Respondent Halderman, a resident of petitioner Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the
mentally retarded, brought a class action in Federal District Court
against Pennhurst, certain of its officials, the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare, and various state and county
officials (also petitioners). It was alleged that conditions at
Pennhurst violated various federal constitutional and statutory
rights of the class members as well as their rights under the
Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966
(MH/MR Act). Ultimately, the District Court awarded injunctive
relief based in part on the MH/MR Act, which was held to provide a
right to adequate habilitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least
restrictive environment" approach for the care of the mentally
retarded, and rejecting petitioners' argument that the Eleventh
Amendment barred a federal court from considering this pendent
state law claim. The court reasoned that, since that Amendment did
not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief
against state officials on the basis of federal claims, citing
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, the
same result obtained with respect to a pendent state law claim.
Held: The Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District
Court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to
state law. Pp.
465 U. S.
97-124.
(a) The principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional
limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III of
the Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state
officials when the State is the real, substantial party in
interest, regardless of whether the suit seeks damages or
injunctive relief. The Court in
Ex parte Young, supra,
recognized an important exception to this general rule: a suit
challenging the federal constitutionality of a state official's
action is not one against the State. Pp.
465 U. S.
97-103.
(b) In
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651, this Court recognized that the need to promote
the supremacy of federal law that is the basis of
Young
must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States.
Thus, the Court declined to extend the
Young doctrine
to
Page 465 U. S. 90
encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively
eliminate the States' constitutional immunity.
Edelman's
distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfilled
Young's underlying purpose of vindicating the supreme
authority of federal law while at the same time preserving to an
important degree the States' constitutional immunity. But this need
to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent when a plaintiff
alleges that a state official has violated state law. In such a
case, the entire basis for the doctrine of
Young and
Edelman disappears. A federal court's grant of relief
against state officials on the basis of state law, whether
prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme
authority of federal law. When a federal court instructs state
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law, this
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie
the Eleventh Amendment. Pp.
465 U. S.
103-106.
(c) The dissenters' view is that an allegation that official
conduct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to override
the State's protection from injunctive relief under the Eleventh
Amendment because such conduct is
ultra vires the
official's authority. This view rests on fiction, is wrong on the
law, and would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. At least insofar
as injunctive relief is sought, an error of law by state officers
acting in their official capacity will not suffice to override the
sovereign immunity of the State where the relief effectively is
against it.
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682.
Under the dissenters' view, the
ultra vires doctrine, a
narrow and questionable exception, would swallow the general rule
that a suit is against the State if the relief will run against it.
Pp.
465 U. S.
106-117.
(d) The principle that a claim that state officials violated
state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a
claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment
applies as well to state law claims brought into federal court
under pendent jurisdiction. Pp.
465 U. S.
117-121.
(e) While it may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to
pendent state law claims results in federal claims' being brought
in state court or in bifurcation of claims, such considerations of
policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the
authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a
State. Pp.
465 U. S.
121-123.
(f) The judgment below cannot be sustained on the basis of the
state law obligation of petitioner county officials, since any
relief granted against these officials on the basis of the MH/MR
Act would be partial and incomplete, at best. Such an ineffective
enforcement of state law would not appear to serve the purposes of
efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction. Pp.
465 U. S.
123-124.
673 F.2d 647, reversed and remanded.
Page 465 U. S. 91
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
465 U. S. 125.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
465 U. S.
126.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court may
award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of
state law.
Page 465 U. S. 92
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the
conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and
Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded.
See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981).
Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our
prior opinion,
see id. at
451 U. S. 5-10, it
is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent Terri Lee
Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a
class consisting of all persons who were or might become residents
of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens
(PARC); and the United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and
various Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county
commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and other
officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding Pennhurst.
Respondents' amended complaint charged that conditions at Pennhurst
violated the class members' rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394,
29 U.S.C. § 794; the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act, 89 Stat. 496, 42 U.S.C. § 6001
et seq.; and
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966
(MH/MR Act), Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and
Supp.1983-1984). Both damages and injunctive relief were
sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered
its decision.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and
Hospital, 446 F.
Supp. 1295. As noted in our prior opinion, the court's findings
were undisputed:
"Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the
residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members, but
also inadequate
Page 465 U. S. 93
for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found
that the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills of some
residents have deteriorated at Pennhurst."
451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 7
(footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions
violated each resident's right to "minimally adequate habilitation"
under the Due Process Clause and the MH/MR Act,
see 446 F.
Supp. at 1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments,
see id. at 1320-1321; and
"nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause
and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
see id. at 1321-1324.
Furthermore, the court found that
"due process demands that, if a state undertakes the
habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the
least
restrictive setting consistent with that individual's
habilitative needs."
Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the
large size of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court
ordered that "immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
residents from Pennhurst."
Id. at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the
class members,
id. at 1326, and the court appointed a
Special Master "with the power and duty to plan, organize, direct,
supervise and monitor the implementation of this and any further
Orders of the Court."
Ibid. [
Footnote 1]
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most of the
District Court's judgment.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
and Hospital, 612 F.2d 84 (1979) (en banc). It agreed that
respondents had a right to habilitation in the least restrictive
environment, but it grounded this right solely on the "bill of
rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010.
See 612 F.2d at
95-100, 104-107. The court did
Page 465 U. S. 94
not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation,
see id. at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in the
least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed except
as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be closed. The
court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life
outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal
provisions relied on by respondents precluded institutionalization.
Id. at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual
determinations by the [District Court], or by the Special Master,
as to the appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for each such
patient," guided by "a presumption in favor of placing individuals
in [community living arrangements]."
Ibid. [
Footnote 2]
On remand, the District Court established detailed procedures
for determining the proper residential placement for each patient.
A team consisting of the patient, his parents or guardian, and his
case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan
providing for habilitation of the patient in a designated community
living arrangement. The plan is subject to review by the Special
Master. A second master, called the Hearing Master, is available to
conduct hearings, upon request by the resident, his parents, or his
advocate, on the question whether the services of Pennhurst would
be more beneficial to the resident than the community living
arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing Master
then determines where the patient should reside,
Page 465 U. S. 95
subject to possible review by the District Court.
See
App. 123a-134a (Order of Apr. 24, 1980). [
Footnote 3]
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U.S.C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
451 U. S. 1 (1981).
We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine if the
remedial order could be supported on the basis of state law, the
Constitution, or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
See id.
at
451 U. S. 31.
[
Footnote 4] We also remanded
for consideration of whether any relief was available under other
provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act.
See id. at
451 U. S. 27-30
(discussing 42 U.S.C. § 6011(a), 6063(b)(5) (1976 ed., Supp.
V)).
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in
its entirety. 673 F.2d 647 (1982) (en banc). It determined that, in
a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had "spoken
definitively" in holding that the MH/MR Act required the State to
adopt the "least restrictive environment" approach for the care of
the mentally retarded.
Id. at 651 (citing
In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86,
429 A.2d
631 (1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state
statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did
not
Page 465 U. S. 96
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal
court from considering this pendent state law claim. The court
noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal court from granting
prospective injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of federal claims,
see 673 F.2d at 656 (citing
Ex
parte Young, 209 U. S. 123
(1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect
to a pendent state law claim. It reasoned that, because
Siler
v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.
S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, also involved state
officials, "there cannot be . . . an Eleventh Amendment exception
to that rule." 673 F.2d at 658. [
Footnote 5] Finally, the court rejected petitioners'
argument that it should have abstained from deciding the state law
claim under principles of comity,
see id. at 659-660, and
refused to consider petitioners' objections to the District Court's
use of a Special Master,
see id. at 651, and n. 10. Three
judges dissented in part, arguing that, under principles of
federalism and comity, the establishment of a Special Master to
supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion.
See id.
at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in part);
ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief).
See also id. at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring)
(seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special
Page 465 U. S. 97
Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of that order
would be meaningless). [
Footnote
6]
We granted certiorari, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and
remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the Court
of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District
Court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to
state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District
Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and (iii) the District
Court abused its discretion in appointing two Masters to supervise
the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need
not reach the latter two issues, for we find the Eleventh Amendment
challenge dispositive.
A
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends,
inter alia, to controversies
"between a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this
language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State of
Georgia.
Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The decision "created
such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once
proposed and adopted."
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.
S. 313,
292 U. S. 325
(1934). The Amendment provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. "
Page 465 U. S. 98
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result in
Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle
of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in
Art. III. Thus, in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.
1 (1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms
of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing
the constitutional debates concerning the scope of Art. III, the
Court determined that federal jurisdiction over suits against
unconsenting States "was not contemplated by the Constitution when
establishing the judicial power of the United States."
Id.
at
134 U. S. 15.
See Monaco v. Mississippi, supra, at
292 U. S.
322-323. [
Footnote
7] In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a
constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established
in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing
upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States that
it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that
the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not
embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties
against a State without consent given: not one brought by
citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought
by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the
Amendment is but
Page 465 U. S. 99
an exemplification."
Ex parte State of New York, 256 U.
S. 490,
256 U. S. 497
(1921) (emphasis added). [
Footnote
8]
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently
has held that a State may consent to suit against it in federal
court.
See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.
S. 436,
108 U. S. 447
(1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's consent be
unequivocally expressed.
See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U. S. 651,
415 U. S. 673
(1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity,
see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional
intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the
several States."
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.
S. 332,
440 U. S. 342
(1979) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a
State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated
stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in our federal system. A State's constitutional
interest in immunity encompasses not merely
whether it may
be sued, but
where it may be sued. [
Footnote 9] As JUSTICE MARSHALL well has
noted,
"[b]ecause
Page 465 U. S. 100
of the problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign
appear against its will in the courts of the other, a restriction
upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has long been
considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 U. S. 279,
411 U. S. 294
(1973) (concurring in result). [
Footnote 10] Accordingly, in deciding this case we must
be guided by "[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh
Amendment doctrine."
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.
S. 678,
437 U. S. 691
(1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own
citizens as well as by citizens of another state."
Employees,
supra, at
411 U. S. 280.
There may be a question, however, whether a particular suit in fact
is a suit against a State. It is clear, of course, that, in the
absence of consent, a suit in which the State or one of its
agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by
the Eleventh Amendment.
See, e.g., Florida Dept. of Health and
Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn.,
450 U. S. 147
(1981) (per curiam);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.
S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). This jurisdictional bar
applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.
See,
e.g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18,
290 U. S. 27
(1933) ("Expressly applying
Page 465 U. S. 101
to suits in equity as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily
embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the
prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the State
itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not been
entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are well
established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state
officials when "the state is the real, substantial party in
interest."
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of
Indiana, 323 U. S. 459,
323 U. S. 464
(1945).
See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.
S. 443,
123 U. S.
487-492 (1887);
Louisiana v. Jumel,
107 U. S. 711,
107 U. S.
720-723,
107 U. S.
727-728 (1883). Thus,
"[t]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an
officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would
operate against the latter."
Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57,
373 U. S. 58
(1963) (per curiam). [
Footnote
11] And, as when the State itself is named as the
Page 465 U. S. 102
defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or
injunctive relief.
See Cory v. White, 457 U. S.
85,
457 U. S. 91
(1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this general
rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in
Ex parte Young, 209 U.
S. 123 (1908), in which a federal court enjoined the
Attorney General of the State of Minnesota from bringing suit to
enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not
prohibit issuance of this injunction. The theory of the case was
that an unconstitutional enactment is "void," and therefore does
not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to
the supreme authority of the United States."
Id. at
209 U. S. 160.
Since the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct."
Ibid. .
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary to
"the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the
theory of
Young has not been provided an expansive
interpretation. Thus, in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
61 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh
Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state
officials for violation of federal law.
Id. at
415 U. S.
666-667. In particular,
Edelman held that, when
a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal
law, the federal court
Page 465 U. S. 103
may award an injunction that governs the official's future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief. Under
the theory of
Young, such a suit would not be one against
the State, since the federal law allegation would strip the state
officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying
out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the State,
and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Respondents advance
two principal arguments in support of the judgment below. [
Footnote 12] First, they contend
that, under the doctrine of
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the
suit is not against
Page 465 U. S. 104
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state law claim
properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
Respondents rely on decisions of this Court awarding relief against
state officials on the basis of a pendent state law claim.
See,
e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. at
213 U. S.
193.
We first address the contention that respondents' state law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it seeks only
prospective relief as defined in
Edelman v. Jordan, supra.
The Court of Appeals held that, if the judgment below rested on
federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials
under the doctrine established in
Edelman and
Young even though the prospective financial burden was
substantial and ongoing. [
Footnote 13]
See 673 F.2d at 656. The court
assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as
well when the official acts in violation of state law. This
argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in
Young and
Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in
Young was
justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself,
on the view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an
official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official
or representative character,"
Young, 209 U.S. at
209 U. S. 160.
This
Page 465 U. S. 105
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the Eleventh Amendment.
Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U. S. 670,
458 U. S. 685
(1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the
Young
doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal
courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials
responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States."
Young, supra, at
209 U. S. 160.
As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed,
"
Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this
Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with
the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in
the Constitution."
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82,
401 U. S. 106
(1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Our decisions
repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests
on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights.
See,
e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at
440 U. S. 337;
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232,
416 U. S. 237
(1974);
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine,
342 U. S. 299,
342 U. S. 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to promote
the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the
constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of
Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the
prospective relief authorized by
Young
"has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to
serve as a sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect."
415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 664.
But we declined to extend the fiction of
Young to
encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively
eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States. Accordingly,
we concluded that, although the difference between permissible and
impermissible relief "will not in many instances be that between
day and night," 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 667,
an award of retroactive relief necessarily
"'fall[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment
Page 465 U. S. 106
if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force.'"
Id. at
415 U. S. 665
(quoting
Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 237 (CA2 1972)
(McGowan, J., sitting by designation),
cert. denied, 411
U.S. 921 (1973)). In sum,
Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose
of
Ex parte Young, while at the same time preserving to an
important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent,
however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated
state law. In such a case, the entire basis for
the doctrine of
Young and
Edelman disappears. A
federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the
basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not
vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it
is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty
than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to
conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts
directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the
Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that
Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials
on the basis of state law.
B
The contrary view of JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent rests on fiction,
is wrong on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the
Eleventh Amendment. [
Footnote
14] Under his view, an allegation that official conduct is
contrary to a state statute would suffice to override the State's
protection under that Amendment. The theory is that such conduct is
contrary to the official's "instructions," and thus
ultra
vires his authority.
Page 465 U. S. 107
Accordingly, official action based on a reasonable
interpretation of any statute might, if the interpretation turned
out to be erroneous, [
Footnote
15] provide the basis for injunctive relief against the actors
in their official capacities. In this case, where officials of a
major state department, clearly acting within the scope of their
authority, were found not to have improved conditions in a state
institution adequately under state law, the dissent's result would
be that the State itself has forfeited its constitutionally
provided immunity.
The theory is out of touch with reality. The dissent does not
dispute that the general criterion for determining when a suit is
in fact against the sovereign is the
effect of the relief
sought.
See supra at
465 U. S. 101;
post at
465 U. S. 146,
n. 29. According to the dissent, the relief sought and ordered here
-- which in effect was that a major state institution be closed and
smaller state institutions be created and expansively funded -- did
not operate against the State. This view would make the law a
pretense. No other court or judge in the 10-year history of this
litigation has advanced this theory. And the dissent's underlying
view that the named defendants here were acting beyond and contrary
to their authority cannot be reconciled with reality -- or with the
record. The District Court in this case held that the individual
defendants "acted in the utmost good faith . . .
within the
sphere of their official responsibilities," and therefore were
entitled to immunity from damages. 446 F. Supp. at 1324 (emphasis
added). The named defendants had nothing to gain personally from
their conduct; they were not found to have acted willfully or even
negligently.
See ibid. The court expressly noted that the
individual defendants
"apparently took every means available to them to reduce the
incidents of abuse and injury, but were
Page 465 U. S. 108
constantly faced with staff shortages."
