NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 19–465
_________________
PETER B. CHIAFALO, LEVI JENNET GUERRA, and
ESTHER VIRGINIA JOHN, PETITIONERS
v. WASHINGTON
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
washington
[July 6, 2020]
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Every four years, millions of Americans cast a
ballot for a presidential candidate. Their votes, though, actually
go toward selecting members of the Electoral College, whom each
State appoints based on the popular returns. Those few “electors”
then choose the President.
The States have devised mechanisms to ensure
that the electors they appoint vote for the presidential candidate
their citizens have preferred. With two partial exceptions, every
State appoints a slate of electors selected by the political party
whose candidate has won the State’s popular vote. Most States also
compel electors to pledge in advance to support the nominee of that
party. This Court upheld such a pledge requirement decades ago,
rejecting the argument that the Constitution “demands absolute
freedom for the elector to vote his own choice.”
Ray v.
Blair,
343 U.S.
214, 228 (1952).
Today, we consider whether a State may also
penalize an elector for breaking his pledge and voting for someone
other than the presidential candidate who won his State’s popular
vote. We hold that a State may do so.
I
Our Constitution’s method of picking
Presidents emerged from an eleventh-hour compromise. The issue, one
delegate to the Convention remarked, was “the most difficult of all
[that] we have had to decide.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787, p. 501 (M. Farrand rev. 1966) (Farrand). Despite long
debate and many votes, the delegates could not reach an agreement.
See generally N. Peirce & L. Longley, The People’s President
19–22 (rev. 1981). In the dying days of summer, they referred the
matter to the so-called Committee of Eleven to devise a solution.
The Committee returned with a proposal for the Electoral College.
Just two days later, the delegates accepted the recommendation with
but a few tweaks. James Madison later wrote to a friend that the
“difficulty of finding an unexceptionable [selection] process” was
“deeply felt by the Convention.” Letter to G. Hay (Aug. 23, 1823),
in 3 Farrand 458. Because “the final arrangement of it took place
in the latter stage of the Session,” Madison continued, “it was not
exempt from a degree of the hurrying influence produced by fatigue
and impatience in all such Bodies: tho’ the degree was much less
than usually prevails in them.”
Ibid. Whether less or not,
the delegates soon finished their work and departed for home.
The provision they approved about presidential
electors is fairly slim. Article II, §1, cl. 2 says:
“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal
to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”
The next clause (but don’t get attached: it will
soon be superseded) set out the procedures the electors were to
follow in casting their votes. In brief, each member of the College
would cast votes for two candidates in the presidential field. The
candidate with the greatest number of votes, assuming he had a
majority, would become President. The runner-up would become Vice
President. If no one had a majority, the House of Representatives
would take over and decide the winner.
That plan failed to anticipate the rise of
political parties, and soon proved unworkable. The Nation’s first
contested presidential election occurred in 1796, after George
Washington’s retirement. John Adams came in first among the
candidates, and Thomas Jefferson second. That meant the leaders of
the era’s two warring political parties—the Federalists and the
Republicans—became President and Vice President respectively. (One
might think of this as fodder for a new season of Veep.) Four years
later, a different problem arose. Jefferson and Aaron Burr ran that
year as a Republican Party ticket, with the former meant to be
President and the latter meant to be Vice. For that plan to
succeed, Jefferson had to come in first and Burr just behind him.
Instead, Jefferson came in first and Burr . . . did too.
Every elector who voted for Jefferson also voted for Burr,
producing a tie. That threw the election into the House of
Representatives, which took no fewer than 36 ballots to elect
Jefferson. (Alexander Hamilton secured his place on the Broadway
stage—but possibly in the cemetery too—by lobbying Federalists in
the House to tip the election to Jefferson, whom he loathed but
viewed as less of an existential threat to the Republic.) By then,
everyone had had enough of the Electoral College’s original voting
rules.
