In 1952, respondent, a nonunion employee in an industry
affecting interstate commerce, brought a common law tort action in
a state court against a labor union and its agent to recover
compensatory and punitive damages for malicious interference with
his lawful occupation, alleging that, by mass picketing and threats
of violence during a strike, they prevented him from entering the
plant where he was employed and from engaging in his employment for
over a month. It is assumed that such action also constituted an
unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, for which the National Labor Relations
Board could have awarded respondent back pay under §10(c).
Held: the Act did not give the Board such exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter as to preclude the state court
from entertaining the action and awarding compensatory and punitive
damages. Pp.
356 U. S.
635-646.
(a) The union's activity in this case clearly was not protected
by federal law. P.
356 U. S.
640.
(b) Congress has not deprived a victim of the kind of tortious
conduct here involved of his common law rights of action for all
damages suffered.
United Workers v. Laburnum Corp.,
347 U. S. 656. Pp.
356 U. S.
640-642.
(c) That, under § 10(c) of the Federal Act, the Board had
limited power to award back pay to respondent does not create such
a conflict as to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction to award
common law damages for lost pay. Pp.
356 U. S.
642-645.
(d) To hold that the limited power of the Board under § 10(c) to
award back pay in its discretion excludes the power of the State to
enforce the employee's common law rights of action would, in
effect, grant to unions a substantial immunity from the
consequences of mass picketing or coercion such as was employed
here. Pp.
356 U. S.
645-646.
Page 356 U. S. 635
(e) An employee's right to recover in the state courts all
damages caused him by this kind of tortious conduct cannot fairly
be said to be preempted without a clearer declaration of
congressional policy than is found here. P.
356 U. S.
646.
(f) The power to award punitive damages is within the
jurisdiction of the state courts, but not within that of the Board.
P.
356 U. S.
646.
264 Ala. 456,
88 So.
2d 175, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before us is whether a state court, in 1952, had
jurisdiction to entertain an action by an employee, who worked in
an industry affecting interstate commerce, against a union and its
agent, for malicious interference with such employee's lawful
occupation. In
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum
Corp., 347 U. S. 656,
347 U. S. 657,
we held that Congress had not
"given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common law tort action
for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court from hearing
and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair
labor practice"
under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, or the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended. [
Footnote 1] For the reasons hereafter stated, we uphold
the jurisdiction of the state courts in this case as we did in the
Laburnum case.
This action was instituted in the Circuit Court of Morgan
County, Alabama, in 1952, by Paul S. Russell,
Page 356 U. S. 636
the respondent, against the petitioners, International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, CIO, an unincorporated labor organization, here called the
union, and its agent, Volk, together with other parties not now in
the case. Russell was a maintenance electrician employed by Calumet
and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company (Wolverine Tube Division) in
Decatur, Alabama at $1.75 an hour and earned approximately $100 a
week. The union was the bargaining agent for certain employees of
that Division, but Russell was not a member of the union. nor had
he applied for such membership.
The allegations of his amended complaint may be summarized as
follows: the union, on behalf of the employees it represented,
called a strike to commence July 18, 1951. To prevent Russell and
other hourly paid employees from entering the plant during the
strike, and to thus make the strike effective, petitioners
maintained a picket line from July 18 to September 24, 1951. This
line was located along and in the public street which was the only
means of ingress and egress to the plant. The line consisted of
persons standing along the street or walking in a compact circle
across the entire traveled portion of the street. Such pickets, on
July 18, by force of numbers, threats of bodily harm to Russell and
of damage to his property, prevented him from reaching the plant
gates. At least one striker took hold of Russell's automobile. Some
of the pickets stood or walked in front of his automobile in such a
manner as to block the street and make it impossible for him, and
others similarly situated, to enter the plant. The amended
complaint also contained a second count to the same general effect,
but alleging that petitioners unlawfully conspired with other
persons to do the acts above described.
The amended complaint further alleged that petitioners willfully
and maliciously caused Russell to lose time from
Page 356 U. S. 637
his work from July 18 to August 22, 1951, and to lose the
earnings which he would have received had he and others not been
prevented from going to and from the plant. Russell, accordingly,
claimed compensatory damages for his loss of earnings and for his
mental anguish, plus punitive damages, in the total sum of
$50,000.
Petitioners filed a plea to the jurisdiction. They claimed that
the National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction of the
controversy to the exclusion of the state court. The trial court
overruled Russell's demurrer to the plea. However, the Supreme
Court of Alabama reversed the trial court and upheld the
jurisdiction of that court, even though the amended complaint
charged a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Act. [
Footnote 2] 258 Ala. 615,
64 So. 2d
384.
On remand, petitioners' plea to the jurisdiction was again filed
but this time Russell's demurrer to it was sustained. The case went
to trial before a jury, and resulted in a general verdict and a
judgment for Russell in the amount of $10,000, including punitive
damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reaffirmed the
Circuit Court's jurisdiction. It also affirmed the judgment for
Russell on the merits, holding that Russell had proved the tort of
wrongful interference with a lawful occupation. 264 Ala. 456,
88 So. 2d
175. Because of the importance of the jurisdictional issue, we
granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 915.
