Smyth v. Ames
Annotate this Case
169 U.S. 466 (1898)
U.S. Supreme Court
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898)
Smyth v. Ames
Argued April 5-7, 1897
Decided March 7, 1898
169 U.S. 466
The adequacy or inadequacy of a remedy at law for the protection of the rights of one entitled upon any ground to invoke the powers of a federal court is not to be conclusively determined by the statutes of the particular state in which suit may be brought. One who is entitled to sue in the federal circuit court may invoke its jurisdiction in equity whenever the established principles and rules of equity permit such a suit in that court, and he cannot be deprived of that right by reason of his being allowed to sue at law in a state court on the same cause of action.
A suit against individuals for the purpose of preventing them as officers of a state from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff is not a suit against the state within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.
Until Congress, in the exercise either of the power specifically reserved by the eighteenth section of the Act of July 1, 1862, incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company, or its power under the general reservation made of authority to add to, alter, amend or repeal that act, prescribes rates to be charged by that company, it remains with the states through which the road passes to fix rates for transportation beginning and ending within their respective limits.
It is settled that --
(1) A railroad corporation is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
(2) A state enactment, or regulations made under the authority of a state enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of persons or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under all the circumstances is just to it and to the public would deprive such carrier of its property without due process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, and would therefore be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
(3) While rates for the transportation of persons and property within the limits of a state are primarily for its determination, the question whether they are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without such compensation as the Constitution secures, and therefore without due process of law, cannot be so conclusively determined by the legislature of the state or by. regulations adopted under its authority that the matter may not become the subject of judicial inquiry.
The grant to the Legislature in the Constitution of Nebraska of the power to establish maximum rates for the transportation of passengers and freight on railroads in that state has reference to "reasonable" maximum rates, as the words strongly imply that it was not intended to give a power to fix maximum rates without regard to their reasonableness, and as it cannot be admitted that the power granted may be exerted in derogation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States, and that the judiciary may not, when its jurisdiction is properly invoked, protect those rights.
The idea that any legislature, state or federal, can conclusively determine for the people and for the courts that what it enacts in the form of law, or what it authorizes its agents to do, is consistent with the fundamental law is in opposition to the theory of our institutions, as the duty rests upon all courts, federal and state, when their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to see to it that no right secured by the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed by legislation.
The reasonableness or unreasonableness of rates prescribed by a state for the transportation of persons and property wholly within its limits must be determined without reference to the interstate business done by the carrier, or to the profits derived from that business. The state cannot justify unreasonably low rates for domestic transportation, considered alone, upon the ground that the carrier is earning large profits on its interstate business, over which, so far as rates are concerned, the state has no control; nor can the carrier justify unreasonably high rates on domestic business upon the ground that it will be able only in that way to meet losses on its interstate business.
A railroad is a public highway, and nonetheless so because constructed and maintained through the agency of a corporation deriving its existence and powers from the state. Such a corporation was created for public purposes. It performs a function of the state. Its authority to exercise the right of eminent domain and to charge tolls was given primarily for the benefit of the public. It is therefore under governmental control -- subject, of course, to the constitutional guarantees for the protection of its property. It may not fix its rates with a view solely to its own interests, and ignore the rights of the public; but the rights of the public would be ignored if rates for the transportation of persons or property on a railroad were exacted without reference to the fair value of the property used for the public or of the services rendered, and in order simply that the corporation may meet operating
expenses, pay the interest on its obligations, and declare a dividend to stockholders.
If a railroad corporation has bonded its property for an amount that exceeds its fair value, or if its capitalization is largely fictitious, it may not impose upon the public the burden of such increased rates as may be required for the purpose of realizing profits upon such excessive valuation or fictitious capitalization, and the apparent value of the property and franchises used by the corporation, as represented by its stocks, bonds and obligations, is not alone to be considered when determining the rates that may be reasonably charged.
A corporation maintaining a public highway, although it owns the property it employs for accomplishing public objects, must be held to have accepted its rights, privileges and franchises subject to the condition that the government creating it, or the government within whose limits it conducts its business, may by legislation protect the people against the exaction of unreasonable charges for the services rendered by it, but it is equally true that the corporation performing such public services, and the people financially interested in its business and affairs, have rights that may not be invaded by legislative enactment in disregard of the fundamental guarantees for the protection of property.
The basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the public, and in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as maybe just and right in each case. What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience, and on the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is that no more be exacted from it for the use of a public highway than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth.
The effect of the Nebraska statute of 1893, entitled
"An act to regulate railroads, to classify freights, to fix reasonable maximum rates to be charged for the transportation of freights upon each of the railroads in the State of Nebraska, and to provide penalties for the violation of this act,"
is to deprive each of the companies involved in these suits of the just compensation secured to them by the Constitution of the United States, and therefore the decree below restraining its enforcement was correct.
