Respondent construction corporation brought in a Virginia state
court against three labor organizations a common law tort action
for damages, based upon tortious conduct which constituted also an
unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947.
the Act did not give to the National Labor
Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action as to preclude the state court from hearing and
determining the issues. Pp. 347 U. S.
(a) To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure
against unfair labor practices, conflicting state procedure to the
same end is excluded. But, to the extent that Congress has not
prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious
conduct already committed, there is no ground for concluding that
existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct
have been eliminated. Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U. S. 485
distinguished. Pp. 347 U. S.
(b) The fact that the 1947 Act prescribed new preventive
procedure against unfair labor practices on the part of labor
organizations was additional recognition of congressional
disapproval of such practices, and is consistent with an increased
insistence upon the liability of such organizations for tortious
conduct and inconsistent with their immunization from liability for
damages caused by their tortious practices. Pp. 347 U. S.
(c) The denial of jurisdiction to the state court in this case
would mean that, where the federal preventive administrative
procedures are impotent or inadequate, the offenders, by coercion
of the type found here, may destroy property without liability for
the damage done. P. 347 U. S.
(d) The fact that petitioners are labor organizations, with no
contractual relationship with respondent or its employees, is no
basis for depriving the State of jurisdiction of this action
against them. P. 347 U. S.
194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694, affirmed.
Page 347 U. S. 657
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, [Footnote 1
given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common law tort action
for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court from hearing
and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair
labor practice under that Act. For the reasons hereafter stated, we
hold that it has not.
November 16, 1949, Laburnum Construction Corporation, a Virginia
corporation, respondent herein, filed a notice of motion for
judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia,
against petitioners United Construction Workers, affiliated with
United Mine Workers of America; District 50, United Mine Workers of
America; and United Nine Workers of America. The proceeding was a
common law tort action for compensatory and punitive damages
totaling $500,000. The notice contained substantially the following
allegations: while respondent was performing construction work in
Breathitt County, Kentucky, under contracts with Pond Creek
Pocahontas Company and others, July
Page 347 U. S. 658
26-August 4, 1949, agents of the respective petitioners came
there. They demanded that respondent's employees join the United
Construction Workers and that respondent recognize that
organization as the sole bargaining agent for respondent's
employees on the project. They added that, if respondent and its
employees did not comply, respondent would not be allowed to
continue its work. Upon respondent's refusal and that of many of
its employees to yield to such demands, petitioners' agents
threatened and intimidated respondent's officers and employees with
violence to such a degree that respondent was compelled to abandon
and its projects in that area. The notice further alleged that, as
the result of this conduct of petitioners' agents, respondent was
deprived of substantial profits it otherwise would have earned on
those and other projects. After trial, a jury found petitioners
jointly and severally liable to respondent for $175,437.19 as
compensatory damages, and $100,000 as punitive damages, making a
total of $275,437.19.
Petitioners moved for a new trial claiming numerous errors of
law, and for a dismissal on the ground that the Labor Management
Relations Act had deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Both motions were overruled, and the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia granted a writ of error and supersedeas.
After argument, it struck out $146,111.10 of the compensatory
damages and affirmed the judgment for the remaining $129,326.09.
194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694. Because of the importance of the
jurisdictional issue to the enforcement of common law rights and to
the administration of the Labor Management Relations Act, we
granted certiorari limited to the following question:
"In view of the type of conduct found by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia to have been carried out by Petitioners, does
the National Labor
Page 347 U. S. 659
Relations Board have exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter so as to preclude the State Court from hearing and
determining the issues in a common law tort action based upon this
46 U.S. 936. [Footnote
We are concerned only with the above-stated jurisdictional
question. We accept the view of the National Labor Relations Board
that respondent's activities affect interstate commerce within the
meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act. [Footnote 3
] The "type of conduct found by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia" is
Page 347 U. S. 660
set out in the margin. [Footnote
] Although the notice for judgment does not mention the Labor
Management Relations Act or unfair labor practices as such, we
assume the conduct
Page 347 U. S. 661
before us also constituted an unfair labor practice within the
following provisions of that Act:
"SEC. 8. . . ."
"* * * *"
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents -- "
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7. . . . "
Page 347 U. S. 662
61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 158(b)(1)(A).
"SEC. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
Page 347 U. S. 663
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities. . . ."
61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 157.