Page 356 U. S. 638
There was much conflict in the testimony as to what took place
in connection with the picketing, but those conflicts were resolved
by the jury in favor of Russell. [
Footnote 3] Accepting a view of the evidence most
favorable to him, the jury was entitled to conclude that
petitioners did, by mass picketing and threats of violence, prevent
him from entering the plant and from engaging in his employment
Page 356 U. S. 639
from July 18 to August 22. The jury could have found that work
would have been available within the plant if Russell, and others
desiring entry, had not been excluded by the force, or threats of
force, of the strikers. [
Footnote
4]
Page 356 U. S. 640
This leaves no significant issue of fact for decision here. The
principal issue of law is whether the state court had jurisdiction
to entertain Russell's amended complaint, or whether that
jurisdiction had been preempted by Congress and vested exclusively
in the National Labor Relations Board.
At the outset, we note that the union's activity in this case
clearly was not protected by federal law. Indeed the strike was
conducted in such a manner that it could have been enjoined by
Alabama courts.
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.
S. 131;
Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board,
351 U. S. 266.
In the
Laburnum case,
supra, the union, with
intimidation and threats of violence, demanded recognition to which
it was not entitled. In that manner, the union prevented the
employer from using its regular employees and forced it to abandon
a construction contract with a consequent loss of profits. The
employer filed a tort action in a Virginia court and received a
judgment for about $30,000
Page 356 U. S. 641
compensatory damages plus $100,000 punitive damages. On petition
for certiorari, we upheld the state court's jurisdiction and
affirmed its judgment. We assumed that the conduct of the union
constituted a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Act.
Nevertheless, we held that the Federal Act did not expressly or
impliedly deprive the employer of its common law right of action in
tort for damages.
This case is similar to
Laburnum in many respects. In
each, a state court awarded compensatory and punitive damages
against a union for conduct which was a tort and also assumed to be
an unfair labor practice. The situations are comparable except
that, in the instant case, the Board is authorized, under § 10(c)
of the Federal Act, to award back pay to employees under certain
circumstances. We assume, for the purpose of argument, that the
Board would have had authority to award back pay to Russell.
[
Footnote 5] Petitioners assert
that the possibility of partial relief distinguishes the instant
case from Laburnum. It is our view, that Congress has not made such
a distinction and that is has not, in either case, deprived a
victim of the
Page 356 U. S. 642
kind of conduct here involved of common law rights of action for
all damages suffered.
Section 10(c) of the Federal Act, upon which petitioners must
rely, gives limited authority to the Board to award back pay to
employees. The material provisions are the following:
"If, upon the preponderance of the testimony taken, the Board
shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then
the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act:
Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an
employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
discrimination suffered by him. . . ."
61 Stat. 147, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
If an award of damages by a state court for conduct such as is
involved in the present case is not otherwise prohibited by the
Federal Acts, it certainly is not prohibited by the provisions of §
10(c). This section is far from being an express grant of exclusive
jurisdiction superseding common law actions, by either an employer
or an employee, to recover damages caused by the tortious conduct
of a union. To make an award, the Board must first be convinced
that the award would "effectuate the policies" of the Act. "The
remedy of back pay, it must be remembered, is entrusted to the
Board's discretion; it is not mechanically compelled by the Act."
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.
S. 177,
313 U. S. 198.
The power to order affirmative relief under
Page 356 U. S. 643
§ 10(c) is merely incidental to the primary purpose of Congress
to stop and to prevent unfair labor practices. Congress did not
establish a general scheme authorizing the Board to award full
compensatory damages for injuries caused by wrongful conduct.
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp.,
347 U. S. 656,
347 U. S.
666-667. In
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v.
Labor Board, 319 U. S. 533,
319 U. S. 543,
in speaking of the Board's power to grant affirmative relief, we
said:
"The instant reimbursement order [which directs reimbursement by
an employer of dues checked off for a dominated union] is not a
redress for a private wrong. Like a back pay order, it does restore
to the employees in some measure what was taken from them because
of the Company's unfair labor practices. In this, both these types
of monetary awards somewhat resemble compensation for private
injury, but it must be constantly remembered that both are remedies
created by statute -- the one explicitly and the other implicitly
in the concept of effectuation of the policies of the Act -- which
are designed to aid in achieving the elimination of industrial
conflict. They vindicate public, not private, rights.
Cf.
Agwilines, Inc. v. Labor Board, 87 F.2d 146, 150, 151;
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S.
177. For this reason, it is erroneous to characterize
this reimbursement order as penal, or as the adjudication of a mass
tort. It is equally wrong to fetter the Board's discretion by
compelling it to observe conventional common law or chancery
principles in fashioning such an order, or to force it to inquire
into the amount of damages actually sustained. Whether and to what
extent such matters should be considered is a complex problem for
the Board to decide in the light of its administrative experience
and knowledge. "
Page 356 U. S. 644
In
Laburnum, in distinguishing
Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U. S. 485, we
said:
"To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure
against unfair labor practices, that case recognized that the Act
excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. To the
extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure for
dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already
committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal
penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated.
