The question of the validity of the Constitution and laws of
Kentucky, under which these proceedings were had, is properly
before the Court, whose consideration of it must, however, be
restricted to its federal aspect.
This Court must accept the meaning of the state enactments to be
that found in them by the state courts.
A state railroad corporation, voluntarily formed, cannot exempt
itself from the control reserved to the state by its constitution,
and, if not protected by a valid contract, cannot successfully
invoke the interposition of federal courts, in respect to long haul
and short haul clauses in a state constitution simply on the ground
that the railroad is property.
A contract of exemption from future general legislation unless
it is given expressly or follows by implication equally clear with
express words, cannot be deemed to exist.
A railroad charter is taken and held subject to the power of the
state to regulate and control the grant in the interest of the
public.
Interference with the commercial power of the general
government, to be unlawful, must be direct.
At the January term, 1895, of the Marion County Circuit Court of
the State of Kentucky, an indictment was found against the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, a corporation of the
State of Kentucky, for an alleged violation of section 218 of the
constitution of the state, and section 820 of the Kentucky
Statutes, in charging more for the transportation of coal from
Altamont, Kentucky, to Lebanon, Kentucky, than to Louisville and
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, over railroads which the company were
operating under its charter. The indictment alleged that it was
filed upon the recommendation of the state railroad commission. The
trial resulted in a judgment of conviction and a fine of $300,
which, on appeal, was, on May 20, 1899, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. From that judgment of the Court of Appeals a writ of error
was allowed by the chief justice of that court on June 28, 1899,
and the case was brought to this Court.
Page 183 U. S. 504
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here on a writ of error to a judgment of the Court
of Appeals of the State of Kentucky, affirming a judgment of the
Circuit Court of Marion County, Kentucky, sentencing the Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Company to a fine of $300 for an alleged
violation of a statute of that state which declares, among other
things, that it shall be unlawful for any person or corporation
owning or operating a railroad in the state to charge or receive
any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of
passengers or of property of like kind, under substantially similar
circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for longer
distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter
being included in the longer distance.
This statute is based upon section 218 of the Constitution of
the State of Kentucky, adopted in 1891. The statute, which is
section 820 of the Kentucky Statutes, and section 218 of the
Constitution, are set forth in full in the report of the case of
McChord v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad and cognate
cases,
ante, 183 U. S. 483, and
need not be here copied at length.
Those cases were here on appeal from final decrees of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky
enjoining the railroad commission of the state from enforcing
against the complainants, of which the Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Company, the plaintiff in error in the present case, was
one, the provisions of an Act of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
approved March 10, 1900, entitled
"An Act to Prevent Railroad Companies or Corporations Owning and
Operating a Line or Lines of Railroad, and its Officers, Agents,
and Employees, from Charging, Collecting, or Receiving Extortionate
Freight or Passenger Rates in This Commonwealth, and to Further
Increase and Define the Duties and Powers of the Railroad
Commission in Reference
Page 183 U. S. 505
thereto, and Prescribing the Manner of Enforcing the Provisions
of This Act and Penalties for the Violation of its Provisions."
The occasion of the passage of this Act of March 10, 1900, was a
decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holding that section
816, which declared that any railroad company which should charge
and collect more than a just and reasonable rate of toll or
compensation for the transportation of passengers or freight in
that state was guilty of extortion, could not be enforced as a
penal statute for want of certainty.
Louisville & Nashville
Railroad v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 132.
The effort was made in the circuit court of the United States,
and successfully, to have it held that, by the said Act of March
10, 1900, section 819, insofar as it provided an action by way of
information, and to liability in damages, and that indictments
should be made only on the recommendation or request of the
railroad commission, was repealed by necessary implication, and
that, accordingly, the order of the commission, fixing the rate,
toll, or compensation they may charge was self-executing, and that
no duty to enforce it was imposed on the commission; that the
railroad companies were shut up by the act to the final
determination of the commission that they have charged more than a
just and reasonable rate; that, on the trial of indictments for
failure to observe the rates made by the commission, the courts
cannot entertain any inquiry as to the reasonableness of rates so
fixed, because such inquiry is unwarranted by the statute, and
therefore illusory and worthless, and that, even if the question of
constitutionality could be raised in defense, yet that, if the
order of the commission were permitted to be entered of record, the
companies, if they did not comply, would be at once exposed to
innumerable prosecutions and to financial ruin by the accumulation
of penalties before a judicial decision as to the validity of the
statute could be had, if it should then happen that the statute was
upheld.
