1. Tugboats plying navigable waters of the United States, and
employed partly in towing other vessels on interstate and foreign
voyages or in moving vessels engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce in and about the harbors where the tugs are stationed are
subject to regulation by Congress under the commerce clause. P.
302 U. S. 4.
2. There is no express provision in federal laws and regulations
for inspection of hull and machinery, in order to insure safety or
determine seaworthiness of motor-driven tugs which do not carry
passengers or freight for hire, or do not have on board any
inflammable or combustible liquid cargo in bulk, or do not
transport explosives or like dangerous cargo, or are not seagoing
vessels of three hundred gross tons or over, or (with respect to
requirements as to load lines) are under one hundred and fifty
gross tons. Pp.
302 U. S. 4,
302 U. S. 8.
3. The federal statutes are not to be construed as implying a
prohibition of inspection by state authorities of hull and
machinery, to insure safety and determine seaworthiness, in the
case of vessels which in this respect lie outside the federal
requirements. P.
302 U. S. 9.
4. State regulation of interstate commerce is invalid (a) if in
conflict with an express regulation by Congress, (b) if the subject
is one demanding uniformity of regulation so that state action is
altogether inadmissible in the absence of federal action, (c) where
federal regulation has occupied the field. P.
302 U. S. 9.
Page 302 U. S. 2
5. When Congress circumscribes its regulation of a subject of
interstate commerce and occupies only a limited field,state
regulation outside of that limited field and otherwise admissible
is not forbidden or displaced. P.
302 U. S. 10.
6. An exercise of state police power which would be valid if not
superseded by federal action is superseded only where the
repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts
cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together. P.
302 U. S. 10.
7. Inspection of the hull and machinery of motor-driven tugs in
order to insure safety and seaworthiness is not such a subject as,
by its nature, requires uniformity of regulation, and therefore
this field is open to the States in the absence of conflicting
federal regulation under the commerce clause. P.
302 U. S. 14.
If, however, the State goes farther and attempts to impose
particular standards as to structure, design, equipment and
operation which, in the judgment of its authorities, may be
desirable but which pass beyond what is plainly essential to safety
and seaworthiness, the State may encounter the principle that such
requirements, if imposed at all, must be through the action of
Congress, which can establish a uniform rule.
186 Wash. 589, 596, 59 P.2d 373, reversed.
Certiorari, 299 U.S. 539, to review a reversal of a judgment
denying a writ of prohibition.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents, owners of motor-driven tugs, sought a writ of
prohibition to prevent the enforcement of provisions
Page 302 U. S. 3
of c. 200 of the Washington Laws of 1907 (Rem.Rev.Stat., § 9843
et seq.) relating to the inspection and regulation of
vessels. The Supreme Court of the state directed judgment for
respondents, holding the statute invalid "if applied to the
navigable waters over which the federal government has control."
186 Wash. 589, 596, 59 P.2d 373, 376. We granted certiorari. 299
U.S. 539. After hearing, we ordered reargument, and requested the
Attorney General of the United States to present the views of the
government upon the question whether the state act or the action of
the officers of the state thereunder conflicts with the authority
of the United States or with the action of its officers under the
acts of Congress. The case has been reargued accordingly, and the
views of the government have been presented both orally and upon
brief in support of the decision of the state court.
The material facts, as set forth in the opinion of the state
court, are that respondents own and operate 139 motor-driven tugs,
of which 111 are less than 65 feet in length. Some of these tugs
are registered, and the remainder are enrolled and licensed under
federal laws. For the most part, these tugs are employed in
intrastate commerce, but some tow to and from British Columbia
ports or across the Columbia river or from other ports in
Washington to ports in Oregon. Practically all these tugs are
capable of engaging in interstate or foreign commerce, and will do
so if and when opportunity offers. Some of the larger tugs have
towed and will tow to California ports. The main business, however,
of most of the tugs is confined to moving vessels engaged in
interstate and foreign commerce and other work in and about the
harbors where they are stationed. 186 Wash. 589, 590.