Ibid. It also found
"that the individual defendants are dedicated professionals in
the field of retardation who were given very little with which to
accomplish the habilitation of the retarded at Pennhurst."
Ibid. [
Footnote
16] As a result, all the relief ordered by the courts below was
institutional and official in character. To the extent
Page 465 U. S. 109
there was a violation of state law in this case, it is a case of
the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises. [
Footnote 17]
The dissent bases its view on numerous cases from the turn of
the century and earlier. These cases do not provide the support the
dissent claims to find. Many are simply miscited. For example, with
perhaps one exception, [
Footnote
18] none of its Eleventh Amendment cases can be said to hold
that injunctive relief could be ordered against state officials for
failing to carry out their duties under state statutes. [
Footnote 19] And
Page 465 U. S. 110
the federal sovereign immunity cases the dissent relies on for
analogy, while far from uniform, make clear that suit may not be
predicated on violations of state statutes that command purely
discretionary duties. [
Footnote
20] Since it cannot be doubted
Page 465 U. S. 111
that the statutes at issue here gave petitioners broad
discretion in operating Pennhurst,
see n 11,
supra; see also 446 F. Supp.
at 1324, the conduct alleged in this case would not be
ultra
vires even under the standards of the dissent's cases.
[
Footnote 21]
Thus, while there is language in the early cases that advances
the authority-stripping theory advocated by the dissent, this
theory had never been pressed as far as JUSTICE STEVENS would do in
this case. And when the expansive approach
Page 465 U. S. 112
of the dissent was advanced, this Court plainly and explicitly
rejected it. In
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682
(1949), the Court was faced with the argument that an allegation
that a Government official committed a tort sufficed to distinguish
the official from the sovereign. Therefore, the argument went, a
suit for an injunction to remedy the injury would not be against
the sovereign. The Court rejected the argument, noting that it
would make the doctrine of sovereign immunity superfluous. A
plaintiff would need only to "claim an invasion of his legal
rights" in order to override sovereign immunity.
Id. at
337 U. S. 693.
In the Court's view, the argument "confuse[d] the doctrine of
sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a
cause of action."
Id. at
337 U. S.
692-693. The dissent's theory suffers a like confusion.
[
Footnote 22] Under the
dissent's view, a plaintiff would need only to claim a denial of
rights protected or provided by statute in order to override
sovereign immunity. Except in rare cases, it would make the
constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity a nullity.
Page 465 U. S. 113
The crucial element of the dissent's theory was also the
plaintiff's central contention in
Larson. It is that "[a]
sovereign, like any other principal, cannot authorize its agent to
violate the law," so that, when the agent does so ,he cannot be
acting for the sovereign.
Post at
465 U. S. 153;
see also post at
465 U. S. 142,
465 U. S.
148-149,
465 U. S. 158;
cf. Larson, supra, at
337 U. S.
693-694 ("It is argued . . . that the commission of a
tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign. . . . It is on this
contention that the respondent's position fundamentally rests . .
."). It is a view of agency law that the Court in
Larson
explicitly rejected. [
Footnote
23]
Larson thus made clear that, at least insofar as
injunctive relief is sought, an error of law by state officers
acting in their official capacities will not suffice to override
the sovereign immunity of the State where the relief effectively is
against it. 337 U.S. at
337 U. S. 690,
337 U. S. 695.
[
Footnote 24] Any resulting
disadvantage to the plaintiff was "outweigh[ed]" by "the necessity
of permitting the Government
Page 465 U. S. 114
to carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial
intervention."
Id. at
337 U. S. 704.
If anything, this public need is even greater when questions of
federalism are involved.
See supra at
465 U. S.
99-100. [
Footnote
25]
The dissent in
Larson made many of the arguments
advanced by JUSTICE STEVENS dissent today, and asserted that many
of the same cases were being overruled or ignored.
Page 465 U. S. 115
See 337 U.S. at
337 U. S.
723-728 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Those arguments
were rejected, and the cases supporting them are moribund. Since
Larson was decided in 1949, [
Footnote 26] no opinion by any Member of this Court has
cited the cases on which the dissent primarily relies for a
proposition as broad as the language the dissent quotes. Many, if
not most, of these cases have not been relied upon in an Eleventh
Amendment context at all. Those that have been so cited have been
relied upon only for propositions with which no one today quarrels.
[
Footnote 27] The plain fact
is that the dissent's broad theory,
Page 465 U. S. 116
if it ever was accepted to the full extent to which it is now
pressed, has not been the law for at least a generation.
The reason is obvious. Under the dissent's view of the
ultra
vires doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment would have force only
in the rare case in which a plaintiff foolishly attempts to sue the
State in its own name, or where he cannot produce some state
statute that has been violated to his asserted injury. Thus, the
ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and questionable exception,
would swallow the general rule that a suit is against the State if
the relief will run against it. That result gives the dissent no
pause, presumably because of its view that the Eleventh Amendment
and sovereign immunity "
undoubtedly ru[n] counter to modern
democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State.'"
Post at 465 U. S. 164,
n. 48 (quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U. S. 47,
322 U. S. 59
(1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). This argument has not been
adopted by this Court. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v.
Read, supra, at 322 U. S. 51
("Efforts to force, through suits against officials, performance of
promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a
sovereign must be free from judicial compulsion in the carrying out
of its policies within the limits of the Constitution");
Larson, 337 U.S. at 337 U. S. 704
("The Government, as representative of the community as a whole,
cannot be stopped in its tracks . . ."). Moreover, the argument
substantially misses the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the Eleventh
Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is based in
large part on "the problems of federalism inherent in
making
Page 465 U. S. 117
one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the
other."
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 294
(concurring in result). The dissent totally rejects the Eleventh
Amendment's basis in federalism.
C
The reasoning of our recent decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials
on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when
-- as here -- the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly
on the State itself. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing
with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the Court of
Appeals was that this Court has granted relief against state
officials on the basis of a pendent state law claim.
See
673 F.2d at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship
between pendent jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that, when a federal court
obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other
related claims over which the court otherwise would not have
jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U. S. 715,
383 U. S. 726
(1966);
Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738,
22 U. S.
819-823 (1824). The Court also has held that a federal
court may resolve a case solely on the basis of a pendent state law
claim,
see Siler, 213 U.S. at
213 U. S.
192-193, and that, in fact, the court usually should do
so in order to avoid federal constitutional questions,
see
id. at
213 U. S. 193;
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288,
297 U. S. 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of Art. III.
The question presented is whether this doctrine
Page 465 U. S. 118
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in
Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction, relief was granted against
state officials on the basis of state law claims that were pendent
to federal constitutional claims. In none of these cases, however,
did the Court so much as mention the Eleventh Amendment in
connection with the state law claim. Rather, the Court appears to
have assumed that, once jurisdiction was established over the
federal law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would
establish power to hear the state law claims as well. The Court has
not addressed whether that doctrine has a different scope when
applied to suits against the State. This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U.
S. 499 (1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued
state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were
excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected
the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
federal constitutional claim. It held that
Ex parte Young
applied to all allegations challenging the constitutionality of
official action, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials purported to act was constitutional or
unconstitutional.
See 244 U.S. at
244 U. S. 507.
Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the
federal court of jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Amendment
question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction
extended
"to the determination of all questions involved in the case,
including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition
that may be made of the federal question, or whether it be found
necessary to decide it at all."
Id. at
244 U. S. 508.
The case then was decided solely on state law grounds.
Accord,
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.
S. 522 (1917). [
Footnote 28]
Page 465 U. S. 119
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before
us.
"[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior
decisions
sub silentio, this Court has never considered
itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us."
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528,
415 U. S. 533,
n. 5 (1974). [
Footnote 29]
We therefore view the question as an open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have been
that, once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal
question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with
respect to other claims raised in the case. This is an erroneous
view, and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh
Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh Amendment is an explicit
limitation of the judicial power of the United States."
Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. at
290 U. S. 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims against
States that otherwise would be within the
Page 465 U. S. 120
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges a
constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against the state treasury even though the claim arises
under the Constitution.
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.
S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a § 1983 action alleging a
constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the
Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on
that claim.
See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.
S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a
specific constitutional bar against hearing even federal claims
that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. [
Footnote 30] This
constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well. As noted
above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency
and efficiency derived from the general Art. III language
conferring power to hear all "cases" arising under federal law or
between diverse parties.
See Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. at
383 U. S. 725.
See also Hagans v. Lavine, supra, at
415 U. S. 545
(terming pendent jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The
Eleventh Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly
granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the adoption
and development of the Amendment,
see supra at
465 U. S.
97-100, confirms that it is an independent limitation on
all exercises of Art. III power:
"the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not
embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties
against a State without consent given,"
Ex parte State of New York, 256 U.S. at
256 U. S. 497.
If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award damages
against a State on the basis of a pendent claim. Our decision
in
Page 465 U. S. 121
Edelman v. Jordan makes clear that pendent jurisdiction
does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the
Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was
correct in exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs']
statutory claim," 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 653,
n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred an
award of retroactive relief on the basis of that pendent claim.
Id. at
415 U. S.
678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U.
S. 499 (1917), neither pendent jurisdiction nor any
other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.
[
Footnote 31] A federal
court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court's
jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
We concluded above that a claim that state officials violated state
law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim
against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
See supra at
465 U. S. 106.
We now hold that this principle applies as well to state law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.
D
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to
pendent state law claims will have a disruptive effect on
litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to
litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction,
see Gibbs,
supra, at
383 U. S. 726,
counsel against a result that may cause litigants to split causes
of action between state and federal courts. They also contend that
the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be
contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state law claims
and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of
Ex parte Young
Page 465 U. S. 122
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims
results in federal claims being brought in state court, or in
bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in this area. Under
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against state officials
for retroactive monetary relief, whether based on federal or state
law, must be brought in state court. Challenges to the validity of
state tax systems under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also must be brought in
state court.
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v.
McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of state law
commonly are split off and referred to the state courts. [
Footnote 32]
Page 465 U. S. 123
In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that such
considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional
limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate
suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. at
290 U. S. 25-26
("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the
[Amendment's] restriction"). [
Footnote 33] That a litigant's choice of forum is reduced
"has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in
our system of federalism."
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of
Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 298
(MARSHALL, J., concurring in result).
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability of the
Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state
officials, the judgment may still be upheld against petitioner
county officials. We are not persuaded. Even assuming that these
officials are not immune from suit challenging their actions under
the MH/MR Act, [
Footnote 34]
it is clear
Page 465 U. S. 124
that, without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns
Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by state officials.
Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes
almost entirely from the State,
see Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 50,
§§ 4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.1983-1984), and the costs of the
Masters have been borne by the State,
see 446 F. Supp. at
1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act contemplates that the state and county
officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs.
See In re Schmidt, 494 Pa., at 95-96, 429 A.2d at 635-636.
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the basis
of the state law obligations of petitioner county officials.
Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials on the
basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best.
Such an ineffective enforcement of state law would not appear to
serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that
must inform the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
V
The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District Court
solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act. We hold that these
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state
institutions and state officials on the basis of
Page 465 U. S. 125
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
See supra at
465 U. S. 93. On
remand, the Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any,
the judgment may be sustained on these bases. [
Footnote 35] The court also may consider whether
relief may be granted to respondents under the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6011, 6063
(1976 ed. and Supp. V). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had
acted in good faith, and therefore were immune from the damages
claims. 446 F. Supp. at 1324.
[
Footnote 2]
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion
to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless
error.
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and
Hospital, 612 F.2d 131 (1979) (en banc). The Association
subsequently was granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in
this Court.
[
Footnote 3]
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill
providing that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses
for the fiscal year July, 1981, to June, 1982. The District Court
held the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and its
Secretary in contempt, and imposed a fine of $10,000 per day.
Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt was purged on January
8, 1982. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt
order.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
673 F.2d 628 (1982),
cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
[
Footnote 4]
Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the
Act, but concluded that the District Court should not have adopted
the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing
"a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates
should remain and which should be moved to community-based
facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
managing Pennhurst. . . ."
451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 54
(WHITE J., joined by BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., dissenting in
part).
[
Footnote 5]
The Court of Appeals also noted that
"the United States is an intervening plaintiff . . . against
which even the state itself cannot successfully plead the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction,"
and that
"the counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within
the coverage of the Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants,
even money damages may be awarded."
673 F.2d at 656 (citation omitted).
As JUSTICE BRENNAN notes in his dissent,
post at
465 U. S. 126,
Judge Gibbons has expanded on his views of the Eleventh Amendment
in a recent law review article. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1889
(1983). Judge Gibbons was the author of both the first and second
opinions by the Court of Appeals in this case.
[
Footnote 6]
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December,
1982.
See App. 220a (Order of Aug. 12, 1982). The Hearing
Master remains in operation.
[
Footnote 7]
See Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 U. S. 279,
411 U. S.
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result) (The
Eleventh Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers
concerning the reach of the federal judicial power" and "restore[d]
the original understanding" that States could not be made unwilling
defendants in federal court).
See also Nevada v. Hall,
440 U. S. 410,
440 U. S.
430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id.
at
440 U. S. 437
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 8]
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to
entertain such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a
proceeding.
"The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an
explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling
force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this
Amendment . . . even though urged for the first time in this
Court."
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana,
323 U. S. 459,
323 U. S. 467
(1945).
[
Footnote 9]
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's
waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of
the Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts.
See,
e.g., Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147,
450 U. S. 150
(1981) (per curiam).
"[I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as
state courts. . . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention
to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own
creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S.
47,
322 U. S. 54
(1944)
[
Footnote 10]
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at
440 U. S.
418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether
they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and the
debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal
judicial power).
Cf. id. at
440 U. S.
430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity
is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of
federalism" and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal
structure to have implicit constitutional dimension");
id.
at
440 U. S. 437
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he States that ratified the
Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the
possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in
foreign jurisdictions").
[
Footnote 11]
"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if
'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or
domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the
effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from
acting, or to compel it to act.'"
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609,
372 U. S. 620
(1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded
below operated against the State in each of the foregoing respects.
They suggest, however, that the suit here should not be considered
to be against the State for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment
because, they say, petitioners were acting
ultra vires
their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dept. of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.
S. 670 (1982), which in turn was founded upon
Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.
S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this
argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state
officer may be said to act
ultra vires only when he acts
"without any authority whatever."
Treasure Salvors, 458
U.S. at
458 U. S. 697
(opinion of STEVENS, J.);
accord, id. at
458 U. S. 716
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of
authority by state officials"). As the Court in
Larson
explained, an
ultra vires claim rests on "the officer's
lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that
power is therefore not sufficient."
Larson, supra, at
337 U. S. 690.
Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense.
The MH/MR Act gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate"
mental health services. Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon
1969). The essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have
not provided such services adequately.
In his dissent, JUSTICE STEVENS advances a far broader -- and
unprecedented -- version of the
ultra vires doctrine,
which we discuss
infra at
465 U. S.
106-117.
[
Footnote 12]
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania
has waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the
suit was filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only
where expressly authorized by the legislature,
see, e.g.,
Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa. 558,
370
A.2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity,
including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in
federal court:
"Federal courts. -- Nothing contained in this subchapter shall
be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in
Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States."
42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the
United States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh
Amendment from consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar the United States from suing a State in federal court,
see, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.
S. 313,
292 U. S. 329
(1934), the United States' presence in the case for any purpose
does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For
example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would
not mean that the court could order the State to pay damages to
other plaintiffs. In any case, we think it clear that the United
States does not have standing to assert the state law claims of
third parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh
Amendment to respondents' state law claim is unaffected by the
United States' participation in the case.
[
Footnote 13]
We do not decide whether the District Court would have
jurisdiction under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on
the basis of federal law, but we note that the scope of any such
relief would be constrained by principles of comity and
federalism.
"Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is
attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the 'special
delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law.'"
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362,
423 U. S. 378
(1976) (quoting
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.
S. 117,
342 U. S. 120
(1951)).