The result was the Twelfth Amendment, whose main
part provided that electors would vote separately for President and
Vice President. The Amendment, ratified in 1804, says:
“The Electors shall meet in their
respective states and vote by ballot for President and
Vice-President . . .; they shall name in their ballots
the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the
person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct
lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons
voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to
[Congress, where] the votes shall then be counted.”
The Amendment thus brought the Electoral
College’s voting procedures into line with the Nation’s new party
system.
Within a few decades, the party system also
became the means of translating popular preferences within each
State into Electoral College ballots. In the Nation’s earliest
elections, state legislatures mostly picked the electors, with the
majority party sending a delegation of its choice to the Electoral
College. By 1832, though, all States but one had introduced popular
presidential elections. See Peirce & Longley, The People’s
President, at 45. At first, citizens voted for a slate of electors
put forward by a political party, expecting that the winning slate
would vote for its party’s presidential (and vice presidential)
nominee in the Electoral College. By the early 20th century,
citizens in most States voted for the presidential candidate
himself; ballots increasingly did not even list the electors. See
Albright, The Presidential Short Ballot, 34 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 955,
955–957 (1940). After the popular vote was counted, States
appointed the electors chosen by the party whose presidential
nominee had won statewide, again expecting that they would vote for
that candidate in the Electoral College.[
1]
In the 20th century, many States enacted
statutes meant to guarantee that outcome—that is, to prohibit
so-called faithless voting. Rather than just assume that
party-picked electors would vote for their party’s winning nominee,
those States insist that they do so. As of now, 32 States and the
District of Columbia have such statutes on their books. They are
typically called pledge laws because most demand that electors take
a formal oath or pledge to cast their ballot for their party’s
presidential (and vice presidential) candidate. Others merely
impose that duty by law. Either way, the statutes work to ensure
that the electors vote for the candidate who got the most statewide
votes in the presidential election.
Most relevant here, States began about 60 years
ago to back up their pledge laws with some kind of sanction. By
now, 15 States have such a system.[
2] Almost all of them immediately remove a faithless
elector from his position, substituting an alternate whose vote the
State reports instead. A few States impose a monetary fine on any
elector who flouts his pledge.
Washington is one of the 15 States with a
sanctions-backed pledge law designed to keep the State’s electors
in line with its voting citizens. As all States now do, Washington
requires political parties fielding presidential candidates to
nominate a slate of electors. See Wash. Rev. Code §29 A. 56.320(1).
On Election Day, the State gives voters a ballot listing only the
candidates themselves. See §29 A. 56.320(2). When the vote comes
in, Washington moves toward appointing the electors chosen by the
party whose candidate won the statewide count. See
ibid. But
before the appointment can go into effect, each elector must
“execute [a] pledge” agreeing to “mark [her] ballots” for the
presidential (and vice presidential) candidate of the party
nominating her. §29 A. 56.084. And the elector must comply with
that pledge, or else face a sanction. At the time relevant here,
the punishment was a civil fine of up to $1,000. See §29 A. 56.340
(2016).[
3]
This case involves three Washington electors who
violated their pledges in the 2016 presidential election. That
year, Washington’s voters chose Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump
for President. The State thus appointed as its electors the
nominees of the Washington State Democratic Party. Among those
Democratic electors were petitioners Peter Chiafalo, Levi Guerra,
and Esther John (the Electors). All three pledged to support
Hillary Clinton in the Electoral College. But as that vote
approached, they decided to cast their ballots for someone else.
The three hoped they could encourage other electors—particularly
those from States Donald Trump had carried—to follow their example.
The idea was to deprive him of a majority of electoral votes and
throw the election into the House of Representatives. So the three
Electors voted for Colin Powell for President. But their effort
failed. Only seven electors across the Nation cast faithless
votes—the most in a century, but well short of the goal. Candidate
Trump became President Trump. And, more to the point here, the
State fined the Electors $1,000 apiece for breaking their pledges
to support the same candidate its voters had.