The care we took in the
Garner case to demonstrate the
existing conflict between state and federal administrative remedies
in that case was itself a recognition that, if no conflict had
existed, the state procedure would have survived."
347 U.S. at
347 U. S.
665.
In this case, there is a possibility that both the Board and the
state courts have jurisdiction to award lost pay. However, that
possibility does not create the kind of "conflict" of remedies
referred to in
Laburnum. Our cases which hold that state
jurisdiction is preempted are distinguishable. In them, we have
been concerned lest one forum would enjoin, as illegal, conduct
which the other forum would find legal, or that the state courts
would restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Federal
Acts. [
Footnote 6]
Page 356 U. S. 645
In the instant case, there would be no "conflict" even if one
forum awarded back pay and the other did not. There is nothing
inconsistent in holding that an employee may recover lost wages as
damages in a tort action under state law, and also holding that the
award of such damages is not necessary to effectuate the purposes
of the Federal Act.
In order to effectuate the policies of the Act, Congress has
allowed the Board, in its discretion, to award back pay. Such
awards may incidentally provide some compensatory relief to victims
of unfair labor practices. This does not mean that Congress
necessarily intended this discretionary relief to constitute an
exclusive pattern of money damages for private injuries. Nor do we
think that the Alabama tort remedy, as applied in this case,
altered rights and duties affirmatively established by
Congress.
To the extent that a back-pay award may provide relief for
victims of an unfair labor practice, it is a partial alternative to
a suit in the state courts for loss of earnings. If the employee's
common law rights of action against a union tortfeasor are to be
cut off, that would, in effect, grant to unions a substantial
immunity from the consequences of mass picketing or coercion such
as was employed during the strike in the present case.
The situation may be illustrated by supposing, in the instant
case, that Russell's car had been turned over, resulting in damage
to the car and personal injury to him. Under state law, presumably,
he could have recovered for
Page 356 U. S. 646
medical expenses, pain and suffering, and property damages. Such
items of recovery are beyond the scope of present Board remedial
orders. Following the reasoning adopted by us in the
Laburnum case, we believe that state jurisdiction to award
damages for these items is not preempted.
Cf. International
Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.
S. 617. Nor can we see any difference, significant for
present purposes, between tort damages to recover medical expenses
and tort damages to recover lost wages. We conclude that an
employee's right to recover, in the state courts, all damages
caused him by this kind of tortious conduct cannot fairly be said
to be preempted without a clearer declaration of congressional
policy than we find here. Of course, Russell could not collect
duplicate compensation for lost pay from the state courts and the
Board.
Punitive damages constitute a well settled form of relief under
the law of Alabama when there is a willful and malicious wrong.
Penney v. Warren, 217 Ala. 120, 115 So. 16. To the extent
that such relief is penal in its nature, it is all the more clearly
not granted to the Board by the Federal Acts.
Republic Steel
Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 7,
311 U. S. 10-12.
The power to impose punitive sanctions is within the jurisdiction
of the state courts, but not within that of the Board. In
Laburnum, we approved a judgment that included $100,000 in
punitive damages. For the exercise of the police power of a State
over such a case as this,
see also Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc., 355 U. S. 131;
Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U.
S. 266,
351 U. S. 274,
note 12.
Accordingly, the judgment for the Supreme Court of Alabama is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
Page 356 U. S. 647
[
Footnote 1]
61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141.
[
Footnote 2]
We assume, for the purposes of this case, that the union's
conduct did violate § 8(b)(1)(A), which provides:
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents --"
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7:
Provided, that this
paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein. . . ."
61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(1)(A).
[
Footnote 3]
Among the instructions given to the jury were the following
requested by petitioners:
"5. I charge you that, unless you are reasonably satisfied from
the evidence in this case that the proximate cause of
(respondent's) inability to work at the Decatur plant of Calumet
and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company (Wolverine Tube Division)
during the period from July 18, 1951 to August 22, 1951, was that a
picket line was conducted by the [petitioners] in a manner which by
force and violence, or threats of force and violence prevented
[respondent] from entering the plant, and unless you are also
reasonably satisfied from the evidence that work would have been
available to [respondent] in the plant during said period, except
for picketing in such manner, you should not return a verdict for
the [respondent]."
"6. I charge you that, unless you are reasonably satisfied from
the evidence that the acts complained of by [respondent] occurred,
and that the [respondent] suffered a loss of wages as the natural
and proximate result of said acts, you should return your verdict
for the [petitioners]."
In its main charge to the jury, the trial court included the
following statement:
"If, in this case, after considering all the evidence and under
the instructions I have given you, you are reasonably satisfied
that, at the time complained of and in doing the acts charged, the
[petitioners] . . . actuated by malice and actuated by ill-will,
committed the unlawful and wrongful acts alleged, you, in addition
to the actual damages, if any, may give damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the [petitioners] or for the
purpose of making the [petitioners] smart, not exceeding in all the
amount claimed in the complaint."
"In order to authorize the fixing of such damages, you must be
reasonably satisfied from the evidence that there was present
willfulness or wantonness and a reckless disregard of the rights of
the other person."