[
Footnote 14]
We are prompted to respond at some length to JUSTICE STEVENS'
41-page dissent in part by his broad charge that "the Court
repudiates at least 28 cases,"
post at
465 U. S. 127.
The decisions the dissent relies upon simply do not support this
sweeping characterization.
See nn.
19 20 and
21 infra.
[
Footnote 15]
In this case, for example, the court below rested its finding
that state law required habilitation in the least restrictive
environment on dicta in
In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86,
429 A.2d
631 (1981). That decision was not issued until seven years
after this suit was filed, and four years after trial ended.
[
Footnote 16]
This part of the court's findings and judgment was not appealed.
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 612
F.2d 84, 90, n. 4 (1979).
See also 446 F. Supp. at 1303
("On the whole, the staff at Pennhurst appears to be dedicated and
trying hard to cope with the inadequacies of the institution").
The parties defendant in this suit were not all individuals.
They included as well the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare, a major department of the State itself; and the Pennhurst
State School and Hospital, a state institution. The dissent
apparently is arguing that the defendants as a group -- including
both the state institutions, and state and county officials -- were
acting
ultra vires. Since the institutions were only said
to have violated the law through the individual defendants, the
District Court's findings, never since questioned by any court,
plainly exonerate all the defendants from the dissent's claim that
they acted beyond the scope of their authority.
A truth of which the dissent's theoretical argument seems
unaware is the plight of many, if not most, of the mental
institutions in our country. As the District Court in this case
found: "History is replete with misunderstanding and mistreatment
of the retarded."
Id. at 1299.
Accord, Message
from President Kennedy Relative to Mental Illness and Mental
Retardation, H.R.Doc. No. 58, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1963) ("We
as a Nation have long neglected the mentally ill and the mentally
retarded"). It is common knowledge that "insane asylums," as they
were known until the middle of this century, usually were
underfunded and understaffed. It is not easy to persuade competent
people to work in these institutions, particularly well-trained
professionals. Physical facilities, due to consistent underfunding
by state legislatures, have been grossly inadequate -- especially
in light of advanced knowledge and techniques for the treatment of
the mentally ill.
See generally id. at 2, 4; The
President's Committee on Mental Retardation, MR 68: The Edge of
Change 11-13 (1968); President's Committee on Mental Retardation,
Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded
1-57 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger eds.1969); R. Scheerenberger,
A History of Mental Retardation 240-243 (1983). Only recently have
States commenced to move to correct widespread deplorable
conditions. The responsibility, as the District Court recognized
after a protracted trial, has rested on the
State
itself.
[
Footnote 17]
The dissent appears to be confused about our argument here.
See post at
465 U. S.
138-139. It is, of course, true, as the dissent says,
that the finding below that petitioners acted in good faith and
therefore were immune from damages does not affect whether an
injunction might be issued against them by a court possessed of
jurisdiction. The point is that the courts below did not have
jurisdiction, because the relief ordered so plainly ran against the
State. No one questions that the petitioners, in operating
Pennhurst, were acting in their official capacity. Nor can it be
questioned that the judgments under review commanded action that
could be taken by petitioners only in their official capacity --
and, of course,
only if the State provided the necessary
funding. It is evident that the dissent would vest in federal
courts authority, acting solely under
state law, to ignore
the sovereignty of the States that the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted to protect. Article III confers no jurisdiction on this
Court to strip an explicit Amendment of the Constitution of its
substantive meaning.
Contrary to the dissent's view,
see post at
465 U. S. 150,
an injunction based on federal law stands on very different
footing, particularly in light of the Civil War Amendments. As we
have explained, in such cases, this Court is vested with the
constitutional duty to vindicate "the supreme authority of the
United States,"
Ex parte Young, 209 U.
S. 123,
209 U. S. 160
(1908). There is no corresponding mandate to enforce state law.
[
Footnote 18]
See Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
120 U. S. 390
(1887). In
Rolston, however, the state officials were
ordered to comply with "a plain ministerial duty,"
see Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. at
322 U. S. 51, a
far cry from this case,
see n 20,
infra.
[
Footnote 19]
The cases are collected in
465 U.S.
89fn2/50|>n. 50 of the dissent,
post at
465 U. S.
165-166. Several of the cases do not rest on an Eleventh
Amendment holding at all. For example, federal jurisdiction in fact
was held to be lacking in
Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.
S. 547 (1918), because of lack of diversity. A fair
reading of
South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U.
S. 542 (1895), and the cases it cites, makes clear that
the ruling there was on the purely procedural point that the party
pressing the appeal was not a party to the proceeding. In two other
cases, the allegation was that a state officer or agency had acted
unconstititionally, rather than merely contrary to state
law.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor,
223 U. S. 280
(1912);
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College,
221 U. S. 636
(1911). In
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.
S. 541 (1918), the relief sought was not injunctive
relief, but money damages against the individual officer.
See n 21,
infra. None of these cases can be said to be overruled by
our holding today. As noted
infra at
465 U. S. 118,
the
Greene cases do not discuss the Eleventh Amendment in
connection with the state law claim.
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204
(1897), and
Scully v. Bird, 209 U.
S. 481 (1908), are more closely analogous cases. In both
of these old cases, however, the allegation was that the defendants
had committed common law torts, not, as here, that they had failed
to carry out affirmative duties assigned to them by statute.
See Tindal, supra, at
167 U. S. 221
(distinguishing suits brought "to enforce the discharge by the
defendants of any specific duty enjoined by the State"); Tr. of
Record in
Tindal v. Wesley, O.T. 1896, No. 231, p. 3
(complaint alleged that defendants had "wrongfully entered into
said premises and ousted the plaintiff . . . to the damage of the
plaintiff ten thousand dollars");
Scully, supra, at
209 U. S. 483
(allegation was that defendant had "injuriously affect[ed] the
reputation and sale of [plaintiff's] products"). Tort cases such as
these were explicitly overruled in
Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682
(1949).
See infra at
465 U. S.
111-114.
[
Footnote 20]
See, e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605,
223 U. S. 620
(1912) ("The complainant did not ask the court to interfere with
the official discretion of the Secretary of War, but challenged his
authority to do the things of which complaint was made");
Santa
Fe Pacific R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197,
259 U. S.
198-199 (1922) (same);
See
also Kendall v.
Stokes, 3 How. 87,
44 U. S. 98
(1845) ("[A] public officer is not liable to an action if he falls
into error in a case where the act to be done is not merely a
ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to
exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may
suffer by his mistake");
Noble v. Union River Logging R.
Co., 147 U. S. 165,
147 U. S.
171-172 (1893);
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S.
10,
161 U. S. 18
(1896) (under Eleventh Amendment, injunctive relief is permitted
where officer commits a tort that is "contrary to a plain official
duty requiring no exercise of discretion");
Wells v.
Roper, 246 U. S. 335,
246 U. S. 338
(1918);
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. at 695 (suit challenging "incorrect decision as to law or
fact" is barred "if the officer making the decision was empowered
to do so");
id. at
337 U. S. 715
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that cases involve orders to
comply with nondiscretionary duties). The opinions make clear that
the question of discretion went to sovereign immunity, and not to
the court's mandamus powers generally.
See, e.g., Philadelphia
Co., supra, at
223 U. S.
618-620. The rationale appears to be that discretionary
duties have a greater impact on the sovereign because they "brin[g]
the operation of governmental machinery into play."
Larson,
supra, at
337 U. S. 715
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 21]
In any event, as with the Eleventh Amendment cases,
see
n19,
supra, the
dissent also is wrong to say that the federal sovereign immunity
cases it cites
post at
465 U. S. 166,
n. 50, are today overruled. Many of them were actions for damages
in tort against the individual officer.
Little v.
Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804);
Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806);
Mitchell
v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1852);
Bates v.
Clark, 95 U. S. 204
(1877);
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S.
10 (1896). In
Belknap, the Court drew a careful
distinction between such actions and suits in which the relief
would run more directly against the State.
Id. at
161 U. S. 18.
The Court disallowed injunctive relief against the officers on this
basis.
Id. at
161 U. S. 23-25.
Contrary to the view of the dissent,
post at
465 U. S. 135,
n. 10, nothing in our opinion touches these cases. The Court in
Larson similarly distinguished between cases seeking money
damages against the individual officer in tort, and those seeking
injunctive relief against the officer in his official capacity. It
held that the latter sought relief against the sovereign, while the
former might not. 337 U.S. at
337 U. S.
687-688, and nn. 7, 8.
There is language in other cases that suggests they were actions
alleging torts, not statutory violations.
See Philadelphia Co.
v. Stimson, supra, at
223 U. S. 623;
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United
States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.
S. 549,
258 U. S. 568
(1922);
Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731,
330 U. S. 736
(1947). The remainder clearly distinguish cases (like the present
one) involving statutes that command discretionary duties.
See n 20,
supra. In any case, the Court in
Larson
explicitly limited the precedential value of all of these cases.
See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643,
369 U. S. 646,
and n. 6 (1962).
[
Footnote 22]
In fact, as the dissent itself states, the argument in
Larson that an allegation of tortious activity overrides
sovereign immunity is essentially the same as the dissent's
argument that an allegation of conduct contrary to statute
overrides sovereign immunity.
See post at
465 U. S. 158.
The result in each case -- as the Court in
Larson
recognized -- turns on whether the defendant state official was
empowered to do what he did,
i.e., whether, even if he
acted erroneously, it was action within the scope of his authority.
See Larson, 337 U.S. at
337 U. S. 685
(controversy on merits concerned whether officer had interpreted
Government contract correctly);
id. at
337 U. S. 695;
id. at
337 U. S.
716-717 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in cases alleging
a tort, the "official seeks to screen himself behind the
sovereign");
id. at
337 U. S.
721-722. What the dissent fails to note is that the
Court in
Larson explicitly rejected the view that the
dissent here also advances, which is "that an officer given the
power to make decisions is only given the power to make correct
decisions."
Id. at
337 U. S. 695.
The Court in
Larson made crystal clear that an officer
might make errors and still be acting within the scope of his
authority.
Ibid. (There can be no question that the
defendants here were "given the power to make decisions" about the
operation of Pennhurst.
See n 11,
supra.) The dissent's view that state
officers "have no discretion to commit a tort,"
post at
465 U. S. 132,
n. 7, cannot be reconciled with the plain holding of
Larson.
[
Footnote 23]
"It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a matter of
agency law, a principal may never lawfully authorize the commission
of a tort by his agent. But that statement, in its usual context,
is only a way of saying that an agent's liability for torts
committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading the direction or
authorization of his principal. The agent is himself liable whether
or not he has been authorized or even directed to commit the tort.
This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable,
nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of
the principal."
337 U.S. at
337 U. S. 694
(footnote omitted).
[
Footnote 24]
The
Larson Court noted that a similar argument
"was at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents,
in an effort to avoid corporate liability for torts, but was
decisively rejected."
Ibid. See 10 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations § 4877, p. 350 (rev. ed.1978) (a
corporation is liable for torts committed by its agent within the
scope of his authority even though the "act was contrary to or in
violation of the instructions or orders given by it to the
offending agent");
id. § 4959 (same as to crimes).
The dissent's strained interpretation of
Larson, post
at
465 U. S.
153-155, simply ignores the language that the dissent
itself quotes:
"It is important to note that, in [
ultra vires] cases,
the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only
because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient."
337 U.S. at
337 U. S.
689-690.
[
Footnote 25]
As we have discussed
supra, at
465 U. S.
102-103,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651 (1974), also shows that the broad
ultra
vires theory enunciated in
Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123
(1908), and in some of the cases quoted by the dissent, has been
discarded. In
Edelman, although the state officers were
alleged to be acting contrary to law, and therefore should have
been "stripped of their authority" under the theory of the dissent,
we held the action to be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The
dissent attempts to distinguish
Edelman on the ground that
the retroactive relief there, unlike injunctive relief, does not
run only against the agent.
Post at
465 U. S. 146,
n. 29. To say that injunctive relief against state officials acting
in their official capacity does not run against the State is to
resort to the fictions that characterize the dissent's theories.
Unlike the English sovereign, perhaps, an American State can act
only through its officials. It is true that the Court in
Edelman recognized that retroactive relief often, or at
least sometimes, has a greater impact on the state treasury than
does injunctive relief,
see 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 666,
n. 11, but there was no suggestion that damages alone were thought
to run against the State while injunctive relief did not.
We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of
Young is a fiction that has been narrowly construed. In
this light, it may well be wondered what principled basis there is
to the
ultra vires doctrine as it was set forth in
Larson and
Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc., 458 U. S. 670
(1982). That doctrine excepts from the Eleventh Amendment bar suits
against officers acting in their official capacities but without
any statutory authority, even though the relief would operate
against the State. At bottom, the doctrine is based on the fiction
of the
Young opinion. The dissent's method is merely to
take this fiction to its extreme. While the dissent's result may be
logical, in the sense that it is difficult to draw principled lines
short of that end, its view would virtually eliminate the
constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is a result from
which the Court in
Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again
today. For present purposes, however, we do no more than question
the continued vitality of the
ultra vires doctrine in the
Eleventh Amendment context. We hold only that, to the extent the
doctrine is consistent with the analysis of this opinion, it is a
very narrow exception that will allow suit only under the standards
set forth in
n 11,
supra.
[
Footnote 26]
The dissent appears to believe that
Larson is
consistent with all prior law.
See post at
465 U. S. 153.
This view ignores the fact that the
Larson Court itself
understood that it was required to "resolve [a] conflict in
doctrine." 337 U.S. at
337 U. S. 701.
The Court since has recognized that
Larson represented a
watershed in the law of sovereign immunity. In
Malone v.
Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643
(1962), Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court observed that "to
reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field
prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task."
Id. at
369 U. S. 646.
His opinion continued:
"The Court's 1949
Larson decision makes it unnecessary,
however, to undertake that task here. For in
Larson, the
Court, aware that it was called upon to 'resolve the conflict in
doctrine,' . . . thoroughly reviewed the many prior decisions, and
made an informed and carefully considered choice between the
seemingly conflicting precedents."
Ibid. The Court included many of the cases upon which
the dissent relies in its list of cases that were rejected by
Larson. See 369 U.S. at
369 U. S. 646,
n. 6.
[
Footnote 27]
E.g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
120 U. S. 390
(1887) (never cited);
Scully v. Bird, 209 U.
S. 481 (1908) (never cited);
Hopkins v. Clemson
Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636
(1911) (never cited);
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.
S. 541 (1918) (never cited);
Land v. Dollar,
330 U. S. 731
(1947) (cited only for proposition that judgment that would expend
itself on public treasury or interfere with public administration
is a suit against the United States);
Cunningham v. Macon &
Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446
(1883) (cited only for proposition that a suit alleging
unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
and that State cannot be sued without its consent);
Poindexter
v. Greenlow, 114 U. S. 270
(1885) (unconstitutional conduct suit is not suit against State);
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.
S. 362 (1894) (same). Prior to
Florida Dept. of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., supra, Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204
(1897), had been cited only for the proposition that a suit
alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The plurality opinion in
Treasure Salvors
discussed
Tindal at some length, 458 U.S. at
458 U. S.
685-688, but noted that the rule of
Tindal "was
clarified in
Larson." 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 688;
see also id. at
458 U. S. 715,
n. 13 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
As noted,
n 26,
supra, some of these cases were also cited -- and rejected
-- in
Malone v. Bowdoin, supra, at
369 U. S. 646,
n. 6.
[
Footnote 28]
The case was argued in the same way. The Eleventh Amendment
argument in the briefs is confined to the federal constitutional
claims.
See, e.g., Brief for Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., O.T. 1916, Nos. 778-779, pp. 15-38 (Jurisdiction over federal
claims);
id. at 38-39 (pendent jurisdiction over state
claims). Indeed, the State's brief somewhat curiously closes with a
concession that the federal courts had jurisdiction. Brief for
State Board and Officers, O.T. 1916, Nos. 778, 779, p. 139;
see Reply Brief, O.T. 1916, Nos. 778, 779, p. 2 (pointing
out concession). Thus, while the State's position on the Court's
jurisdiction over the federal claims is somewhat unclear, the State
never argued that there might not be jurisdiction over the local
law claims if the Court found jurisdiction over the federal
question in the case.
