Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,
Annotate this Case
154 U.S. 362 (1894)
- Syllabus |
U.S. Supreme Court
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894)
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company
Argued April 4-5, 1894
Decided May 28, 1894
154 U.S. 362
Without passing upon the validity of the 5th and 14th sections of the Act of the Legislature of Texas of April 3, 1891, establishing a railroad commission with power to classify and regulate rates, the remainder of the act is a valid and constitutional exercise of the state sovereignty, and the commission created thereby is an administrative board, created for carrying into effect the will of the state as expressed by its legislation.
A citizen of another state who feels himself aggrieved and injured by the rates prescribed by that commission may seek his remedy in equity against the commissioners in the circuit court of the United states in Texas, and the circuit court has jurisdiction over such a suit under the statutes regulating its general jurisdiction, with the assent of Texas, expressed in the act creating the commission.
Such a suit is not a suit against the State of Texas.
It is within the power of a court of equity in such case to decree that the rates so established by the commission are unreasonable and unjust and to restrain their enforcement, but it is not within its power to establish rates itself or to restrain the commission from again establishing rates.
On April 3, 1891, the Legislature of the State of Texas passed an act to establish a railroad commission. The first section provides for the appointment and qualification of three persons to constitute the commission; the second for the organization of the commission, while the third defines the powers and duties of the commission, and is as follows:
"SEC. 3. The power and authority is hereby vested in the Railroad Commission of Texas and it is hereby made its duty, to adopt all necessary rates, charges, and regulations to govern and regulate railroad freight and passenger tariffs, the power to correct abuses and prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the different railroads in this state and to enforce the same by having the penalties inflicted as by this act prescribed through proper courts having jurisdiction. "
"(a) The said commission shall have power, and it shall be its duty, to fairly and justly classify and subdivide all freight and property of whatsoever character that may be transported over the railroads of this state into such general and special classes or subdivisions as may be found necessary and expedient."
"(b) The commission shall have power, and it shall be its duty, to fix to each class or subdivision of freight a reasonable rate for each railroad subject to this act for the transportation of each of said classes and subdivisions."
"(c) The classifications herein provided for shall apply to and be the same for all railroads subject to the provisions of this act."
"(d) The said commission may fix different rates for different railroads and for different lines under the same management, or for different parts of the same lines if found necessary to do justice, and may make rates for express companies different from the rates fixed for railroads."
"(e) The said commission shall have power, and it shall be its duty, to fix and establish for all or any connecting lines of railroad in this state reasonable joint rates of freight charges for the various classes of freight and cars that may pass over two or more lines of such railroads."
"(f) If any two or more connecting railroads shall fail to agree upon a fair and just division of the charges arising from the transportation of freights, passengers or cars over their lines, the commission shall fix the pro rata part of such charges to be received by each of said connecting lines."
"(g) Until the commission shall make the classifications and schedules of rates as herein provided for, and afterwards if they deem it advisable, they may make partial or special classifications for all or any of the railroads subject hereto, and fix the rates to be charged by such roads therefor, and such classifications and rates shall be put into effect in the manner provided for general classifications and schedules of rates."
"(h) The commission shall have power, and it shall be its duty from time to time, to alter, change, amend, or abolish
any classification or rate established by it when deemed necessary, and such amended, altered, or new classifications or rates shall be put into effect in the same manner as the originals."
"(i) The commission may adopt and enforce such rules, regulations, and modes of procedure as it may deem proper to hear and determine complaints that may be made against the classifications or the rates, the rules, regulations, and determinations of the commission."
"(j) The commission shall make reasonable and just rates of charges for each railroad subject hereto for the use or transportation of loaded or empty cars on its road, and may establish for each railroad or for all railroads alike reasonable rates for the storing and handling of freight and for the use of cars not unloaded after forty-eight hours' notice to the consignee, not to include Sundays."
"(k) The commission shall make and establish reasonable rates for the transportation of passengers over each or all of the railroads subject hereto, which rates shall not exceed the rates fixed by law. The commission shall have power to prescribe reasonable rates, tolls, or charges for all other services performed by any railroad subject hereto."
The first paragraph of the fourth section is in these words:
"SEC. 4. Before any rates shall be established under this act, the commission shall give the railroad company to be affected thereby ten days' notice of the time and place when and where the rates shall be fixed, and said railroad company shall be entitled to be heard at such time and place, to the end that justice may be done, and it shall have process to enforce the attendance of its witnesses. All process herein provided for shall be served as in civil cases."
The remaining paragraphs give power to adopt rules of procedure. The fifth, sixth, and seventh sections are as follows:
"SEC. 5. In all actions between private parties and railway companies brought under this law, the rates, charges, orders, rules, regulations, and classifications prescribed by said commission before the institution of such action shall be held conclusive, and deemed and accepted to be reasonable, fair,
and just, and in such respects shall not be controverted therein until finally found otherwise in a direct action brought for that purpose in the manner prescribed by sections 6 and 7 hereof."
