The railroad company constructed a driveway over its station
grounds to connect with the streets of the town. The railroad and
the town agreed that the driveway should be kept open and that the
town should exercise upon the station grounds, etc., all necessary
police powers for the regulation of traffic and for the enforcement
of the railroad's rules and regulations. The railroad granted a
Page 276 U. S. 183
cabman exclusive right to solicit passengers and baggage in the
station grounds and to park his vehicles in the driveway. The town
(claiming the right so to do under the contract) declared the space
so assigned by the railroad a public hackstand, and prohibited
parking elsewhere. Other cabmen thereupon entered the grounds and
used that space. The railroad objected on the ground that its
property was being taken for municipal purposes without
1. The taking of private property for public use is against the
common right, and authority so to do must be clearly expressed. The
agreement does not empower the town to establish a public hackstand
on the company's land. P. 276 U. S.
2. Assuming that the creation of a public hackstand upon the
station grounds would be a proper exertion of the police power, the
due process clause safeguards to the owner of the land just
compensation for the use of its property. P. 276 U. S.
3. As against those not using it for purposes of transportation,
the railroad is private property in every legal sense, and if any
part of its land is capable of use that does not interfere with
discharge of its obligations as a carrier, the railroad has the
right to use or permit others so to use it for any lawful purpose.
P. 276 U.S. 194
4. A railroad is not bound to permit persons having no business
with it to enter its trains, station, or grounds to solicit trade
or patronage for themselves, and the grant of such privilege to one
does not give rise to any duty to others. P. 276 U.S. 194
5. To compel the use of railroad station grounds for public
hackstands without compensation is to take them in violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 276 U. S.
14 F.2d 257 reversed; district court affirmed.
Certiorari, 273 U.S. 686, to a decree of the circuit court of
appeals which reversed a decree of permanent injunction and
directed dismissal of the bill in a suit by the railroad against
the town and a number of taxicab men to prevent the use of its land
for the parking of vehicles and enjoin the enforcement of an
ordinance designating part of it as a public hackstand.
Page 276 U. S. 188
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
October 30, 1924, petitioner brought this suit in the District
Court for New Jersey against the Town of Morristown and 16
operators of taxicabs to restrain the town from enforcing an
ordinance establishing a public hackstand in a driveway on
petitioner's station grounds, to prevent the use of its land for
parking of taxicabs and other vehicles, and to restrain the
individual defendants from going on its premises to solicit
patronage and from using its ground as a hackstand.
The Morris & Essex Railroad Company owns the railroad, and
petitioner operates it as lessee in perpetuity. September 24, 1912,
an agreement was made between the town and the companies providing
for the elevation of the tracks, in order to eliminate certain
grade crossings. The agreement was fully performed. The tracks run
north and south through station grounds of somewhat irregular
shape, containing about four acres. The main station building is on
the west side of the tracks, and on the east side there is a
platform roofed over, called the shelter house. The town agreed to
lay out and construct a new street extending to the station grounds
on the east side of the tracks. The companies agreed to "dedicate
any lands owned by them necessary for the laying out of such new
street." Petitioner constructed and maintains driveways within its
grounds, one of which passes under the track along the north
boundary, and thence south parallel to the tracks and near the east
side of the shelter
Page 276 U. S. 189
house, to the south boundary of the grounds, where it connects
with the new street. It was agreed that:
"Said driveway shall be kept open at all times for passengers,
pedestrians . . . and . . . vehicular traffic to and from the
station grounds on the easterly side of said railroad and for the
use of those now having rights of egress to Morris street in Saw
Mill Lane, but this contract shall not be construed as a dedication
of said driveway as a public highway."
It was further agreed:
". . . that the town may and shall exercise all necessary police
powers in and upon the station, station grounds, approaches, and
driveways for the purpose of regulating foot and vehicular traffic
at said station and for the enforcement of the rules and
regulations of the railroad companies in respect thereto."
