In the case of an employer subject to the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, a state court may not enjoin peaceful
picketing of the employer's premises, undertaken by its employees
and their union for the purpose of obtaining recognition of the
union as the employees' bargaining representative, when the union
holds cards authorizing such representation concededly signed by a
majority of the employ eligible to be represented -- even though
the union has not filed with the Secretary of Labor any of the
financial or organizational data described in § 9(f) and (g) of the
Act, nor with the National Labor Relations Board any of the
non-Communist affidavits described in § 9(h) of the Act. Pp.
351 U. S.
63-76.
(a) By its noncompliance with § 9 (f), (g) and (h), a union
makes itself ineligible for certain advantages and services offered
by the Act, but it does not exempt itself from other applicable
provisions of the Act. Pp.
351 U. S. 69-70.
(b) Section 8(a)(5) declares it to be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of" §
9(a); but the latter section does not make it a condition that the
representative shall have complied with § 9(f), (g), or (h), or
shall be certified by the Board, or even be eligible for such
certification. Pp.
351 U. S.
70-72.
(c) Likewise, § 7, which deals with the employees' rights to
self-organization and representation, makes no reference to any
need that the employees' chosen representative must have complied
with § 9 (f), (g), or (h). Pp.
351 U. S.
72-73.
(d) Subsections (f), (g), and (h) of § 9 merely describe certain
advantages that may be gained by compliance with their conditions,
and the express provision for the loss of these advantages implies
that no other consequences shall result from noncompliance. P.
351 U. S.
73.
(e) In this case, noncompliance of the union with § 9 (f), (g),
and (h) precludes any right of the union to seek certification of
its status
Page 351 U. S. 63
by the Board; but the employer, employees and union are
controlled by the applicable provisions of the Act, and all courts,
state and federal, are bound by them. Pp.
351 U. S.
73-74.
(f) Under §§ 7 and 9 (a), and by virtue of the conceded majority
designation of the union, the employer is obligated to recognize
the union, and the union can take lawful action, such as striking
and peaceful picketing, to induce the employer to do so. Pp.
351 U. S.
74-75.
(g) That being so, the State cannot enjoin the peaceful
picketing here practiced. P.
351 U. S.
75.
227 La. 1109,
81
So. 2d 413, reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether, in the case of an employer
subject to the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, a state
court may enjoin peaceful picketing of the employer's premises,
undertaken by its employees and their union for the purpose of
obtaining recognition of that union as the employees' bargaining
representative, when the union holds cards authorizing such
representation concededly signed by a majority of the employees
eligible to be represented, but has filed none of the data or
affidavits described in § 9(f), (g), and (h) of that
Page 351 U. S. 64
Act, as amended. [
Footnote
1] For the reasons hereafter stated, our answer is in the
negative.
In 1953, the respondent, Arkansas Oak Flooring Company, a
Delaware corporation with its main office in Pine
Page 351 U. S. 65
Bluff, Arkansas, owned and operated a sawmill and flooring plant
in Alexandria, Louisiana. The company was there engaged in
interstate commerce and subject to the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended. At the same
Page 351 U. S. 66
time, District 50, United Mine Workers of America, here called
the "union," was an unincorporated labor organization which
undertook to organize the company's eligible employees at its
Alexandria plant. The union, however, did not file with the
Secretary of Labor any of the financial or organizational data
described in § 9(f) and (g) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, nor, with the National Labor Relations Board, any of the
non-Communist affidavits described in § 9(h) of that Act. It
contended that the company, nevertheless, should recognize it as
the collective bargaining representative of the Alexandria plant
employees because it was authorized by more than a majority of such
employees to represent them.
Although for four years there had been no labor organization
representing the plant employees, this union, by February 24, 1954,
held applications for membership from 174 of the 225 eligible
employees. Such applicants had elected officers and stewards and
had authorized the union organizer to request the company to
recognize the union as their collective bargaining representative.
On February 24, the organizer accordingly presented that request to
the assistant superintendent of the plant. The latter, in the
absence of any higher officer of the company, replied that the
union was not recognized either by the National Labor Relations
Board or by him, and that, if negotiations were desired, the union
organizer should call the company's office at Pine Bluff.
Page 351 U. S. 67
On March 1, the petitioning employees struck for recognition of
the union and set up a peaceful picket line of three employees. Two
were placed in front of the plant and one at the side. They carried
signs stating "This Plant is on Strike" or "We want Recognition,
District 50 UMWA."