Nor do any of the other pendent jurisdiction cases cited in
JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent,
post at
465 U. S. 166,
n. 52, discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state
law claims. Moreover, since
Larson was decided in 1949,
making clear that mere violations of state law would not override
the Eleventh Amendment, these cases have been cited only for the
proposition that, as a general matter, a federal court should
decide a case on state law grounds where possible to avoid a
federal constitutional question. Nothing in our decision is meant
to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the
Siler
principle in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to
decide the state law issues.
[
Footnote 29]
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 671
("Having now had an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh
Amendment issue after briefing and argument, we disapprove the
Eleventh Amendment holdings of [certain prior] cases to the extent
that they are inconsistent with our holding today").
[
Footnote 30]
See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. at
292 U. S. 322
("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the
suit is sought to be prosecuted against a State, without her
consent, by one of her own citizens");
Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18,
290 U. S. 25-26
(1933).
[
Footnote 31]
See Missouri v. Fiske, supra, at
290 U. S. 27
("This is not less a suit against the State, because the bill is
ancillary and supplemental").
[
Footnote 32]
Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state
law to be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster
the policies of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants,"
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.
S. 715,
383 U. S. 726
(1966), on which pendent jurisdiction is founded. For example, when
a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal court's
construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this
case, the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication
of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result.
See,
e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.
S. 315,
319 U. S. 327
(1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal
conflict with the state policy are the inevitable product of this
double [
i.e., federal-state] system of review"). This case
is an example. Here, the federal courts effectively have been
undertaking to operate a major state institution based on
inferences drawn from dicta in a state court opinion not decided
until four years after the suit was begun. The state court has had
no opportunity to review the federal courts' construction of its
opinion, or their choice of remedies. The only sure escape from an
erroneous interpretation of state law is presumably the rather
cumbersome route of legislation.
Waste and delay may also result from abstention, which often is
called for when state law is unclear,
see Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360,
377 U. S.
378-379 (1964) ("abstention operates to require
piecemeal adjudication in many courts, thereby delaying ultimate
adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time") (citations
omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has
special force when relief is sought on state law grounds,
see
Gibbs, supra, at
383 U. S. 726;
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52,
288 U. S. 61
(1933).
[
Footnote 33]
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S.
1,
427 U. S. 14-15
(1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be
served by permitting pendent party jurisdiction, "the addition of a
completely new party would run counter to the well-established
principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of
general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").
[
Footnote 34]
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to
"counties and similar municipal corporations."
Mt. Healthy City
Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274,
429 U. S. 280
(1977);
see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.
S. 529,
133 U. S. 530
(1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment to bar
relief against county officials
"in order to protect the state treasury from liability that
would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a
judgment against the State itself."
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U. S. 391,
440 U. S. 401
(1979).
See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare
benefits). The Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a
suit against officials of a county or other governmental entity is
barred if the relief obtained runs against the State.
See,
e.g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 594 F:2d 489,
493 (CA5 1979);
Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 233-234 (CA7
1978);
Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507
F.2d 281, 287-288 (CA6 1974);
Harris v. Tooele County School
District, 471 F.2d 218, 220 (CA10 1973). Given that the
actions of the county commissioners and mental health
administrators are dependent on funding from the State, it may be
that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the
State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F.
Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa.1978) (holding that Pennsylvania
county commissioners, acting as members of the board of the county
office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
backpay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this
issue in light of our disposition above.
[
Footnote 35]
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307
(1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court
issued its decision.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I fully agree with JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. Nevertheless, I
write separately to explain that, in view of my continued belief
that the Eleventh Amendment "bars federal court suits against
States only by citizens of other States,"
Yeomans v.
Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 984 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting),
I would hold that petitioners are not entitled to invoke the
protections of that Amendment in this federal court suit by
citizens of Pennsylvania.
See Employees v. Missouri Dept. of
Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279,
411 U. S. 298
(1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);
Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U. S. 651,
415 U. S. 687
(1974) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). In my view,
Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890),
upon which the Court today relies,
ante at
465 U. S. 98,
recognized that the Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, erects a
limited constitutional barrier prohibiting suits against States by
citizens of another State; the decision, however, "accords to
nonconsenting States only a
nonconstitutional immunity
from suit by its own citizens."
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of
Public
Page 465 U. S. 126
Health and Welfare, supra, at
411 U. S. 313
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For scholarly
discussions supporting this view,
see Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1889, 1893-1894 (1983); Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part
One, 126 U.Pa.L.Rev. 515, 538-540, and n. 88 (1978). To the extent
that such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity may apply to
petitioners, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that, since petitioners'
conduct was prohibited by state law, the protections of sovereign
immunity do not extend to them.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
This case has illuminated the character of an institution. The
record demonstrates that the Pennhurst State School and Hospital
has been operated in violation of state law. In 1977, after three
years of litigation, the District Court entered detailed findings
of fact that abundantly support that conclusion. In 1981, after
four more years of litigation, this Court ordered the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to decide whether the law of
Pennsylvania provides an independent and adequate ground which can
support the District Court's remedial order. The Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, unanimously concluded that it did. This Court does
not disagree with that conclusion. Rather, it reverses the Court of
Appeals because it did precisely what this Court ordered it to do;
the only error committed by the Court of Appeals was its faithful
obedience to this Court's command.
This remarkable result is the product of an equally remarkable
misapplication of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. In a
completely unprecedented holding, today the Court concludes that
Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from
enjoining the conduct that Pennsylvania itself has prohibited. No
rational view of the sovereign immunity of the States supports this
result. To the
Page 465 U. S. 127
contrary, the question whether a federal court may award
injunctive relief on the basis of state law has been answered
affirmatively by this Court many times in the past. Yet the Court
repudiates at least 28 cases, spanning well over a century of this
Court's jurisprudence, proclaiming instead that federal courts have
no power to enforce the will of the States by enjoining conduct
because it violates state law. This new pronouncement will require
the federal courts to decide federal constitutional questions
despite the availability of state law grounds for decision, a
result inimical to sound principles of judicial restraint. Nothing
in the Eleventh Amendment, the conception of state sovereignty it
embodies, or the history of this institution requires or justifies
such a perverse result.
I
The conduct of petitioners that the Court attributes to the
State of Pennsylvania in order to find it protected by the Eleventh
Amendment is described in detail in the District Court's findings.
As noted in our prior opinion,
Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981),
and by the majority today,
ante at
465 U. S. 92-93,
those findings were undisputed:
"Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the
residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members, but
also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the
court found that the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills
of some residents have deteriorated at Pennhurst."
451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 7
(footnote omitted). The court concluded that Pennhurst was actually
hazardous to its residents. [
Footnote
2/1] Organized programs of training or education
Page 465 U. S. 128
were inadequate or entirely unavailable, and programs of
treatment or training were not developed for residents. When they
visited Pennhurst, shocked parents of residents would find their
children bruised, drugged, and unattended. These conditions often
led to a deterioration in the condition of the residents after
being placed in Pennhurst. Terri Lee Halderman, for example, was
learning to talk when she entered Pennhurst; after residing there,
she lost her verbal skills. At every stage of this litigation,
petitioners have conceded that Pennhurst fails to provide even
minimally adequate habilitation for its residents.
See
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 612 F.2d 84,
92-94 (CA3 1979) (en banc);
446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1304 (ED Pa.1977).
The District Court held that these conditions violated each
resident's rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa.Stat.Ann.,
Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.1983-1984) (MH/MR Act).
The en banc Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most of
the District Court's judgment, but it grounded its decision solely
on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010. The court did
not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. While it affirmed the District Court's holding
that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate habilitation, the
court did not decide whether that state right justified all of the
relief granted by the District Court.
Petitioners sought review by this Court, asserting that the
Court of Appeals had erred in its construction of both federal and
state statutes. This Court granted certiorari and reversed,
Page 465 U. S. 129
451 U. S. 1 (1981),
holding that 42 U.S.C. § 6010 created no substantive rights. We did
not accept respondents' state law contention, because there was a
possibility that the Court of Appeals' analysis of the state
statute had been influenced by its erroneous reading of federal
law. Concluding that it was "unclear whether state law provides an
independent and adequate ground which can support the court's
remedial order," 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 31, we
"remand[ed] the state law issue for reconsideration in light of our
decision here."
Ibid. In a footnote, we declined to
consider the effect of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then recent
decision,
In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86,
429 A.2d
631 (1981), on the state law issues in the case, expressly
stating that on remand the Court of Appeals could "consider the
state law issues in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
recent decision." 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 31, n.
24.
On remand, 673 F.2d 647 (CA3 1982) (en banc), the Court of
Appeals, noting that this Court had remanded for reconsideration of
the state law issue, examined the impact of Schmidt. [
Footnote 2/2] According to the Court of
Appeals, which was unanimous on this point, the State Supreme Court
had "spoken definitively" on the duties of the State under the
MH/MR Act, holding that the State was required to provide care to
the mentally retarded in the "least restrictive environment." 673
F.2d at 651. Since the MH/MR Act fully justified the relief issued
in the Court of Appeals' prior judgment, the court reinstated its
prior judgment on the basis of petitioners' violation of state law.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Page 465 U. S. 130
Thus, the District Court found that petitioners have been
operating the Pennhurst facility in a way that is forbidden by
state law, by federal statute, and by the Federal Constitution. The
en banc Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously
concluded that state law provided a clear and adequate basis for
upholding the District Court, and that it was not necessary to
address the federal questions decided by that court. That action
conformed precisely to the directive issued by this Court when the
case was here before. Petitioners urge this Court to make an
unprecedented about-face, and to hold that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibited the Court of Appeals from doing what this Court ordered
it to do when we instructed it to decide whether respondents were
entitled to relief under state law. Of course, if petitioners are
correct, then error was committed not by the Court of Appeals,
which after all merely obeyed the instruction of this Court, but
rather by this Court in 1981, when we ordered the Court of Appeals
to consider the state law issues in the case.
Petitioners' position is utterly without support. The Eleventh
Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity it embodies have
never been interpreted to deprive a court of jurisdiction to grant
relief against government officials who are engaged in conduct that
is forbidden by their sovereign. On the contrary, this Court has
repeatedly and consistently exercised the power to enjoin state
officials from violating state law. [
Footnote 2/4]
II
The majority proceeds as if this Court has not had previous
occasion to consider the Eleventh Amendment argument made by
petitioners, and contends that
Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123
(1908), has no application to a suit seeking injunctive relief on
the basis of state law. That is simply not the case. The Court
rejected the argument that the Eleventh
Page 465 U. S. 131
Amendment precludes injunctive relief on the basis of state law
twice only two Terms ago. In
Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670
(1982), four Justices concluded that a suit for possession of
property in the hands of state officials was not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment inasmuch as the State did not have even a
colorable claim to the property under state law.
See id.
at
458 U. S.
696-697 (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by BURGER, C.J.,
and MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ.). Four additional Justices accepted
the proposition that, if the state officers' conduct had been in
violation of a state statute, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar
the action.
Id. at
458 U. S. 714
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part,
joined by POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.). [
Footnote 2/5] And in just one short paragraph in
Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85
(1982), the Court thrice restated the settled rule that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officers when
they are "alleged to be acting against federal or state law."
[
Footnote 2/6] These
Page 465 U. S. 132
are only the two most recent in an extraordinarily long line of
cases.
By 1908, it was firmly established that conduct of state
officials under color of office that is tortious as a matter of
state law is not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
See
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.
S. 362,
154 U. S.
390-391 (1894);
Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U. S. 270,
114 U. S. 287
(1885);
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co.,
109 U. S. 446,
109 U. S. 452
(1883). [
Footnote 2/7]
Cf.
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10,
161 U. S. 18
(1896) (same rule adopted for sovereign immunity of the United
States);
Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.
S. 508,
147 U. S.
518-519 (1893) (same). [
Footnote 2/8] In
Hopkins v. Clemson
Agricultural College, 221
Page 465 U. S. 133
U.S. 636 (1911), the Court explained the relationship of these
cases to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
"[I]mmunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty -- a
prerogative of the State itself -- which cannot be availed of by
public agents when sued for their own torts. The Eleventh Amendment
was not intended to afford them freedom from liability in any case
where, under color of their office, they have injured one of the
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be to create a
privileged class free from liability for wrongs inflicted or
injuries threatened. . . ."
". . . Besides, neither a State nor an individual can confer
upon an agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the
perpetrator. In such cases, the law of agency has no application --
the wrongdoer is treated as a principal and individually liable for
the damages inflicted and subject to injunction against the
commission of acts causing irreparable injury."
Id. at
221 U. S.
642-643. [
Footnote
2/9]
Page 465 U. S. 134
The principles that were decisive in these cases are not
confined to actions under state tort law. They also apply to claims
that state officers have violated state statutes. In
Johnson v.
Lankford, 245 U. S. 541
(1918), the Court reversed the dismissal of an action against the
bank commissioner of Oklahoma and his surety to recover damages for
the loss of plaintiff's bank deposit, allegedly caused by the
commissioner's failure to safeguard the business and assets of the
bank in negligent or willful disregard of his duties under
applicable state statutes. The Court explained that the action was
not one against the State.
"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think, that
whatever an officer does, even in contravention of the laws of the
State, is state action, identifies him with it and makes the
redress sought against him a claim against the State, and therefore
prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State
may be delinquent without involving the State in delinquency,
indeed, may injure the State by delinquency as well as some
resident of the State, and be amenable to both."
Id. at
245 U. S.
545.
Similarly, in
Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
120 U. S. 390
(1887), the Court rejected the argument that a suit to enjoin a
state officer to comply with state law violated the Eleventh
Amendment. The Court wrote: "Here the suit is to get a state
officer to do what a statute requires of him. The litigation is
with the officer, not the state."
Id. at
120 U. S. 411.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Page 465 U. S. 135
Significantly, this rule was expressly reaffirmed in a case
decided by this Court in the same Term as
Ex parte Young
and published in the same volume of the United States Reports.
Page 465 U. S. 136
The appellants in
Scully v. Bird, 209 U.
S. 481 (1908), brought a diversity suit seeking
injunctive relief against the dairy and food commissioner of the
State of Michigan, on the ground that, "under cover of his office,"
he had maliciously engaged in a course of conduct designed to ruin
plaintiffs' business in the State. The Circuit Court dismissed the
complaint on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On appeal, the plaintiffs
contended that the Eleventh Amendment
"does not apply where a suit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to act as officers of the State, and under color of a
statute which is valid and constitutional, but wrongfully
administered by them, commit, or threaten to commit, acts of wrong
or injury to the rights and property of the plaintiff, or make such
administration of the statute an illegal burden and exaction upon
the plaintiff."
Ibid. This Court agreed. It noted that the complaint
alleged action "in dereliction of duties enjoined by the statutes
of the State," and concluded that it was "manifest from this
summary of the allegations of the bill that this is not a suit
against the State."
Id. at
209 U. S. 490.
[
Footnote 2/11]
Finally, in
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.
Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), and its companion cases,
Louisville & Nashville R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522
(1917);
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.
S. 555 (1917), the plaintiffs challenged the conduct of
state officials under both federal and state law. The Court,
citing,
inter alia, Young and
Clemson, held that
the Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief on the basis
of state law, noting that the plaintiffs' federal claim was
sufficiently substantial to justify the exercise
Page 465 U. S. 137
of pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims,
[
Footnote 2/12] and that, since
violations of federal and state law had been alleged, it was
appropriate for the federal court to issue injunctive relief on the
basis of state law without reaching the federal claims, despite the
strictures of the Eleventh Amendment. In short, the
Greene
Court approved of precisely the methodology employed by the Court
of Appeals in this case. [
Footnote
2/13]
None of these cases contains only "implicit" or
sub
silentio holdings; all of them explicitly consider and reject
the claim that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from
issuing injunctive relief based on state law. There is therefore no
basis for the majority's assertion that the issue presented by this
case is an open one,
ante at
465 U. S. 119.
[
Footnote 2/14]
Page 465 U. S. 138
The Court tries to explain away these cases by arguing that the
applicable state statutes gave petitioners such "broad discretion"
over Pennhurst that their actions were not
ultra vires,
ante at
465 U. S.
110-111. The Court, however, does not dispute the Court
of Appeals' conclusion that these state statutes gave petitioners
no discretion whatsoever to disregard their duties with
respect to institutionalization of the retarded as they did.