The Electors challenged their fines in state
court, arguing that the Constitution gives members of the Electoral
College the right to vote however they please. The Washington
Superior Court rejected the Electors’ claim in an oral decision,
and the State’s Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. See
In re
Guerra, 193 Wash. 2d 380, 441 P.3d 807 (2019). The court relied
heavily on our decision in
Ray v.
Blair upholding a
pledge requirement—though one without a penalty to back it up. See
193 Wash. 2d, at 393–399, 441 P. 3d, at 813–816. In the state
court’s view, Washington’s penalty provision made no difference.
Article II of the Constitution, the court noted, grants broad
authority to the States to appoint electors, and so to impose
conditions on their appointments. See
id., at 393, 395, 441
P. 3d, at 813, 814. And nothing in the document “suggests that
electors have discretion to cast their votes without limitation or
restriction by the state legislature.”
Id., at 396, 441
P. 3d, at 814.
A few months later, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a
case involving another faithless elector. See
Baca v.
Colorado Dept. of State, 935 F.3d 887 (2019). The Circuit
Court held that Colorado could not remove the elector, as its
pledge law directs, because the Constitution “provide[s]
presidential electors the right to cast a vote” for President “with
discretion.”
Id., at 955.
We granted certiorari to resolve the split. 589
U. S. ___ (2020). We now affirm the Washington Supreme Court’s
judgment that a State may enforce its pledge law against an
elector.
II
As the state court recognized, this Court has
considered elector pledge requirements before. Some seventy years
ago Edmund Blair tried to become a presidential elector in Alabama.
Like all States, Alabama lodged the authority to pick electors in
the political parties fielding presidential candidates. And the
Alabama Democratic Party required a pledge phrased much like
Washington’s today. No one could get on the party’s slate of
electors without agreeing to vote in the Electoral College for the
Democratic presidential candidate. Blair challenged the pledge
mandate. He argued that the “intention of the Founders was that
[presidential] electors should exercise their judgment in voting.”
Ray, 343 U. S., at 225. The pledge requirement, he
claimed, “interfere[d] with the performance of this constitutional
duty to select [a president] according to the best judgment of the
elector.”
Ibid.
Our decision in
Ray rejected that
challenge. “Neither the language of Art. II, §1, nor that of
the Twelfth Amendment,” we explained, prohibits a State from
appointing only electors committed to vote for a party’s
presidential candidate.
Ibid. Nor did the Nation’s history
suggest such a bar. To the contrary, “[h]istory teaches that the
electors were expected to support the party nominees” as far back
as the earliest contested presidential elections.
Id., at
228. “[L]ongstanding practice” thus “weigh[ed] heavily” against
Blair’s claim.
Id., at 228–230. And current voting
procedures did too. The Court noted that by then many States did
not even put electors’ names on a presidential ballot. See
id., at 229. The whole system presupposed that the electors,
because of either an “implied” or an “oral pledge,” would vote for
the candidate who had won the State’s popular election.
Ibid.
Ray, however, reserved a question not
implicated in the case: Could a State enforce those pledges through
legal sanctions? See
id., at 230. Or would doing so violate
an elector’s “constitutional freedom” to “vote as he may choose” in
the Electoral College?
Ibid. Today, we take up that
question. We uphold Washington’s penalty-backed pledge law for
reasons much like those given in
Ray. The Constitution’s
text and the Nation’s history both support allowing a State to
enforce an elector’s pledge to support his party’s nominee—and the
state voters’ choice—for President.
A
Article II, §1’s appointments power gives the
States far-reaching authority over presidential electors, absent
some other constitutional constraint.[
4] As noted earlier, each State may appoint electors “in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” Art. II,
§1, cl. 2; see
supra, at 2. This Court has described
that clause as “conveying the broadest power of determination” over
who becomes an elector.
McPherson v.
Blacker,
146 U.S.
1, 27 (1892).[
5] And the
power to appoint an elector (in any manner) includes power to
condition his appointment—that is, to say what the elector must do
for the appointment to take effect. A State can require, for
example, that an elector live in the State or qualify as a regular
voter during the relevant time period. Or more substantively, a
State can insist (as
Ray allowed) that the elector pledge to
cast his Electoral College ballot for his party’s presidential
nominee, thus tracking the State’s popular vote. See
Ray,
343 U. S., at 227 (A pledge requirement “is an exercise of the
state’s right to appoint electors in such manner” as it chooses).
Or—so long as nothing else in the Constitution poses an obstacle—a
State can add, as Washington did, an associated condition of
appointment: It can demand that the elector actually live up to his
pledge, on pain of penalty. Which is to say that the State’s
appointment power, barring some outside constraint, enables the
enforcement of a pledge like Washington’s.[
6]
And nothing in the Constitution expressly
prohibits States from taking away presidential electors’ voting
discretion as Washington does. The Constitution is barebones about
electors. Article II includes only the instruction to each State to
appoint, in whatever way it likes, as many electors as it has
Senators and Representatives (except that the State may not appoint
members of the Federal Government). The Twelfth Amendment then
tells electors to meet in their States, to vote for President and
Vice President separately, and to transmit lists of all their votes
to the President of the United States Senate for counting.
Appointments and procedures and . . . that is all. See
id., at 225.
The Framers could have done it differently;
other constitutional drafters of their time did. In the founding
era, two States—Maryland and Kentucky—used electoral bodies
selected by voters to choose state senators (and in Kentucky’s
case, the Governor too). The Constitutions of both States,
Maryland’s drafted just before and Kentucky’s just after the
U. S. Constitution, incorporated language that would have made
this case look quite different. Both state Constitutions required
all electors to take an oath “to elect without favour, affection,
partiality, or prejudice, such persons for Senators, as they, in
their judgment and conscience, believe best qualified for the
office.” Md. Declaration of Rights, Art. XVIII (1776); see Ky.
Const., Art. I, §14 (1792) (using identical language except
adding “[and] for Governor”). The emphasis on independent “judgment
and conscience” called for the exercise of elector discretion. But
although the Framers knew of Maryland’s Constitution, no language
of that kind made it into the document they drafted. See 1 Farrand
218, 289 (showing that Madison and Hamilton referred to the
Maryland system at the Convention).
The Electors argue that three simple words stand
in for more explicit language about discretion. Article II, §1
first names the members of the Electoral College: “electors.” The
Twelfth Amendment then says that electors shall “vote” and that
they shall do so by “ballot.” The “plain meaning” of those terms,
the Electors say, requires electors to have “freedom of choice.”
Brief for Petitioners 29, 31. If the States could control their
votes, “the electors would not be ‘Electors,’ and their ‘vote by
Ballot’ would not be a ‘vote.’ ”
Id., at 31.
But those words need not always connote
independent choice. Suppose a person always votes in the way his
spouse, or pastor, or union tells him to. We might question his
judgment, but we would have no problem saying that he “votes” or
fills in a “ballot.” In those cases, the choice is in someone
else’s hands, but the words still apply because they can signify a
mechanical act. Or similarly, suppose in a system allowing proxy
voting (a common practice in the founding era), the proxy acts on
clear instructions from the principal, with no freedom of choice.
Still, we might well say that he cast a “ballot” or “voted,” though
the preference registered was not his own. For that matter, some
elections give the voter no real choice because there is only one
name on a ballot (consider an old Soviet election, or even a
down-ballot race in this country). Yet if the person in the voting
booth goes through the motions, we consider him to have voted. The
point of all these examples is to show that although voting and
discretion are usually combined, voting is still voting when
discretion departs. Maybe most telling, switch from hypotheticals
to the members of the Electoral College. For centuries now, as
we’ll later show, almost all have considered themselves bound to
vote for their party’s (and the state voters’) preference. See
infra, at 13–17. Yet there is no better description for what
they do in the Electoral College than “vote” by “ballot.” And all
these years later, everyone still calls them “electors”—and not
wrongly, because even though they vote without discretion, they do
indeed elect a President.