On March 2, respondent sought a restraining order and injunction
in the Ninth Judicial District for the Parish of Rapides,
Louisiana. That court promptly issued an order restraining the
above-described picketing by 11 named employees, the union and its
organizer. The order was obeyed, but the strike continued. On March
12 and 15, evidence was introduced, including, by that date, 179
applications for membership in the union, each of which authorized
the union to represent the signer in negotiations and in the making
of agreements as to wages, hours and conditions of work. The
parties to the proceeding stipulated that each of those
applications was signed by an employee of respondent. In the face
of that record, the court nevertheless converted its restraining
order into a temporary injunction and the defendants, who are the
petitioners herein, appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
While that appeal was pending, the trial court, on the same record,
made its injunction permanent. Petitioners appealed that decision
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and the two appeals were
consolidated. There, the permanent injunction was sustained, one
judge concurring specially and another dissenting, in part, on an
issue not material here. 227 La. 1109,
81
So. 2d 413.
The State Supreme Court's ground for sustaining the injunction
was that the union, which sought to be recognized, had failed to
file with the Secretary of Labor the financial and other data
required by § 9(f) and (g), and had failed to file with the Labor
Board the non-Communist affidavits required by § 9(h). The court
held that the union, by failing to comply with § 9(f), (g) and
(h),
Page 351 U. S. 68
had precluded its certification by the Board, and that,
accordingly, neither the employees nor the union had a right to
picket the plant to induce the company to recognize the
noncomplying union. The court, agreeing with respondent's theory,
took the position that such recognition would be illegal and that
picketing to secure it therefore was subject to restraint by a
state court. [
Footnote 2]
Rehearing was denied.
Because of the significance of that decision in relation to the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we granted certiorari and
invited the Solicitor General to file a brief setting forth the
views of the National Labor Relations Board. 350 U.S. 860. Such a
brief was filed favoring a reversal.
There is no doubt that, if the union had filed the data and
affidavits required by § 9(f), (g) and (h), the complaint, under
the circumstances of this case, would have had to be dismissed by
the state court for lack of jurisdiction, and that, if an
injunction were sought through the National Labor Relations Board,
the request would have had to be denied on the merits. Under those
circumstances, the Board would have had jurisdiction of the issue
to the exclusion of the state court.
Garner v.
Teamsters
Page 351 U. S. 69
Union, 346 U. S. 485,
and see Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.
S. 468. In the absence of any
bona fide dispute
as to the existence of the required majority of eligible employees,
the employer's denial of recognition of the union would have
violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act. [
Footnote 3]
The issue before us thus turns upon the effect of the union's
choice not to file the information and affidavits described in §
9(f), (g) and (h). The state court misconceived that effect. The
union's failure to file was not a confession of guilt of anything.
It was merely a choice not to make public certain information. The
Act prescribes no fine or penalty, in the ordinary sense, for
failure to file the specified data and affidavits. The Act does not
even direct that they be filed. The nearest to such a direction in
the Act is the statement, in § 9(g), that it shall be "the
obligation" of all labor organizations to file annual reports
"bringing up to date the information required to be supplied in
the initial filing by subsection (f)(A) of this section, and to
file with the Secretary of Labor and furnish to its members
annually financial reports in the form and manner prescribed in
subsection (f)(B)."
However, neither subsection (f)(A) nor (f)(B) of § 9 requires
any initial filing to be made. Each merely describes what is
required to be filed in the event that a labor organization elects
to seek the advantages offered by subsection (f).
Congress seeks to induce labor organizations to file the
described data and affidavits by making various benefits of the Act
strictly contingent upon such filing.
See New
Page 351 U. S. 70
Jersey Carpet Mills, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 604, 610. In
particular, Congress makes the services of the Labor Board
available to labor organizations only upon their filing of the
specified data and affidavits. [
Footnote 4] By its noncompliance with § 9(f), (g) and (h),
a union does not exempt itself from other applicable provisions of
the Act. [
Footnote 5]
What, then, is the precise status of a labor organization that
elects not to file some or all of the data or affidavits in
question? It is significant that the effect of noncompliance is the
same whether one or more of the filings are omitted. Accordingly,
it simplifies the issue to assume a situation where a union has
filed the non-Communist affidavits specified in § 9(h), but has
chosen not
Page 351 U. S. 71
to disclose the information called for by § 9(f)(A)(2) and (3)
as to the salaries of its officers, or the manner in which they
have been elected. There is no provision stating that, under those
circumstances, the union may not represent an appropriate unit of
employees if a majority of those employees give it authority so to
do. Likewise, there is no statement precluding their employer from
voluntarily recognizing such a noncomplying union as their
bargaining representative. Section 8(a)(5) [
Footnote 6] declares it to be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of
section 9(a)." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 9(a), [
Footnote 7] which deals expressly with
employee representation, says nothing as to how the employees'
representative shall be chosen.