If the circuit court finds that the present condition of business is such as to admit of the application of the statute to the railroad companies in question without depriving them of just compensation, it will be its duty to discharge the injunction heretofore granted, and to make whatever
order is necessary to remove any obstruction placed by the decrees in these cases in the way of the enforcement of the statute.
The appellees in the first of the above cases were the plaintiffs below, and are citizens of Massachusetts, and stockholders of the Union Pacific Railway Company. They sue on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. The defendants are the Union Pacific Railway Company; the St. Joseph and Grand Island Railroad Company, the Omaha and Republican Valley Railroad Company, and the Kansas City and Omaha Railroad Company -- corporations of Nebraska under the control of the Union Pacific Railway Company; certain persons, citizens of Nebraska, who hold the offices, respectively, of Attorney General, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, State Treasurer, and Commissioner of Public Lands and buildings, and constitute the State Board of Transportation, and James C. Dahlman, Joseph W. Edgerton, and Gilbert L.Laws, citizens of Nebraska, and Secretaries of that board. By a supplemental bill in the same suit, certain persons, receivers of the Union Pacific Railway Company, were made defendants.
In the second case, some of the plaintiffs, appellees here, are subjects of Queen Victoria, while the others are citizens of Massachusetts. They are all stockholders of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa, and have sued in that capacity on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. The defendants are the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company; the Fremont, Elkhorn and Missouri Valley Railroad Company, a Nebraska corporation, and the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Company a corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota and Nebraska, both under the control of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company, and the above officers constituting the State Board of Transportation, as well as those holding the positions of Secretaries of that board.
In the third case, the appellees Henry L. Higginson and others, citizens of Massachusetts, were the plaintiffs below. They sued on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders
of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Illinois and Iowa, and whose lines west of the Missouri River are known as the Burlington and Missouri Road. The defendants are the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, the persons composing the Nebraska State Board of Transportation, and the Secretaries of that board.
For the sake of brevity, the Union Pacific Railway Company will be called the "Union Pacific Company," the St. Joseph and Grand Island Railroad Company the "St. Joseph Company," the Omaha and Republican Valley Railroad Company the "Omaha Company," the Kansas City and Omaha Railroad Company the "Kansas City Company," the Fremont, Elkhorn and Missouri Valley Railroad Company the "Fremont Company," the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Company the "St. Paul Company," and the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company the "Burlington Company."
Each of these suits was brought July 28, 1893, and involves the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature of Nebraska approved by the Governor April 12, 1893, and which took effect August 1, 1893. It was an act
"to regulate railroads, to classify freights, to fix reasonable maximum rates to be charged for the transportation of freights upon each of the railroads in the State of Nebraska, and to provide penalties for the violation of this act."
Acts of Nebraska, 1893, c. 24; Compiled Statutes of Nebraska, 1893, c. 72, art. 12. The act is referred to in the record as "House Roll 33."
Prior to the enactment of that statute, the legislature passed an act to regulate railroads, prevent unjust discrimination, provide for a Board of Transportation, and define its duties, and repeal articles 5 and 8 of chapter 72, entitled "Railroads," of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska, and all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith, the same being chapter 60 of the Session Laws of 1887, and now article 8 of chapter 72 of the Compiled Statutes of Nebraska of 1893. By that act, the Attorney General, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, State Treasurer, and Commissioner of Public Lands
and Buildings were constituted a Board of Transportation, with power to appoint three Secretaries to assist in the performance of its duties and with authority to inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers subject to its provisions and obtain from them the full and complete information necessary to enable the board to perform its duties and carry out the objects for which it was created. It was also provided that, for the purposes of the act, the Board should have power to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation, and to that end could invoke the aid of any of the district courts or of the supreme court of the state, and that any court of competent jurisdiction in which such inquiry was carried on could, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any common carrier or person subject to the provisions of the act, issue an order requiring such carrier or other person to appear before the Board (and produce books and papers, if ordered), and give evidence touching the matter in question, and any failure to obey the order was punishable by the court as for contempt. The claim that any testimony or evidence might tend to criminate the person giving evidence would not excuse the witness from testifying, but such evidence or testimony could not be used against him on the trial of any criminal proceeding.
The power to enact the statute whose validity is now assailed -- that is, the above statute of August 1, 1893, regulating railroads, classifying freights, fixing reasonable maximum rates, etc., in Nebraska -- was referred by counsel to the general legislative power of the state, as well as to the fourth section of Article XI of the state constitution which provides:
"Railways heretofore constructed, or that may hereafter be constructed in this state, are hereby declared public highways, and shall be free to all persons for the transportation of their persons and property thereon, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. And the legislature may from time to time pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight on
the different railroads in this state. The liability of railroad corporations as common carriers shall never be limited."