The Electors and their
amici object that
the Framers using those words expected the Electors’ votes to
reflect their own judgments. See Brief for Petitioners 18–19; Brief
for Independence Institute as
Amicus Curiae 11–15. Hamilton
praised the Constitution for entrusting the Presidency to “men most
capable of analyzing the qualities” needed for the office, who
would make their choices “under circumstances favorable to
deliberation.” The Federalist No. 68, p. 410 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). So too, John Jay predicted that the Electoral College would
“be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens,”
whose choices would reflect “discretion and discernment.”
Id., No. 64, at 389.
But even assuming other Framers shared that
outlook, it would not be enough. Whether by choice or accident, the
Framers did not reduce their thoughts about electors’ discretion to
the printed page. All that they put down about the electors was
what we have said: that the States would appoint them, and that
they would meet and cast ballots to send to the Capitol. Those
sparse instructions took no position on how independent from—or how
faithful to—party and popular preferences the electors’ votes
should be. On that score, the Constitution left much to the future.
And the future did not take long in coming. Almost immediately,
presidential electors became trusty transmitters of other people’s
decisions.
B
“Long settled and established practice” may
have “great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional
provisions.”
The Pocket Veto Case,
279
U.S. 655, 689 (1929). As James Madison wrote, “a regular course
of practice” can “liquidate & settle the meaning of ”
disputed or indeterminate “terms & phrases.” Letter to S. Roane
(Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed.
1908); see The Federalist No. 37, at 225. The Electors make an
appeal to that kind of practice in asserting their right to
independence. But “our whole experience as a Nation” points in the
opposite direction.
NLRB v.
Noel Canning,
573 U.S.
513, 557 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Electors
have only rarely exercised discretion in casting their ballots for
President. From the first, States sent them to the Electoral
College—as today Washington does—to vote for pre-selected
candidates, rather than to use their own judgment. And electors (or
at any rate, almost all of them) rapidly settled into that
non-discretionary role. See
Ray, 343 U. S., at
228–229.
Begin at the beginning—with the Nation’s first
contested election in 1796. Would-be electors declared themselves
for one or the other party’s presidential candidate. (Recall that
in this election Adams led the Federalists against Jefferson’s
Republicans. See
supra, at 3.) In some States, legislatures
chose the electors; in others, ordinary voters did. But in either
case, the elector’s declaration of support for a
candidate—essentially a pledge—was what mattered. Or said
differently, the selectors of an elector knew just what they were
getting—not someone who would deliberate in good Hamiltonian
fashion, but someone who would vote for their party’s candidate.
“[T]he presidential electors,” one historian writes, “were
understood to be instruments for expressing the will of those who
selected them, not independent agents authorized to exercise their
own judgment.” Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional
Construction, and the Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 Ariz. L.
Rev. 903, 911 (2017). And when the time came to vote in the
Electoral College, all but one elector did what everyone expected,
faithfully representing their selectors’ choice of presidential
candidate.[
7]
The Twelfth Amendment embraced this new
reality—both acknowledging and facilitating the Electoral College’s
emergence as a mechanism not for deliberation but for party-line
voting. Remember that the Amendment grew out of a pair of
fiascos—the election of two then-bitter rivals as President and
Vice President, and the tie vote that threw the next election into
the House. See
supra, at 3. Both had occurred because the
Constitution’s original voting procedures gave electors two votes
for President, rather than one apiece for President and Vice
President. Without the capacity to vote a party ticket for the two
offices, the electors had foundered, and could do so again. If the
predominant party’s electors used both their votes on their party’s
two candidates, they would create a tie (see 1800). If they
intentionally cast fewer votes for the intended vice president,
they risked the opposite party’s presidential candidate sneaking
into the second position (see 1796). By allowing the electors to
vote separately for the two offices, the Twelfth Amendment made
party-line voting safe. The Amendment thus advanced, rather than
resisted, the practice that had arisen in the Nation’s first
elections. An elector would promise to legislators or citizens to
vote for their party’s presidential and vice presidential
candidates—and then follow through on that commitment. Or as the
Court wrote in
Ray, the new procedure allowed an elector to
“vote the regular party ticket” and thereby “carry out the desires
of the people” who had sent him to the Electoral College.