Respondents' complaint challenged the validity of a large number
of requirements of the state act which it was alleged the state
authorities sought to enforce (186
Page 302 U. S. 4
Wash., p. 591), but these authorities, by their answer and in
the argument at bar, disclaim an intention to enforce any of the
state regulations which conflict with those established under the
laws of the United States.
First. The first question is whether the state
legislation, as applied to respondents' motor-driven tugs, is in
all respects in conflict with express provisions of the federal
laws and regulations. Wherever such conflict exists, the state
legislation must fall.
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 210.
Chapter 200 of the Washington Laws of 1907 is described by the
state court as
"a comprehensive and complete code for the inspection and
regulation of every vessel operated by machinery which is not
subject to inspection under the laws of the United States."
Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9844; 186 Wash. p. 590.
It cannot be doubted that the power of Congress over interstate
and foreign commerce embraces the authority to make regulations for
respondents' tugs.
Foster v.
Davenport, 22 How. 244;
Moran v. New
Orleans, 112 U. S. 69;
Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 396. Has
Congress exercised that authority, and, if so, to what extent?
The federal acts and regulations with respect to vessels on the
navigable waters of the United States are elaborate. They were well
described in the argument of the Assistant Solicitor General as a
maze of regulation. Provisions with respect to steam vessels are
extremely detailed. 46 U.S.C. c. 14, § 361
et seq.
Provisions as to motor-driven vessels are far less comprehensive,
and establish only a limited regulation. By section 4426 of the
Revised Statutes, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1905, c. 1457,
§ 4, 33 Stat. 1029, 1030, and by the Act of May 16, 1906, c. 2460,
34 Stat. 193, 194, it was provided that all vessels
"above fifteen gross tons carrying freight or passengers for
hire, but not engaged in fishing as a regular business, propelled
by gas, fluid,
Page 302 U. S. 5
naptha, or electric motors"
should be subject to the provisions of the statute relating to
the inspection of hulls and boilers and requiring engineers and
pilots. These vessels were also required to carry life preservers
for passengers and, while carrying passengers, to be in charge of a
person duly licensed by the federal local board. 46 U.S.C. § 404.
It does not appear that respondents' motor-driven tugs are within
the class of vessels which carry freight or passengers for
hire.
In 1910, Congress enacted the Motor Boat Regulations Act, 36
Stat. 462. While this statute is applicable to respondents' tugs,
so far as it goes, its scope is restricted. Section 1 defines the
word "motor boat" as including "every vessel propelled by machinery
and not more than sixty-five feet in length except tugboats and
towboats propelled by steam." There follows in that section a
proviso that the engine, boiler, or other operating machinery shall
be subject to inspection by the local inspectors of steam vessels,
and to the approval of the design thereof, where the vessels "are
more than forty feet in length, and which are propelled by
machinery driven by steam." Section 2 divides the motor boats which
are subject to the act into three classes: (1) those less than 26
feet in length; (2) those 26 feet or over and less than 40 feet in
length; (3) those 40 feet or over and not more than 65 feet in
length. Section 3 then provides for the carrying of lights by motor
boats of the respective classes. Section 4 relates to whistles, fog
horns, and bells. Sections 5 and 6 provide that motor boats subject
to the act, and also motor boats more than 65 feet in length, shall
carry life preservers or life belts or similar devices, and fire
extinguishing equipment. Section 5 requires that all motor boats
carrying passengers for hire shall be in charge of a person duly
licensed by the federal local board of inspectors, and has the
proviso that motor boats shall not be required to carry
Page 302 U. S. 6
licensed officers except as required by the Motor Boat
Regulations Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 511-516. Under the federal
regulations, motor boats are required to have on board two copies
of the pilot rules to be observed by them, with copies of the
departmental circular.