Petitioners contend that the Act of 1947 has occupied that labor
relations field so completely that no regulatory agency other than
the National Labor Relations Board and no court may assert
jurisdiction over unfair labor practices as defined by it, unless
expressly authorized by Congress to do so. They claim that state
courts accordingly are excluded not only from enjoining future
unfair labor practices and thus colliding with the Board, as
occurred in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.
, but that state courts are excluded also from
entertaining common law tort actions for the recovery of damages
caused by such conduct. The latter exclusion is the issue here. In
case, Congress had provided a federal
administrative remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its
enforcement, with which the state injunctive procedure conflicted.
] Here Congress has
neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the
Page 347 U. S. 664
traditional state court procedure for collecting damages for
injuries caused by tortious conduct. For us to cut off the injured
respondent from this right of recovery will deprive it of its
property without recourse or compensation. To do so will, in
effect, grant petitioners immunity from liability for their
tortious conduct. We see no substantial reason for reaching such a
result. The contrary view is consistent with the language of the
Act and there is positive support for it in our decisions and in
the legislative history of the Act.
In the Garner
case, we said:
"The national Labor Management Relations Act, as we have before
pointed out, leaves much to the states, though Congress has
refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from
conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which
state action is still permissible."
"This is not an instance of injurious conduct which the National
Labor Relations Board is without express power to prevent and which
therefore either is 'governable by the state or it is entirely
ungoverned.' In such cases, we have declined to find an implied
exclusion of state powers. International Union v. Wisconsin
Board, 336 U. S. 245
, 336 U. S.
. Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening
of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes.
We have held that the state still may exercise 'its historic powers
over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order
and the use of streets and highways.' Allen-Bradley Local v.
Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740
, 315 U. S.
346 U.S. at 346 U. S.
Page 347 U. S. 665
To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure
against unfair labor practices, that case recognized that the Act
excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. To the
extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure for
dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already
committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal
penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated.
The care we took in the Garner
case to demonstrate the
existing conflict between state and federal administrative remedies
in that case was, itself, a recognition that, if no conflict had
existed, the state procedure would have survived. The primarily
private nature of claims for damages under state law also
distinguishes them in a measure from the public nature of the
regulation of future labor relations under federal law.
The Labor Management Relations Act sets up no general
compensatory procedure except in such minor supplementary ways as
the reinstatement of wrongfully discharged employees with back pay.
61 Stat. 147, 29 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 160(c). See also Labor
Board v. Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464
One instance in which the Act prescribes judicial procedure for
the recovery of damages caused by unfair labor practices is that
with reference to the jurisdiction of federal and other courts to
adjudicate claims for damages resulting from secondary boycotts. In
that instance, the Act expressly authorizes a recovery of damages
in any Federal District Court and "in any other court having
jurisdiction of the parties." [Footnote 6
] By this provision, the Act assures uniformity,
otherwise lacking, in rights of
Page 347 U. S. 666
recovery in the state courts and grants jurisdiction to the
federal courts without respect to the amount in controversy. To
recover damages under that section is consistent with the existence
of jurisdiction in state courts to enforce criminal penalties and
common law liabilities generally. On the other hand, it is not
consistent to say that Congress, in that section, authorizes court
action for the recovery of damages caused by tortious conduct
related to secondary boycotts, and yet, without express mention of
it, Congress abolishes all common law rights to recover damages
caused more directly and flagrantly through such conduct as is
Considerable legislative history supports this interpretation.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, [Footnote 7
] there were no prohibitions of unfair
labor practices on the part of labor organizations. Yet there is no
doubt that, if agents of such organizations at that time had
damaged property through their tortious conduct, the persons
responsible would have been liable to a tort action in state courts
for the damage done. See Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin
Board, 315 U. S. 740
The 1947 Act has increased, rather than decreased, the legal
responsibilities of labor organizations. Certainly that Act did not
expressly relieve labor organizations from liability for unlawful
conduct. It sought primarily to empower a federal regulatory body,
through administrative procedure, to forestall unfair labor
practices by anyone in circumstances affecting interstate commerce.
The fact that it prescribed new preventive procedure against unfair
labor practices on the part of labor organizations was an
additional recognition of congressional
Page 347 U. S. 667
disapproval of such practices. Such an express recognition is
consistent with an increased insistence upon the liability of such
organizations for tortious conduct, and inconsistent with their
immunization from liability for damages caused by their tortious
practices. [Footnote 8
The language declaring the congressional policy against such
practices is phrased in terms of their prevention:
"SEC. 10. (a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided,
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
(listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise. . .