Petitioners acted outside of their lawful discretion every bit as
much as did the government officials in the cases I have discussed,
which hold that, when an official commits an act prohibited by law,
he acts beyond his authority and is not protected by sovereign
immunity. [
Footnote 2/15] After
all, it is only common sense to conclude that States do not
authorize their officers to violate their legal duties.
The Court also relies heavily on the fact that the District
Court found petitioners immune from damages liability because they
"
acted in the utmost good faith . . . within the sphere of
their official responsibilities,'" ante at
465 U. S. 107
(emphasis in original) (quoting 446 F.Supp. at 1324). This confuses
two distinct concepts. An official can act in good faith, and
therefore be immune from damages liability, despite the
Page 465 U. S. 139
fact that he has done that which the law prohibits, a point
recognized as recently as
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U. S. 800
(1982). Nevertheless, good faith immunity from damages liability is
irrelevant to the availability of injunctive relief.
See Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308,
420 U. S.
314-315, n. 6 (1975). The state officials acted in
nothing less than good faith and within the sphere of their
official responsibilities in asserting Florida's claim to the
treasure in
Treasure Salvors; the same can be said for the
bank commissioner's actions in safeguarding bank deposits
challenged in
Johnson v. Lankford, the fund commissioner's
decision to sell property mortgaged to the State challenged in
Rolston, and the state food and dairy commissioner's
decision to prosecute the appellant for violating the state food
impurity Act challenged in
Scully, to give just a few
examples. Yet in each of these cases, the state officers' conduct
was enjoined.
Greene makes this point perfectly clear.
There state officers did nothing more than carry out
responsibilities clearly assigned to them by a statute. Their
conduct was nevertheless enjoined because this Court held that
their conduct violated the State Constitution, despite the fact
that their reliance on a statute made it perfectly clear that their
conduct was not only in good faith, but reasonable.
See
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31
(1979). Until today, the rule has been simple: conduct that exceeds
the scope of an official's lawful discretion is not conduct the
sovereign has authorized, and hence is subject to injunction.
[
Footnote 2/16] Whether that
conduct also gives rise to damages liability is an entirely
separate question.
Page 465 U. S. 140
III
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits
against a State brought by citizens of other States and foreign
nations. [
Footnote 2/17] This
textual limitation upon the scope of the States' immunity from suit
in federal court was set aside in
Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U. S. 1 (1890).
Hans was a suit against the State of Louisiana, brought by
a citizen of Louisiana seeking to recover interest on the State's
bonds. The Court stated that some of the arguments favoring
sovereign immunity for the States made during the process of the
Amendment's ratification had become a part of the judicial scheme
created by the Constitution. As a result, the Court concluded that
the Constitution prohibited a suit by a citizen against his or her
own State. When called upon to elaborate in
Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313
(1934), the Court explained that the Eleventh Amendment did more
than simply prohibit suits brought by citizens of one State against
another State. Rather, it exemplified the broader and more ancient
doctrine of sovereign immunity, which operates to
Page 465 U. S. 141
bar a suit brought by a citizen against his own State without
its consent. [
Footnote 2/18]
The Court has subsequently adhered to this interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment. For example, in
Quern v. Jordan,
440 U. S. 332
(1979), the Court referred to the Eleventh Amendment as
incorporating "the traditional sovereign immunity of the States."
Id. at
440 U. S. 341.
Similarly, in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.
S. 445 (1976), the Court referred to "the Eleventh
Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies. . . ."
Id. at
427 U. S. 456.
See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410,
440 U. S.
438-441 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). [
Footnote 2/19] Thus, under our cases it
is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, rather than the text of the
Amendment
Page 465 U. S. 142
itself, which is critical to the analysis of any Eleventh
Amendment problem. [
Footnote
2/20]
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in England, where
it was thought that the King could not be sued. However, common law
courts, in applying the doctrine, traditionally distinguished
between the King and his agents, on the theory that the King would
never authorize unlawful conduct, and that therefore the unlawful
acts of the King's officers ought not to be treated as acts of the
sovereign.
See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *244. As
early as the 15th century, Holdsworth writes, servants of the King
were held liable for their unlawful acts.
See 3 W.
Holdsworth, A History of English Law 388 (1903). During the 17th
century, this rule of law was used extensively to curb the King's
authority. The King's officers
"could do wrong, and if they committed wrongs, whether in the
course of their employment or not, they could be made legally
liable. The command or instruction of the king could not protect
them. If the king really had given such commands or instructions,
he must have been deceived."
6
id. at 101 (footnote omitted). In one famous case, it
was held that, although process would not issue against the
sovereign himself, it could issue against his officers. "[F]or the
warrant of no man, not even of the King himself, can excuse the
doing of an illegal act."
Sands v. Child, 3 Lev. 351, 352,
83 Eng.Rep. 725, 726 (K.B. 1693). [
Footnote 2/21] By the 18th century, this rule of law
was unquestioned.
Page 465 U. S. 143
See 10 Holdsworth,
supra, at 650-652. And in
the 19th century, this view was taken by the court to be so well
settled as not to require the citation of authority,
see
Feather v. Queen, 6 B. & S. 257, 295-297, 122 Eng.Rep.
1191, 1205-1206 (Q.B. 1865). [
Footnote 2/22]
It was only natural, then, that this Court, in applying the
principles of sovereign immunity, recognized the distinction
between a suit against a State and one against its officer.
[
Footnote 2/23] For example,
while the Court did inquire as to whether a suit was "in essence"
against the sovereign, it soon became settled law that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar suits against state officials in their
official capacities challenging unconstitutional conduct.
See
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466,
169 U. S.
518-519 (1898);
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy,
140 U. S. 1,
140 U. S. 10-12
(1891);
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.
S. 270,
114 U. S. 288
(1885). [
Footnote 2/24] This rule
was reconciled with sovereign immunity
Page 465 U. S. 144
principles by use of the traditional rule that an action against
an agent of the sovereign who had acted unlawfully was not
considered to be against the sovereign. When an official acts
pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the Court reasoned, the
absence of valid authority leaves the official
ultra vires
his authority, and thus a private actor stripped of his status as a
representative of the sovereign. [
Footnote 2/25] In
Ex parte Young, 209 U.
S. 123 (1908), the Court was merely restating a settled
principle when it wrote:
"The Act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and
if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an
unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding
without the authority of, and one which does not affect, the State
in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal
act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of
the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is
void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes
into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and
he is in that case stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct."
Id. at
209 U. S.
159-160. [
Footnote
2/26]
Page 465 U. S. 145
The majority states that the holding of
Ex parte Young
is limited to cases in which relief is provided on the basis of
federal law, and that it rests entirely on the need to protect the
supremacy of federal law. That position overlooks the foundation of
the rule of
Young, as well
Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy and
Young's other predecessors.
The
Young Court distinguished between the State and its
Attorney General because the latter, in violating the Constitution,
had engaged in conduct the sovereign could not authorize. The
pivotal consideration was not that the conduct violated federal
law, since nothing in the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment
permits a suit against a sovereign merely because federal law is at
issue. [
Footnote 2/27] Indeed, at
least since
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.
1 (1890), the law has been settled that the Eleventh
Amendment applies even though the State is accused of violating the
Federal Constitution. In
Hans, the Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment applies to all cases within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, including those brought to require compliance
with federal law, and bars any suit where the State is the proper
defendant under sovereign immunity principles. A long line of cases
has endorsed that proposition, holding that, irrespective
Page 465 U. S. 146
of the need to vindicate federal law, a suit is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment if the State is the proper defendant. [
Footnote 2/28] It was clear until today
that
"the State [is not] divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground
that the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States.'"
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Ala. Docks Dept.,
377 U. S. 184,
377 U. S. 186
(1964) (quoting
Hans, 134 U.S. at
134 U. S. 10).
The pivotal consideration in
Young was that it was not
conduct of the sovereign that was at issue. [
Footnote 2/29] The rule that unlawful acts of an
officer should not be attributed to the sovereign has deep roots in
the history of sovereign immunity, and makes
Young
reconcilable with the principles of sovereign immunity found in the
Eleventh Amendment, [
Footnote
2/30] rather
Page 465 U. S. 147
than merely an unprincipled accommodation between federal and
state interests that ignores the principles contained in the
Eleventh Amendment.
This rule plainly applies to conduct of state officers in
violation of state law.
Young states that the significance
of the charge of unconstitutional conduct is that it renders the
state official's conduct "simply an illegal act," and hence the
officer is not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. Since a state
officer's conduct in violation of state law is certainly no less
illegal than his violation of federal law, in either case, the
official, by committing an illegal act, is "stripped of his
official or representative character." For example, one of
Young's predecessors held that a suit challenging an
unconstitutional attempt by the Virginia Legislature to disavow a
state contract was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, reasoning
that
"inasmuch as, by the Constitution of the United States,
which is also the supreme law of Virginia, that contract,
when made, became thereby unchangeable, irrepealable by the State,
the subsequent act of January 26, 1882, and all other like acts,
which deny the obligation of that contract and forbid its
performance, are not the acts of the State of Virginia. The true
and real Commonwealth which contracted the obligation is incapable
in law of doing anything in derogation of it. Whatever having that
effect, if operative, has been attempted or done, is the work of
its government acting without authority, in violation of
its fundamental law, and must be looked upon, in all
courts of justice, as if it were not and never had been. . . . The
State of Virginia has done none of
Page 465 U. S. 148
these things with which this defence charges her. The defendant
in error is not her officer, her agent, or her representative, in
the matter complained of, for he has acted not only without her
authority, but contrary to her express commands."
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. at
114 U. S.
292-293 (emphasis supplied). [
Footnote 2/31] It is clear that the Court in
Poindexter attached no significance to the fact that
Virginia had been accused of violating federal, and not its own,
law. [
Footnote 2/32] To the
contrary, the Court treated the Federal Constitution as part of
Virginia's law, and concluded that the challenged action was not
that of Virginia precisely because it violated Virginia's law. The
majority's position turns the
Young doctrine on its head
-- sovereign immunity did not bar actions challenging
unconstitutional conduct by state officers, since the Federal
Constitution was also to be considered part of the State's law --
and since the State could not and would not authorize a violation
of its own law, the officers' conduct was considered
individual,
Page 465 U. S. 149
and not sovereign. No doubt the Courts that produced
Poindexter and
Young would be shocked to discover
that conduct authorized by state law but prohibited by federal law
is not considered conduct attributable to the State for sovereign
immunity purposes, but conduct prohibited by state law is
considered conduct attributable to the very State which prohibited
that conduct. Indeed, in
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.
S. 204 (1899), the Court specifically found that it was
impossible to distinguish between a suit challenging
unconstitutional conduct of state officers and a suit challenging
any other type of unlawful behavior:
"If a suit against officers of a State to enjoin them from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute . . . be not one against the
State, it is impossible to see how a suit against the individuals
to recover the possession of property belonging to the plaintiff
and illegally withheld by the defendants can be deemed a suit
against the State."
Id. at
167 U. S. 222.
[
Footnote 2/33] These cases are
based on the simple idea that an illegal act strips the official of
his state law shield, thereby depriving the official of the
sovereign's immunity. The majority criticizes this approach as
being "out of touch with reality" because it ignores the practical
impact of an injunction on the
Page 465 U. S. 150
State though directed at its officers.
Ante at
465 U. S.
106-108. Yet that criticism cannot account for
Young, since an injunction has the same effect on the
State whether it is based on federal or state law. Indeed, the
majority recognizes that injunctions approved by
Young
have an "obvious impact on the State itself,"
ante at
465 U. S. 104.
In the final analysis, the distinction between the State and its
officers, realistic or not, is one firmly embedded in the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. It is that doctrine, and not any theory of
federal supremacy, which the Framers placed in the Eleventh
Amendment and which this Court therefore has a duty to respect.
It follows that the basis for the
Young rule is present
when the officer sued has violated the law of the sovereign; in all
such cases, the conduct is of a type that would not be permitted by
the sovereign, and hence is not attributable to the sovereign under
traditional sovereign immunity principles. In such a case, the
sovereign's interest lies with those who seek to enforce its laws,
rather than those who have violated them.
"[P]ublic officials may become tortfeasors by exceeding the
limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold
a citizen's realty or chattels, recoverable by appropriate action
at law or in equity . . . [t]he dominant interest of the sovereign
is then on the side of the victim, who may bring his possessory
action to reclaim that which is wrongfully withheld."
Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731,
330 U. S. 738
(1947). [
Footnote 2/34] The
majority's position that the Eleventh Amendment does not permit
federal courts to enjoin conduct that the sovereign State itself
seeks to prohibit thus is inconsistent with both
Page 465 U. S. 151
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the underlying respect
for the integrity of state policy which the Eleventh Amendment
protects. The issuance of injunctive relief which enforces state
laws and policies, if anything, enhances federal courts' respect
for the sovereign prerogatives of the States. [
Footnote 2/35] The majority's approach, which
requires federal courts to ignore questions of state law and to
rest their decisions on federal bases, will create more, rather
than less, friction between the States and the federal
judiciary.
Moreover, the majority's rule has nothing to do with the basic
reason the Eleventh Amendment was added to the Constitution. There
is general agreement that the Amendment was passed because the
States were fearful that federal courts would force them to pay
their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin.
[
Footnote 2/36] Entertaining a
suit for injunctive relief based on state law implicates none of
the concerns of the Framers. Since only injunctive relief is
sought, there is no threat to the state treasury of the type that
concerned the Framers,
see Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U. S. 267,
433 U. S.
288-290 (1977);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651,
415 U. S.
667-668 (1974); and if the State wishes to avoid the
federal injunction, it can easily do so simply by changing its law.
The possibility of States left helpless in the face of disruptive
federal decrees which led to the passage of the Eleventh
Page 465 U. S. 152
Amendment simply is not presented by this case. Indeed, the
Framers no doubt would have preferred federal courts to base their
decisions on state law, which the State is then free to reexamine,
rather than forcing courts to decide cases on federal grounds,
leaving the litigation beyond state control.
In light of the preceding, it should come as no surprise that
there is absolutely no authority for the majority's position that
the rule of
Young is inapplicable to violations of state
law. The only cases the majority cites,
ante at
465 U. S.
105-106, for the proposition that
Young is
limited to the vindication of federal law do not consider the
question whether
Young permits injunctive relief on the
basis of state law -- in each of the cases, the question was
neither presented, briefed, argued, nor decided. [
Footnote 2/37] It is curious, to say the least,
that the majority disapproves of reliance on cases in which the
issue we face today was decided
sub silentio, see ante at
465 U. S. 119,
yet it is willing to rely on cases in which the issue was not
decided at all. In fact, not only is there no precedent for the
majority's position, but, as I have demonstrated in
465 U.
S. supra, there is an avalanche of precedent
squarely to the contrary. [
Footnote
2/38]
Page 465 U. S. 153
That the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect conduct
which has been prohibited by the sovereign is clearly demonstrated
by the case on which petitioners chiefly rely,
Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.
S. 682 (1949). The
Larson opinion teaches that
the actions of state officials are not attributable to the State --
are
ultra vires -- in two different types of situations:
(1) when the official is engaged in conduct that the sovereign has
not authorized, and (2) when he has engaged in conduct that the
sovereign has forbidden. A sovereign, like any other principal,
cannot authorize its agent to violate the law. When an agent does
so, his actions are considered
ultra vires, and he is
liable for his own conduct under the law of agency. Both types of
ultra vires conduct are clearly identified in
Larson.
"There may be, of course, suits for specific relief against
officers of the sovereign which are not suits against the
sovereign. If the officer purports to act as an individual and not
as an official, a suit directed against that action is not a suit
against the sovereign. If the War Assets Administrator had
completed a sale of his personal home, he presumably could be
enjoined from later conveying it to a third person. On a similar
theory,
where the officer's powers are limited by statute, his
actions beyond those limitations are considered individual, and not
sovereign, actions. The officer is not doing
Page 465 U. S. 154
the business which the sovereign has empowered him to do
or
he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden. His
actions are
ultra vires his authority, and therefore may
be made the object of specific relief. It is important to note
that, in such cases, the relief can be granted, without impleading
the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated
power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore
not sufficient. And, since the jurisdiction of the court to hear
the case may depend, as we have recently recognized, upon the
decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits, it is necessary
that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the statutory
limitation on which he relies."
Id. at
337 U. S.
689-690 (emphasis supplied).
Larson thus clearly indicates that the immunity
determination depends upon the merits of the plaintiff's claim. The
same approach is employed by
Young -- the plaintiff can
overcome the state official's immunity only by succeeding on the
merits of its claim of unconstitutional conduct.
Following the two-track analysis of
Larson, the cases
considering the question whether the state official is entitled to
the sovereign's immunity can be grouped into two categories. In
cases like
Larson, Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.
S. 643 (1962), and
Florida Dept. of State v.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670
(1982), which usually involve the State functioning in its
proprietary capacity, the
ultra vires issue can be
resolved solely by reference to the law of agency. Since there is
no specific limitation on the powers of the officers other than the
general limitations on their authority, the only question that need
be asked is whether they have acted completely beyond their
authority. But when the State has placed specific limitations on
the manner in which state officials may perform their duties, as it
often does in regulatory or other administrative contexts such as
were considered in
Scully v. Bird, 209 U.
S. 481 (1908), and
Johnson
v.
Page 465 U. S. 155
Lankford, 245 U. S. 541
(1918), the
ultra vires inquiry also involves the question
whether the officials acted in a way that state law forbids. No
sovereign would authorize its officials to violate its own law, and
if the official does so, then
Larson indicates that his
conduct is
ultra vires, and not protected by sovereign
immunity.
Larson confirms that the Court's disposition of this
case in 1981 -- ordering the Court of Appeals to consider
respondents' state law claims -- was fully harmonious with
established sovereign immunity principles. The jurisdiction of the
federal court was established by a federal claim; [
Footnote 2/39] the Court of Appeals therefore had
jurisdiction to resolve the case and to grant injunctive relief on
either federal or state grounds. Respondents pleaded a specific
statutory limitation on the way in which petitioners were entitled
to run Pennhurst. The District Court and the Court of Appeals have
both found that petitioners operated Pennhurst in a way that the
sovereign has forbidden. Specifically, both courts concluded that
petitioners placed residents in Pennhurst without any consideration
at all of the limitations on institutional confinement that are
found in state law, and that they failed to create community living
programs that are mandated by state law. In short, there can be no
dispute that petitioners ran Pennhurst in a way that the sovereign
had
Page 465 U. S. 156
forbidden. Under the second track of the
Larson
analysis, petitioners were acting
ultra vires because they
were acting in a way that the sovereign, by statute, had forbidden.
[
Footnote 2/40]
Page 465 U. S. 157
Petitioners readily concede, both in their brief and at oral
argument, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against
state officers who have acted
ultra vires. The majority
makes a similar concession,
ante at
465 U. S.
101-102, n. 11. Yet both ignore the fact that the cases,
and most especially
Larson, set out a two-step analysis
for
ultra vires conduct -- conduct that is completely
beyond the scope of the officer's authority, or conduct that the
sovereign has forbidden. In fact, the majority goes so far as to
quote the passage from
Larson indicating that a state
official acts
ultra vires when he completely lacks power
delegated from the State,
ante at
465 U. S. 101,
n. 11. That quotation ignores sentences immediately preceding and
following the quoted passage stating in terms that, where an
official violates a statutory prohibition, he acts
ultra
vires and is not protected by sovereign immunity. This
omission is understandable, since petitioners' conduct in this case
clearly falls into the category of conduct the sovereign has
specifically forbidden by statute. Petitioners were told by
Pennsylvania how to run Pennhurst, and there is no dispute that
they disobeyed their instructions. Yet without explanation, the
Court repudiates the two-track analysis of
Larson and
holds that sovereign immunity extends to conduct the sovereign has
statutorily prohibited. [
Footnote
2/41] Thus, contrary
Page 465 U. S. 158
to the Court's assertion,
Larson is in conflict with
the result reached today. [
Footnote
2/42]
In sum, a century and a half of this Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence has established the following. A suit alleging that
the official had acted within his authority but in a manner
contrary to state statutes was not barred because the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits suits against States; it does not bar suits
against state officials for actions not permitted by the State
under its own law. The sovereign could not and would not authorize
its officers to violate its own law; hence an action against a
state officer seeking redress for conduct not permitted by state
law is a suit against the officer, not the sovereign.
Ex parte
Young concluded in as explicit a fashion as possible that
unconstitutional action by state officials is not action by the
State even if it purports to be authorized by state law,
because the Federal Constitution strikes down the state law
shield. In the tort cases, if the plaintiff proves his case,
there is by definition no state law defense to shield the
defendant. Similarly,
when the state officer violates a state
statute, the sovereign has by definition erected no shield against
liability. These precedents make clear that there is no
foundation for the contention that the majority embraces -- that
Ex parte Young authorizes injunctive relief against state
officials only on the basis of federal law. To the contrary,
Young is as clear as a
Page 465 U. S. 159
bell: the Eleventh Amendment does not apply where there is no
state law shield. That simple principle should control this
case.
IV
The majority's decision in this case is especially unwise in
that it overrules a long line of cases in order to reach a result
that is at odds with the usual practices of this Court. In one of
the most respected opinions ever written by a Member of this Court,
Justice Brandeis wrote:
"The Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases
confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which
it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:"
"
* * * *"
". . . The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter.
Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175,
213 U. S.
191."
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288,
297 U. S.
346-347 (1936) (concurring opinion).
The
Siler case, cited with approval by Justice Brandeis
in
Ashwander, employed a remarkably similar approach to
that used by the Court of Appeals in this case. A privately owned
railroad corporation brought suit against the members of the
railroad commission of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate
schedule promulgated by the commission. The Federal Circuit Court
found that the schedule violated the plaintiff's federal
constitutional rights, and granted relief.
Page 465 U. S. 160
This Court affirmed, but it refused to decide the constitutional
question because injunctive relief against the state officials was
adequately supported by state law. The Court held that the
plaintiff's claim that the schedule violated the Federal
Constitution was sufficient to justify the assertion of federal
jurisdiction over the case, but then declined to reach the federal
question, deciding the case on the basis of state law instead:
"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to
questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is
usually pursued, and is not departed from without important
reasons. In this case, we think it much better to decide it with
regard to the question of a local nature, involving the
construction of the state statute and the authority therein given
to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to
unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing
in the record."
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
213 U. S. 175,
213 U. S. 193
(1909). [
Footnote 2/43]
The
Siler principle has been applied on numerous
occasions; when a suit against state officials has presented both
federal constitutional questions and issues of state law, the Court
has upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds.
See, e.g.,
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415,
292 U. S. 425
(1934);
Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.
S. 177,
290 U. S. 178
(1933);
Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.
S. 478,
257 U. S.
482-485 (1922);
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Greene, 244 U.S. at 527;
Greene v. Louisville &
Interurban R. Co., 244 U.S. at
244 U. S. 508,
244 U. S.
512-514. [
Footnote
2/44]
Page 465 U. S. 161
In
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528
(1974), the Court quoted from the
Siler opinion and noted
that the "Court has characteristically dealt first with possibly
dispositive state law claims pendent to federal constitutional
claims." 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 546.
It added:
"Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the general
proposition endorsed in
Siler -- that a federal court
properly vested with jurisdiction may pass on the state or local
law question without deciding the federal constitutional issues --
and have then proceeded to dispose
Page 465 U. S. 162
of the case solely on the nonfederal ground.
See, e.g.,
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620,
326 U. S.
629-630 (1946);
Waggoner Estate v. Wichita
County, 273 U. S. 113,
273 U. S.
116-119 (1927);
Chicago G.W. R. Co. v. Kendall,
266 U. S.
94 (1924);
United Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
278 U. S.
300,
278 U. S. 308 (1929);
Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 270 U. S.
378,
270 U. S. 387 (1926). These
and other cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal
policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where not absolutely
essential to disposition of a case."
Id. at
415 U. S. 547,
n. 12. In fact, in this very case, we applied the
Siler
rule by remanding the case to the Court of Appeals with explicit
instructions to consider whether respondents were entitled to
relief under state law.
Not only does the
Siler rule have an impressive
historical pedigree, but it is also strongly supported by the
interest in avoiding duplicative litigation and the unnecessary
decision of federal constitutional questions.
"The policy's ultimate foundations . . . lie in all that goes to
make up the unique place and character, in our scheme, of judicial
review of governmental action for constitutionality. They are found
in the delicacy of that function, particularly in view of possible
consequences for others stemming also from constitutional roots;
the comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration
due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power
concerning the scope of their authority; the necessity, if
government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within
its power, including the courts; the inherent limitations of the
judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative
character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the
paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our
Page 465 U. S. 163
system."
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.
S. 549,
331 U. S. 571
(1947). [
Footnote 2/45]
In addition, application of the
Siler rule enhances the
decisionmaking autonomy of the States.
Siler directs the
federal court to turn first to state law, which the State is free
to modify or repeal. [
Footnote
2/46] By leaving the policy determinations underlying
injunctive relief in the hands of the State, the Court of Appeals'
approach gives appropriate deference to established state
policies.
In contrast, the rule the majority creates today serves none of
the interests of the State. The majority prevents federal courts
from implementing state policies through equitable enforcement of
state law. Instead, federal courts are required to resolve cases on
federal grounds that no state authority can undo. Leaving
violations of state law unredressed and ensuring that the decisions
of federal courts may never be reexamined by the States hardly
comports with the respect for States as sovereign entities
commanded by the Eleventh Amendment.
V
One basic fact underlies this case: far from immunizing
petitioners' conduct, the State of Pennsylvania prohibited it.
Respondents do not complain about the conduct of the State of
Pennsylvania -- it is Pennsylvania's commands which they seek to
enforce. Respondents seek only to have Pennhurst
Page 465 U. S. 164
run the way Pennsylvania envisioned that it be run. Until today,
the Court understood that the Eleventh Amendment does not shield
the conduct of state officers which has been prohibited by their
sovereign.
Throughout its history, this Court has derived strength from
institutional self-discipline. Adherence to settled doctrine is
presumptively the correct course. [
Footnote 2/47] Departures are, of course, occasionally
required by changes in the fabric of our society. [
Footnote 2/48] When a court, rather than a
legislature, initiates
Page 465 U. S. 165
such a departure, it has a special obligation to explain and to
justify the new course on which it has embarked. Today, however,
the Court casts aside well-settled respected doctrine that plainly
commands affirmance of the Court of Appeals -- the doctrine of the
law of the case, [
Footnote 2/49]
the doctrine of
stare decisis (the Court repudiates at
least 28 cases) [
Footnote 2/50]
the
Page 465 U. S. 166
doctrine of sovereign immunity, [
Footnote 2/51] the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,
[
Footnote 2/52] and the doctrine
of judicial restraint. No sound reason justifies the further
prolongation of this litigation or this Court's voyage into the sea
of undisciplined lawmaking.
Page 465 U. S. 167
As I said at the outset, this case has illuminated the character
of an institution.
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Infectious diseases were common, and minimally adequate health
care was unavailable. Residents of Pennhurst were inadequately
supervised, and, as a consequence, were often injured by other
residents or as a result of self-abuse. Assaults on residents by
staff members, including sexual assaults, were frequent. Physical
restraints were employed in lieu of adequate staffing, often
causing injury to residents, and on one occasion leading to a
death. Dangerous psychotropic drugs were indiscriminately used for
purposes of behavior control and staff convenience. Staff
supervision during meals was minimal, and residents often stole
food from each other -- leaving some without enough to eat. The
unsafe conditions led to aggressive behavior on the part of
residents, which was punished by solitary confinement. There was
often urine and excrement on the walls.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In the questions raised in their petition for certiorari,
petitioners do not ask this Court to reexamine the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that respondents are clearly entitled to relief
under state law. Nor would it be appropriate for this Court to
reexamine the unanimous conclusion of the en banc Court of Appeals
on a question of state law.
See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood,
426 U. S. 341,
426 U. S.
345-346 (1976).
[
Footnote 2/3]
The court therefore found it unnecessary to decide if
respondents were also entitled to relief under the federal
statutory and constitutional provisions which had been raised in
the District Court.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Although the Court struggles mightily to distinguish some of the
cases that foreclose its holding today,
see ante at
465 U. S.
106-116, this vain effort merely brings into stark
relief the total absence of any affirmative support for its
holding.
[
Footnote 2/5]
"
Larson [v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U. S.
682 (1949),] established that, where the officer's
actions are limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations
are to be considered individual and not sovereign actions."
458 U.S. at
458 U. S.
714.
[
Footnote 2/6]
"Neither did
Edelman [v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974),] deal with a suit naming a state officer as
defendant, but not
alleging a violation of either federal or
state law. Thus, there was no occasion in the opinion to cite
or discuss the unanimous opinion in
Worcester [County Trust Co.
v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937),] that the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers
unless
they are alleged to be acting contrary to federal law or against
the authority of state law. Edelman did not hold that
suits against state officers who are
not alleged to be acting
against federal or state law are permissible under the
Eleventh Amendment if only prospective relief is sought."
457 U.S. at
457 U. S. 91
(emphasis supplied).
See also Worcester County Trust Co. v.
Riley, 302 U. S. 292,
302 U. S. 297
(1937) ("[G]enerally suits to restrain action of state officials
can, consistently with the constitutional prohibition, be
prosecuted only when the action sought to be restrained is without
the authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or
Constitution of the United States. The Eleventh Amendment, which
denies to the citizen the right to resort to a federal court to
compel or restrain state action, does not preclude suit against a
wrongdoer merely because he asserts that his acts are within an
official authority which the state does not confer" (citations
omitted)). In
Worcester, the Court held a suit barred by
the Eleventh Amendment only after stating:
"Hence, it cannot be said that the threatened action of
respondents involves any breach of state law or of the laws or
Constitution of the United States."
Id. at
302 U. S.
299.
[
Footnote 2/7]
The Court explained that the state officer sued in tort
"is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the
government, but as an individual, and the court is not ousted of
jurisdiction because he
asserts authority as such officer.
To make out his defence, he must show that his authority was
sufficient in law to protect him."
Cunningham, 109 U.S. at
109 U. S. 452,
quoted in
Poindexter, 114 U.S. at
114 U. S. 287.
Today's majority notes that these cases involve nondiscretionary
duties of governmental officers,
ante at
465 U. S.
109-110, but overlooks the reason for this
characterization -- officers have no discretion to commit a tort.
The same is true of the Court's treatment of the federal sovereign
immunity cases I discuss below.
[
Footnote 2/8]
See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.
S. 478,
438 U. S.
489-490 (1978) (officers of the United States are liable
for their torts unless the torts are authorized by federal law);
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605,
223 U. S.
619-620 (1912) (officers of the United States may be
enjoined where they wrongfully interfere with property rights).
Justice Holmes had occasion to state that sovereign immunity does
not generally extend to the acts of an officer of the sovereign.
"In general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its
immunity does not extend to those that acted in its name."
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549,
258 U. S. 568
(1922). He characterized petitioner's argument in that case that
sovereign immunity should extend to the unlawful acts of agents of
the United States acting within the scope of their authority --
as
"a very dangerous departure from one of the first principles of
our system of law. The sovereign properly so called is superior to
suit for reasons that often have been explained. But the general
rule is that any person within the jurisdiction always is amenable
to the law. . . . An instrumentality of government he might be and
for the greatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not
cease to be answerable for his acts."
Id. at
258 U. S.
566-567.
See also Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co.,
317 U. S. 575
(1943) (following
Sloan).