"SEC. 6. If any railroad company or other party at interest be dissatisfied with the decision of any rate, classification, rule, charge, order, act, or regulation adopted by the commission, such dissatisfied company or party may file a petition setting forth the particular cause or causes of objection to such decision, act, rate, rule, charge, classification, or order, or to either or all of them, in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Texas, against said commission as defendant. Said action shall have precedence over all other causes on the docket of a different nature, and shall be tried and determined as other civil causes in said court. Either party to said action may appeal to the appellate court having jurisdiction of said cause, and said appeal shall be at once returnable to said appellate court at either of its terms, and said action so appealed shall have precedence in said appellate court of all causes of a different character therein pending, provided that if the court be in session at the time such right of action accrues, the suit may be filed during such term and stand ready for trial after ten days' notice."
"SEC. 7. In all trials under the foregoing section, the burden of proof shall rest upon the plaintiff, who must show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the rates, regulations, orders, classifications, acts, or charges complained of are unreasonable and unjust to it or them."
Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 contain special provisions which are not material to the consideration of any question presented in this case.
Section 14 reads:
"SEC. 14. If any railroad company subject to this act or its agent or officer shall hereafter charge, collect, demand or receive from any person, company, firm or corporation a greater rate, charge, or compensation than that fixed and established by the railroad commission for the transportation of freight, passengers, or cars, or for the use of any car on
the line of its railroad or any line operated by it, or for receiving, forwarding, handling, or storing any such freight or cars, or for any other service performed or to be performed by it, such railroad company and its said agent and officer shall be deemed guilty of extortion, and shall forfeit and pay to the State of Texas a sum not less than $100 nor more than $5,000."
Section 15 defines "unjust discrimination," and imposes a penalty of not less than $500 nor more than $5,000 upon any railroad company violating any provision of the section.
Section 16 is leveled against officers and agents of railroads, and imposes a penalty of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 for certain offenses denounced therein.
Section 17 declares that any railroad company violating the provisions of the act shall be liable to the persons injured thereby for the damages sustained in consequence of such violation, and in case it is guilty of extortion or discrimination, as defined in the act, shall pay, in addition to such damages, to the person injured, a penalty of not less than $125 nor more than $500.
In sections 18 and 19 are further provisions as to penalties. The remaining sections, 20 to 24, inclusive, contain matter of detail which is unimportant in this case.
Three of the plaintiffs in error, Reagan, McLean, and Foster, were duly appointed and qualified as members of said railroad commission, and organized it on the 10th day of June, 1891. The other plaintiff in error, Culberson, is the Attorney General of the state, who, by section 19 of the act, was charged with the duty of instituting suits in the name of the state for the recovery of all the penalties prescribed by the act excepting those recoverable by individuals under the authority of section 17.
After the commission had organized, on June 10 it proceeded to establish certain rates for the transportation of goods over the railroads in the state and also certain regulations for the management of such transportation. Thereafter, on April 30, 1892, the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company filed its bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District
of Texas, making as defendants the railroad commissioners, the Attorney General, the International and Great Northern Railroad Company, and Thomas M. Campbell, the receiver thereof, duly appointed by the District Court of Smith County, Texas. That bill, which is too long to be copied in full, alleged that the plaintiff was the trustee in a trust deed executed by the railroad company on the 15th day of June, 1881, to secure a second series of bonds, aggregating $7,054.000, bearing interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, and that there was a prior issue of bonds, to the amount of $7,954,000, secured by a conveyance to John S. Kennedy and Samuel Sloan, as trustees. It then set forth the railroad commission act, heretofore referred to, or so much thereof as was deemed material, the proceedings of the commission, and the notices that were given to the railroad company, and attached as exhibits the several orders prescribing rates and regulations. It also averred generally that such rates were unreasonable and unjust, set forth certain specific facts which it claimed established the injustice and unreasonableness of those rates, and prayed a decree restraining the commission from enforcing those rates or any other rates, and also restraining the Attorney General from instituting any suits to recover penalties for failing to conform to such rates and obey such regulations. The International and Great Northern Railroad Company appeared, filed an answer and also a cross-bill similar in its scope and effect to the bill filed by the plaintiff and praying substantially the same relief. The railroad commission and the Attorney General at first filed answers, but, after a certain amount of testimony had been taken, of the nature and extent of which we are not advised inasmuch as it is not preserved in the record, they withdrew their answers and filed demurrers, leave being given at the same time to the complainant and cross-complainant to amend the bill and cross-bill before the filing of the demurrer. The amendments to the bill and cross-bill were similar, and contained allegations more in detail of the losses in revenue sustained by the company through the enforcement of the tariffs and the average reduction caused by such tariffs in the rate theretofore existing,
and also setting forth certain contract rights under an act of the Legislature of the State of Texas passed on February 7, 1853. Thereafter the cause was submitted to the court on the bills and cross-bills and demurrers, and on March 23, 1893, a decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff, as follows:
"This cause having been set down for final hearing on the pleadings and evidence, and being called for hearing thereon, the defendants John H. Reagan, William P. McLean, L. L. Foster, and Charles A. Culberson presented their motion, on file herein, for leave to withdraw their answers and file demurrers, which motion was granted, conditioned upon the said defendants' paying all costs of taking depositions and evidence herein against them to be taxed and for which execution may issue, and on condition that the complainant and cross-complainant have leave to amend before the filing of the demurrers of the said defendants, which leave was granted, and whereupon said amendments were filed, and the demurrers of the said defendants were filed to the original bill of complaint and cross-bill in this cause, as also to all amendments thereto, and were by complainant and cross-complainant set down for argument, by consent, and were by all parties forthwith submitted. And thereupon, in consideration thereof, it was ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said demurrers be, and the same are hereby, overruled. And the defendants John H. Reagan, William P. McLean, L. L. Foster, and Charles A. Culberson having entered of record their refusal to make further answer, and the fact that they stood upon their demurrers, and all parties submitting the cause for final decree, it is now, upon consideration thereof, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the bill of complaint, as amended, and the cross-bill of complaint, as amended, in the above-entitled cause, be, and the same are hereby, sustained and taken for confessed. And the said cause coming on further to be heard upon the bill of complaint herein, as amended, and upon the answer of the defendant railroad company thereto confessing the same, it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows, to-wit:"
"First. That the injunctions heretofore issued in this
cause be, and the same are hereby, made perpetual, and accordingly."
"Second. That defendant, the International and Great Northern Railroad Company be, and it is hereby, perpetually enjoined, restrained, and prohibited from putting or continuing in effect the rates, tariffs, circulars, or orders of the Railroad Commission of Texas, or either or any of them, as described in the bill of complaint herein, and in Exhibit C, thereto and therewith filed, and from charging, or continuing to charge, the rates specified in said tariffs, circulars, or orders, or either or any of them."
"Third. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the defendants the Railroad Commission of Texas and the defendants John H. Reagan, William P. McLean, and L. L. Foster, acting as the Railroad Commission of Texas, and their successors in office, and the defendant Charles A. Culberson, acting as Attorney General of the State of Texas, and his successors in office, be, and they are hereby, perpetually enjoined, restrained, and prohibited from instituting or authorizing or directing any suit or suits, action or actions, against the defendant railroad company for the recovery of any penalties under and by virtue of the provisions of the act of the Legislature of the State of Texas approved April 3, 1891, and fully described in the bill of complaint, or under or by virtue of any of the said tariffs, orders, or circulars of the said Railroad Commission of Texas, or any or either of them, or under or by virtue of the said act and the said tariffs, orders, or circulars of said railroad commission, or any or either of them combined, and said defendants Reagan, McLean, and Foster, and the Railroad Commission of Texas are further perpetually restrained from certifying any copy or copies of any of said orders, tariffs, or circulars, or from delivering, or causing or permitting to be delivered, certified copies of any of said orders, tariffs, or circulars to the said Culberson or any other party and from furnishing the said Culberson or any other party any information of any character for the purpose of inducing, enabling, or aiding him or any other party to institute or prosecute any suit or suits against the said defendant
railroad company for the recovery of any penalty or penalties under the said act."
"Fourth. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said Railroad Commission of Texas and the said Reagan, McLean, and Foster be perpetually enjoined, restrained, and prohibited from making, issuing, or delivering to the said railroad company, or causing to be made, issued, or delivered to it, any further tariff or tariffs, circular or circulars, order or orders."
"Fifth. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that all other individuals, persons, or corporations be, and they are hereby, perpetually enjoined, restrained, and prohibited from instituting or prosecuting any suit or suits against the said railroad company for the recovery of any damages, overcharges, penalty, or penalties, under or by virtue of the said act or any of its provisions or under and by virtue of the said tariffs, orders, or circulars of the said Railroad Commission of Texas, or any or either of them, or under and by virtue of the said act and the said tariffs, orders, and circulars, or any or either of them combined."
"Sixth. If is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that all rates, tariffs, circulars, and orders heretofore made and issued by said commission, and fully described in Exhibit C to the bill of complaint herein, be, and they are hereby, declared to be unreasonable, unfair, and unjust as to complainant and cross-complainant, and they are hereby cancelled, and declared to be null, void, and of no effect."
"Seventh. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that all costs herein be taxed against said defendants Reagan, McLean, Culberson, and Foster, and the Railroad Commission of Texas, and that execution may issue therefor."
From that decree the railroad commission and the Attorney General have appealed to this Court.