As documented vessels of the United States, motor boats must be
marked in a specified manner with their names and home ports. 46
U.S.C. § 46. All vessels, regardless of tonnage, size, or manner of
propulsion, and whether or not carrying freight or passengers for
hire (other than public vessels of the United States not engaged in
commercial service), which have on board "any inflammable or
combustible liquid cargo in bulk," are to be "considered steam
vessels," and are made subject to the provisions of the statutes
relating to such vessels. This provision does not apply to
inflammable or combustible liquid for use as fuel or stores. Act of
June 23, 1936, c. 729, 49 Stat. 1889, 46 U.S.C. § 391a. Vessels
transporting explosives or like dangerous cargo are subject to
inspection to determine that such cargo may be carried with safety,
and appropriate permit for that purpose is required. Act of August
26, 1935, c. 697, 49 Stat. 868, 46 U.S.C. § 178. "Load lines" are
established for merchant vessels of 150 gross tons or over
proceeding on a "coastwise voyage by sea," as defined -- that is,
outside the line dividing inland waters from the high seas. Act of
August 27, 1935, c. 747, 49 Stat. 888, 46 U.S.C. § 88.
Compare International Load Line Convention of July 5,
1930, 47 Stat. 2229. It appears from statements in the record and
in argument, which we do not understand to be challenged, that
there are not more than three of respondents' motor tugs, here
involved, which exceed 150 tons gross.
The limited application of the provisions of the federal laws
and regulations to vessels propelled by internal-combustion engines
was recently and definitely brought to
Page 302 U. S. 7
the attention of Congress. The report of the Bureau of
Navigation and Steamboat Inspection showed that there were many
large vessels of this class. [
Footnote 1] The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
of the House of Representatives found that this situation was due
to the fact
"that, when the steamboat inspection laws were passed, internal
combustion engine laws were unknown, with the result that many of
the existing laws apply to steam vessels, and, under the opinion of
the law, officers of the department do not apply to vessels
operated by machinery other than by steam."
The Committee added that "it was very doubtful whether, under
existing law, lifeboats could be required on these motor vessels."
[
Footnote 2] To meet that
situation, Congress has provided that existing laws covering the
inspections of steam vessels shall be applicable "to seagoing
vessels of three hundred gross tons and over propelled in whole or
in part by internal-combustion engines" to such extent as may be
required by the regulations of the Board of Supervising Inspectors
of Steam Vessels with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce.
Act of June 20, 1936, c. 628, 49 Stat. 1544, 46 U.S.C. § 367. Even
as thus limited, the act expressly excepts vessels engaged "in
fishing, oystering, claiming, crabbing, or any other branch of the
fishery or kelp or sponge industry." It is manifest that Congress
carefully considered the application of existing laws, and decided
to what extent its field of regulation should be widened. [
Footnote 3] Congress decided to extend
its regulation as to motor-driven vessels only to those of the
specified class.
Page 302 U. S. 8
We find the conclusion inescapable that, apart from the
particular requirements in other respects, there is no provision of
the federal laws and regulations for the inspection of the hull and
machinery of respondents' motor-driven tugs in order to insure
safety or determine seaworthiness where these tugs, respectively,
do not carry freight or passengers for hire or do not have on board
any inflammable or combustible liquid cargo in bulk or do not
transport explosives or like dangerous cargo or are not seagoing
vessels of 300 gross tons or over or, with respect to requirements
as to load lines, are under 150 gross tons. It follows that
inspection of the hull and machinery of these tugs by state
authorities in order to insure safety and determine seaworthiness
is not in conflict with any express provision of the federal laws
and regulations. The testimony in the record shows that those laws
and regulations are administered in accordance with this view.
Page 302 U. S. 9
Second. The next question is whether the federal
statutes are to be construed as implying a prohibition of
inspection by state authorities of hull and machinery to insure
safety and determine seaworthiness in the case of vessels which in
this respect lie outside the federal requirements.
The state court took the view that Congress had occupied the
field, and that no room was left for state action in relation to
vessels plying on navigable waters within the control of the
federal government. 186 Wash. 589, 593, 596, 59 P.2d 373. And this
is the argument pressed by respondents and the Solicitor
General.
