutory claim could have been pendent. If the three-judge
court had attempted to give the single judge power to adjudicate
the statutory claim, it could not have done so, since, with the
dissolution of the three-judge court, the statutory claim was no
longer pendent to any claim at all, much less to any claim over
which the single judge could exercise adjudicatory power."
414 F.2d at 175.
[
Footnote 3]
Even if
Poresky is read simply as a restatement of the
truism that a Court always has jurisdiction to determine its own
jurisdiction, in view of the now-settled rule that the
insubstantiality of a federal question is the occasion for a
jurisdictional dismissal, as opposed to a dismissal on the merits
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it
still lends support to the proposition that jurisdiction is vested
at the outset in the
district court, and not the
three-judge panel.
[
Footnote 4]
We intimate no view as to whether the situation might have been
different had the constitutional claim become moot before the
District Court had invested substantial time in its resolution.
[
Footnote 5]
See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 725,
where the Court said:
"[I]f, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in
federal courts to hear the whole."
[
Footnote 6]
A persuasive analogy is to be found in the well settled rule
that a federal court does not lose jurisdiction over a diversity
action which was well founded at the outset, even though one of the
parties may later change domicile or the amount recovered falls
short of $10,000.
See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U. S.
91,
354 U. S. 93 n.
1 (1957);
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U. S. 283,
303 U. S.
289-290 (1938);
Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.
S. 632 (1907);
see generally C. Wright, Federal
Courts § 33, pp. 93-94 (1963).
[
Footnote 7]
Since we conclude that the District Court properly exercised its
pendent jurisdiction, we have no occasion to consider whether, as
urged by petitioners, this statutory claim satisfies the $10,000
amount in controversy requirement of the general federal
jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or whether it could be
maintained under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which contains no amount in
controversy limitation, as an action
"[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law . .
. of any right, privilege or immunity secured by . . . any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens. . . ."
See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 312
n. 3;
see generally Note, Federal Judicial Review of State
Welfare Practices, 67 Col.L.Rev. 84 (1967).
[
Footnote 8]
In order to evaluate this argument, it is necessary to
understand the mechanism by which HEW reviews state plans under the
AFDC program. States desiring to obtain federal funds available for
AFDC programs are required to submit a plan to the Secretary of HEW
for his approval. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Once
initially approved, federal funds are provided to the State until a
change in its plan is formally disapproved. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)
(1964 ed., Supp. IV). The Secretary must afford the State notice of
an alleged noncompliance with federal requirements and an
opportunity for a hearing.
Ibid. If, after notice and
hearing, the Secretary finds that the State does not comply with
the federal requirements, he is directed to make a total or partial
cut-off of federal funds to the State.
Ibid. 42 U.S.C. §
1316 (1964 ed., Supp. IV) describes the administrative procedures
that the Secretary must afford a State before cutting off funds,
and also provides for review in the courts of appeals of the
Secretary's action at the behest of the State. Whether HEW could
provide a mechanism by which welfare recipients could theoretically
get relief is immaterial. It has not done so, which means there is
no basis for the refusal of federal courts to adjudicate the merits
of these claims.
[
Footnote 9]
As we observed in
Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co.,
Inc. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.
S. 411,
360 U. S. 420
(1959), that an issue is
"one appropriate ultimately for judicial, rather than
administrative, resolution . . . does not mean that the courts must
therefore deny themselves the enlightenment which may be had from a
consideration of the relevant . . . facts which the administrative
agency charged with regulation of the transaction . . . is
peculiarly well equipped to marshal and initially to evaluate."
See also Far East Conference v. United States,
342 U. S. 570,
342 U. S.
574-575 (1952).
[
Footnote 10]
The four categorical assistance programs are the Old Age
Assistance (OAA), 42 U.S.C. § 301
et seq.; Aid to Families
With Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. § 601
et seq.;
Aid to the Blind (AB), 42 U.S.C. § 1201
et seq.; Aid For
the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), 42 U.S.C. § 1351
et seq.
[
Footnote 11]
See Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F.
Supp. 336,
304 F.
Supp. 1384 (D.C.E.D. La.1969);
Jefferson v.
Hackney, 304 F.
Supp. 1332 (D.C.N.D. Tex.1969);
Williams v.