See Lebanon Steel Foundry v.
Labor Board, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 103, 130 F.2d 404, 407. It
does not make it a condition that the representative shall have
complied
Page 351 U. S. 72
with § 9(f), (g), or (h), or shall be certified by the Board, or
even by eligible for such certification. [
Footnote 8]
Likewise, § 7, which deals with the employees' rights to
self-organization and representation, makes no reference to any
need that the employees' chosen representative must have complied
with § 9(f), (g), or (h). [
Footnote
9] Section 7 provides --
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities
Page 351 U. S. 73
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a)(3)."
61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 157. [
Footnote 10]
Subsections (f), (g), and (h) of § 9 merely describe advantages
that may be gained by compliance with their conditions. The very
specificity of the advantages to be gained and the express
provision for the loss of these advantages imply that no
consequences other than those so listed shall result from
noncompliance. [
Footnote
11]
The noncompliance of the union with § 9(f), (g), and (h) in the
instant case precludes any right of the union to seek certification
of its status by the Labor Board. [
Footnote 12]
Page 351 U. S. 74
Such elimination of the Board does not, however, eliminate the
applicability of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and
does not settle the issue as to the right of the state court to
enjoin the employees and their union from peacefully picketing the
employer's plant for the purpose of securing recognition.
The industrial relations between the company and its employees
nonetheless affect interstate commerce and come within the field
occupied by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Labor
Board is but an agency through which Congress had authorized
certain industrial relations to be supervised and enforced. The Act
goes further. The instant employer, employees and union are
controlled by its applicable provisions and all courts, state as
well as federal, are bound by them.
Section 7 recognizes the right of the instant employees "to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing," and leaves open the manner of choosing such
representatives when certification does not apply. The employees
have exercised that right through the action of substantially more
than a majority of them authorizing the instant union to represent
them.
Section 9(a) provides that representatives
"designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment. . . ."
That fits this situation precisely. It does not require the
designated labor organization to disclose
Page 351 U. S. 75
the salaries of its officers, or even to file non-Communist
affidavits.
Under those sections and by virtue of the conceded majority
designation of the union, the employer is obligated to recognize
the designated union. Upon the employer's refusal to do so, the
union, because of its noncompliance with § 9(f), (g), and (h),
cannot resort to the Labor Board. It can, however, take other
lawful action, such as that engaged in here.
The company can, if it so wishes, lawfully recognize the union
as the employees' representative. That being so, there is no reason
why the employees, and their union under their authorization, may
not, under § 13, strike, [
Footnote 13] and, under § 7, peacefully picket the
premises of their employer to induce it thus to recognize their
chosen representative.
See West Tex. Utilities Co. v. Labor
Board, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 185, 184 F.2d 233, 239, and the
other cases cited in
note 6
supra. [
Footnote
14]
Such being the case, the state court is governed by the federal
law which has been applied to industrial relations, like these,
affecting interstate commerce and the state court erred in
enjoining the peaceful picketing here practiced. A "State may not
prohibit the exercise of rights which the federal Acts protect."
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.
S. 468,
348 U. S. 474,
and see Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.
S. 485,
346 U. S.
494.