This argument, invoking a familiar principle, would be
unnecessary and inapposite if there were a direct conflict with an
express regulation of Congress acting within its province. The
argument presupposes the absence of a conflict of that character.
The argument is also unnecessary and inapposite if the subject is
one demanding uniformity of regulation, so that state action is
altogether inadmissible in the absence of federal action. In that
class of cases, the Constitution itself occupies the field, even if
there is no federal legislation. The argument is appropriately
addressed to those cases where States may act in the absence of
federal action, but where there has been federal action governing
the same subject.
Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539,
41 U. S.
617-618;
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Washington, 222 U. S. 370,
222 U. S. 379;
Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671,
233 U. S.
681-682;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 236 U. S. 439,
236 U. S.
446-447;
Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co. v.
Washington, 270 U. S. 87,
270 U. S.
101-102;
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
272 U. S. 605,
272 U. S.
612-613;
Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co.,
292 U. S. 57,
292 U. S.
60-61.
Under our constitutional system, there necessarily remains to
the states, until Congress acts, a wide range for the permissible
exercise of power appropriate to their territorial
Page 302 U. S. 10
jurisdiction, although interstate commerce may be affected.
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
230 U. S. 402.
States are thus enabled to deal with local exigencies and to exert
in the absence of conflict with federal legislation an essential
protective power. And when Congress does exercise its paramount
authority, it is obvious that Congress may determine how far its
regulation shall go. There is no constitutional rule which compels
Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may circumscribe its
regulation and occupy only a limited field. When it does so, state
regulation outside that limited field and otherwise admissible is
not forbidden or displaced. The principle is thoroughly established
that the exercise by the state of its police power, which would be
valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where
the repugnance or conflict is so "direct and positive" that the two
acts cannot "be reconciled or consistently stand together."
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227,
63 U. S. 243;
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Haber,
169 U. S. 613,
169 U. S.
623-624;
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.
S. 137,
187 U. S. 148;
Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189,
192 U. S.
199-200;
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.
S. 251,
209 U. S.
257-258;
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee
Mills, 211 U. S. 612,
211 U. S. 623;
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501,
225 U. S. 533;
Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U.
S. 280,
234 U. S.
293-294;
Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.
S. 118,
250 U. S. 122;
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission,
283 U. S. 380,
283 U. S.
392-393;
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.
S. 346,
289 U. S. 350;
Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., supra.
A few illustrations will suffice. In
Reid v. Colorado,
supra, the question arose with respect to a statute of
Colorado aimed at the prevention of the introduction into the state
of diseased animals. One who had been convicted of its violation
contended that the subject of the transportation of cattle by one
state to another had been so far covered by the federal statute,
known as the Animal Industry Act (23 Stat. 31) that no enactment by
the state upon that subject was permissible. While the
Page 302 U. S. 11
congressional act did deal with the subject of the driving or
transporting of diseased livestock from one state into another,
Congress had gone no further than to make it an offense against the
United States for one knowingly to take or send from one state to
another livestock affected with infectious or communicable disease.
The court concluded that the state statute, requiring a certificate
that the cattle were free from disease, irrespective of the
shipper's knowledge of the actual condition of the cattle, did not
cover the same ground as the act of Congress, and was not
inconsistent with it.
Id., pp.
187 U. S.
149-150. The principle was thus emphatically stated:
"It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede, or
by its legislation suspend, the exercise of the police powers of
the states, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect
that result is clearly manifested. This Court has said, and the
principle has been often reaffirmed, that,"
"in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of
Congress in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a
reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and
positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or
consistently stand together."
In
Savage v. Jones, supra, the Court held that a
statute of Indiana regulating the sale, and requiring a statement
of the formula of ingredients, of concentrated commercial food for
stock was not repugnant to the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906
(34 Stat. 768). A citizen of Minnesota sought to restrain the
enforcement of the Indiana statute with respect to stock food sold
and transported in interstate commerce. The federal act dealt with
the subject of adulterated and misbranded foods and defined
misbranding. It covered any false or misleading statements as to
ingredients, but did not require a disclosure of the ingredients.