Dandridge, 297 F.
Supp. 450 (1968 and 1969),
prob. juris. noted, 396
U.S. 811 (1969), decided this date,
post, p.
397 U. S. 471.
[
Footnote 12]
According to information supplied by HEW in 1967, reported in
the Explanation of Provisions of H.R. 5710, p. 36, $3,100 annually
for a family of four marked the "poverty" level. According to the
report, "Although a few States define need at or above the poverty
level, no State pays as much as that amount." It further appears
that, at that time, 33 States provided less than their avowed
standard of need, which frequently fell short of the poverty mark.
While New York purports to have paid its full standard, it would
thus appear not to have paid enough to take a family out of
poverty.
See Hearings before the House Committee on Ways
and Means on H.R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 11
(1967).
[
Footnote 13]
A maximum may either be fixed in relation to the number of
persons on welfare,
e.g., X dollars per child, no matter
what age, or in terms of a family, dollars per family unit,
irrespective of the number of persons in the unit, this latter
procedure has been challenged on equal protection grounds,
see
Williams v. Dandridge, supra. A "ratable reduction" represents
a fixed percentage of the standard of need that will be paid to all
recipients. In the event that there is some income that is first
deducted, the ratable reduction is applied to the amount by which
the individual or family income falls short of need.
[
Footnote 14]
See §§ 202(a), (c), (d), and (e).
[
Footnote 15]
Secretary Gardner testified:
"The House bill does nothing to improve the level of State
public assistance payments. As things stand today, the States are
required to set assistance standards for needy persons in order to
determine eligibility -- but they need not make their assistance
payments on the basis of these standards. The result is that
welfare payments are much too low in a good many States. That is a
widely accepted fact among all who are concerned with these
programs; indeed, it is probably the most widely agreed-upon fact
among welfare experts today."
"We strongly urge you to adopt the administration's proposal
requiring States to meet need in full as they determine it in their
own State assistance standards, and to update these standards
periodically to keep pace with changes in the cost of living."
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 12080,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 216 (1967).
See also
testimony of Undersecretary Cohen.
Id. at 255-259.
[
Footnote 16]
The comment to § 213 in the Senate Report reads:
"Social security benefits have been increased 15 percent across
the board by the committee, with a minimum of $70, for an average
increase of 20 percent. However, there is no similar
across-the-board increase in the amount of benefits payable to aged
welfare recipients. . . . In view of this situation and the need to
recognize that the increase in the cost of living since the last
change made in the Federal matching formula in 1965 also is
detrimental to the wellbeing of these recipients, the committee is
recommending a further change in the law. It is proposed that the
law be amended to provide that recipients of old-age assistance,
aid to the blind, and aid to the permanently and totally disabled
shall receive an average increase in assistance plus social
security or assistance alone (for the recipients who do not receive
social security benefits) of $7.50 a month. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"To accomplish these changes, the States would have to adjust
their standards and any maximums imposed on payments by July 1,
1968, so as to produce an average increase of $7.50 from assistance
alone or assistance and social security benefits (or other income).
Any State which wishes to do so can claim credit for any increase
it may have made since December 31, 1966. Thus, no State needs to
make an increase to the extent that it has recently done so."
"States would be required to price their standards used for
determining the amount of assistance under the AFDC program by July
1, 1969, and to reprice them at least annually thereafter,
adjusting the standards and any maximums imposed on payments to
reflect changes in living costs."
S.Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 169-170 (1967);
see
also id. at 293.
[
Footnote 17]
The District Court, while disclaiming any construction of §
402(a)(23) that would preclude converting to a flat grant system by
averaging, concluded: "[S]ection 402(a)(23) precludes a state from
making changes resulting in either reduced standards of need or
levels of payments." 304 F. Supp. at 1377. (Emphasis
added.) An extensive alteration in the basic underlying structure
of an established program is not to be inferred from ambiguous
language that is not clarified by legislative history. Such
legislative history as there is suggests the opposite. The Senate's
failure to adopt the Administration's proposals, and its failure to
provide for AFDC recipients an increase like that provided for the
adult program, notwithstanding a proposed amendment to that effect
by Senator McGovern, gives rise to an inference, not negatived by
the noncommittal and unilluminating comments of the committee,
see n 16,
supra, that Congress had no such purpose. These
considerations, we think, foreclose the broad construction adopted
by the District Court.