[
Footnote 2/9]
The Court also stated:
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State stand in
no better position than officers of the General Government, and as
to them it has often been held that:"
"The exemption of the United States from judicial process does
not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time
of peace, from being personally liable to an action of tort by a
private person, whose rights of property they have wrongfully
invaded or injured,
even by authority of the United
States."
"
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10,
161 U. S.
18."
221 U.S. at
221 U. S. 645
(emphasis supplied). The language I have quoted in the text makes
it clear that the Court is incorrect to suggest,
ante at
465 U. S.
109-110, n.19, that
Clemson dealt only with
unconstitutional conduct, and not with conduct in violation of
state tort law.
See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Seattle,
271 U. S. 426,
271 U. S. 431
(1926) (reaffirming the rationale of
Clemson in an action
against city and county officials).
[
Footnote 2/10]
In
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U. S. 362
(1894), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a
suit alleging that a state officer has wrongfully administered a
state statute. The Court awarded injunctive relief against state
officers on the basis of both state and federal law. In
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.
S. 280 (1912), the Court held that a suit against state
officers seeking recovery of taxes paid under duress was not
against the State, since a state statute required the recovery of
wrongfully paid taxes.
See id. at
223 U. S. 287.
In
Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.
S. 461 (1915), the Court assumed that the Eleventh
Amendment would not bar a suit
"to compel submission by the officers of the State to the laws
of the State, accomplishing at once the policy of the law and its
specific purpose,"
id. at
235 U. S. 471,
but rejected the appellees' construction of the state statute.
See also Farish v. State Banking Board of Okla.,
235 U. S. 498
(1915);
American Water Softener Co. v. Lankford,
235 U. S. 496
(1915). In
Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.
S. 547 (1918), the Court stated that the case was not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, since the claim
"is based, as we have seen, upon the tortious conduct of
Lankford, not in exertion of the state law, but in violation of it.
The reasoning of [
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S.
541 (1918),] is therefore applicable and the conclusion
must be the same, that is, the action is not one against the State,
and the District Court erred in dismissing it for want of
jurisdiction on that ground."
Id. at
245 U. S. 551.
While it is true, as the Court points out
ante at
465 U. S. 109,
n.19, that the
Martin Court went on to hold that there was
no federal diversity jurisdiction over the case, it cannot be
denied that the majority today repudiates the reasoning of
Martin. As for the Court's treatment of
Johnson v.
Lankford and
O'Connor, ante at
465 U. S.
109-110, n.19, it is true that Johnson sought only
damages, but the holding of that case, that the action was not
barred by the Constitution since it alleged conduct in violation of
state law, is utterly at odds with the Court's decision today.
Surely the Court cannot mean to rely on a distinction between
damages and injunctive relief, for it states:
"A federal court's grant of relief against state officers on the
basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not
vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. . . . We conclude
that
Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit
against state officials on the basis of state law."
Ante at
465 U. S. 106.
Awarding damages for a violation of state law by state officers
acting within their authority is inconsistent with the majority's
position that only a need to vindicate federal law justifies the
lifting of the Eleventh Amendment bar. If an order to pay damages
for wrongful conduct against a state officer is not against the
State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, an additional order
in the form of an injunction telling the officer not to do it again
is no more against the State. It cannot be doubted that today's
decision overrules
Johnson. Finally, as for
O'Connor, while it involved an allegation of
unconstitutional action, that allegation was insufficient to lift
the bar of the Eleventh Amendment because the complaint sought
retroactive relief. It was the fact that relief was authorized by
state law that defeated the Eleventh Amendment claim in
O'Connor. See 223 U.S. at 287.
[
Footnote 2/11]
Cases construing the sovereign immunity of the Federal
Government also hold that conduct by federal officers forbidden by
statute is not shielded by sovereign immunity even though the
officer is not acting completely beyond his authority.
See Land
v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731
(1947);
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U S 82 (1937);
Work v.
Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250
(1925);
Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U.
S. 197 (1922);
Payne v. Central Pacific R. Co.,
255 U. S. 228
(1921);
Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606
(1918).
[
Footnote 2/12]
The Court cited
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 213 U. S. 175
(1909), which will be discussed in
465 U. S.
infra, in support of this proposition.
[
Footnote 2/13]
The unanimous rejection of the argument that the Eleventh
Amendment bars claims based on state officers' violations of
federal statutes in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U. S. 151,
435 U. S. 156,
n. 6 (1978), is entirely consistent with my analysis of our cases.
But under the majority's view, it represented a rather dramatic
extension of
Ex parte Young to encompass federal statutory
claims as well as constitutional claims.
Ray demonstrates
that it cannot be maintained that
Young and the other
cases of this Court permit injunctive relief only when the
constitutionality of state officers' conduct is at issue. If that
were so,
Ray would be wrongly decided -- an argument that
a state officer has violated a federal statute does not constitute
a challenge to the constitutionality of the officer's conduct.
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.
S. 600,
441 U. S.
612-615 (1979);
Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
382 U. S. 111
(1965). In my view, the Eleventh Amendment claim in
Ray
deserved no more than the cursory footnote it received, since the
state officials had engaged in conduct forbidden by statute. If the
Court were willing to adhere to settled rules of law today, the
Eleventh Amendment claim could be rejected just as summarily.
[
Footnote 2/14]
The majority incredibly claims that
Greene contains
only an implicit holding on the Eleventh Amendment question the
Court decides today.
Ante at
465 U. S.
117-119. In plain words, the
Greene Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar consideration of the
pendent state law claims advanced in that case. The Court then
considered and sustained those claims on their merits.
[
Footnote 2/15]
Contrary to the Court's treatment of them, the cases discussed
above rely on the doctrine embraced in the quotation from
Clemson I have set out -- officials have no discretion to
violate the law. The same is true of the federal sovereign immunity
cases.
See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. at
330 U. S. 736
("the assertion by officers of the Government of their authority to
act did not foreclose judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of their
action [and] a determination of whether their
authority is
rightfully assumed is the exercise of jurisdiction, and must lead
to the decision of the merits of the question'"); Payne v.
Central Pacific R. Co., 255 U.S. at 255 U. S. 236
("But of course [the Secretary of the Interior's statutory
authority] does not clothe him with any discretion to enlarge or
curtail the rights of the grantee, nor to substitute his judgment
for the will of Congress as manifested in the granting act");
Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. at 246 U. S. 610
("The Secretary [of the Treasury] and the board must keep within
the statute . . . , and we see no reason why the restriction should
not be enforced by injunction . . ."); Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U. S. 605,
223 U. S. 620
(1912) ("And in case of an injury threatened by his illegal action,
the officer cannot claim immunity from injunction
process").
[
Footnote 2/16]
In a rather desperate attempt to explain these cases,
amici suggest that the Court simply did not realize that
it was deciding questions of state law, since, in the era before
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64
(1938), and
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.
S. 715 (1966), it was not clear that diversity cases or
pendent claims were governed by state, rather than federal, law.
That suggestion is refuted by the cases discussed above in which it
was held that relief could issue against state officers who had
violated state statutes. Even under the construction of the Rules
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, adopted in
Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), and repudiated in
Erie, federal courts were bound to apply state statutes.
See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.
S. 518,
276 U. S.
529-531 (1928);
Swift, 16 Pet. at
41 U. S. 18-19.
Thus, in these cases, the Court was indisputably issuing relief
under state law. The Court was explicit about the state law basis
for the relief it granted in
Greene, to use just one
example. It stated that federal jurisdiction
"extends, to the determination of all questions involved in the
case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the
disposition that may be made of the federal question, or whether it
be found necessary to decide it at all."
244 U.S. at
244 U. S. 508.
It then granted plaintiffs relief under state law, and concluded by
declining to decide any question of federal law.
"It is obvious, however, in view of the result reached upon the
questions of state law, just discussed, that the disposition of the
cases would not be affected by whatever result we might reach upon
the federal question. . . . Therefore, we find it unnecessary to
express any opinion upon the question raised under the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Id. at
244 U. S.
519.
[
Footnote 2/17]
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
[
Footnote 2/18]
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of
the words of § 2 or Article III, or assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against
nonconsenting states. Behind the words of the constitutional
provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the
essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall
be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the
postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of
sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent,
save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan
of the convention.'"
292 U.S. at
292 U. S.
322-323 (footnote omitted).
See also Ex parte State
of New York, 256 U. S. 490,
256 U. S. 497
(1921);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.
1,
134 U. S. 15-18
(1890). Most commentators have understood this Court's Eleventh
Amendment cases as taking the position that the Constitution
incorporates the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment,
48 U.Colo.L.Rev. 139, 153-158 (1977); Field, The Eleventh Amendment
and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U.Pa.L.Rev.
515, 538-546 (1978); Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An
Endangered Species, 55 Ind. L.J. 293, 305-310 (1980); Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About
Federalism, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 682, 684-688 (1976); Comment, Private
Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U.Chi.L.Rev. 331,
334-336 (1966).
[
Footnote 2/19]
Petitioners themselves treat the Eleventh Amendment as
equivalent to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See
Brief for Petitioners 12, n. 10. The Court appears to agree.
Ante at
465 U. S.
98.
[
Footnote 2/20]
Of course, if the Court were to apply the text of the Amendment,
it would not bar an action against Pennsylvania by one of its own
citizens.
See 465 U.S.
89fn2/17|>n. 17,
supra.
[
Footnote 2/21]
The rationale for this principle was compelling. Courts did not
wish to confront the King's immunity from suit directly;
nevertheless they found the threat to liberty posed by permitting
the sovereign's abuses to go unremedied to be intolerable. Since,
in reality, the King could act only through his officers, the rule
which permitted suits against those officers formally preserved the
sovereign's immunity while operating as one of the means by which
courts curbed the abuses of the monarch.
See 10 Holdsworth
at 262-268.
[
Footnote 2/22]
Commentators have noted the influence of these English doctrines
on the American conception of sovereign immunity.
See
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 19-29 (1963); Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh
Amendment Immunity, 17 Ga.L.Rev. 513, 517-518 (1983); Note,
Developments in the Law -- Remedies Against the United States and
its Officials, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 827, 831-833 (1957). In fact, in
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10
(1896), the Court, in holding that officers of the United States
were liable for injuries caused by their unlawful conduct even if
they did so acting pursuant to official duties, cited the passage
from
Feather v. Queen. See 161 U.S. at
161 U. S.
18.
[
Footnote 2/23]
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, recognized this
distinction in the very first case to reach the Court concerning
the application of the Eleventh Amendment to the conduct of a state
official,
Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).
[
Footnote 2/24]
See also McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U.
S. 543,
202 U. S. 559
(1906);
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U.
S. 273,
200 U. S.
283-284 (1906);
Prout v. Starr, 188 U.
S. 537 (1903);
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S.
58,
165 U. S. 67-70
(1897);
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S.
at
154 U. S.
388-391;
In re Tyler, 149 U.
S. 164,
149 U. S.
190-191 (1893);
In re Ayers, 123 U.
S. 443,
123 U. S.
506-507 (1887);
Hagood v. Southern,
117 U. S. 52,
117 U. S. 70
(1886);
Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 114 U.
S. 311,
114 U. S.
315-316 (1885);
Board of Liquidation v. McComb,
92 U. S. 531,
92 U. S. 541
(1876).
Cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U.
S. 196,
106 U. S.
219-222 (1882) (sovereign immunity of the United States
not a defense against suit charging officers of the United States
with unconstitutional conduct).
[
Footnote 2/25]
"That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of
Virginia, but it is not a law of the State of Virginia. The State
has passed no such law, for it cannot; and what it cannot do, it
certainly, in contemplation of law, has not done. The Constitution
of the United States, and its own contract, both irrepealable by
any act on its part, are the law of Virginia; and that law made it
the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax,
thereafter taken, to be without warrant of law, and therefore a
wrong. He stands, then, stripped of his official character; and,
confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's rights for which
he must personally answer, he is without defence."
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. at
114 U. S.
288.
[
Footnote 2/26]
See generally Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983
U.Ill.L.Rev. 423. The Court has adhered to this formulation to the
present day.
See Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc., 458 U. S. 670,
458 U. S.
684-690 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.);
id. at
458 U. S.
714-715 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part);
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. at
435 U. S. 156,
n. 6;
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232,
416 U. S. 237
(1974);
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine,
342 U. S. 299
(1952);
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.
S. 378,
287 U. S. 393
(1932). Of course, the fragment from
Young quoted by the
Court,
ante at
465 U. S. 109,
n. 17, does not convey the same meaning when considered in the
context of the paragraph quoted above.
[
Footnote 2/27]
As the Solicitor General correctly notes in his brief,
"this Court has no power to create any exception to a
constitutional bar to federal court jurisdiction.
Ex parte
Young rests instead on recognition that the Eleventh Amendment
simply does not apply to suits seeking to restrain illegal acts by
state officials -- whether those acts are illegal because they
violate the Constitution, as in
Young, or federal or state
law."
Brief for United States 23 (citations omitted).
[
Footnote 2/28]
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332,
440 U. S. 345,
n. 17 (1979);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.
S. 781 (1978) (per curiam);
Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U. S. 651,
415 U. S.
668-669 (1974);
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of
Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279,
411 U. S. 280,
n. 1 (1973);
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.
S. 436,
178 U. S.
444-449 (1900);
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.
S. 516 (1899);
In re Ayers, 123 U.
S. 443 (1887);
Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S.
52 (1886);
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.
S. 711 (1883).
See generally C. Jacobs, The
Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 88-91, 109-110
(1972).
[
Footnote 2/29]
The distinction between the sovereign and its agents not only
explains why the rationale of
Ex parte Young and its
predecessors is consistent with established sovereign immunity
doctrine, but it also explains the critical difference between
actions for injunctive relief and actions for damages recognized in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651
(1973). Since the damages remedy sought in that case would have
required payment by the State, it could not be said that the action
ran only against the agents of the State. Therefore, while the
agents' unlawful conduct was considered
ultra vires, and
hence could be enjoined, a remedy which did run against the
sovereign and not merely its agent could not fit within the
ultra vires doctrine, and hence was impermissible. If
damages are not sought from the State and the relief will run only
against the state official, damages are a permissible remedy under
the Eleventh Amendment.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at
416 U. S.
237-238.
[
Footnote 2/30]
"While, in England, personification of sovereignty in the person
of the King may have been possible, attempts to adopt this
reasoning in the United States resulted in the postulation of the
abstract State as sovereign. Since the ideal State could only act
by law, whatever the State did must be lawful. On this ground, a
distinction was drawn between the State and its government, which
consisted of its officers, and since the State could not commit an
illegal act, any such act was imputed to government officers. It
logically followed that a suit against state officers was not
necessarily a suit against the State."
Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and
Some of its Recent Developments, 40 Minn.L.Rev. 234, 244-245 (1956)
(footnotes omitted). Curiously, the majority appears to acknowledge
that it has created a sovereign immunity broader than had ever been
enjoyed by the King of England.
Ante at
465 U. S. 114,
n. 25.
[
Footnote 2/31]
See also Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.
S. 430,
193 U. S.
439-441 (1904).
[
Footnote 2/32]
This approach began long before
Poindexter. The
earliest cases in which this Court rejected sovereign immunity
defenses raised by officers of the sovereign accused of unlawful
conduct did not involve charges of unconstitutional conduct, but
rather simple trespass actions. In rejecting the defense, the Court
simply noted that, although the officers were acting pursuant to
their duties, they were engaged in unlawful conduct, which
therefore could not be the conduct of the sovereign.
See Bates
v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204,
95 U. S. 209
(1877);
Mitchell v.
Harmony, 13 How. 115,
54 U. S. 137
(1852);
Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806);
Little v.
Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804). In the landmark case
of
Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), the Court took it as
beyond argument that, if a state officer unlawfully seized property
in an attempt to collect taxes he believed to be owed the State,
the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a simple trespass action
against the officer. The majority strangely takes comfort in the
fact that the former cases allowed damages actions against federal
officers.
Ante at
465 U. S. 111, n. 21. The allowance of a damages remedy
is no more consistent with the Court's approach than the allowance
of an injunction,
see 465 U.S.
89fn2/10|>n. 10,
supra.