Page 351 U. S. 76
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, accordingly, is
reversed and the case is remanded to it for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
"SEC. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment: . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(f) No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question
affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees,
raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this
section, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made
by a labor organization under subsection (b), of section 10, unless
such labor organization and any national or international labor
organization of which such labor organization is an affiliate or
constituent unit (A) shall have prior thereto filed with the
Secretary of Labor copies of its constitution and bylaws and a
report, in such form as the Secretary may prescribe, showing --
"
" (1) the name of such labor organization and the address of its
principal place of business;"
" (2) the names, titles, and compensation and allowances of its
three principal officers and of any of its other officers or agents
whose aggregate compensation and allowances for the preceding year
exceeded $5,000, and the amount of the compensation and allowances
paid to each such officer or agent during such year;"
" (3) the manner in which the officers and agents referred to in
clause (2) were elected, appointed, or otherwise selected;"
" (4) the initiation fee or fees which new members are required
to pay on becoming members of such labor organization;"
" (5) the regular dues or fees which members are required to pay
in order to remain members in good standing of such labor
organization;"
" (6) a detailed statement of, or reference to provisions of its
constitution and bylaws showing the procedure followed with respect
to, (a) qualification for or restrictions on membership, (b)
election of officers and stewards, (c) calling of regular and
special meetings, (d) levying of assessments, (e) imposition of
fines, (f) authorization for bargaining demands, (g) ratification
of contract terms, (h) authorization for strikes, (i) authorization
for disbursement of union funds, (j) audit of union financial
transactions, (k) participation in insurance or other benefit
plans, and (l) expulsion of members and the grounds therefor;"
"and (B) can show that prior thereto it has --"
" (1) filed with the Secretary of Labor, in such form as the
Secretary may prescribe, a report showing all of (a) its receipts
of any kind and the sources of such receipts, (b) its total assets
and liabilities as of the end of its last fiscal year, (c) the
disbursements made by it during such fiscal year, including the
purposes for which made; and"
" (2) furnished to all of the members of such labor organization
copies of the financial report required by paragraph (1) hereof to
be filed with the Secretary of Labor."
"(g) It shall be the obligation of all labor organizations to
file annually with the Secretary of Labor, in such form as the
Secretary of Labor may prescribe, reports bringing up to date the
information required to be supplied in the initial filing by
subsection (f)(A) of this section, and to file with the Secretary
of Labor and furnish to its members annually financial reports in
the form and manner prescribed in subsection (f)(B). No labor
organization shall be eligible for certification under this section
as the representative of any employees, and no complaint shall
issue under section 10 with respect to a charge filed by a labor
organization unless it can show that it and any national or
international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or
constituent unit has complied with its obligation under this
subsection."
"(h) No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question
affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees,
raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this
section, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made
by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless
there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed
contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by
each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any
national or international labor organization of which it is an
affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the
Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not
believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization
that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.
The provisions of section 35A of the Criminal Code shall be
applicable in respect to such affidavits."
61 Stat. 143, 145-146, 65 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), (f),
(g) and (h).
[
Footnote 2]
Respondent also had sought the injunction on the alternative
ground that the request for recognition of the union was being made
in the absence of a selection of the union by the majority of
respondent's employees. The Supreme Court of Louisiana did not pass
upon this contention. The record upon which the temporary and the
permanent injunctions were granted contained concededly genuine
applications for union membership and authorizations of
representation from 179 of the 225 eligible employees. Accordingly,
we do not now consider the questions that would have been presented
if the union or the pickets had represented less than a majority of
the eligible employees, or if there had been a
bona fide
dispute as to the existence of authorization from a majority of the
eligible employees.
[
Footnote 3]
"SEC. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer --"
"
* * * *"
"(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). For the material
portion of § 9(a),
see note 1 supra.
[
Footnote 4]
Congress seeks "to stop the use of the Labor Board" by
noncomplying unions.
Labor Board v. Dant, 344 U.
S. 375,
344 U. S. 385.
For example, the following benefits are available to labor
organizations only upon their voluntary compliance with the
conditions prescribed in the statutory provisions listed below:
(1) The Board's investigations of questions, raised by labor
organizations, concerning representation, on compliance with § 9(f)
and (h); (2) labor organizations' eligibility for certification as
representatives, on compliance with § 9(g) and (h); (3) the Board's
issuance of complaints pursuant to charges by labor organizations,
on compliance with § 9(f) and (g); (4) privilege of making a union
shop agreement,
see § 8(a)(3); (5) labor organizations'
right to obtain redress from Board for unfair labor practices,
see § 8; (6) limited right to engage in boycott when
seeking recognition,
see § 8(b)(4)(B); (7) limited right
to strike for assignment of work,
see § 8(b)(4)(D); and
(8) limited protection for a certified representative against a
strike for recognition of a rival organization,
see §
8(b)(4)(C).
[
Footnote 5]
The Board may provide relief in case of a refusal by a
noncomplying union to bargain in good faith, as required by §
8(b)(3).