[
Footnote 18]
While it might be technically said that there was no majority
holding on the merits in the Court of Appeals, this overlooks Judge
Hays' preface to his discussion of the merits:
"Although we are persuaded that the district judge had no power
to adjudicate this action, we turn to a brief discussion of the
merits, since our decision does not rest solely on jurisdictional
grounds."
414 F.2d at 178. Chief Judge Lumbard disavowed reaching the
merits, but expressly disagreed with Judge Feinberg. 414 F.2d at
181. In these circumstances, it would be hypertechnical to conclude
that the merits had not been faced and decided below, so as to make
a remand desirable prior to review and decision by this Court.
Cf. Barlow v. Collins, ante, p.
397 U. S. 159.
[
Footnote 19]
The regulations and explanations are set forth in the
Government's
Amicus Memorandum.
[
Footnote 20]
New York points to the preamble to § 131-a, which sets forth as
its purpose the streamlining of administration of the welfare grant
system and relies on that part of the HEW program that invites the
States to adopt administrative programs that curtail unnecessarily
burdensome calculations and paperwork.
[
Footnote 21]
HEW's position, set forth in the Government's
Amicus
Memorandum 12, seems to be that, under its regulations, a
"reduction of content" does not necessarily result from "reductions
in the recognition of special needs." The Department has, however,
recognized, both administratively and in the Government's
Memorandum, that certain "special" needs should properly be
regarded as part of the basic standard. Thus, while the memorandum
suggests that payments for special diets or special attendants are
extraordinary, and not susceptible of averaging, it leaves open the
question whether New York's special grants have not been for
recurring items which are basic.
[
Footnote 22]
See also former 18 NYCRR § 351.2, Aspects of
Eligibility.
"Social investigation shall cover the following aspects of
initial and continuing eligibility. (b)
Need.
Consideration shall be given to individual and family requirements
for the items of basic maintenance and for items of
special
need. . . ."
(Second emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 23]
The judiciary is being called upon with increasing frequency to
review not only the viability of state welfare procedures,
e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p.
397 U. S. 254, and
Wheeler v. Montgomery, ante, p.
397 U. S. 280;
Wyman v. James, 303 F.
Supp. 935 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1969),
prob. juris. noted,
post, p. 904 (inspections of the house), but also the
substance and structure of state programs and the validity of
innumerable individual provisions.
See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618
(1969) (residence requirements);
King v. Smith, supra,
(substitute father);
Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F.
Supp. 409,
aff'd, 396 U. S. 5 (1969);
Lewis v. Stark, 312 F.
Supp. 197 (D.C.N.D. Cal.1968),
prob. juris. noted, 396
U.S. 900 (1969) ("man in the house rule"). At least two other
actions have been instituted to review various aspects of state
programs in light of the statutory provisions involved in this
case.
See Lampton v. Bonin, 29 F. Supp. 336,
304 F.
Supp. 1384 (D.C.E.D. La.1969);
Jefferson v.
Hackney, 304 F.
Supp. 1332 (D.C.N.D. Tex.1969);
cf. Rothstein v.
Wyman, 303 F.
Supp. 339 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1969);
Dandridge v. Williams,
decided today,
post, p.
397 U. S. 471.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
While I join this opinion of the Court, I add a few words.
I
Our leading case on pendent jurisdiction is
United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715,
383 U. S.
721-729. In line with
Gibbs, the courts below
distinguished between the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction
and the discretionary use of that power.
Gibbs abandoned
the "single cause of action" test, which had been the controlling
standard under
Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.
S. 238, and instead held that pendent jurisdiction
exists when "[t]he state and federal claims . . . derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact" and,
"if, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."
383 U.S. at
383 U. S.
725.
The claims presented in this case attacked the New York statute
on two grounds. The constitutional ground attacked the differential
in the level of welfare payments between New York City and Nassau
County.
Page 397 U. S. 424
The statutory claim attacked the State's reduction in the
overall level of payments on the ground that it violated §
402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 81 Stat. 898, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1064 ed., Supp. IV), which requires States to
make cost of living adjustments in the amounts used to determine
need. No argument is made by any of the parties in this case that
the three-judge court did not have pendent jurisdiction over the
statutory claim. The sole basis for respondents' contention that
pendent jurisdiction is not present in this case flows from the
action of the three-judge court in remanding the case to the single
district judge "for such further proceedings as are
appropriate."