By the first section of that statute, it is declared that, except as therein otherwise provided, its provisions shall apply to all railroad corporations, railroad companies, and common carriers engaged in Nebraska in the transportation of freight by railroad therein, and also to shipments of property made from any point within the state to any other point within its limits. That section provides.
"The term 'railroad,' as used in this act, shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation, receiver, trustee or other person operating a railroad whether owned or operated under contract, agreement, lease or otherwise, and the term 'transportation' shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage, and the term 'railroad corporation' contained in this act shall be deemed and taken to mean all corporations, companies or individuals, now owning or operating, or which may hereafter own or operate, any railroad, in whole or in part, in this state, and the provisions of this act, except as in this act other wise provided, shall apply to all persons, firm and companies, and to all associations of persons, whether incorporated or otherwise that shall do business as common carrier of freight upon any of the lines of railway in this state, the same as to railroad corporations herein mentioned."
The second section provides that all freight or property to be transported by any railroad company or companies mentioned in the first section
"from any point in the State of Nebraska to any other point in said state shall be classified as hereinafter in this section provided, and any other or different classification of freight which would raise the rates on class or commodity of freights above the rates prescribed in this act, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. The classification established by this act shall be known as the 'Nebraska Classification.' Freights shall be billed at the actual weight unless otherwise directed in the classification -- twenty thousand pounds shall
be a carload, and all excessive weights shall be at the same rate per hundred pounds, except in carloads of light and bulky articles, and unless otherwise specified in the classification. When the classification makes an article 'released' or 'owner's risk,' the same at carrier's risk will be the next highest rate higher, unless otherwise provided in the classification. Articles rated first class, 'released' or owner's risk, if taken at 'carrier's risk,' will be 1 1/2 times first class unless otherwise provided in the classification. All articles carried according to this classification at 'owner's risk' of fire, leakage, damage or breakage must be so receipted for by agents of the railroad, and so considered by owners and shippers. Signing a release contract by a shipper shall not release the railroad company for loss or damages caused by carelessness or negligence of its employees."
Following this section, in the body of the statute, are tables of the classification of freights.
The third section is in these words:
"That each of the railroads in the State of Nebraska shall charge for the transportation of freight from any point in said state to any other point in said state, no higher or greater rate of charge than is by this act fixed as the reasonable maximum rate for the distance hauled, and the reasonable maximum rates for the transportation of freight by railroad from any point in the State of Nebraska to any other point in said state are declared and established to be as hereinafter in this section fixed for the distance named, and any higher or greater rate for the distance hauled than that herein fixed and established is prohibited and declared to be unlawful, and the reasonable maximum rate herein fixed and established shall be known as the 'Nebraska Schedule of Reasonable Maximum Rates.'"
Here follow tables of the rates prescribed by the statute.
That the full scope of the act may appear, its remaining sections are given as follows:
"§ 4. All railroads or parts thereof which have been built in this state since the 1st day of January 1889, or may be built before the 31st day of December 1899, shall be exempt
from the provisions of this act until the 31st day of December 1899."
"§ 5. Whenever any railroad company or companies in this state shall in a proper action show by competent testimony that the schedule of rates prescribed by the act are unjust and unreasonable, such railroad or railroads shall be exempt therefrom as hereinafter provided. All such actions shall be brought before the Supreme Court, in the name of the railroad company or companies bringing the same, and against the State of Nebraska, and upon the hearing thereof, if the court shall become satisfied that the rates herein prescribed are unjust insofar as they relate to the railroad bringing the action, [it] may issue their [its] order directing the Board of Transportation to permit such railroad to raise its rates to any sum in the discretion of the Board: provided that in no case shall the rates so raised be fixed at a higher sum than that charged by such railroad on the first day of January 1893. Whenever any railroad company in this state shall claim the benefit of the provisions of this section, it shall be the duty of such railroad company to show to the court all matters pertaining to the management thereof, and if it shall appear that said railroad company is operating branch lines of railroad in connection with its main line, and all included in one system, then, in that case, it shall be the duty of the railroad company to show to the court upon which branch or branches, or upon which portion of such system the schedule of rates prescribed in this act is unjust and unreasonable, and only such portions shall be exempted from the provisions thereof: provided that in no case shall a railroad company be allowed to pool the earnings of all the lines operated under one management, where more than one line is so operated, for the purpose of lowering the general average."