Ray, 343 U. S., at 224, n. 11. No independent
electors need apply.
Courts and commentators throughout the 19th
century recognized the electors as merely acting on other people’s
preferences. Justice Story wrote that “the electors are now chosen
wholly with reference to particular candidates,” having either
“silently” or “publicly pledge[d]” how they will vote. 3
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1457, p. 321
(1833). “[N]othing is left to the electors,” he continued, “but to
register [their] votes, which are already pledged.”
Id., at
321–322. Indeed, any “exercise of an independent judgment would be
treated[ ] as a political usurpation, dishonourable to the
individual, and a fraud upon his constituents.”
Id., at 322.
Similarly, William Rawle explained how the Electoral College
functioned: “[T]he electors do not assemble in their several states
for a free exercise of their own judgments, but for the purpose of
electing” the nominee of “the predominant political party which has
chosen those electors.” A View of the Constitution of the United
States of America 57 (2d ed. 1829). Looking back at the close of
the century, this Court had no doubt that Story’s and Rawle’s
descriptions were right. The electors, the Court noted, were chosen
“simply to register the will of the appointing power in respect of
a particular candidate.”
McPherson, 146 U. S., at
36.
State election laws evolved to reinforce that
development, ensuring that a State’s electors would vote the same
way as its citizens. As noted earlier, state legislatures early
dropped out of the picture; by the mid-1800s, ordinary voters chose
electors. See
supra, at 4. Except that increasingly, they
did not do so directly. States listed only presidential candidates
on the ballot, on the understanding that electors would do no more
than vote for the winner. Usually, the State could ensure that
result by appointing electors chosen by the winner’s party. But to
remove any doubt, States began in the early 1900s to enact statutes
requiring electors to pledge that they would squelch any urge to
break ranks with voters. See
supra, at 5. Washington’s law,
penalizing a pledge’s breach, is only another in the same vein. It
reflects a tradition more than two centuries old. In that practice,
electors are not free agents; they are to vote for the candidate
whom the State’s voters have chosen.
The history going the opposite way is one of
anomalies only. The Electors stress that since the founding,
electors have cast some 180 faithless votes for either President or
Vice President. See Brief for Petitioners 7. But that is 180 out of
over 23,000. See Brief for Republican National Committee as
Amicus Curiae 19. And more than a third of the faithless
votes come from 1872, when the Democratic Party’s nominee (Horace
Greeley) died just after Election Day.[
8] Putting those aside, faithless votes represent just
one-half of one percent of the total. Still, the Electors counter,
Congress has counted all those votes. See Brief for Petitioners 46.
But because faithless votes have never come close to affecting an
outcome, only one has ever been challenged. True enough, that one
was counted. But the Electors cannot rest a claim of historical
tradition on one counted vote in over 200 years. And anyway, the
State appointing that elector had no law requiring a pledge or
otherwise barring his use of discretion. Congress’s deference to a
state decision to tolerate a faithless vote is no ground for
rejecting a state decision to penalize one.
III
The Electors’ constitutional claim has neither
text nor history on its side. Article II and the Twelfth Amendment
give States broad power over electors, and give electors themselves
no rights. Early in our history, States decided to tie electors to
the presidential choices of others, whether legislatures or
citizens. Except that legislatures no longer play a role, that
practice has continued for more than 200 years. Among the devices
States have long used to achieve their object are pledge laws,
designed to impress on electors their role as agents of others. A
State follows in the same tradition if, like Washington, it chooses
to sanction an elector for breaching his promise. Then too, the
State instructs its electors that they have no ground for reversing
the vote of millions of its citizens. That direction accords with
the Constitution—as well as with the trust of a Nation that here,
We the People rule.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington
is
Affirmed.