Yet, if the three-judge court had pendent jurisdiction over the
statutory claim, it had the power to decide that claim despite the
dismissal of the constitutional claim. This Court held in
United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.
S. 285,
371 U. S.
287-288:
"Once [a three-judge court is] convened, the case can be
disposed of below or here on any ground, whether or not it would
have justified the calling of a three-judge court."
See also Florida Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73,
362 U. S. 80-81.
There is no rule, however, holding that a three-judge court is
required to decide all the claims presented in a suit properly
before it, although the practice of a three-judge court remanding a
case to the initial district judge for further proceedings seems to
have been little used.
See Landry v. Daley, 288 F.
Supp. 194.
What united Judges Hays and Lumbard was the view that, as a
matter of discretion, the District Court should have refused to
exercise its pendent jurisdiction. The factors outlined in
Gibbs to guide the discretionary exercise of pendent
jurisdiction are those of "judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants." 383 U.S. at
383 U. S.
726.
Page 397 U. S. 425
The main distinction between this case and
Gibbs is
that the pendent claim here was one of federal, rather than state,
law. And it is clear from the opinion in
Gibbs that the
factor of federal-state comity is highly relevant in deciding
whether or not the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is proper.
Thus, the Court stated:
"There may, on the other hand, be situations in which the state
claim is so closely tied to questions of federal policy that the
argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly
strong."
Id. at
383 U. S. 727.
Since the claim involved here is one of federal law, the reasons
for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction are especially weighty,
and exceptional circumstances should be required to prevent the
exercise.
Moreover, incident to the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, prior to the impaneling of the three-judge court, District
Judge Weinstein had received and considered substantial testimony,
affidavits, and briefs, so that he required no further hearings or
testimony prior to issuing his preliminary injunction opinion three
days after the case was remanded to him. In light of this fact,
considerations of economy, convenience, and fairness all point to
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
See Moore v. New York
Cotton Exch., 270 U. S. 593,
270 U. S.
608-610.
II
The fact that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
is studying the relationship between the contested provision of the
New York statute and the relevant section of the Social Security
Act is irrelevant to the judicial problem. Once a State's AFDC plan
is initially approved by the Secretary of HEW, federal funds are
provided the State until the Secretary finds, after notice and
opportunity for hearing to the State, that changes in the plan or
the administration of the plan are
Page 397 U. S. 426
in conflict with the federal requirements. Social Security Act §
404(a), 49 Stat. 628, as amended, 81 Stat. 918, 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)
(1964 ed., Supp. IV).
The statutory provisions for review by HEW of state AFDC plans
[
Footnote 2/1] do not permit
private individuals, namely, present or potential welfare
recipients, to initiate or participate in these compliance
hearings. Thus, there is no sense in which these individuals can be
held to have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by the
fact that there has been no HEW determination on the compliance of
a state statute with the federal requirements. In the present case,
that problem was discussed in terms of the District Court's
discretion to refuse to exercise pendent jurisdiction. The argument
for such a refusal has little to commend it. HEW has been extremely
reluctant to apply the drastic sanction of cutting off federal
funds to States that are not complying with federal law. Instead,
HEW usually settles its differences with the offending States
through informal negotiations.
See Note, Federal Judicial
Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 Col.L.Rev. 84, 91-92 (1967).
[
Footnote 2/2]
Whether HEW could provide a mechanism by which welfare
recipients could theoretically get relief is immaterial. It has not
done so, which means there is no basis for the refusal of federal
courts to adjudicate the merits of these claims. Their refusal to
act merely forces plaintiffs into the state courts which certainly
are no more competent to decide the federal question than are the
federal courts. The terms of the New York statute are clear, and
there is no way in which a state court could interpret the
challenged law in a way that would avoid the statutory claim
pressed here.
Page 397 U. S. 427
State participation in federal welfare programs is not required.