[
Footnote 2/33]
To the same effect as
Tindal is
South Carolina v.
Wesley, 155 U. S. 542
(1895). The majority argues that the case notes that South Carolina
was not a party to the proceeding, and suggests the ruling was
"purely procedural,"
ante at
465 U. S. 109,
n.19, but that misses the whole purpose of the "procedural" point
made in the opinion -- Eleventh Amendment immunity may only be
claimed by the State; it does not extend to state officers accused
of violating state law.
See also Florida Dept. of State v.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 697
(opinion of STEVENS, J.) ("If conduct of a state officer taken
pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute is deemed to be
unauthorized and may be challenged in federal court, conduct
undertaken without any authority whatever is also not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity").
[
Footnote 2/34]
While
Land v. Dollar is a case dealing with the
sovereign immunity of the Federal Government, it is pertinent to
the Eleventh Amendment, which after all, for present purposes, is
no more than an embodiment of sovereign immunity principles.
[
Footnote 2/35]
For example, in cases barring suits against individual officers
as suits against the State, the Court has also acknowledged the
importance of state law authority for the challenged conduct of the
officer. In such cases, the Court has frequently noted that the
relief sought would be unauthorized by state law and would
therefore adversely affect the State itself.
See, e.g., Hagood
v. Southern, 117 U.S. at
117 U. S. 68;
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. at
107 U. S. 721.
In contrast, in cases of official actions contrary to state law, a
federal court's remedy would not adversely affect any state
policy.
[
Footnote 2/36]
See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n,
359 U. S. 275,
359 U. S. 276,
n. 1 (1959);
Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.
18,
290 U. S. 27
(1933);
Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
19 U. S.
406-407 (1821).
[
Footnote 2/37]
The majority cites
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.
S. 332 (1979);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.
S. 232 (1974);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651 (1974);
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v.
Redwine, 342 U. S. 299
(1952). In each of these cases, the only question presented or
decided was whether
monetary relief could be obtained
against state officials on the basis of
federal law,
except for
Redwine, where the Court decided that a suit to
enjoin collection of a state tax on the basis of
federal
law was
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In none of
these cases was any question concerning the availability of
injunctive relief under
state law considered even in
dicta.
[
Footnote 2/38]
In addition to overruling the cases discussed in
465 U.
S. supra, the majority's view that
Young exists simply to ensure the supremacy of federal law
indicates that a number of our prior cases, which held that the
Eleventh Amendment may bar an action for injunctive relief even
where the State has violated the Federal Constitution,
see,
e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam), were incorrectly decided. The Court can have
no satisfactory explanation for
Pugh, which held that even
as to a federal constitutional claim, a suit may not be brought
directly against a State even where it may be brought against its
officials. On the majority's view, there is no basis for
distinguishing between the State and its officials -- as to both,
there is a need to vindicate the supremacy of federal law through
the issuance of injunctive relief, and, unless the officials are
acting completely outside of their authority, they must be treated
as is the State. However,
Pugh can be explained simply by
reference to
Young's use of the
ultra vires
doctrine with respect to unconstitutional conduct by state officers
-- such conduct is not conduct by the sovereign, because it could
not be authorized by the sovereign, hence the officers are not
entitled to the sovereign's immunity. A suit directly against the
State cannot succeed, because the
ultra vires doctrine is
unavailable without a state officer to which it can be applied.
Pugh makes it clear that
Young rests not on a
need to vindicate federal law, but on the traditional distinction
between the sovereign and its agents.
[
Footnote 2/39]
There can be no doubt that respondents' federal claims were
sufficiently substantial to justify federal jurisdiction in this
case. In another case brought by a resident of Pennhurst, we held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires,
at a minimum, that petitioners provide the residents with
reasonable care and safety.
See Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U. S. 307,
457 U. S. 324
(1982). The uncontested findings of the District Court in this case
establish that Pennhurst neither was safe nor was it providing
reasonable care to its residents. Therefore, respondents' federal
claims not only were sufficiently substantial to support the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case, but also would
almost certainly have justified the issuance of at least some
injunctive relief had a state law basis for the relief been
unavailable.
[
Footnote 2/40]
In
Larson, the Administrator of the War Assets
Administration was in possession of coal that the plaintiff claimed
the Administrator was contractually obligated to deliver to it.
Instead of seeking damages for breach of contract in the Court of
Claims, the plaintiff sought an injunction in the District Court.
The Court held that the Administrator had acted properly in
refusing to deliver the coal and instead insisting that the
plaintiff seek its remedy in the Court of Claims.
"There was, it is true, an allegation that the Administrator was
acting 'illegally,' and that the refusal to deliver was
'unauthorized.' But these allegations were not based, and did not
purport to be based, upon any lack of delegated power. Nor could
they be, since the Administrator was empowered by the sovereign to
administer a general sales program encompassing the negotiation of
contracts, the shipment of goods, and the receipt of payment. A
normal concomitant of such powers, as a matter of general agency
law, is the power to refuse delivery when, in the agent's view,
delivery is not called for under a contract and the power to sell
goods which the agent believes are still his principal's to
sell."
337 U.S. at
337 U. S.
691-692 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the Administrator had
acted properly. He was doing what any agent would do -- holding on
to property he believed was his principal's and insisting that the
claimant sue the principal if it wanted the property. He was merely
exercising the "normal" duties of a sales agent. Congress
envisioned that he do exactly that; the remedy it had provided
required the claimant to sue for damages in the Court of Claims,
rather than obtaining the property directly from the Administrator,
and no one had questioned the constitutional sufficiency of that
alternative remedy.
See McCord, Fault Without Liability:
Immunity of Federal Employees, 1966 U.Ill.Law Forum 849,
862-867.
"Since the plaintiff had not made an affirmative allegation of
any relevant statutory limitation upon the Administrator's powers,
and had made no claim that the Administrator's action amounted to
an unconstitutional taking, the Court ruled that the suit must fail
as an effort to enjoin the United States."
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643,
369 U. S. 647
(1962).
Malone can be explained similarly. These cases
hold that Congress had empowered the governmental official to make
necessary decisions about whether to hold on to property the
official believes is the Government's, at least pending the
aggrieved party's remedy in the Claims Court (formerly Court of
Claims) under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491
et seq.
(1982 ed.).
See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable
Parties, Mandamus, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 1479, 1490-1491 (1962); Jaffe,
The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 401, 436-437 (1958).
Thus, where the official acts as the sovereign intends, he is
entitled to the sovereign's immunity under the principles discussed
above. Where that is not the case,
Larson permits
injunctive relief. In this case, respondents did plead a specific
limitation on petitioners' powers, and the holding of the Court of
Appeals on the merits of respondents' state law claims indicates
that petitioners were not exercising the "normal" duties that the
sovereign had envisioned for them, unlike the Administrator in
Larson. Instead, petitioners were running Pennhurst "in a
way which the sovereign has forbidden." 337 U.S. at
337 U. S.
689.
[
Footnote 2/41]
The majority also repudiates JUSTICE WHITE's recent statement in
Treasure Salvors:
"where the officer's actions are limited by statute, actions
beyond those limitations are to be considered individual, and not
sovereign, actions."
458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 714.
Four Members of today's majority subscribed to that statement only
two Terms ago.
[
Footnote 2/42]
Indeed, the majority senses as much, by admitting that it cannot
reconcile the
ultra vires doctrine endorsed by
Larson with its approach.
See ante at
465 U. S. 114,
n. 25. The majority is also incorrect in suggesting that
Larson overruled most, if not all, of the cases contrary
to its position. In fact,
Larson cited most of those cases
with approval, including
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 U. S. 636
(1911),
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.
S. 204 (1896),
Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U. S. 270
(1885), and
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.
S. 731 (1947); the
Larson opinion stated that
it was overruling only a single case,
Goltra v. Weeks,
271 U. S. 536
(1926).
See 337 U.S. at
337 U. S.
698-702.
Larson simply did not wreak the kind
of havoc on this Court's precedents that the majority does
today.
[
Footnote 2/43]
In
Siler, the Court decided the case on state law
grounds, even though it acknowledged that,
"[i]n this case, we are without the benefit of a construction of
the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we must
proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject."
213 U.S. at
213 U. S.
194.
[
Footnote 2/44]
Justice Peckham's opinion in
Siler rested on a long
line of cases, dating back to Chief Justice Marshall's decision in
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. at
22 U. S. 822,
holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over all the issues
-- state as well as federal -- presented by a case that properly
falls within its jurisdiction. Nor was
Siler breaking new
ground in avoiding a federal constitutional question by deciding on
state law grounds. In
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.
Co., 118 U. S. 394
(1886), the Court noted the importance of the federal
constitutional questions. Even though these had been treated as
dispositive by the lower court, and though they were the "main --
almost the only -- questions discussed by counsel,"
id. at
118 U. S. 395,
the Court stated:
"These questions belong to a class which this court should not
decide, unless their determination is essential to the disposal of
the case in which they arise."
Id. at
118 U. S. 410.
It then determined that the challenged tax assessments were not
authorized by state law, and affirmed the judgment solely on that
ground. In addition, the Court has routinely applied the
Siler rule in cases upholding injunctive relief on the
basis of state law against municipal officials,
see, e.g.,
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620,
326 U. S. 629
(1946);
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.
S. 439,
281 U. S.
448-449 (1930);
Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.
Co., 270 U. S. 378
(1926); Bohler v. Callaway,
267 U. S. 479,
267 U. S. 489
(1925);
Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of
Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256,
250 U. S.
268-269 (1919); and in cases in which the plaintiffs
were not held to be entitled to the relief they sought,
see
Schmidt v. Oakland United School Dist., 457 U.
S. 594 (1982) (per curiam);
Railroad Comm'n Of
California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.
S. 388,
302 U. S. 391
(1938);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Ky.,
278 U. S. 300,
278 U. S. 307
(1929);
Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.
S. 113,
273 U. S. 116
(1927);
Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Kendall,
266 U. S. 94,
266 U. S. 97-98
(1924);
Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576,
232 U. S.
586-587 (1914);
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Garrett, 231 U. S. 298,
231 U. S.
303-304 (1913). Numerous other cases decided by this
Court have cited
Siler as an accurate statement of the law
regarding pendent jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U. S. 1,
427 U. S. 7
(1976);
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73,
362 U. S. 81, n.
7 (1960);
Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.
S. 238,
289 U. S.
243-245 (1933).
[
Footnote 2/45]
Cf. H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.
S. 398,
450 U. S. 407
(1981) (citing Justice Brandeis' opinion in
Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U. S. 288
(1936));
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.
S. 111,
443 U. S. 122
(1979) (citing the Court's opinion in
Siler).
[
Footnote 2/46]
In some of the cases following
Siler, this Court has
required that the decree include a provision expressly authorizing
its reopening in the event that a state court later decided the
question of state law differently.
See Lee v. Bickell,
292 U. S. 415,
292 U. S. 426
(1934);
Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S.
602 (1933);
Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.
S. 177,
290 U. S.
178-179(1933).
[
Footnote 2/47]
"I agree with what the Court stated only days ago, that"
"the doctrine of
stare decisis, while perhaps never
entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine
that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law."
"
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U. S.
416,
462 U. S. 419-420 (1983).
While the doctrine of
stare decisis does not absolutely
bind the Court to its prior opinions, a decent regard for the
orderly development of the law and the administration of justice
requires that directly controlling cases be either followed or
candidly overruled."
Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277,
463 U. S.
311-312 (1983) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
This statement was joined by four Members of today's majority.
The fifth was the author of the opinion of the Court in
City of
Akron.
[
Footnote 2/48]
This is an especially odd context in which to repudiate settled
law because changes in our social fabric favor limitation, rather
than expansion, of sovereign immunity. The concept that the
sovereign can do no wrong, and that citizens should be remediless
in the face of its abuses, is more a relic of medieval thought than
anything else.
"Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the monarchial
privilege, or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on
abstract logical grounds, it undoubtedly runs counter to modern
democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State.
Accordingly, courts reflect a strong legislative momentum in their
tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to
confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago that,
"it is a wholesome sight to see
the Crown' sued and answering
for its torts.""
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S.
47,
322 U. S. 59
(1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
In the even older decision of
Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U. S. 270
(1885), the Court, after observing that "the distinction between
the government of a State and the State itself is important, and
should be observed,"
id. at
114 U. S. 290,
wrote:
"This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional
government. To deny it or blot it out obliterates the line of
demarcation that separates constitutional government from
absolutism, free self-government based on the sovereignty of the
people from that despotism, whether of the one or the many, which
enables the agent of the State to declare and decree that he is the
State; to say '
L'Etat c'est moi.' Of what avail are
written constitutions whose bills of right for the security of
individual liberty have been written, too often, with the blood of
martyrs shed upon the battlefield and the scaffold, if their
limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed with
impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard,
defend, and enforce them; and that, too, with the sacred authority
of law, not only compelling obedience, but entitled to respect? And
how else can these principles of individual liberty and right be
maintained, if, when violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden
to visit penalties upon individual offenders, who are the
instruments of wrong, whenever they interpose the shield of the
State? The doctrine is not to be tolerated. The whole frame and
scheme of the political institutions of this country, State and
Federal, protest against it. Their continued existence is not
compatible with it. It is the doctrine of absolutism, pure, simple,
and naked. . . ."
Id. at
114 U. S. 291.
See also Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1889
(1983).
[
Footnote 2/49]
The heart of today's holding is that this Court had no power to
act as it did in 1981 when it ordered the Court of Appeals to
consider and decide the state law issues in this very case.
[
Footnote 2/50]
In the following cases, the Court held injunctive relief may
issue against state officers on the basis of state law after
explicitly rejecting their Eleventh Amendment defense:
Rolston
v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U.
S. 390 (1887);
South Carolina v. Wesley,
155 U. S. 542
(1895);
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.
S. 204 (1897);
Scully v. Bird, 209 U.
S. 481 (1908);
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 U. S. 636
(1911);
Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor,
223 U. S. 280
(1912);
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.
S. 541 (1918);
Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.
S. 547 (1918);
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban
R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917);
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene,
244 U. S. 522
(1917);
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.
S. 555 (1917).
Since petitioners' position applies also to federal sovereign
immunity (indeed the principal case on which they rely,
Larson, is a federal sovereign immunity case), the
following additional cases which refused to apply sovereign
immunity to suits against federal officers acting within the scope
of their authority because the plaintiff had alleged that the
officers had engaged in unlawful conduct are rejected:
Little v.
Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804);
Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806);
Mitchell
v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1852);
Bates v.
Clark, 95 U. S. 204
(1877);
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S.
10 (1896);
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States
Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.
S. 549 (1922);
Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. v. Fall,
259 U. S. 197
(1922);
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605 (1912);
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. at
330 U. S. 738.
Larson itself cites most of these cases with approval, and
disapproves of none of them. All are overruled today. In fact,
today the Court repudiates the two-track analysis of
Larson, since, in
Larson, the Court stated that
conduct which has been specifically prohibited by statute is not
protected by sovereign immunity even if it is performed within the
scope of the official's duties, yet today the Court holds that,
even if an officer violates a statute, his conduct is protected by
sovereign immunity. The Court also overrules the cases cited in
465 U.S.
89fn2/52|>n. 52,
infra. If some of these cases have
been rarely cited,
see ante at
465 U. S.
115-116, n. 27, this is because, until today, the law
was thought to be well settled on this point.
[
Footnote 2/51]
From the 15th-century English common law to
Larson and
beyond, courts have never held that prohibited conduct can be
shielded by sovereign immunity. That rule makes good sense -- since
a principal cannot authorize unlawful conduct, such conduct is, of
necessity,
ultra vires. There is no reason to abandon such
a well-settled and sensible rule.
[
Footnote 2/52]
The majority also overrules
Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175
(1909), and its progeny, including
Louisville & Nashville
R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298
(1913);
Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.
S. 478 (1922);
Chicago Great Western R. Co. v.
Kendall, 266 U. S. 94
(1924);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Ky.,
278 U. S. 300
(1929);
Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.
S. 177 (1933);
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.
S. 415 (1934);
Railroad Comm'n of California v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.
S. 388 (1938).