See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 86
N.L.R.B. 1041, 1048, and note 16;
National Maritime Union,
78 N.L.R.B. 971, 987-988. As to decertification of a noncomplying
union under § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii),
see Harris Foundry & Machine
Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 118. For the effect of noncompliance with §
9(h),
see generally American Communications Assn. v.
Douds, 339 U. S. 382,
332 U. S.
390.
[
Footnote 6]
See note 3
supra. When a majority of an employer's eligible employees
have authorized a noncomplying union to represent them and such
union later has complied with the statutory filing requirements,
the union, under appropriate circumstances, has been permitted to
invoke the Board's processes to remedy the consequences of the
employer's prior refusal to bargain with the union.
". . . Congress has not made compliance with the filing
requirements of § 9(f), (g), and (h) a condition precedent to the
obligation of an employer under § 8(a)(5) to bargain collectively
with the chosen representative of the employees; such compliance is
merely made a condition precedent to invoking the machinery of the
Act for the investigation of a question concerning representation,
or for the issuance of a complaint charging the commission of
unfair labor practices."
Labor Board v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d
131, 133-134.
See also Labor Board v. Pecheur Lozenge Co.,
209 F.2d 393, 402-403;
Labor Board v. Tennessee Egg Co.,
201 F.2d 370;
West Tex. Utilities Co. v. Labor Board, 87
U.S.App.D.C. 179, 185, 184 F.2d 233, 239.
[
Footnote 7]
See note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 8]
A Board election is not the only method by which an employer may
satisfy itself as to the union's majority status.
See, e.g.,
Labor Board v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.
S. 318,
310 U. S.
338-339;
Labor Board v. Knickerbocker Plastic
Co., 218 F.2d 917, 921-922;
Labor Board v. Parma Water
Lifter Co., 211 F.2d 258, 261;
Labor Board v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501, 503-504;
Labor Board v.
Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8, 14;
Brookville v. Glove Co., 114
N.L.R.B. 213, 214, M. 4, 36 L.R.R.M. 1548, 1549, note 4.
[
Footnote 9]
". . . The Act does not proscribe bargaining with a noncomplying
union; indeed, consonant with public policy, an employer may
voluntarily recognize and deal with such a union. If Congress had
intended the Act to have the effect urged by the Respondents, it
easily could have inserted an express provision in the statute to
accomplish such result. This Congress did not do."
Brookville Glove Co., supra, at 1549. The Board there
held that the employer committed an unfair labor practice (§
8(a)(3)) when it discharged employees who struck to induce their
employer to recognize as their bargaining representative the same
noncomplying union (United Mine Workers) which is a petitioner
here. There also, the union had been designated as their chosen
representative by a majority of the eligible employees.
See
also Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 610, 619;
Labor Board v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d 579, 581;
Labor Board v. Electronics Equipment Co., 194 F.2d 650,
651, note 1;
Labor Board v. Pratt, Read & Co., 191
F.2d 1006, 1008.
Cf. Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corp. v. Labor
Board, 213 F.2d 646;
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Labor
Board, 194 F.2d 207.
[
Footnote 10]
The cross-reference to § 8(a)(3) has to do only with an
exception in favor of union shops.
[
Footnote 11]
For example, § 9(f) prescribes that,
unless the labor
organization files the required material,
"No investigation shall be made
by the Board of any
question affecting commerce concerning the representation of
employees,
raised by a labor organization under subsection
(c) of this section. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.) Subsection (c) of § 9 so referred to
relates to elections of collective bargaining representatives under
supervision of the Board. Section 9(f) also prescribes that,
unless the labor organization files the required material,
"
no complaint shall be issued [by the Board] pursuant to a
charge made by a
labor organization under subsection (b) of
section 10. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Subsection (b) of § 10
so referred to relates to complaints by the Board, so that, here
again, that which is cut off by noncompliance is only that which
the Act has added. Subsections (g) and (h) of § 9 contain like
provisions.
[
Footnote 12]
For the Board's conclusion that an employer may not have
recourse to the Board to verify, by certification, the union's
status or lack of status as the exclusive representative of the
eligible employee,
see Herman Loewenstein, Inc., 75
N.L.R.B. 377;
Sigmund Cohn Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 177, 180,
n. 2;
National Maritime Union of America v.
Herzog, 78 F. Supp.
146, 156,
aff'd, 334 U.S. 854;
Fay v. Douds,
172 F.2d 720, 724-726.
[
Footnote 13]
"SEC. 13. Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided
for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right."
61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. § 163.
See also Labor Board v. Rice
Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665,
341 U. S. 673,
and cases cited in
note 6
supra.
[
Footnote 14]
"Present law in no way limits the primary strike for recognition
except in the face of another union's certification." Report of the
Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, No. 986, Pt. 3, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 71; S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22;
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
Although my doubts are not shared by others, they have not been
overcome, and the nature of the problem raised by this case makes
it not inappropriate to express them.
The problem is the recurring difficulty of determining when a
federal enactment bars the exercise of what otherwise would clearly
be within the scope of a State's lawmaking power. There is, of
course, no difficulty when Congress explicitly displaces state
power. The perplexity arises in a situation like the present, where
such displacement by the controlling federal power is attributed to
implications or radiations of a federal statute.
The various aspects in which this problem comes before the Court
are seldom easy of solution. Decisions ultimately depend on
judgment in balancing overriding considerations making for the
requirement of an exclusive nationwide regime in a particular field
of legal control and respect for the allowable area within which
the forty-eight States may enforce their diverse notions of policy.
The Court has heretofore adverted to the uncertainties in the
accommodation of these interests of the Nation and the States in
regard to industrial relations affecting interstate commerce --
uncertainties inevitable in the present state of federal
legislation.
Proper accommodation is dependent on an empiric process, on
case-to-case determinations. Abstract propositions and unquestioned
generalities do not furnish answers.
Page 351 U. S. 77
In this case, the Court concludes that Louisiana law must yield
to the dominance of the National Labor Relations Act. Presumably,
what Louisiana has decreed in the judgment now reversed would be
within Louisiana's power were it not for the argumentatively
derived withdrawal of that power by the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended. Over the years, the Court has found such
withdrawal of state power from reasonable implications of what
Congress wrote in the National Labor Relations Act in some cases,
and not in others. Withdrawal has been found to exist in at least
two types of situations: (1) where state law interferes with
federal rights conferred on employees by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act,
e.g., Hill v. Florida, 325 U.
S. 538; (2) where state law makes inroads on the primary
jurisdiction with which Congress has invested the National Labor
Relations Board,
e.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
348 U. S. 468.
Here, we are not concerned with the Board's primary jurisdiction.
The issue is whether Louisiana, by enjoining, according to its law,
a strike calculated to coerce respondent to bargain with a union
which has not complied with the non-Communist and other reporting
provisions, § 9(f), (g), and (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
interferes with the protection afforded by § 7 of that Act, where
that union may represent a majority of employees.
Section 7 grants employees the federal right to engage in
concerted activities in furtherance of collective bargaining. A
strike accompanied by peaceful picketing is a typical expression of
such authorized concerted activity. Instances of special situations
that are clearly outside of this protection are (1) where the
aspect that the strike action takes constitutes a union unfair
labor practice interdicted by the Taft-Hartley Act, or (2) where
the strike is in violation of the federal criminal law.
See
Southern S.S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S.
31. It
Page 351 U. S. 78
would be self-contradictory for federal law to protect conduct
which federal law brands as illegal. That is not this situation. A
noncomplying union, such as the petitioner, however vigorously it
may assert noncompliance as a matter of principle, is not under
condemnation of illegality by the Taft-Hartley Act, or any other
federal law, if it employs economic pressure to achieve its goal.
The explicit consequence which that Act attaches to noncompliance
is that such a union is denied the advantages of the National Labor
Relations Board -- it cannot utilize that Board's machinery to
obtain certification as the bargaining representative or to secure
redress against unfair labor practices by an employer.
The policy of § 9 is that of Congress, and the wisdom of the
policy is not our concern. But just as all fair implications must
be given to § 7, so it is equally incumbent to give to the scope of
the non-Communist affidavit and other reporting requirements of § 9
the reasonable direction of their meaning and purpose. So far as
its own law enforcement machinery for protecting the interests of
employees is concerned, Congress designed to hamper nonconforming
unions and to discriminate against them by denying them rights
deemed of the utmost importance to trade unions. This being so, I
find it rather difficult to conclude that, while visiting such
consequences upon a nonconforming union in the federal domain of
law enforcement, the Congress has impliedly withdrawn from the
States the power to regulate such a union. In balancing these
considerations, the weight of my judgment tips in favor of not
finding in § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act an implied limitation upon
power exercised by Louisiana in the circumstances of this case.