States may choose not to apply for federal assistance, or may join
in some, but not all, of the various programs, of which AFDC is
only one. That a State may choose to refuse to comply with the
federal requirements at the cost of losing federal funds is, of
course, a risk that any welfare plaintiff takes. Such a risk was
involved in
King v. Smith, 392 U.
S. 309, which attacked Alabama's "substitute father"
regulation as inconsistent with the Social Security Act. As long as
a State is receiving federal funds, however, it is under a legal
requirement to comply with the federal conditions placed on the
receipt of those funds, and individuals who are adversely affected
by the failure of the State to comply with the federal requirements
in distributing those federal funds are entitled to a judicial
determination of such a claim.
King v. Smith, supra. The
duty of a State which receives this federal bounty to comply with
the conditions imposed by Congress was adverted to by Mr. Justice
Cardozo, who wrote for the Court in
Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 548,
301 U. S.
597-598, sustaining the constitutionality of the Social
Security Act:
"Alabama is seeking and obtaining a credit of many millions in
favor of her citizens out of the Treasury of the nation. Nowhere in
our scheme of government -- in the limitations express or implied
of our federal constitution -- do we find that she is prohibited
from assenting to conditions that will assure a fair and just
requital for benefits received."
As he also said, speaking for the Court in
Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 619,
301 U. S. 645,
a companion case to
Steward Machine Co.:
"When money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept
of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states.
"
Page 397 U. S. 428
Where the suit involves an alleged conflict between the state
regulation and the federal law, neither the United States nor HEW
is a necessary party to such an action. The wrong alleged is the
State's failure to comply with federal requirements in its use of
federal funds, not HEW's failure to withhold funds from the
State.
Whether HEW should withhold federal funds is entrusted to it, at
least as a preliminary matter, by § 404(a) of the Social Security
Act. [
Footnote 2/3] Whether the
courts have any role to perform beyond ruling on an alleged
conflict between the state regulation and the federal law is a
question we need not reach.
Page 397 U. S. 429
|
397
U.S. 397app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., CONCURRING
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201
rj:
December 29, 1969
lj:
Mr. George R. Houston
Associate Librarian
The Supreme Court of the United States
1st Street & East Capitol,
N.W. Washington, D.C. 20543
Dear Mr. Houston:
This relates to your conversation with me on December 29
concerning statements made in the last paragraph and footnote 55 on
page 91 of volume 67, Columbia Law Review, January 1967, that this
Department had not responded to a complaint and petition for
hearing filed by Georgia and Arkansas claimants.
The author of the Law Review article is correct. There was, in
fact, no response to the request for a conformity hearing. Had we
replied to the letter, however, we would have stated, as we usually
do in such cases, that conformity hearings are held only on the
initiative of this Department when a determination has been made
that the deficiencies in a state program are such that the state,
under its applicable laws, cannot, or the responsible official,
will not, voluntarily bring the state into compliance.
Letters such as the one you refer to may, however, trigger
action by this Department when the contents
Page 397 U. S. 430
bring to light conformity matters of which the Department has
not been made aware . . . as a result of its audits.
To date, this Department has initiated conformity hearings in
connection with the state plans of Nevada and Connecticut. In view
of the fact that the imposition of sanctions against states which
are found to be out of conformity are mandatory, we exert every
effort at our command to bring a state into conformity without the
necessity of a formal hearing.
If you have any further questions, please let us know.
Very truly yours,
Robert C. Mardian,
General Counsel.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The procedure by which HEW reviews state plans is set out in the
opinion of the Court,
ante at
397 U. S. 403
n. 8.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See 397
U.S. 397app|>Appendix to this concurrence.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Section 404(a) of the Act provides:
"In the case of any State plan for aid and services to needy
families with children which has been approved by the Secretary, if
the Secretary, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing
to the State agency administering or supervising the administration
of such plan, finds --"
"(1) that the plan has been so changed as to impose any
residence requirement prohibited by section 602(b) of this title,
or that, in the administration of the plan, any such prohibited
requirement is imposed, with the knowledge of such State agency, in
a substantial number of cases; or"
"(2) that, in the administration of the plan, there is a failure
to comply substantially with any provision required by section
602(a) of this title to be included in the plan;"
"[T]he Secretary shall notify such State agency that further
payments will not be made to the State (or, in his discretion, that
payments will be limited to categories under or parts of the State
plan not affected by such failure) until the Secretary is satisfied
that such prohibited requirement is no longer so imposed, and that
there is no longer any such failure to comply. Until he is so
satisfied, he shall make no further payments to such State (or
shall limit payments to categories under or parts of the State plan
not affected by such failure)."