The state statute dealt with that omitted matter. We found that the
state requirements could be sustained without impairing the
operation of the federal act as to the matters with which that act
dealt. We
Page 302 U. S. 12
said:
"But the intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its
police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation
is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit
to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In
other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of
Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of
the state. P.
225 U. S. 533."
In
Mintz v. Baldwin, supra, the question related to the
validity of the requirement of a New York statute that cattle
brought into that state for dairy or breeding purposes, and also
the herds from which they came, should be certified to be free from
Bang's disease by the chief sanitary official of the state of
origin. One of the contentions was that the statute conflicted with
the federal statute known as the Cattle Contagious Disease Act of
1903. 32 Stat. 791. To enable the Secretary of Agriculture to
prevent the spread of disease among cattle and other livestock, he
was authorized to establish regulations concerning interstate
transportation from any place where he had reason to believe that
diseases existed. When an inspector of the Bureau of Animal
Industry certified that he had inspected cattle and had found them
free from communicable disease, they were permitted to be
transported
"without further inspection or the exaction of fees of any kind,
except such as may at any time be ordered or exacted by the
Secretary of Agriculture."
But the express exclusion of state inspection extended only to
cases where there had been federal inspection and a certificate
issued. Accordingly, we held that it could not be extended to the
case before the court where the cattle had not been inspected and
certified by federal authority. We said:
"The purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state action
against the ravages of the disease is not lightly to be inferred.
The intention so to do must definitely and clearly appear."
P.
289 U. S.
350.
Page 302 U. S. 13
The application of the principle is strongly fortified where the
state exercises its power to protect the lives and the health of
its people. But the principle is not limited to cases of that
description. It extends to exertions of state power directed to
more general purposes. Thus, it was applied in sustaining the order
of a state commission requiring interstate carriers to construct a
union passenger station as against the contention that Congress had
occupied the field, in view of the broad sweep of the act
conferring authority upon the Interstate Commission to deal with
the operation of interstate railroads, as it was found that
Congress had not authorized the commission to meet the public need
in the particular matter in question.
Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, p.
283 U. S.
391.
In the instant case, in relation to the inspection of the hull
and machinery of respondents' tugs, the state law touches that
which the federal laws and regulations have left untouched. There
is plainly no inconsistency with the federal provisions. It would
hardly be asserted that, when Congress set up its elaborate
regulations as to steam vessels, it deprived the state of the
exercise of its protective power as to vessels not propelled by
steam. The fact that the federal regulations were numerous and
elaborate does not extend them beyond the boundary they
established. When Congress took up the regulation of vessels
otherwise propelled, it applied its requirements to vessels of a
described tonnage which carried freight or passengers for hire.
When Congress a few years later passed the Motor Boat Regulations
Act, it did not attempt to deal with the subject comprehensively,
but laid down rules in a few particulars of a definitely restricted
range. And when, in 1936, Congress again addressed itself to the
subject, it did not purport to occupy the entire field, but
confined its regulation to seagoing vessels of three hundred gross
tons and over. It would be difficult to find a
Page 302 U. S. 14
series of statutes in which the intention of Congress to
circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a field limited by
definite description is more clearly manifested.
When the state is seeking to prevent the operation of unsafe and
unseaworthy vessels in going to and from its ports, it is
exercising a protective power akin to that which enables the state
to exclude diseased persons, animals, and plants. These are not
proper subjects of commerce, and an unsafe and unseaworthy vessel
is not a proper instrumentality of commerce. When the state is
seeking to protect a vital interest, we have always been slow to
find that the inaction of Congress has shorn the state of the power
which it would otherwise possess. And we are unable to conclude
that, so far as concerns the inspection of the hull and machinery
of these vessels of respondents in order to insure safety and
seaworthiness, the federal laws and regulations, which as we have
found are not expressly applicable, carry any implied prohibition
of state action.