[
Footnote 4]
On the evidence before it, the jury was entitled to find that
about 400 of the employees who had attended union meetings on July
17 were in front of the plant gates at 8 o'clock the following
morning . A crowd of between 1,500 and 2,000 people, including the
above 400, was near the plant gates when the first shift was due to
report for work at 8 a.m. Between 700 and 800 automobiles were
parked along the street which led to and ended at the plant. A
picket line of 25 to 30 strikers, carrying signs and walking about
three feet apart, moved in a circle extending completely across the
street. Adjacent to the street at that point, there was a group of
about 150 people, some of whom changed places with those in the
circle. On the other side of the street, there was another group of
about 50 people. Many members of the first shift came, bringing
their lunches, in expectation of working that day as usual. Russell
was one of these, and he tried to reach the plant gates. Because of
the crowd, he proceeded slowly to within 20 or 30 feet of the
picket line. There he felt a drag on his car and stopped. While
thus stopped, the regional director of the union came to him and
said, "If you are salaried, you can go on in. If you are hourly,
this is as far as you can go." Russell nevertheless edged toward
the entrance until someone near the picket line called out, "He's
going to try to go through." Another yelled, "Looks like we're
going to have to turn him over to get rid of him," and several
yelled, "Turn him over." No one actually attempted to turn over
Russell's car, but the picket line effectively blocked his further
progress. He remained there for more than an hour and a half. From
time to time, he tried to ease his car forward but, when he did so,
the pickets would stop walking and turn their signs toward his car,
some of them touching the car. When he became convinced that he
could not get through the picket line without running over somebody
or getting turned over, he went home. The plant's offices were
open, and salaried employees worked there throughout the strike.
Russell and other hourly employees necessary to operate the plant
were prevented from reaching the company gates in the manner
described. During the next five weeks, he kept in touch with the
unchanged situation at the plant entrance, and set about securing
signatures to a petition of enough employees, who wished to resume
work, to operate the plant. After obtaining over 200 signatures,
the petition was presented to the company on or about August 18. On
August 20, the company advertised in a local newspaper that, on
August 22, the plant would resume operations. All employees were
requested to report to work at 8 a.m. on August 22. At that time,
about 70 state highway patrol officers and 20 local police officers
were at the gates and convoyed into the plant about 230 hourly paid
employees reporting for work. Russell was among them, and he was
immediately put to work. Thereafter, he had no difficulty in
entering the plant.
There also was evidence that, on August 20, the company sought
to run its switch engine out of the yard to bring in cars
containing copper ingots. The engine, however, was met by strikers
-- some of whom stood in its path. One pulled out the engine's
ignition key and threw it away. Others in the crowd cut the
engine's fan belts, air hoses and spark plug wires, removed the
distributor head and disabled the brakes. The engine was then
rolled back into the plant yard by the crew without its mission
having been accomplished. There is no evidence that Russell was
present on this occasion.
[
Footnote 5]
The Board has held that it can award back pay where a union has
wrongfully caused a termination in the employee status, but not in
a case such as this when a union merely interferes with access to
work by one who remains at all times an employee.
In re United
Furniture Workers of America, CIO, 84 N.L.R.B. 563, 565. That
view was acknowledged in
Progressive Mine Workers v. National
Labor Relations Board, 187 F.2d 298, 306-307, and has been
adhered to by the Board in subsequent cases.
E.g., Local
983, 115 N.L.R.B. 1123. Petitioners contend that the Board's
above interpretation of its own power conflicts with the rationale
of
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.
S. 177, and
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v.
Labor Board, 319 U. S. 533.
See also In re United Mine Workers, 92 N.L.R.B. 916, 920
(dissenting opinion);
United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, 95 N.L.R.B. 391, 392, n. 3. As the decision of this
question is not essential in the instant case, we do not pass upon
it.
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
353 U. S. 26
(involving state injunction of peaceful picketing);
Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U. S.
20,
353 U. S. 23
(same);
United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co.,
351 U. S. 62,
351 U. S. 75
(same);
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.
S. 485,
346 U. S.
498-500 (same);
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
348 U. S. 468,
348 U. S.
475-476,
348 U. S.
479-481 (involving state injunction of a strike and
peaceful picketing);
Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board,
340 U. S. 383,
340 U. S.
394-395,
340 U. S.
398-399 (involving state statute restricting right to
strike of, and compelling arbitration by, public utility
employees);
Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.
S. 454,
339 U. S.
456-459 (involving state statute restricting right to
strike by requiring, as a condition precedent, a strike vote
resulting in an affirmative majority);
La Crosse Telephone
Corp. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 18,
336 U. S. 24-26
(involving state certification of the appropriate unit for
collective bargaining);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Board, 330 U. S. 767,
330 U. S.
773-776 (same);
Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson,
325 U. S. 538,
325 U. S.
541-543 (involving state statute restricting eligibility
to be a labor representative).