42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.
Petitioners are New York welfare recipients who contend that
recently enacted New York welfare legislation which reduces the
welfare benefits to which they are entitled under the Aid to
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program is inconsistent
with the federal AFDC requirements found in § 402(a)(23) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
The New York statute that petitioners are challenging, § 131-a of
the New York Social Services Law, was enacted on March 31, 1969.
Little more than a week later, on April 9, petitioners filed their
complaint challenging this statute. The Court today holds that "the
District Court correctly exercised its discretion by proceeding to
the merits" of petitioners' claim that the federal and state
statutes are inconsistent.
Ante at
397 U. S. 401.
The Court reaches this conclusion despite the fact that the
determination whether a State is following the federal AFDC
requirements is clearly vested in the first
Page 397 U. S. 431
instance not in the federal courts, but in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW); despite the fact that, at the
very moment the District Court was deciding the merits of
petitioners' claim, HEW was performing its statutory duty of
reviewing the New York legislation to determine if it was at odds
with § 402(a)(23), and despite the fact that, if HEW had been given
enough time to make a decision with regard to the New York
legislation, its decision might have obviated the need for this,
and perhaps many other, lawsuits, I regret that I cannot join an
opinion which fails to give due consideration to the unmistakable
intent of the Social Security Act to give HEW primary jurisdiction
over these highly technical and difficult welfare questions, which
affirms what is to me a clear abuse of discretion by the District
Court, and which plunges this Court and other federal courts into
an ever-increasing and unnecessary involvement in the
administration of the Nation's categorical assistance programs
administered by the States. [
Footnote
3/1]
Under the AFDC program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1964 ed. and Supp.
IV), the Federal Government provides funds to a State on the
condition that the State's plan for supplementing and distributing
those funds to needy individuals satisfies the various federal
requirements set out in the Social Security Act. By statute, the
Secretary of HEW is charged with the duty of reviewing state plans
to determine if they comply with the now considerable list of
federal requirements, 42 U.S.C. 602 (1964 ed. and Supp. IV), and
his approval of such a plan, and only his approval, qualifies the
state program for federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1964 ed., Supp. IV). So that HEW may determine whether
Page 397 U. S. 432
the state plan continues at all times to meet the federal
requirements, each State is required by regulation to submit all
relevant changes, such as new state statutes, regulations, and
court decisions, to HEW for its review. 45 CFR § 201.3. If, after
affording the State reasonable notice and an opportunity for a
hearing, HEW determines that the state plan does not conform to the
federal requirements, the federal agency then has a legal
obligation to terminate federal aid to which the State would
otherwise be entitled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 604, 1316 (1964 ed., Supp. IV);
45 CFR § 201.5. Waiver by the Secretary of any of the federal
requirements is permitted only where the Secretary and state
welfare officials have together undertaken a "demonstration" or
experimental welfare project. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1964 ed., Supp.
IV). The administrative procedures that the Secretary must afford a
State before denying or curtailing the use of federal funds are
elaborated in 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), and this
section also provides that a State can obtain judicial review in a
United States court of appeals of an adverse administrative
determination.
This unified, coherent scheme for reviewing state welfare rules
and practices was established by Congress to ensure that the
federal purpose behind AFDC is fully carried out. The statutory
provisions evidence a clear intent on the part of Congress to vest
in HEW the primary responsibility for interpreting the federal Act
and enforcing its requirements against the States. Although the
agency's sanction, the power to terminate federal assistance, might
seem at first glance to be a harsh and inflexible remedy, Congress
wisely saw that, in the vast majority of cases, a credible threat
of termination will be more than sufficient to bring about
compliance. These procedures, if followed as Congress intended,
would render unnecessary countless lawsuits by welfare recipients.
In the case before the Court today, it is
Page 397 U. S. 433
undisputed that HEW had, by the time of the proceedings in the
District Court, commenced its own administrative proceedings to
determine whether § 131-a conforms to the Social Security Act's
provisions. The agency had requested the New York welfare officials
to provide detailed information regarding the statute, and was
preparing to make its statutorily required decision on the
conformity or nonconformity of § 131-a. It was at this point, when
HEW was in the midst of performing its statutory obligation, that
the District Court assumed jurisdiction over petitioners' claim and
decided the very state-federal issue then pending before HEW. Both
Judge Hays and Judge Lumbard of the Court of Appeals were of the
opinion that the District Court abused its discretion in finding
that it had jurisdiction over this statutory claim, and both judges
relied in part on the pendency of the identical question before the
federal agency. 414 F.2d 170, 176, 181 (1969). Chief Judge
Lumbard's reasoning is instructive:
"[H]ere, as Judge Hays points out, the federal claim seems more
apt for initial resolution by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare than by the courts. The two issues upon a resolution of
which this claim turns -- the practical effect of 131-a and the
proper construction of § 602(a)(23) of the Social Security Act --
both are exceedingly complex. The briefs and arguments of the
parties, and the varying judicial views they have elicited, have
demonstrated the wisdom of allowing HEW, with its expertise in the
operation of the AFDC program and its experience in reviewing the
very technical provisions of state welfare laws, an initial
opportunity to consider whether or not § 131-a is in compliance
with § 602(a)(23). This is HEW's responsibility under the Social
Security Act,
see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1316 (Supp. 1969). I
believe that
Page 397 U. S. 434
the district court should have declined to exercise its
jurisdiction, thus permitting HEW to determine the statutory claim
asserted by plaintiffs, for the Department already had initiated
review proceedings concerning § 131-a."
414 F.2d at 181. I agree with the Court of Appeals that the
District Court abused its discretion in taking jurisdiction over
this case, but I would go further than holding that the District
Court's action was a mere abuse of discretion. Ensuring that the
federal courts have the benefit of HEW's expertise in the welfare
area is an important, but by no means the only, consideration
supporting the limitation of judicial intervention at this stage.
Congress has given to HEW the grave responsibility of guaranteeing
that, in each case where federal AFDC funds are used, federal
policies are followed, and it has established procedures through
which HEW can enforce the federal interests against the States. I
think these congressionally mandated compliance procedures should
be the exclusive ones until they have run their course. The
explicitness with which Congress set out the HEW compliance
procedures without referring to other remedies suggests that such
was the congressional intent. But, more fundamentally, I think it
will be impossible for HEW to fulfill its function under the Social
Security Act if its proceedings can be disrupted and its authority
undercut by courts which rush to make precisely the same
determination that the agency is directed by the Act to make. And,
in instances when HEW is confronted with a particularly sensitive
question, the agency might be delighted to be able to pass on to
the courts its statutory responsibility to decide the question. In
the long run, then, judicial preemption of the agency's rightful
responsibility can only lead to the collapse of the enforcement
scheme envisioned by Congress, and I fear that this case and others
have carried such a
Page 397 U. S. 435
process well along its way. Finally, there is the very important
consideration of judicial economy and the prevention of premature
and unnecessary lawsuits, particularly at this time, when the
courts are overrun with litigants on every subject. If courts are
permitted to consider the identical questions pending before HEW
for its determination, inevitably they will hand down a large
number of decisions that could have been mooted if only they had
postponed deciding the issues until the administrative proceedings
were completed. For all these reasons, I would go one step further
than the Court of Appeals majority and hold that all judicial
examinations of alleged conflicts between state and federal AFDC
programs prior to a final HEW decision approving or disapproving
the state plan are fundamentally inconsistent with the enforcement
scheme created by Congress, and, hence, such suits should be
completely precluded. This preclusion of judicial action does not,
of course, necessarily mean that the individual welfare recipient
has no legal remedies. The precise questions of when and under what
circumstances individual welfare recipients can properly seek
federal judicial review are not before the Court, however, and I
express no views about those issues. [
Footnote 3/2]
[
Footnote 3/1]
This precise issue was not so clearly and sharply presented in
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309
(1968), which I joined.
See id. at
392 U. S. 317
n. 11,
392 U. S. 326
n. 23.
[
Footnote 3/2]
The issues are canvassed in Note, Federal Judicial Review of
State Welfare Practices, 67 Col.L.Rev. 84 (1967).