61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 160(a). [Footnote 9
Section 10(c) directs the Board to issue a cease and desist
order after an appropriate finding of fact. There is no declaration
that this procedure is to be exclusive.
Page 347 U. S. 668
The history of the enactment of § 8(b)(1)(A) lends further
support to this interpretation. Senate Report No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 50, as to S. 1126, said in part:
"Since this bill establishes the principle of unfair labor
practices on the part of unions, we can see no reason whatever why
they should not be subject to the same rules as the employers. The
committee heard many instances of union coercion of employees such
as that brought about by threats of reprisal against employees and
their families in the course of organizing campaigns; also, direct
interference by mass picketing and other violence. Some of
these acts are illegal under State law, but we see no reason why
they should not also constitute unfair labor practices to be
investigated by the National Labor Relations Board, and at least
deprive the violators of any protection furnished by the Wagner
Senator Taft, one of the sponsors of the bill, added later:
"But suppose there is duplication in extreme cases; suppose
there is a threat of violence constituting violation of the law of
Why should it not be an unfair labor practice? It
is on the part of the employer. If an employer proceeds to use
violence, as employers once did, if they use the kind of goon squad
tactics labor unions are permitted to use -- and they once did --
if they threaten men with physical violence if they join a union,
they are subject to State law, and they are also subject to be
proceeded against for violating the National Labor Relations Act.
There is no reason in the world why
Page 347 U. S. 669
there should not be two remedies for an act of that
(Emphasis added.) 93 Cong.Rec. 4024. [Footnote 10
If Virginia is denied jurisdiction in this case, it will mean
that, where the federal preventive administrative procedures are
impotent or inadequate, the offenders, by coercion of the type
found here, may destroy property without liability for the damage
done. If petitioners were unorganized private persons, conducting
themselves as petitioners did here, Virginia would have had
undoubted jurisdiction of this action against them. The fact that
petitioners are labor organizations, with no contractual
relationship with respondent or its employees, provides no
reasonable basis for a different conclusion. [Footnote 11
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia is,
therefore, sustained and its judgment
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
61 Stat. 136 et seq.,
29 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 141 et
Our order also stated that --
"The Government is invited to submit a memorandum setting forth
the policy of the National Labor Relations Board in regard to: (1)
the proviso in § 10(a), 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) §
160(a), and (2) other cases, apart from those in § 10(a), in which
the Board declines to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. The
memorandum should indicate by what standards the Board declines to
act and whether the standards are applied by rule or regulation or
on a case by case method."
The Government filed a memorandum stating that it had found it
"not feasible under the limitations prescribed by the Act to
consummate agreements ceding jurisdiction" under the proviso in §
10(a). It stated also that
"Under the standards which the Board is currently continuing to
apply, it would assert jurisdiction over an enterprise similar to
[that of] respondent company herein."
It found that respondent's enterprises came within at least the
following categories of the Board's jurisdictional standards:
"4. Enterprises producing or handling goods destined for
out-of-State shipment, or performing services outside the State in
which the firm is located, valued at $25,000 a year."
"5. Enterprises furnishing goods or services of $50,000 a year
or more to concerns in categories 1, 2, or 4 [supra
Mimeograph Release of National Labor Relations
Board, dated October 6, 1950, entitled "NLRB Clarifies and Defines
Areas In Which It Will and Will Not Exercise Jurisdiction";
National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building Council,
341 U. S. 675
341 U. S.
See note 2
"During the period from September 6, 1947 to December 1, 1949,
the plaintiff performed work in West Virginia and Kentucky for Pond
Creek Pacohontas Company, Island Creek Coal Company, and their
subsidiary companies, under twelve separate contracts amounting to
more than $650,000, from which it derived an annual profit slightly
over $25,000. . . ."
"In October, 1948, the two coal-producing companies determined
to open a mine in Breathitt county, Kentucky, and Bryan (president
of respondent) was asked to undertake the building of the
preparation plant there. Because of the undeveloped condition of
the roads and lack of living accommodations for the laborers, Bryan
was told that, if Laburnum would undertake the project, it would be
awarded additional work which would be required for the operation
of another mine in Breathitt county, amounting to more than
$600,000, on the basis of cost plus a fee of five per cent."
"On October 28, 1948, Pond Creek Pocahontas Company awarded the
plaintiff a contract for construction of the preparation plant on
the basis of cost plus a fee of five percent, the total fee, not to
exceed the sum of $12,000. The estimated cost of the project was
$200,000. Work on this project was commenced November 1, 1948, and
was approximately ninety-five per cent completed when it was
interrupted on July 26, 1949. Pursuant to their agreement, the coal
companies also awarded Laburnum several projects included in the
additional work to which reference has been made."