Passengers arriving on trains from New York get off on the east
side and leave the station grounds by the driveway described. Prior
to 1922, operators of taxicabs were accustomed to drive into the
grounds to meet these trains and there solicit patronage. It is a
matter of common knowledge that such competition for the
transportation of passengers and their baggage from railway
stations is liable, if not indeed certain, to be attended by
crowding together of cabmen, confusion, noisy solicitations,
importunities, and contentions, resulting to the annoyance and
disadvantage of those sought to be served. *
And the record
shows that these or similar abuses prevailed or were liable to
occur at the Morristown station. December
Page 276 U. S. 190
28, 1922, petitioner made an agreement with one Welsh in which
it was stated that petitioner desired to establish adequate cab
service for the accommodation of its passengers and to regulate the
solicitation of business in its station and upon its station
grounds and the parking of vehicles there. It granted to him the
privilege, under the control of petitioner's manager, to solicit
business as a cabman in the station and on its grounds, to have a
stand and telephone facilities in the station, and to park his
vehicles upon a specified space in the driveway east of the shelter
house. Welsh agreed to have a sufficient number of vehicles, to
maintain them at the highest standard of efficiency, and to give
satisfactory service at specified rates which should "in no wise
exceed the rates now or hereafter prescribed by municipal
ordinance." Then, on February 7, 1923, the municipal authorities,
conceiving that this agreement created a monopoly and was unjust to
other taxicabmen, adopted an ordinance prohibiting the standing of
automobiles upon the space set aside for Welsh for "a longer time
than is necessary to take on and let off passengers, expressage or
baggage," and prohibiting such standing of vehicles on any other
part of the driveway. In a suit brought by Welsh against the town,
the state supreme court held this ordinance to be a valid
regulation of traffic under general power of the town and under the
track elevation agreement. 98 N.J.L. 630, affirmed by the Court of
Errors and Appeals sub nomine Welsh v. Potts,
528. Upon the termination of that litigation, the town, October 22,
1924, passed the ordinance here in question. It declared a space,
including that set aside by the petitioner for the use of Welsh's
vehicles, to be "an additional public hackstand," and prohibits the
parking of vehicles in other parts of the driveway. Immediately
upon the passage of this ordinance, the individual defendants
entered the station grounds, parked their vehicles upon the space
so designated, and solicited patronage.
Page 276 U. S. 191
The petitioner brought this suit claiming that the enforcement
of the ordinance would take its property for municipal purposes
without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In defense, the respondents maintain that the
establishment of the public hackstand does not amount to a taking
of petitioner's property, but is a mere traffic regulation that the
town is authorized to make under the track elevation agreement and
also by the exertion of its police power.
After trial, the district court entered its final decree
declaring the ordinance repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment and
restraining the town from taking the company's land for a public
hackstand and preventing it from interfering with the company's use
of its premises or control of vehicles thereon, and commanding the
individual defendants to refrain from parking vehicles or
soliciting patronage on the station grounds. The circuit court of
appeals reversed the decree and directed the district court to
dismiss the case. 14 F.2d 257. This Court granted a writ of
certiorari. 273 U.S. 686.
The circuit court of appeals held that the track elevation
agreement authorized the town to establish a public hackstand on
the driveway in the station grounds. The principal purpose of that
agreement was to eliminate grade crossings; regulation of traffic
to from the station was incidental. The town has not acquired by
purchase or eminent domain any part of petitioner's land or the
right to establish a public hackstand there. It is not claimed that
the agreement expressly authorized the town to make such an
appropriation of petitioner's land. And there is nothing from which
such a grant may be implied. The intention of the parties is
plainly expressed. There is an express dedication by the companies
of their lands within the new street opened by the town outside the
station grounds. But, there being no such purpose in respect of
land within the grounds, the agreement declares
Page 276 U. S. 192
"this contract shall not be construed as a dedication of said
driveway as a public highway." There is no room for construction.
And, even in the absence of that clause, the facts disclosed by the
record are not sufficient to raise a presumption of dedication.
Wood v. Hurd.
34 N.J.L. 87.
While petitioner owed its passengers the duty of providing a
suitable way for them to reach and leave its station, it was not
bound to allow cabmen or others to enter upon or use any part of
its buildings or grounds to wait for fares or to solicit patronage.
Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.