It was, however, held by this Court that it was not the intent
or effect of the Act of March 10, 1900, to repeal those provisions
of section 819 requiring indictments to be found only on the
recommendation of the commission, nor to circumscribe
Page 183 U. S. 506
in this particular the general duty of the commission to see
that the law relating to railroads should be faithfully executed.
This view of the meaning and effect of the legislation was that
taken by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the case of
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Commonwealth, decided
while the appeals from the decrees of the circuit court of the
United States were pending in this Court. In that case, the
railroad company was indicted under section 820, and fined for
charging more for a shorter than a longer haul. The indictment was
returned before the railroad commission had determined whether the
railroad company should be exonerated as provided in that section,
and the Court of Appeals held that
"to allow the carrier to be indicted in advance of any action by
the railroad commission under this section would be to deprive it
of all opportunity for exoneration. . . . The long and short haul
matter is only another form of undue discrimination and preference,
which are provided for by section 819, and indictments under this
section can only be had upon the recommendation of the railroad
commission. This has been a settled legislative policy, as shown by
the Act of April 6, 1882 (
see General Statutes, 1021),
which was in force at the time of the adoption of the constitution
and the present statutes. In other words, the legislature has
always acted upon the idea that the interests of the entire people
of the state should be looked to in these matters, and that the
railroad commission must first determine them before the general
juries of the state should find indictments."
The conclusion reached by this Court, therefore, was that the
duty of enforcing its rates rests on the commission, and that there
was no basis for interposition by a court of equity before the
rates were fixed at all, and that whether, after the rates have
been determined by the commission, their enforcement could be
restrained was a question not necessarily presented for decision in
those cases, and, accordingly, the decrees of the circuit court
were reversed with a direction to sustain the demurrer and dismiss
the bills.
In the case now in hand, the indictment was found not in advance
of any action by the railroad commission, but on its
Page 183 U. S. 507
recommendation. Hence the question of the validity of the
provisions of the Constitution and laws of the State of Kentucky
under which these proceedings were had is properly before us. Of
course, our consideration of it must be restricted to its federal
aspect -- in other words, we are to inquire whether the state
enactments, constitutional and statutory, in the particulars
involved in this controversy and under the construction given them
by the Court of Appeals, are in conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
At the trial of the indictment, it was not seriously disputed
that the defendant company had, at the time and place alleged,
charged and received for the carriage and transportation of coal
over its line of road a greater compensation for a shorter than for
a longer distance, over the same line in the same direction, the
shorter being included within the longer distance, without having
been authorized by the railroad commission so to charge, and after
the commission, upon investigation, had refused so to do.
But certain facts which were alleged to show that the
circumstances and conditions under which the charges in question
were made and received were not substantially similar with those
ordinarily obtaining, and thus to show that the charges objected to
were just and reasonable, were offered in evidence by the railroad
company and excluded from the jury by the trial court, which gave
to the jury what amounted, in legal effect, to a peremptory
instruction to find the defendant company guilty as indicted. The
jury accordingly returned a verdict of guilty, fixing the fine at
$300, for which judgment was rendered, and an appeal was taken by
the defendant company from that judgment to the Court of
Appeals.
It was contended in the courts below and here that, as section
218 of the Constitution of the State of Kentucky, regulating
charges for transportation over different distances, is in terms a
copy of the provision on the same subject in the Interstate
Commerce Act, it should be assumed that it was the intention of the
constitutional convention of Kentucky to adopt the construction put
upon that provision in the interstate commerce
Page 183 U. S. 508
law by the federal courts, and that, as those courts had held
that the existence of actual competition of controlling force in
respect to traffic important in amount might make out a
dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions entitling the carrier
to charge less for the longer than for the shorter haul, without
any necessity to first apply to the commission for authority so to
do, that construction should have been followed at the present
trial, where evidence was offered tending to show the existence of
competition of that character caused by river transportation of
coal from points outside of the state.