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins,
dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether the Taft-Hartley Act has
preempted a State's power to assess compensatory and punitive
damages against a union for denying a worker access to a plant
during an economic strike -- conduct that the Federal Act subjects
to correction as an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A). If
Congress had specifically provided that the States were without
power to award damages under such circumstances, or if it had
expressly sanctioned such redress in the state courts, our course
of action would be clear. Because Congress did not in specific
words make its will manifest,
International Union v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 245,
336 U. S. 252,
we must be guided by regulation that Congress has established. what
is consistent with the scheme of
It is clear from the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
that, in subjecting certain conduct to regulation as an unfair
labor practice, Congress has no intention of impairing a State's
traditional powers to punish or, in some instances, prevent that
same conduct when it was offensive to what a leading case termed
"such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and
the use of streets and highways."
Allen-Bradley Local v.
Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740,
315 U. S. 749.
Both proponents and critics of the measure conceded that certain
unfair labor practices would include acts "constituting violation
of the law of the State," [
Footnote
2/1] "illegal under State Law," [
Footnote 2/2] "punishable under State and local police
law," [
Footnote 2/3] or acts of
such nature that "the main remedy for such conditions is
prosecution under State law and better local law enforcement."
[
Footnote 2/4]
Page 356 U. S. 648
It was this role of state law that the lawmakers referred to
when they conceded that there would be "two remedies" [
Footnote 2/5] for a violent unfair labor
practice. For example, when Senator Taft was explaining to the
Senate the import of the § 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice, he
responded in this manner to a suggestion that it would "result in
duplication of some of the State laws":
"I may say further that one of the arguments has suggested that,
in case this provision covered violence, it duplicated State law. I
wish to point out that the provisions agreed to by the committee
covering unfair labor practices on the part of labor unions also
might duplicate to some extent that State law. Secondary boycotts,
jurisdictional strikes, and so forth,
may involve some
violation of State law respecting violence which may be
criminal, and so to some extent the measure may be duplicating
the remedy existing under State law. But that, in my opinion, in no
valid argument. [
Footnote 2/6]"
(Emphasis added.) This frequent reference to a State's
continuing power to prescribe criminal punishments for conduct
defined as an unfair labor practice by the Federal Act is in sharp
contrast to the absence of any reference to a State's power to
award damages for that conduct.
In the absence of a reliable indication of congressional intent,
the Court should be guided by principles that lead to a result
consistent with the legislative will. It is clear that the States
may not take action that fetters the exercise of rights protected
by the Federal Act,
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.
S. 538, or constitutes a counterpart to its regulatory
scheme,
International Union of United
Automobile
Page 356 U. S. 649
Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, or
duplicates its remedies,
Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U. S. 485. The
Court must determine whether the state law "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52,
312 U. S. 67. If
the state action would frustrate the policies expressed or implied
in the Federal Act, then it must fall. The state action here -- a
judgment requiring a certified bargaining representative to pay
punitive and compensatory damages to a nonstriker who lost wages
when striking union members denied him access to the plant -- must
be tested against that standard.
Petitioners do not deny the State's power to award damages
against individuals or against a union for physical injuries
inflicted in the course of conduct regulated under the Federal Act.
[
Footnote 2/7] The majority's
illustration involving facts of that sort is therefore beside the
point. But the power to award damages for personal injuries does
not necessarily imply a like power for other forms of monetary
loss. The unprovoked infliction of personal injuries during a
period of labor unrest is neither to be expected nor to be
justified, but economic loss inevitably attends work stoppages.
Furthermore, damages for personal injuries may be assessed without
regard to the merits of the labor controversy, but, in order to
determine the cause and fix the responsibility for economic loss, a
court must consider the whole background and status of the dispute.
As a consequence, precedents or examples involving personal
injuries are inapposite when the problem is whether a state court
may award damages for
Page 356 U. S. 650
economic loss sustained from conduct regulated by the Federal
Act.
The majority assumes for the purpose of argument that the Board
had authority to compensate for the loss of wages involved here. If
so, then the remedy the state court has afforded duplicates the
remedy provided in the Federal Act, and is subject to the
objections voiced in my dissent in
International Association of
Machinists v. Gonzales, ante, p.
356 U. S. 617,
decided this day. But I find it unnecessary to rely upon any
particular construction of the Board's remedial authority under §
10(c) of the Act. In my view, this is a case in which the State is
without power to assess damages whether or not like relief is
available under the Federal Act. Even if we assume that the Board
had no authority to award respondent back pay in the circumstances
of this case, the existence of such a gap in the remedial scheme of
federal legislation is no license for the States to fashion
correctives.
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board,
353 U. S. 1. The
Federal Act represents an attempt to balance the competing
interests of employee, union and management. By providing
additional remedies, the States may upset that balance as
effectively as by frustrating or duplicating existing ones.
State court damage awards such as those in the instant case
should be reversed because of the impact they will have on the
purposes and objectives of the Federal Act. The first objection is
the want of uniformity this introduces into labor regulation.
Unquestionably, the Federal Act sought to create a uniform scheme
of national labor regulation. By approving a state court damage
award for conduct regulated by the Taft-Hartley Act, the majority
assures that the consequences of violating the Federal Act will
vary from State to State with the availability and constituent
elements of a given right of action
Page 356 U. S. 651
and the procedures and rules of evidence essential to its
vindication. The matter of punitive damages is an example, though
by no means the only one. Several States have outlawed or severely
restricted such recoveries. [
Footnote
2/8] Those States where the recovery is still available
entertain wide differences of opinion of the end sought to be
served by the exaction and the conditions and terms on which it is
to be imposed. [
Footnote 2/9]
The multitude of tribunals that take part in imposing damages
also has an unfavorable effect upon the uniformity the Act sought
to achieve. Especially is this so when the plaintiff is seeking
punitive or other damages for which the measure of recovery is
vague or nonexistent. Differing attitudes toward labor
organizations will inevitably be given expression in verdicts
returned by jurors in various localities. The provincialism this
will engender in labor regulation is in direct opposition to the
care Congress took in providing a single body of nationwide
jurisdiction to administer its code of labor regulation. Because of
these inescapable differences in the content and application of the
various state laws, the majority's decision assures that the
consequences of engaging in an unfair labor practice will vary from
State to State. That is inconsistent with a basic purpose of the
Federal Act.
Page 356 U. S. 652
The scant attention the majority pays to the large proportion of
punitive damages in plaintiff's judgment [
Footnote 2/10] cannot disguise the serious problem
posed by that recovery. [
Footnote
2/11] The element of deterrence inherent in the imposition or
availability of punitive damages for conduct that is an unfair
labor practice ordinarily makes such a recovery repugnant to the
Federal Act. The prospect of such liability on the part of a union
for the action of its members in the course of concerted activities
will inevitably influence the conduct of labor disputes. There is a
very real prospect of staggering punitive damages accumulated
through successive actions by parties injured by members who have
succumbed to the emotion that frequently accompanies concerted
activities during labor unrest. This threat could render even those
activities protected by the Federal Act too risky to undertake.
Must we assume that the employer who resorts to a lockout is also
subject to a succession of punitive recoveries at the hands of his
employees? By its deterrent effect, the imposition or availability
of punitive damages serves a regulatory purpose paralleling that of
the Federal Act. It is precisely such an influence on the sensitive
area of labor
Page 356 U. S. 653
relations that the preemption doctrines are designed to
avoid.
There are other vices in the punitive recovery. A principal
purpose of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts is to promote
industrial peace. [
Footnote 2/12]
Consistent with that aim, Congress created tribunals, procedures,
and remedies calculated to bring labor disputes to a speedy
conclusion. Because the availability of a state damage action
discourages resort to the curative features of the pertinent
federal labor law, it conflicts with the aims of that legislation.
In a case such as the present one, for example, the plaintiff is
unlikely to seek a cease and desist order, which would quickly
terminate the § 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice, if he is assured
compensatory damages and has the prospect of a lucrative punitive
recovery as well.
In Alabama, as in many other jurisdictions, the theory of
punitive damages is at variance with the curative aims of the
Federal Act. The jury in this case was instructed that, if it found
that the defendant was "actuated by ill will" it might award "smart
money" (punitive damages) "for the purpose of making the defendant
smart. . . ." [
Footnote 2/13] The
parties to labor controversies have enough devices for making one
another "smart" without this Court's putting its stamp of approval
upon another. I can conceive of nothing more disruptive of
congenial labor relations than arming employee, union, and
management with the potential for "smarting" one another with
exemplary damages. Even without the punitive element, a damage
action has an unfavorable effect on the climate of labor relations.
Each new step in the proceedings rekindles the animosity. Until
final judgment, the action is a constant source of friction between
the parties. In the present case, for example, it has been
Page 356 U. S. 654
nearly six years since the complaint was filed. The numerous
other actions awaiting outcome of this case portend more years of
bitterness before the courts can conclude what a Board cease and
desist order might have settled in a week. As the dissent warned in
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U. S. 656,
347 U. S. 671,
a state court damage action for conduct that constitutes an unfair
labor practice
"drags on and on in the courts, keeping old wounds open and
robbing the administrative remedy of the healing effects it was
intended to have."
The majority places its principal reliance upon
United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., supra. I joined in
that decision, but my understanding of the case differs from that
of the majority here. That case was an action by an employer
against a stranger union for damages for interference with
contractual relations. While engaged in construction work on
certain mining properties, the plaintiff employer had used AFL
laborers pursuant to its collective bargaining contract. A field
representative of the United Construction Workers, an affiliate of
the United Mine Workers, informed plaintiff's foreman that he was
working in "Mine Workers territory," and demanded that his union be
recognized as the sole bargaining agent for the employees.
Otherwise, he threatened, the United Construction Workers would
"close down" all of the work. At the time of this ultimatum, not a
single worker in Laburnum's employ belonged to the stranger union.
Plaintiff refused. A few days later, the union representative
appeared at the job site with a "rough, boisterous crowd" variously
estimated from 40 to 150 men. Some were drunk. Some carried guns
and knives. Plaintiff's employees were informed that they would
have to join the United Construction Workers or "we will kick you
out of here." A few workers yielded to the mob. Those who refused
were
Page 356 U. S. 655
subjected to a course of threats and intimidation until they
were afraid to proceed with their work. As a consequence, the
employer was compelled to discontinue his work on the contract, and
it was lost. The employer sued the United Construction Workers for
the profits lost by this interference, recovering compensatory and
punitive damages. [
Footnote 2/14]
This Court affirmed.