"Upon commencing the work in Breathitt county, Laburnum, in
compliance with its agreement with Richmond Building &
Construction Trades Council, procured skilled laborers through the
nearest local affiliates of the American Federation of Labor. With
the knowledge and consent of these affiliates, it employed local
unskilled laborers who were not members of any labor
"Laburnum proceeded with its work on these several projects
without trouble until July 14, 1949, when William O. Hart, speaking
from Pikeville, Kentucky, telephoned Bryan, who was in Richmond.
According to the testimony of Bryan, which was accepted by the
jury, Hart identified himself as a 'field representative of the
United Construction Workers and District 50 of the United Mine
Workers of America,' working under David Hunter, 'Regional Director
of Region 58 of United Construction Workers and District 50,' with
headquarters in Pikeville. Hart told Bryan that he was familiar
with the work which Laburnum was doing and about to do in Breathitt
county, that the plaintiff was 'working in United Mine Workers
territory,' and that he (Hart) would close down this work unless
the plaintiff recognized the United Construction Workers in the
employment of its workers. Bryan told Hart of Laburnum's agreement
with the American Federation of Labor affiliate at Richmond, under
which it was to employ members of that union, and that consequently
it would not be able to comply with Hart's demand and make an
agreement with the United Construction Workers. Hart replied that
he was going 'to take over' the plaintiff's work, that he intended
to 'organize' all of its workers, 'including the carpenters,
electricians, pipefitters, ironworkers, millwrights, laborers, and
everybody else,' and that, if the plaintiff failed to make an
agreement 'recognizing the United Construction Workers, he (Hart)
would close down' all of the plaintiff's work in Breathitt county,
as had been done in other instances within his (Hart's)
"* * * *"
"On Monday, July 25, about 7:30 p.m., Delinger [in respondent's
employ] telephoned Bryan that he had been informed that, on the
next day at noon, the United Construction Workers were coming to
the job site with a large group of men, that they would be armed,
and would stop the plaintiff's employees from working on the
"* * * *"
". . . When he [Bryan] arrived there [July 26], he found that
all work on the several projects in which his men were engaged had
stopped. It developed that, about noon on that day, Hart had
arrived at the job site accompanied by a crowd variously estimated
at from 40 to 150 men. There is evidence that this was 'a very
rough, boisterous crowd,' that some of the men used abusive
language, that some were drunk, and that some carried guns and
"* * * *"
"Hart and his men then went to the coal preparation plant and
told the Laburnum workers there that he was taking over the job,
and that the Laburnum workers would have to 'join up with the
United Construction Workers.' He accosted other employees of the
plaintiff at another site, where he repeated his threats that he
would 'take over' the job unless they joined the union which he
represented. Some of the plaintiff's employees yielded to these
threats and agreed to join Hart's labor organization, while others
refused to do so."
"* * * *"
"Bryan talked with Hart again at the job site on August 1, and,
as he says, Hart 'left no doubt in anybody's mind that he was going
to have people to stop any men from working who tried.'"
"He continually threatened to bring a large crowd of people
there from Beaver Creek and other places to stop us from working if
any of our people went to work. He said he would do that unless we
signed a paper recognizing his organization as the representative
of the laborers."
"Bryan replied that he 'wouldn't do it and couldn't do it'
because of his prior obligation to another labor organization.
Moreover, Hart threatened that, if the Laburnum men 'went back to
work, he was going to close down the mine operations by stopping
the United Mine Workers from working for Pond Creek.'"
". . . Consequently, on August 4, the coal companies, because of
the dispute in which the plaintiff had become involved with
representatives of these labor organizations, canceled the
construction contracts with Laburnum which were then in
"* * * *"
"After the violent events of July, 1949, Pond Creek Pocahontas
Company and Island Creek Coal Company abandoned the award of the
additional work upon a cost plus five per cent basis which they had
promised the Laburnum company. The coal companies invited bids upon
this proposed construction, but Laburnum was unsuccessful in all of
its bids for such work. The officials of the coal companies
expressed their high regard and sympathy for Bryan, but explained
that they could not run the risk of having the defendant unions
shut down the mining operations because of the unions' differences
194 Va. 872, 880-881, 882, 883, 884-885, 75 S.E.2d 694, 700-701,
The cases relied upon to exclude state jurisdiction are those
where a conflict with federal control has been made clear.