, 199 U. S. 295
Thompson's Express Co. v. Mount,
91 N.J.Eq. 497. Its
agreement to keep the driveway "open for traffic to and from the
station" did not add to its obligations or enlarge the powers of
the town. Respondents put much reliance upon the clause providing
that the town "may and shall exercise all necessary police powers"
in and upon the station grounds "for the purpose of regulating
traffic" at the station and for the enforcement of petitioner's
rules and regulations in respect thereto. But it is to be borne in
mind that the taking of private property for public use is deemed
to be against the common right, and authority so to do must be
clearly expressed. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R. Co.,
195 U. S. 540
195 U. S. 569
Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.) § 371; Inhabitants of
Springfield v. Connecticut River Railroad Co.,
4 Cush. (Mass.)
63, 69-72; Holyoke Co. v.
15 Wall. 500, 82 U. S. 507
Cf. Richmond v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 174 U.
, 174 U. S. 777
The provision relied on is merely petitioner's authorization and
the town's agreement that the municipal power of police shall be
exerted for the purpose of regulating, and to carry into effect
petitioner's rules in respect of, the traffic at the station. The
agreement does not empower the town so to appropriate petitioner's
Page 276 U. S. 193
Is the provision of the ordinance of October 22, 1924, declaring
a part of the driveway to be a public hackstand, a valid exercise
of the police power? We assume that, by the laws of the state, the
town is authorized to regulate traffic and to establish public
hackstands in its streets and other public places. It does not
claim the power to take or appropriate private property for such a
purpose without giving the owner just compensation, but it contends
that the establishing of this hackstand "was justified under the
police power by the public necessities for the safety, welfare, and
comfort of the public using the driveway," and that it does not
take private property for public use without compensation, "because
the lands taken are devoted to a public use." But, assuming that,
under the circumstances, the creation of the public hackstand would
be a proper exertion of the police power, it does not follow that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would not
safeguard to the owner just compensation for the use of its
property. Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.
, 260 U. S. 416
The police power may be, and frequently it is, exerted to effect a
purpose or consummate an enterprise in the public interest that
requires the taking of private property; but, whatever the purpose
or the means employed to accomplish it, the owner is entitled to
compensation for what is taken from him. The railroad grounds,
station, platforms, driveways, etc., are used by the petitioner for
the purposes of its business as a common carrier, and, while that
business is subject to regulation in the public interest, the
property used belongs to petitioner. The state may not require it
to be used in that business, or take it for another public use,
without just compensation, for that would contravene the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reagan v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362
154 U. S. 396
et seq.; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466
169 U. S. 523
169 U. S. 526
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Penna. R. Co., supra,
195 U. S. 571
Page 276 U. S. 194
Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U.
; Michigan Commission v. Duke,
266 U. S. 570
266 U. S.
As against those not using it for the purpose of transportation,
petitioner's railroad is private property in every legal sense. The
driveway in question is owned and held by petitioner in the same
right and stands on the same footing as its other facilities. Its
primary purpose is to provide means of ingress and egress for
patrons and others having business with the petitioner. But, if any
part of the land in the driveway is capable of other use that does
not interfere with the discharge of its obligations as a carrier,
petitioner, as an incident of its ownership and in order to make
profit for itself, has a right to use or permit others to use such
land for any lawful purpose. Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co.,
supra, 199 U. S.
There was no duty upon petitioner to accord to other taxicabmen
the use of its lands simply because it had granted Welsh the
privileges specified in its contract with him. Petitioner is not
bound to permit persons having no business with it to enter its
trains, stations, or grounds to solicit trade or patronage for
themselves; they have no right to use its property to carry on
their own business. Petitioner had no contract relations with
taxicabmen other than Welsh, and owed them no duty because they did
not have any business with it. The enforcement of the ordinance
here assailed would operate to deprive petitioner of the use of the
land in question and hand it over to be used as a public hackstand
by the individual defendants and others. As to them, and so far as
concerns its use as a public hackstand, the driveway was
petitioner's private property, and could not be so appropriated in
whole or in part except upon the payment of compensation.
Under the guise of regulation, the town cannot require any part
of the driveway to be used in a service that petitioner
Page 276 U. S. 195
is under no duty to furnish. And, as petitioner's duty here
involved is confined to the business of carrying passengers by
railroad, the declaration of the ordinance that the specified part
of the driveway "is hereby designated and established as an
additional public hackstand" clearly transcends the power of
regulation. To compel the use of petitioner's land for that purpose
is to take it without compensation in contravention of the
constitutional safeguard here invoked. Great Northern Ry. Co.
v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340
238 U. S. 346
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U. S.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals is reversed, and
the decree of the district court is affirmed.
* Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.
, 199 U. S. 295
Commonwealth v. Power,
7 Metc. (Mass.) 596; Napman v.
19 Mich. 352, 356; Dingman v. Duluth, etc., R.
164 Mich. 328, 330-331; Hedding v. Gallagher,
N.H. 377; Thompson's Co. v. Whitmore,
88 N.J.Eq. 535, 536;
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kohler,
107 Kan. 673, 677; Brown
v. Railroad Co.,
75 Hun, 355, 362; Rose v. Public Service
75 W.Va. 1, 6; New York N.H. & H. R. Co.
71 Conn. 136, 137, 148; Landrigan v.
31 Ark. 50; Union Depot & Ry. Co. v.
42 Colo. 89, 97.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, concurring in part.
I agree that the decree of the circuit court of appeals
directing a dismissal of the railroad's bill should be reversed.
But I think that the decree of the district court requires serious
modification. That decree ordered, among other things:
". . . that the town of Morristown do desist and refrain, and is
hereby forever restrained and enjoined, by the attempted
enforcement of said ordinance or otherwise, from in any manner
interfering with or hindering or obstructing the complainant, the
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, in the
occupation, use or control of its said station grounds, or in
regulating the place, manner or time in which public or private
vehicles going to and from said station grounds shall enter, stand
or wait thereon or depart from the same."
This part of the decree is, in my opinion, inconsistent with the
terms of the contract between the railroad and the town, with the
decision of the highest court of the state construing the same
(Welsh v. Morristown,
98 N.J.L. 630, affirmed
Page 276 U. S. 196
nom. Welsh v. Potts,
99 N.J.L. 528), and with the
general law of New Jersey. It seems to me inconsistent, also, with
the law concerning the obligations of railroads as heretofore
declared by this Court.
The situation which confronted the town authorities was this:
about 3,000 passengers are handled in and out of the station each
day. Continuously, for nearly 10 years after the elimination of the
grade crossings, cabs had, under the direction of the town
authorities and with the acquiescence of the railroad, parked at
the place later assigned by the ordinance here in question. Then,
in 1922, arose the controversy which gave rise to the
case and to the case at bar. The bulk of the traffic
passing through the station is composed of persons commuting to
Newark and New York. Accordingly, the demand for taxicabs at the
station is largely concentrated in the late afternoon hours. There
are 42 licensed cabs in Morristown. About 25 of them were
accustomed to park at the station at various times of the day.
Presumably most of them were available for service at the rush hour
in the late afternoon. Welsh, for whom the railroad asserts the
exclusive privilege of using the driveway as a hackstand, has only
3 licensed cabs. Obviously, these are insufficient to give an
adequate service. It is true that Welsh made application for
additional licenses, and that these have been denied by the town
authorities. But the testimony shows that the authorities were of
the opinion that there were already more taxicabs in the town than
could be operated profitably. No new license had been granted to
anyone since a date preceding Welsh's application, and no cabman
had a license to operate more than three cabs.
The railroad presented this alternative to the town:
"Either grant to Welsh licenses sufficient in number to enable
him to supply the needs of all passengers arriving at the station
or submit to a denial to such passengers of
Page 276 U. S. 197
the facilities customary on leaving the station."
To escape from that dilemma, the town first resorted to the
means upheld by the New Jersey courts in the Welsh
It prohibited all parking on the driveway, and located a public
taxi stand on a public street adjacent thereto. While this provided
a service adequate so far as the number of vehicles was concerned,
it proved unsatisfactory in other respects. The taxi stand was
several hundred feet distant from the shelter house, was not easily
visible therefrom, and was difficult of access in inclement
weather. The town then passed the ordinance which gave rise to the
present suit. It undertook to establish near the station door a
public taxi stand on the railroad's land. That it clearly had no
right to do, for the contract between it and the railroad had not
made the driveway a public street. Obviously a railroad's property
cannot be taken without compensation for a purpose unconnected with
its rail transportation. Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340
238 U. S. 346
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U. S.
. A public taxi stand is such an unconnected purpose.
It would be open to use by cabs which do not serve the patrons of
the railroad, as well as those which do. In establishing this
public taxi stand, the town exceeded its powers. Enforcement of
this ordinance was properly enjoined. And, since the individual
defendants must base their claims on the ordinance, the injunction
against them also was proper. Compare Donovan v. Pennsylvania
Co., 199 U. S. 279
Thompson's Express & Storage Co. v. Mount,
But the injunction granted by the district court was so broad as
to prevent the town from making, by future ordinance, provisions
which it may deem necessary to assure to its inhabitants adequate
cab facilities. While the contract between the town and the
railroad did not make the driveway a public highway, it did not
Page 276 U. S. 198
rights which the town would otherwise have had under the New
Jersey law and under decisions of this Court. Under the New Jersey
law, the railroad was bound to keep the driveway open to all
persons seeking access to and from the station on legitimate
business. It could not obstruct the driveway by physical enclosure.
Public Service Ry. Co. v. Weehawken,
94 N.J.Eq. 88, 92. It
could not, by its private contract with Welsh, interfere with the
power of the municipality to make appropriate regulations as to
traffic there. Welsh v. Morristown, supra.
For, as the New
Jersey court said, "the driveway in question was and is devoted to
public use, although the fee thereof remained in the railroad
company." Like all property of a carrier by railroad, the driveway
was subject to the power of the state to compel the provision of
adequate facilities incident to the rail transportation.
In these days, the ability of the traveler to obtain
conveniently, upon reaching the street door of the station, a
taxicab to convey him and his hand baggage to his ultimate
destination is an essential of adequate rail transportation. The
duties of a rail carrier are not necessarily limited to
transporting freight and passengers to and from its stations. It
must, in connection with its stations, provide adequately for
ingress and for egress. And if it does not itself provide the
facilities essential for the convenient removal of freight and
passengers from the station, it may be required to let others
provide them. That a railroad's obligations may be extended beyond
its rails is settled by numerous decisions of this Court.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Corporation Commission,
206 U. S. 1
206 U. S. 21
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Iowa,
233 U. S. 334
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Railroad Commission,
236 U. S. 615
Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U.
; Lake Erie & Western R.
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
Page 276 U. S. 199
U.S. 422. A state may require a railroad to construct stations.
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Minnesota,
193 U. S. 53
may compel the building of a crossing for the convenience of
shippers in removing freight. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 265 U. S. 70
265 U. S. 74
Its power to require adequate provision for carrying passengers to
their ultimate destination rests on the same basis. Compare New
York ex rel. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S.
, 192 U. S.
The Lackawanna Railroad recognized the importance of proper cab
service. It undertook to provide it by the contract with Welsh. But
Welsh was in no position to furnish adequate service. He had only
three licensed cabs. The railroad answers that Welsh agreed by his
contract with it to supply as many cabs as were needed, and that,
but for the refusal of the town to grant him more licenses, he
would have supplied the requisite number. The town was not obliged
to issue additional licenses to Welsh. Its refusal to do so was not
arbitrary or unreasonable. The ground of its refusal was that the
granting of additional licenses would ruin the business of the
established cabmen who had long been engaged in serving its
inhabitants, and thus would impair the cab service of the general
public throughout the town. The principle on which the town acted
is one that is general in motor vehicle regulation today.* It is
one that has been approved
Page 276 U. S. 200
by this Court. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266
270 U. S. 277
Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co.,
273 U. S. 45
273 U. S. 52
Compare Packard v. Banton, 264 U.
, 264 U. S. 145
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission,
271 U. S. 583
271 U. S.
The record shows that the service which Welsh can furnish is
inadequate, that to grant him sufficient licenses to enable him to
furnish such service would impair taxi service throughout the town,
and that a taxi stand located elsewhere than on the driveway does
not satisfy the needs of travelers leaving the station. If, under
these circumstances, the town should pass an ordinance
Page 276 U. S. 201
on the driveway, a taxi stand available only to incoming
passengers, I see no reason why, under the contract between it and
the railroad or under the general laws of New Jersey, it may not do
so. Certainly Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.
, presents no obstacle. For, in that case, the
Court expressly left open the question whether the state, to secure
adequate service, might require what the cabmen there asserted of
own right. Page 199 U. S. 298
Compare Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Public Service
Moreover, the decree is subject to another infirmity. By its
broad language, it restrains the town from making and enforcing
reasonable traffic regulations applicable to the driveway. In so
doing, it conflicts with both the terms of the contract and the
decision of the New Jersey courts in the Welsh
contract between the railroad and the town expressly declares that
"shall be kept open at all times for passengers, pedestrians,
carriages, wagons, automobiles and general vehicular traffic to and
from the station grounds,"
"the town may and shall exercise all necessary police powers in
and upon the station, station grounds, approaches, and driveways,
for the purpose of regulating foot and vehicular traffic."
It was decided in Welsh v. Morristown,
98 N.J.L. 630,
affirmed sub nom. Welsh v. Potts,
99 N.J.L. 528, that,
under this contract the town had power to prohibit all parking on
the driveway. That construction, being a ruling on a matter of law,
is binding upon us. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St.
Paul Water Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349
168 U. S. 358
Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101
237 U. S.
-113. Compare Detroit v. Osborne,
135 U. S. 492
135 U. S.
-500; Hartford Insurance Co. v. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 175 U. S.
, 175 U. S.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES concurs in this opinion.
* In at least nine states, the commission charged with the duty
of licensing bus operators is specifically directed to consider the
transportation service already furnished and the effect which the
proposed service would have upon it. Colorado, Compiled Laws 1921,
§ 2946; Kansas, Laws 1925, c. 206, § 4; Kentucky, Acts 1926, c.
112, § 4; Montana, Laws 1923, c. 154, § 4; North Dakota, Laws 1925,
c. 91, §§ 4, 5, 8; Ohio, Page's Code 1926, § 614-87; South Dakota,
Laws 1925, c. 224, § 3; West Virginia, Barnes' Code Supp. 1925, c.
43, § 82; Wyoming, Compiled Statutes 1920, § 5497. The principle of
safeguarding established, adequate facilities is applied by
commissions in passing upon applications for certificates of
convenience and necessity, and by courts in reviewing their orders,
although there is not a specific direction in the statute. In the
following cases, the orders of commissions granting certificates of
convenience and necessity were set aside on the ground that it did
not sufficiently appear that existing facilities were inadequate:
West Suburban Transportation Co. v. Chicago & West Towns
309 Ill. 87; Choate v. Commerce Commission,
309 Ill. 248; Superior Motor Bus Co. v. Community Motor Bus
320 Ill. 175; Cooper v. McWilliams &
221 Ky. 320; Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Public
112 Ohio St. 699; East End Traction
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
115 Ohio St. 119;
Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities
116 Ohio St. 36; Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Ry. Co. v. State,
123 Okl.190. In Red Star
Transportation Co. v. Red Dot Coach Lines,
220 Ky. 424,
McLain v. Public Utilities Commission,
110 Ohio St. 1, and
Abbott v. Public Utilities Commission
(R.I.), 136 A. 490,
orders denying certificates were sustained, on the ground that the
proposed operation would have impaired adequate transportation
facilities already established. The same principles apply with
regard to municipal regulation of jitney busses. Cloe v.
209 Ala. 544, 545-546; Birmingham Interurban
Taxicab Service Corp. v. McLendon,
210 Ala. 525; State v.
City of Spokane,
109 Wash. 360. That a railroad has no
preferred claim to the grant of a certificate, see Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Department of Public Works,
144 Wash. 47.
Compare Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. State Road
(W.Va.), 139 S.E. 744.