There are at least three crucial differences between this case
and
Laburnum. First, in this case, the plaintiff
is seeking damages for an interference with his right to work
during a strike. Since the right to refrain from concerted
activities is protected by § 7 of the Act, a § 8(b)(1)(A) unfair
labor practice is inherent in the wrong of which plaintiff
complains, and the Federal Act offers machinery to correct it. The
§ 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice in
Laburnum, on the
other hand, was involved only fortuitously. Damages were awarded
for interference with the contractual relationship between the
employer and the parties for whom the construction work was being
performed. The means defendants chose to effect that interference
happened to constitute an unfair labor practice, but the same tort
might have been committed by a variety of means in no way offensive
to the Federal Act.
Laburnum simply holds that a
tortfeasor should not be allowed to immunize himself from liability
for a wrong having no relation to federal law simply because the
means he adopts to effect the wrong transgress a comprehensive code
of federal regulation. The availability of state court damage
relief may discourage the employer from invoking the remedies of
the Federal Act on behalf of his employees. [
Footnote 2/15]
Page 356 U. S. 656
But that effect may be tolerated since the employer's interest
is at most derivative, and there will be nothing to dissuade the
employees, who are more directly concerned, from using the federal
machinery to correct the interference with their protected
activity.
Second, the defendant in this case is the certified
bargaining agent of employees at the plant where plaintiff is
employed, and the wrong involved was committed in the course of
picketing incident to an economic strike to enforce wage demands.
Thus, the controversy grows out of what might be called an ordinary
labor dispute. Continued relations may be expected between the
parties to this litigation. The defendant in
Laburnum, on
the other hand, was a total stranger to the employer's collective
bargaining contract, and could claim the membership of not a single
worker. There was no prospect of a continuing relationship between
the parties to the suit, and no need for concern over the climate
of labor relations that an action might impair. The defendant was
attempting to coerce Laburnum's employees, either by direct threats
or employer pressures, to join its ranks. Such predatory forays are
disfavored when undertaken by peaceful picketing, and even more so
when unions engage in the crude violence used in
Laburnum.
Finally, the effect of punitive damages in cases such as the
present one is entirely different from that which results from the
recovery sanctioned in
Laburnum. Since the wrong in
Laburnum was committed against an employer, the damages
exacted there were probably the extent of the defendant's liability
for that particular conduct. Where it is employees who have been
wronged, however, there may be dozens of actions for the same
conduct, each with its own demand for punitive damages. In the
instant case, for example, Russell is only one of thirty employees
who have filed suits against the union for the same conduct, all of
them claiming substantial
Page 356 U. S. 657
punitive damages. [
Footnote
2/16] Whatever the law in other States, Alabama seems to hold
to the view that evidence of a previous punitive recovery is
inadmissible as a defense in a subsequent action claiming punitive
damages for the
Page 356 U. S. 658
same conduct. [
Footnote 2/17]
Thus, the defendant union may be held for a whole series of
punitive as well as compensatory recoveries. The damages claimed in
the pending actions total $1,500,000, and to the prospect of
liability for a fraction of that amount may be added the certainty
of large legal expenses entailed in defending the suits. By reason
of vicarious liability for its members' ill-advised conduct on the
picket lines, the union is to be subjected to a series of judgments
that may and probably will reduce it to bankruptcy, or at the very
least deprive it of the means necessary to perform its role as
bargaining agent of the employees it represents. To approve that
risk is to exact a result Laburnum does not require.
Page 356 U. S. 659
From the foregoing, I conclude that the
Laburnum case,
to which the majority attributes such extravagant proportions, is
not controlling here. In my judgment, the effect of allowing the
state courts to award compensation and fix penalties for this and
similar conduct will upset the pattern of rights and remedies
established by Congress, and will frustrate the very policies the
Federal Act seeks to implement. The prospect of that result impels
me to dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
93 Cong.Rec. 4024.
[
Footnote 2/2]
S.Rep.No. 105 on S. 1126, Supp.Views, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
50.
[
Footnote 2/3]
93 Cong.Rec. 4019.
[
Footnote 2/4]
93 Cong.Rec. 4432.
[
Footnote 2/5]
E.g., 93 Cong.Rec. 4024.
[
Footnote 2/6]
93 Cong.Rec. 4437.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430,
85 S.E.2d
729,
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953;
McDaniel v.
Textile Workers, 36 Tenn.App. 236,
254
S.W.2d 1.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington allow no such
recovery. Indiana forbids it when the conduct is also punishable
criminally. Connecticut limits the recovery to the expenses of
litigation. McCormick, Damages, § 78. Note, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 517.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Some States regard the damages as extra compensation for injured
feelings. In most jurisdictions, the recovery is calculated to
punish and deter, rather than compensate, though some States permit
the jury to consider the plaintiff's costs of litigation. In most
state courts, a principal must answer if the wrongful conduct was
within the general scope of the agent's authority. This list of
differences is not exhaustive. McCormick, §§ 78-85. Note, 70
Harv.L.Rev. 517.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Plaintiff's wages were approximately $100 per week, and he was
out of work five weeks. Therefore, about $9,500 of his $10,000
verdict represents punitive damages and damages for "mental pain
and anguish."
[
Footnote 2/11]
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U. S.
7, is not authority for the majority's holding on
punitive damages. That case held that the Board overstepped the
remedial authority conferred by § 10(c) of the Wagner Act when it
required an employer to reimburse the Work Projects Administration
for wages paid wrongfully discharged employees subsequently
employed on WPA projects. The Court said this payment was in the
nature of a penalty, and concluded that the Act conferred no
authority on the Board to exact such a penalty. There was no
question of preemption, and no discussion directed at whether an
award of punitive damages by a
State would be consistent
with the Federal Act.
[
Footnote 2/12]
29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151.
[
Footnote 2/13]
R. 632.
[
Footnote 2/14]
194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694.
[
Footnote 2/15]
It is clear that the employer in
Laburnum could have
invoked the investigative and preventive machinery of the Board. An
unfair labor practice charge may be filed by "any person." 29 CFR,
1955 Cum.Supp. § 102.9.
Local Union No. 25 v. New York, New
Haven & H. R. Co., 350 U. S. 155,
350 U. S.
160.
[
Footnote 2/16]
Petitioner has supplied the Court with the following list of
those cases. All are held in abeyance pending decision of the
instant case. Unless otherwise noted, each action is in the Circuit
Court of Morgan County, Alabama. The amount shown is the total
damages asked, which is composed of a relatively insubstantial loss
of wages claim and a balance of punitive damages. Petitioners'
Appendices, pp. 7a-9a.
"1.
Burl McLemore v. United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.,
No. 6150, $50,000. Verdict and judgment of $8,000. New trial
granted because of improper argument of plaintiff's counsel. 264
Ala. 538,
88 So. 2d
170."
"2.
James W. Thompson v. Same, No. 6151, $50,000.
Appeal from $10,000 verdict and judgment pending in Supreme Court
of Alabama."
"3.
N. A. Palmer v. Same, No. 6152, $50,000. Appeal
from $18,450 verdict and judgment pending in Supreme Court of
Alabama."
"4.
Lloyd E. McAbee v. Same, No. 6153, $50,000."
"5.
Tommie F. Breeding v. Same, No. 6154, $50,000."
"6.
David G. Puckett v. Same, No. 6155, $50,000."
"7.
Comer T. Junkins v. Same, No. 6156, $50,000."
"8.
Joseph E. Richardson v. Same, No. 6157,
$50,000."
"9.
Cois E. Woodard v. Same, No. 6158, $50,000."
"10.
Millard E. Green v. Same, No. 6159, $50,000."
"11.
James C. Hughes v. Same, No. 6160, $50,000."
"12.
James C. Dillehay v. Same, No. 6161, $50,000."
"13.
James T. Kirby v. Same, No. 6162, $50,000."
"14.
Cloyce Frost v. Same, No. 6163, $50,000."
"15.
E. L. Thompson, Jr. v. Same, No. 6164,
$50,000."
"16.
J. A. Glasscock, Jr. v. Same, No. 6165,
$50,000."
"17.
Hoyt T. Penn v. Same, No. 6166, $50,000."
"18.
Spencer Weinman v. Same, No. 6167, $50,000."
"19.
Joseph J. Hightower v. Same, No. 6168,
$50,000."
"20.
A. A. Kilpatrick v. Same, No. 6169, $50,000."
"21.
Charles E. Kirk v. Same, No. 6170, $50,000."
"22.
Richard W. Penn v. Same, No. 6171, $50,000."
"23.
Robert C. Russell v. Same, No. 6172, $50,000."
"24.
T. H. Abercrombie v. Same, No. 6173, $50,000."
"25.
James H. Tanner v. Same, No. 6174, $50,000."
"26.
Charles E. Carroll v. Same, No. 6175,
$50,000."
"27.
Ordell T. Garvey v. Same, No. 6176, $50,000."
"28.
A. R. Barran v. Same, No. 6177, $50,000."
"29.
Russell L. Woodard v. Same, No. 6178,
$50,000."
[
Footnote 2/17]
Alabama Power Co. v. Goodwin, 210 Ala. 657, 99 So. 158.
That was an action by a passenger against a streetcar company for
injuries sustained in a collision. As a defense to a count for
punitive damages, the defendant sought to show that punitive
damages had already been awarded against it in another suit growing
out of the same collision. The court held that the evidence was
properly excluded, for, "in its civil aspects, the single act or
omission forms as many distinct and unrelated wrongs as there are
individuals injured by it." 210 Ala. at 658-659, 99 So. at 160.
While conceding the logical relevancy of a previous recovery, the
court felt that the rule of exclusion was the better rule, since it
would prevent the introduction of such collateral issues as whether
and to what extent punitive damages had been included in a previous
verdict. This rule of exclusion was applied in
Southern R. Co.
v. Sherrill, 232 Ala. 184, 167 So. 731.
Cf.
McCormick, Damages, § 82, and 2 Sutherland, Damages, § 402 (4th
ed., 1916), discussing the majority rule that evidence of prior
criminal punishment is inadmissible in an action for punitive
damages for the same misfeasance.