"[W]hen Congress does exercise its paramount authority, it is
obvious that Congress may determine how far its regulation shall
go. There is no constitutional rule which compels Congress to
occupy the whole field. Congress may circumscribe its regulation
and occupy only a limited field. When it does so, state regulation
outside that limited field and otherwise admissible is not
forbidden or displaced. The principle is thoroughly established
that the exercise by the State of its police power, which would be
valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where
the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two
acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together.'"
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1
302 U. S. 10
See also Amalgamated Assn. v. Wisconsin Board,
340 U. S. 383
United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.
; Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin
338 U.S. 953; La Crosse Telephone Corp. v.
Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 18
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Board, 330 U.
; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.
"SEC. 303. . . ."
"(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by
reason or [of] any violation of subsection (a) [boycotts and other
unlawful combinations] may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of
section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or
in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall
recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit."
61 Stat. 158, 159, 29 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 187(b).
49 Stat. 449 et seq.,
29 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 151 et
". . . While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a strike,
when and because its purpose is one that the Federal Act made
illegal, it has been given no power to forbid one because its
method is illegal -- even if the illegality were to consist of
actual or threatened violence to persons or destruction of
property. Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the states. In
this case, there was also evidence of considerable injury to
property and intimidation of other employees by threats and no one
questions the state's power to police coercion by those
International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.
, 336 U. S. 253
336 U.S. at 336 U. S.
-258, distinguishing the conduct there complained of
from that protected by § 7 of the Labor Management Relations
". . . By retaining the language which provides the Board's
powers under section 10 shall not be affected by other means of
adjustment, the conference agreement makes clear that, when two
remedies exist, one before the Board and one before the courts, the
remedy before the Board shall be in addition to, and not in lieu
of, other remedies."
Conference Report on H.R. 3020, H.R.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong., 1st
Similarly, H.R.Rep.No.245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, said:
"EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE THE LAW"
"When employers violate rights that the Labor Act gives to
employees or to unions, the Board can issue orders against them.
When employers violate rights of employees or of unions under
other laws, they must answer in court for what they do.
the bill, when unions and their members violate rights given to
employers and to employees, the new Board can issue orders
protecting the employers and the employees."
Note, Labor Law -- Federal and State
Jurisdiction -- Common Law Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 468; Cox and
Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 211,
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs,
If this labor organizer had committed murder on the picket line,
he would, of course, be subject to prosecution
Page 347 U. S. 670
by Virginia. For the federal Act in no way deals with such
conduct, and there may be doubt if constitutionally it could do so,
at least in such a way as to supersede local law.
The present case is different. The labor organizer's conduct
that has led to this judgment for damages is conduct with which the
federal Act specifically deals. On the facts found by the state
court, the labor organizer and the union have committed an unfair
labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A) by using threats and the force of
a picket line to make employees join a union, contrary to their
desires. A state court or a state labor board could not enjoin that
conduct, as Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.
, teaches. And I think like reasons preclude a
State from applying other sanctions to it.
This conduct is the stuff out of which labor-management strife
has been made ever since trade unionism began its growth. For
years, the law of the jungle applied, victory going to the
strongest. The emergence of more civilized methods of settling
these disputes is familiar history. At first, the law was mostly on
the side of management. The courts as well as the legislatures
shaped the rules against the interests of labor. Gradually, the
human rights in industry were recognized, until they finally
received more generous recognition under the Wagner Act.
That Act subjected these industrial disputes to settlement and
adjudication in administrative proceedings. For example, the
administrative agency was granted power to forbid employers from
interfering with trade union activities. May a union not only
institute proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board,
but sue the employer as well? Or may it have a choice of remedies?
I would think not. But, if the union may not sue the employer for
the tortious conduct, why may the employer sue the union?
Page 347 U. S. 671
I think that, for each wrong which the federal Act recognizes,
the parties have only the remedy supplied by that Act -- and for a
simple reason. The federal Act was designed to decide
labor-management controversies, to bring them to a peaceful,
orderly settlement, to put the parties on the basis of equality
which the rules designed by Congress envisaged. *
If the parties
not only have the remedy Congress provided but the right to sue for
damages as well, the controversy is not settled by what the federal
agency does. It drags on and on in the courts, keeping old wounds
open and robbing the administrative remedy of the healing effects
it was intended to have.
* Section 1(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61
Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141(b), provides that:
"It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote
the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of
both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce,
to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the
interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with
labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and
proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which
affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to
protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes