1. The National Labor Relations Board, upon a charge made to it,
issued a complaint against a corporation engaged at the plant
involved, in the building and sale of ships, boats, and marine
equipment. The complaint alleged that the corporation dominated and
interfered, in a manner described, with a labor organization of its
employees, and was thus engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act of
July 5, 1935. The corporation was given notice of a hearing to be
had upon the complaint.
Held:
(1) That the District Court had no jurisdiction of a suit by the
corporation to enjoin the Board from holding the hearing. P.
303 U. S.
47.
Page 303 U. S. 42
The bill alleged that the business of the company at the plant
affected, and the sale of its products, were not in interstate or
foreign commerce; that the holding of the hearings would be futile,
and would irreparably damage the company, by expense and
inconvenience, impairment of the goodwill and harmonious relations
existing between it and its employees, and lowered efficiency of
its operations.
(2) That the District Court had no jurisdiction of a suit by
employees of the corporation who were officers of a labor
organization at the plant to enjoin the Board from holding the
hearing, the bill in this case alleging further that the employees
are satisfied with their existing contracts of employment, and
desire to retain the existing plan of representation without
change; that the holding of the proposed hearing will discredit the
plan and destroy its usefulness to the employees; that they will be
deprived of their right to negotiate by the method of their choice,
the value of which has been proved by years of operation; that
alteration of the plan will cause dissatisfaction among the
employees; that operation of plant will be disrupted by labor
disturbances; that employment will be interrupted, and that the
damage to the employees will be irreparable. P.
303 U. S.
53.
2. In the National Labor Relations Act, Congress provided for
appropriate procedure before the Labor Board and an adequate
opportunity, through review by the Circuit Court of Appeals, to
secure judicial protection against possible illegal action by the
Board, and the grant to the Board and the Circuit Court of Appeals
of exclusive jurisdiction "to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice affecting commerce" is constitutional. P.
303 U. S.
48.
3. The conclusion that the District Court is without
jurisdiction to enjoin the holding of a hearing by the Labor Board,
even though it be claimed that interstate or foreign commerce is
not involved and that the holding of a hearing would cause
irreparable injury, does not deny any rights guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. P.
303 U. S.
50.
4. The rule requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy
cannot be circumvented by a claim that the charge on which the
complaint rests is groundless, and that the mere holding of the
prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable
damage. P.
303 U. S.
51.
5. The general rule that the decree of a District Court granting
or denying a preliminary injunction will not be disturbed on
appeal
Page 303 U. S. 43
has no application where there is an insuperable objection in
point of jurisdiction to the maintenance of the suit, and where it
clearly appears that the decree was the result of an improvident
exercise of judicial power. In such case, dismissal of the bill
should be directed. P.
303 U. S.
52.
88 F.2d 154, 89
id. 1000, reversed.
Certiorari, 302 U.S. 667, to review decrees affirming decrees of
the District Court in two cases,
15 F.
Supp. 915, heard together below. The decrees granted
preliminary injunctions restraining the holding of a hearing by the
National Labor Relations Board.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether a federal District Court
has equity jurisdiction to enjoin the National Labor Relations
Board from holding a hearing upon a complaint filed by it against
an employer alleged to be engaged in unfair labor practices
prohibited by National Labor Relations Act, July 5, 1935, c. 372,
49 Stat. 449. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held in these cases that the District Court possesses such
jurisdiction, and granted preliminary injunctions. Every other
Circuit Court of Appeals in which the question has arisen has
Page 303 U. S. 44
held the contrary. [
Footnote
1] Because of the importance of the questions presented, the
conflict in the lower courts and alleged conflict with our own
decisions, we granted these writs of certiorari.
The declared purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to
diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening and obstructing
interstate and foreign commerce, and its provisions are applicable
only to such commerce. In order to protect it, the act seeks to
promote collective bargaining; confers upon employees engaged in
such commerce the right to form, and join in, labor organizations;
defines acts of an employer which shall be deemed unfair labor
practice, and confers upon the Board certain limited powers with a
view to preventing such practices. If a charge is made to the Board
that a person "has engaged in or is engaging in any . . . unfair
labor practice," and it appears that a proceeding in respect
thereto should be instituted, a complaint stating the charge is to
be filed, and a hearing is to be held thereon upon notice to the
person complained of.
The Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of
America, Local No. 5, made to the Board a charge that the Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corporation, Limited, [
Footnote 2] was engaging in unfair labor practices at its
plant in Quincy, Mass., for the production, sale, and
Page 303 U. S. 45
distribution of boats, ships, and marine equipment. Upon that
charge, the Board filed, on April 13, 1936, a complaint which
alleged, among other things, that the company dominates and
interferes in the manner described "with a labor organization known
as Plan of Representation of Employees in Plants of the Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd.;" that such action leads to strikes
interfering with interstate commerce, and that
"the aforesaid acts of respondent constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8,
subdivisions (1) and (2) and Section 2, subdivisions (6) and (7) of
said [National Labor Relations] Act."
The complaint alleged specifically:
"The respondent, in the course and conduct of its business,
causes and has continuously caused large quantities of the raw
materials used in the production of its boats, ships, and marine
equipment to be purchased and transported in interstate commerce
from and through states of the United States other than the
Massachusetts to the Fore River Plant in the State of
Massachusetts, and causes and has continuously caused the boats,
ships, and marine equipment produced by it to be sold and
transported in interstate commerce from the Fore River Plant in the
State of Massachusetts to, into, and through states of the United
States other than the State of Massachusetts, all of the aforesaid
constituting a continuous flow of trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several states."
The Board duly notified the corporation that a hearing on the
complaint would be held on April 27, 1936, at Boston,
Massachusetts, in accordance with rules and regulations of the
Board, a copy of which was annexed to the notice, and that the
corporation "will have the right to appear, in person or otherwise,
and give testimony."
Page 303 U. S. 46
On that day, the corporation filed, in the federal court for
Massachusetts, the bill in equity, herein numbered 181, against A.
Howard Myers, acting regional director for the First Region,
National Labor Relations Board, Edmund J. Blake, its regional
attorney for the First Region, and Daniel M. Lyons, trial examiner,
to enjoin them from holding
"a hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the
plaintiff has engaged at its Fore River Plant in any so-called
unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act, and
from having any proceedings or taking any action whatsoever at any
time or times with respect thereto."
There were prayers for a restraining order, an interlocutory
injunction, and a permanent injunction, and also a prayer that the
court declare that the National Labor Relations Act and
"defendants' actions and proposed actions thereunder" violate the
Federal Constitution.
On May 4, 1936, another bill in equity, herein numbered 182,
against the same defendants, seeking, on largely the same
allegations of fact, substantially the same relief was brought in
the same court by Charles MacKenzie, James E. Manning, and Thomas
E. Barker, employees of the Bethlehem Corporation and officers of
the so-called Plan of Representation at the Fore River Plant.
[
Footnote 3]
Upon the filing of each bill, the District Court issued a
restraining order and an order of notice to show cause why a
preliminary injunction should not issue. In each case, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint, and
also a return to the order to show cause. The cases were heard
together. In each, the District Court issued the preliminary
injunction, and the decrees therefor are still in effect. They were
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on
February
Page 303 U. S. 47
12, 1937. 88 F.2d 154. Petitions for a rehearing, based upon the
conflict with the decisions of other circuit courts of appeals,
were denied. And the court denied also motions for leave to file a
second petition for rehearing, based upon the decisions of this
Court in
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1, and
other cases rendered April 12, 1937. 89 F.2d 1000. The District
Court denied the motions to dismiss the bills.
15 F. Supp.
915. But the review by the Circuit Court of Appeals dealt only
with the decrees for a preliminary injunction.
The two cases present, in the main, the same questions. In
discussing them, reference will be made, in the first instance,
only to the suit brought by the corporation.
We are of opinion that the District Court was without power to
enjoin the Board from holding the hearings.
First. There is no claim by the corporation that the
statutory provisions and the rules of procedure prescribed for such
hearings are illegal, or that the corporation was not accorded
ample opportunity to answer the complaint of the Board, or that
opportunity to introduce evidence on the allegations made will be
denied. The claim is that the provisions of the act are not
applicable to the corporation's business at the Fore River Plant
because the operations conducted there are not carried on, and the
products manufactured are not sold, in interstate or foreign
commerce; that therefore the corporation's relations with its
employees at the plant cannot burden or interfere with such
commerce; that hearings would, at best, be futile, and that the
holding of them would result in irreparable damage to the
corporation not only by reason of their direct cost and the loss of
time of its officials and employees, but also because the hearings
would cause serious impairment of the goodwill and harmonious
relations existing between the corporation
Page 303 U. S. 48
and its employees, and thus seriously impair the efficiency of
its operations. [
Footnote
4]
Second. The District Court is without jurisdiction to
enjoin hearings because the power "to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair practice affecting commerce" has been vested
by Congress in the Board and the Circuit Court of Appeals, and
Congress has declared:
"This power shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise. [
Footnote 5]"
The grant of that exclusive power is constitutional because the
act provided for appropriate procedure before the Board and, in the
review by the Circuit Court of Appeals, an adequate opportunity to
secure judicial protection against possible illegal action on the
part of the Board. No power to enforce an order is conferred upon
the Board. To secure enforcement, the Board must apply to a Circuit
Court of Appeals for its affirmance. And, until the Board's order
has been affirmed by the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals, no
penalty accrues for disobeying it. The independent right to apply
to a Circuit Court of Appeals to have an order set aside
Page 303 U. S. 49
is conferred upon any party aggrieved by the proceeding before
the Board. The Board is even without power to enforce obedience to
its subpoena to testify or to produce written evidence. To enforce
obedience, it must apply to a District Court, and to such an
application, appropriate defense may be made. [
Footnote 6]
As was said in
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 46-47,
the procedural provisions
"do not offend against the constitutional requirements governing
the creation and action of administrative bodies.
See
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 227 U. S. 88,
227 U. S.
91. The act establishes standards to which the Board
must conform. There must be complaint, notice and hearing. The
Board must receive evidence and make findings. The findings as to
the facts are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence.
The order of the Board is subject to review by the designated
court, and only when sustained by the court may the order be
enforced. Upon that review, all questions of the jurisdiction of
the Board and the regularity of its proceedings, all questions of
constitutional right or statutory authority, are open to
examination by the court. We construe the procedural provisions as
affording adequate opportunity to secure judicial protection
against arbitrary action in accordance with the well settled rules
applicable to administrative agencies set up by Congress to aid in
the enforcement of valid legislation."
It is true that the Board has jurisdiction only if the complaint
concerns interstate or foreign commerce. Unless the Board finds
that it does, the complaint must be dismissed. And, if it finds
that interstate or foreign commerce
Page 303 U. S. 50
is involved, but the Circuit Court of Appeals concludes that
such finding was without adequate evidence to support it, or
otherwise contrary to law, the Board's petition to enforce it will
be dismissed, or the employer's petition to have it set aside will
be granted. [
Footnote 7] Since
the procedure before the Board is appropriate, and the judicial
review so provided is adequate, Congress had power to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the Board and the Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 301 U.
S. 337,
301 U. S.
343-346.
Third. The corporation contends that, since it denies
that interstate or foreign commerce is involved and claims that a
hearing would subject it to irreparable damage, rights guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution will be denied unless it be held that
the District Court has jurisdiction to enjoin the holding of a
hearing by the Board. [
Footnote
8] So to hold would, as the government insists, in effect
substitute the District Court for the Board as the tribunal to hear
and determine what Congress declared the Board exclusively should
hear and determine in the first instance. The contention is at war
with the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one
is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
until the prescribed
Page 303 U. S. 51
administrative remedy has been exhausted. [
Footnote 9] That rule has been repeatedly acted on
in cases where, as here, the contention is made that the
administrative body lacked power over the subject matter. [
Footnote 10]
Obviously, the rules requiring exhaustion of the administrative
remedy cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which
the complaint rests is groundless and that the mere holding of the
prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable
damage. [
Footnote 11]
Lawsuits also often prove to have been groundless,
Page 303 U. S. 52
but no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the
necessity of a trial to establish the fact.
Fourth. The Circuit Court of Appeals should have
reversed the decrees for a preliminary injunction. It is true that,
ordinarily, the decree of a District Court granting or denying a
preliminary injunction will not be disturbed on appeal. But that
rule of practice has no application where, as here, there was an
insuperable objection to the maintenance of the suit in point of
jurisdiction, and where it clearly appears that the decree was the
result of an improvident exercise of judicial discretion. [
Footnote 12] Since the
constitutionality of the act has been determined by our decision in
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1, and
Page 303 U. S. 53
the defect in the bill is incapable of remedy by amendment, its
dismissal should be directed. [
Footnote 13]
Fifth. In No. 182 also, the Circuit Court of Appeals
should have reversed the decree for a preliminary injunction and
directed dismissal of the bill. The plaintiffs, officers of the
so-called Plan of Representation of Employees, alleged, in addition
to the facts already stated, that the employees are satisfied with
their existing contracts of employment and desire to retain the
existing plan without change; that the holding of the proposed
hearing will discredit the plan and destroy its usefulness to the
employees; that they will be deprived of their right to negotiate
by the method of their choice, the value of which has been proved
by years of operation; that alteration of the plan will cause
dissatisfaction among the employees; that operation of plant will
be disrupted by labor disturbances; that employment will be
interrupted, and that the damage to the employees will be
irreparable. These additional allegations furnish no reason why the
Board should be prevented from exercising the exclusive initial
jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress.
Decrees for preliminary injunction reversed, with direction
to dismiss the bills.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
*Together with No. 182,
Myers et al. v. MacKenzie et
al., also on writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 85 F.2d
12;
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
Schauffler, 91 F.2d 730;
Bradley Lumber Co. v. Labor
Board, 84 F.2d 97;
Clark v. Lindemann & Hoverson
Co., 88 F.2d 59;
Pratt v. Oberman & Co., Inc., 89
F.2d 786;
Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, 66 App.D.C. 306, 86
F.2d 862;
compare Bowen v. James Vernor Co., 89 F.2d 968;
Carlisle Lumber Co. v. Hope, 83 F.2d 92;
Lyons v.
Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 90 F.2d 321.
[
Footnote 2]
A Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at
Bethlehem, Pa.
[
Footnote 3]
A substituted bill of complaint was filed May 7, 1936.
[
Footnote 4]
It is alleged that, in 1934 and 1935, the predecessor of the
present National Labor Relations Board instituted somewhat similar
action against the corporation. Although the proceedings were
eventually dismissed, the hearings consumed a total of some 2,500
hours of working time of officials and employees, and cost the
corporation more than $15,000, none of which could be
recovered.
[
Footnote 5]
Compare House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. 1147, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 24:
"any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought may claim a review of
such order in the appropriate circuit court of appeals, or in the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. It is intended here
to give the party aggrieved a full, expeditious, and exclusive
method of review in one proceeding after a final order is made.
Until such final order is made, the party is not injured, and
cannot be heard to complain, as has been held in cases under the
Federal Trade Commission Act."
[
Footnote 6]
See § 11 of the Act and article II, §§ 20 and 21, of
the Rules and Regulations issued April 27, 1936.
Compare
Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.
S. 160;
E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v.
Boland, 85 F.2d 12.
[
Footnote 7]
Section 10(f) of the Act provides:
"Upon such filing, the court shall proceed in the same manner as
in the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e),
and shall have the same exclusive jurisdiction to grant to the
Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just
and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree
enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting
aside in whole or in part the order of the Board, and the findings
of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall in
like manner be conclusive."
[
Footnote 8]
In support of that contention the following cases were cited:
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.
S. 287,
253 U. S. 289;
Bluefield Water Works Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
262 U. S. 679,
262 U. S. 683;
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.
S. 589,
283 U. S. 600;
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22,
285 U. S. 60,
285 U. S. 64;
State Corporation Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.
S. 561,
290 U. S. 569;
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.
38,
298 U. S.
51-52.
[
Footnote 9]
The rule has been most frequently applied in equity where relief
by injunction was sought.
Pittsburgh &c. Ry. v. Board of
Public Works, 172 U. S. 32,
172 U. S. 44-45;
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.
S. 210,
211 U. S. 230;
Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n,
236 U. S. 699,
236 U. S. 701;
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.
S. 265,
266 U. S.
269-270;
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Claire Furnace
Co., 274 U. S. 160,
274 U. S. 174;
Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.
S. 588,
274 U. S.
592-593;
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v.
Risty, 276 U. S. 567,
276 U. S. 575;
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service
Comm'n, 279 U. S. 560,
279 U. S. 563;
Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U.
S. 461,
286 U. S. 468;
United States v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 291 U.
S. 457,
291 U. S.
463-464;
Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin,
293 U. S. 163,
293 U. S. 172;
compare Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. North Carolina,
222 U. S. 380,
222 U. S. 394;
Farncomb v. Denver, 252 U. S. 7,
252 U. S. 12;
Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel District, 262 U.
S. 710,
262 U. S. 723;
McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U. S. 234,
263 U. S. 238;
White v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367,
282 U. S. 374;
Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.
S. 570,
290 U. S. 575;
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.
S. 300,
291 U. S. 304. But
because the rule is one of judicial administration -- not merely a
rule governing the exercise of discretion -- it is applicable to
proceedings at law, as well as suits in equity.
Compare First
National Bank of Fargo v. Board of County Comm'rs,
264 U. S. 450,
264 U. S. 455;
Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.
S. 337,
301 U. S.
343.
[
Footnote 10]
Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n,
236 U. S. 699;
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.
S. 160;
Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Co., 274 U. S. 588;
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service
Comm'n, 279 U. S. 560.
Compare Western & Atlantic R. v. Georgia Public Service
Comm'n, 267 U. S. 493,
267 U. S. 496,
and cases cited in
note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
Such contentions were specifically rejected in
Bradley
Lumber Co. v. Labor Board, 84 F.2d 97;
Clark v. Lindemann
& Hoverson Co., 88 F.2d 59;
Chamber of Commerce v.
Federal Trade Commission, 280 F. 45;
Heller Bros. Co. v.
Lind, 66 App.D.C. 306, 86 F.2d 862, and
Pittsburgh &
W.Va. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 52 App.D.C. 40,
280 F. 1014.
Compare United States v. Los Angeles & S.L. R.
Co., 273 U. S. 299,
273 U. S. 314;
Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.
S. 588;
Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State
Corporation Comm'n, 236 U. S. 699;
McChord v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co.,
183 U. S. 483;
Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 74 F.2d 200, 201.
The cases cited by the corporation are not opposed.
Watson v.
Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74;
Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510;
Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S.
1;
Vicksburg Water Works Co. v. Vicksburg,
185 U. S. 65,
185 U. S. 82;
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.
S. 229,
245 U. S. 248;
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.
S. 553,
262 U. S.
592-593;
City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 291 U. S. 24,
291 U. S. 34;
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33;
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197,
263 U. S.
215-216.
[
Footnote 12]
Meccano Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.
S. 136,
253 U. S. 141;
Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.
S. 588 (
semble);
compare Prendergast v. New
York Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43,
262 U. S. 50-51;
National Fire Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.
S. 331,
281 U. S. 338;
Alabama v. United States, 279 U.
S. 229,
279 U. S. 231;
Rogers v. Hill, 289 U. S. 582,
289 U. S.
587.
[
Footnote 13]
Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.
S. 518,
165 U. S. 525;
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.
S. 485,
177 U. S. 494;
Metropolitan Water Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist.,
223 U. S. 519,
223 U. S. 523;
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Gray,
225 U. S. 205,
225 U. S. 214;
Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.
S. 123,
229 U. S. 136;
compare In re Tampa Suburban R. Co., 168 U.
S. 583,
168 U. S. 588;
Ex parte National Enameling & Stamping Co.,
201 U. S. 156,
201 U. S. 162;
Meccano Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.
S. 136,
253 U. S.
141.