Much is made of the fact that the state law remained unenforced
for a long period. But it did not become inoperative for that
reason. Where the state police power exists, it is not lost by
nonexercise, but remains to be exerted as local exigencies may
demand.
Third. The remaining question is whether the state law
must fall in its entirety, not because of inconsistency with
federal action, but because the subject is one as to which
uniformity of regulation is required, and hence, whether or not
Congress has acted, the state is without authority.
Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 12 How. 299,
53 U. S. 319;
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
230 U. S.
399-400.
The state law is a comprehensive code. While it excepts vessels
which are subject to inspection under the laws of the United
States, it has provisions which may be deemed to fall within the
class of regulations which Congress alone can provide. For example,
Congress may
Page 302 U. S. 15
establish standards and designs for the structure and equipment
of vessels, and may prescribe rules for their operation, which
could not properly be left to the diverse action of the states. The
State of Washington might prescribe standards, designs, equipment,
and rules of one sort, Oregon another, California another, and so
on. But it does not follow that in all respects the state act must
fail.
We have found that, in relation to the inspection of the hull
and machinery of these tugs, in order to insure safety and
seaworthiness, there is a field in which the state law could
operate without coming into conflict with present federal laws. Is
that a subject which necessarily and in all aspects requires
uniformity of regulation and as to which the state cannot act at
all, although Congress has not acted? We hold that it is not. A
vessel which is actually unsafe and unseaworthy in the primary and
commonly understood sense is not within the protection of that
principle. The state may treat it as it may treat a diseased animal
or unwholesome food. In such a matter, the state may protect its
people without waiting for federal action, providing the state
action does not come into conflict with federal rules. If, however,
the state goes further and attempts to impose particular standards
as to structure, design, equipment, and operation, which in the
judgment of its authorities may be desirable, but pass beyond what
is plainly essential to safety and seaworthiness, the state will
encounter the principle that such requirements, if imposed at all,
must be through the action of Congress, which can establish a
uniform rule. Whether the state, in a particular matter, goes too
far must be left to be determined when the precise question
arises.
We have mentioned the inspection of hull and machinery of
respondents' vessels in order to insure safety and seaworthiness.
There may be other requirements of the
Page 302 U. S. 16
state act which also lie outside the bounds of the federal
action thus far taken, and as to which uniformity of regulation is
not needed. That question cannot be satisfactorily determined on
this record, and must also remain for decision as it may be
presented in the future in connection with some particular action
taken by the state authorities. Our conclusion is that the state
act has a permissible field of operation in relation to
respondents' tugs, and that the state court was in error in holding
the act completely unenforceable in deference to federal law. The
judgment of the state court to that effect is reversed, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Report (June 25, 1935) of the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries of the House of Representatives on "Inspection of Motor
Vessels." H.R.Rep. No.1321, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. Reference was
made to the situation as described by the Assistant Director of the
Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection as follows:
"We have at the present time vessels that are operated by
internal combustion engines, of tonnages exceeding 100, there are
772 vessels of 819,935 gross tons that would come under the
provision of this law [the proposed bill]."
"For instance, we have in the class from 5,000 to 7,500 tons 29
vessels, with a total tonnage of 179,556, and, over 7,500 tons, we
have 33 vessels, with a total tonnage of 300,292."
"Those large vessels at the present time are subject to only a
very limited inspection -- that is, the inspection of the hulls and
boilers, and are required under the law to carry a licensed
engineer and a licensed pilot. The provisions of section 4472 that
provides for protection against fire do not apply to our 7,500-ton
vessels that are in the trans-Atlantic trade. They are not required
under the law to carry a single lifeboat. There are many other
provisions of the steamboat inspection laws that are of the utmost
importance to safety of life that do not apply to these large
transoceanic vessels. As a matter of fact, we are inspecting those
vessels at the present time, but it is only because the owners of
the ships accept such inspection. It is not a matter of law."
[
Footnote 2]
H.R.Rep. No.2505, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
[
Footnote 3]
Id.