"§ 6. That the Board of Transportation is hereby empowered and directed to reduce the rates on any class or commodity in the schedule of rates fixed in this act whenever it shall seem just and reasonable to a majority of said Board so to reduce any rate, and said Board of Transportation is hereby empowered and directed to revise said classification of
freight as hereinbefore in this act established, whenever it shall appear to a majority of said Board just and reasonable to revise said classification: provided that said Board of Transportation shall never change the classification in the act established, so that, by such change or classification the rates on any freight will become higher or greater than in this act fixed. When any reduction of rates or revision of classification shall be made by said Board, it shall be the duty of said Board to cause notice thereof to be published two successive weeks in some public newspaper, published in the City of Lincoln, in this state, which notice shall state the date of the taking effect of such change of rate or classification, and said change of rate or classification so made by the said Board and published in said notice, shall take effect at the time so stated in said notice."
"§ 7. That articles not enumerated in said classification in section two of this act established, not rated in said schedule of rates in section three of this act, shall be classed with analogous articles in said classification, and where there is any conflict between said classification and said schedule of maximum rates, said rates shall govern."
"§ 8. That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall do, or cause to be done, or permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this act required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for all damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this act, together with cost of suit and a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in which the same is heard on appeal or otherwise, which shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case: provided that in all cases, demand in writing on said common carrier shall be made for the money damages sustained before suit is brought for recovery under this section, and that no suit shall be brought until the expiration of fifteen days after such demand"
"§ 9. That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions
of this act shall do, or cause to be done, or permit to be done, any act, matter or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or thing in this act required to be done, such common carrier shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than one thousand dollars, nor more than five thousand dollars for the first offense, and for the second offense not less than five thousand dollars, nor more than ten thousand dollars, and for the third offense, not less than ten thousand dollars, nor more than twenty thousand dollars, and for every subsequent offense and conviction thereof, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars: provided, that in all cases under this act either party shall have the right of trial by jury."
"§ 10. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are repealed."
These cases were heard at the same time, and in the one in which the Union Pacific Company, the St. Joseph Company, the Omaha Company, and the Kansas City Company were defendants it was adjudged in the circuit court -- MR. JUSTICE BREWER presiding -- as follows:
"That the said railroad companies, and each and every of them, and said receivers, be perpetually enjoined and restrained from making or publishing a schedule of rates to be charged by them, or any or either of them, for the transportation of freight on and over their respective roads in this state from one point to another therein, whereby such rate shall be reduced to those prescribed by the act of the legislature of this state, called in the bill filed therein, 'House Roll 33,' and entitled 'An act to regulate railroads, to classify freights, to fix reasonable maximum rates to be charged for the transportation of freight upon each of the railroads in the State of Nebraska, and to provide penalties for the violation of this act,' approved April 12, 1893, and below those now charged by said companies, or either of them, or their receivers, or in any wise obeying, observing, or conforming to the provisions, commands, injunctions, and prohibitions of said alleged act, and that the Board of Transportation of said state and the members and Secretaries
of said Board be in like manner perpetually enjoined and restrained from entertaining, hearing, or determining any complaint to it against said railroad companies, or any or either of them or their receivers, for or on account of any act or thing by either of said companies or their receivers, their officers, agents, servants, or employees, done, suffered, or omitted, which may be forbidden or commanded by said alleged act, and from instituting or prosecuting, or causing to be instituted or prosecuted, any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, against either of said companies or their receivers for any act or thing done, suffered or omitted, which may be forbidden or commanded by said act, and particularly from reducing its present rates of charges for transportation of freight to those prescribed in said act, and that the Attorney General of this state be in like manner enjoined from bringing, aiding in bringing, or causing to be brought, any proceeding by way of injunction, mandamus, civil action, or indictment against said companies, or either of them, or their receivers, for or on account of any action or omission on their part commanded or forbidden by the said act, and that a writ of injunction issue out of this Court, and under the seal thereof, directed to the said defendants, commanding, enjoining, and restraining them as hereinbefore set forth, which injunction shall be perpetual save as is hereinafter provided. And it is further declared, adjudged, and decreed that the act above entitled is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States forasmuch as by the provisions of said act the said defendant railroad companies may not exact for the transportation of freight from one point to another within this state charges which yield to the said companies, or either of them, reasonable compensation for such services. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the defendant members of the Board of Transportation of said state may hereafter, when the circumstances have changed so that the rates fixed in the said act shall yield to the said companies' reasonable compensation for the services aforesaid, apply to this Court by supplemental bill or otherwise, as they may be advised, for a further order in that behalf. It is further ordered, adjudged, and
decreed that the plaintiffs recover of the said defendants their costs to be taxed by the clerk."
The above decree was in accordance with the prayer for relief. A similar decree was rendered in each of the other cases.
The present appeals were prosecuted by the defendants constituting the State Board of Transportation, as well as by the defendants who are Secretaries of that Board.
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