Such contention might seem reasonably to have been urged in the
state courts, but, as they have seen fit to disregard it, and to
put a different construction upon the language employed, this Court
must accept the meaning of the state enactments to be that found in
them by the state courts. The prevailing view in the Court of
Appeals was thus expressed by Judge Hobson:
"Appellant transported coal from Altamont to Louisville at $1.00
per ton, and to Elizabethtown at $1.30 per ton, while it charged
$1.55 per ton from Altamont to Lebanon, an intermediate station on
its line of road. Complaint being made to the railroad commission,
it investigated the matter and made an order in writing declining
to exonerate appellant from the operation of the provisions of
section 820, and thereafter, at the suggestion of the commission,
appellant was indicted in the Marion Circuit Court, as provided in
the statute. The case was tried, and appellant having been adjudged
guilty, it prosecuted this appeal to reverse the judgment imposing
a fine upon it of $300."
"Appellant justified the difference of the rate on the ground
that at Louisville, the coal hauled from Altamont came in
competition with the coal brought down the Ohio River on boats, and
that at Elizabethtown, it came in competition with western Kentucky
coal brought there by the Illinois Central Railroad. It insists
that these rates could be made no higher on account of this
competition, and that the rates to noncompetitive points like
Lebanon were reasonable, and were unaffected by the reductions
referred to, which were necessary for the coal to be handled in
those markets at all. The evidence offered by it to
Page 183 U. S. 509
sustain this contention was excluded by the court below on the
trial, on the ground that competition is not one of the
circumstances or conditions exempting the railroad from the
operation of section 218 of the Constitution. It is earnestly
argued for appellant that the transportation is not under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions when competition
exists at one point and not in another, and we are referred to
numerous decisions of the federal courts so holding. On the other
hand, it is contended for the state that to adopt this construction
is to emasculate the section and deprive it of all practical
operation and effect."
"The precise question thus presented was determined by this
Court in the case of
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Commonwealth, 20 Ky.L.Rep. 1380, where the construction of the
section adopted by appellees was sustained. We are urged to
overrule that case; but it was fully considered, and we are
disinclined, with whole court, and we are disinclined, with
substantially no new light upon the question, to set aside the
conclusion of the court reached then after so mature
deliberation."
In order fully to understand the position of the Court of
Appeals, it may be well to quote a portion of the opinion of that
court in the case of
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Commonwealth, 20 Ky.L.Rep. 1380, referred to in the court's
opinion in the present case:
"The railroad commission was therefore created to meet the
emergency, and was intended to be invested with full power to
authorize or not in special cases less compensation to be charged
for the longer than shorter distance, and to prescribe from time to
time the extent to which the common carrier may be relieved from
operation of the section. In our opinion, the court has not
jurisdiction to either compel the railroad commission, upon
application of the common carrier or those interested in particular
industries or callings, to suspend or relax operation of section
218, or, upon application of individuals or corporations feeling
aggrieved, to prohibit such suspension or relaxation in special
cases. While the commission is thus, and to that extent, free from
judicial interposition, it cannot, of course, nullify or, except in
special cases, at all suspend operation of section 218,
Page 183 U. S. 510
and though the railroad commission be invested with this unusual
power, it must be treated as a constitutional power with which the
court cannot interfere."
With the meaning thus attributed to section 218 of the
Constitution, it is strenuously contended on behalf of the
plaintiff in error
"that said section has no reasonable relation to securing for
the public reasonable rates or the prevention of extortion or
undercharges, or the promotion of the safety, health, convenience,
or proper protection to the public, but that it amounts to an
arbitrary and wholly unreasonable interference with perfectly
legitimate business, and is therefore in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and
since the railroad company has built its railroads in the State of
Kentucky upon the faith of a charter granted it by the state
authorizing it to operate those railroads, it has a contract right
to engage in such legitimate railroad business, and any such
arbitrary interference therewith as results from such a
construction of section 218 would impair the obligation of that
contract."
To sustain these contentions, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff in error cite and rely upon those decisions of this Court
in which it has been held that, under pretense of regulating fares
and freights, a state cannot require a railroad corporation to
carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that
which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation or without due process of law; that the
question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for
transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the
reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the
public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation,
requiring due process of law for its determination, and that, if
the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates
for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in
the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is
deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance
and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law and
in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and that
insofar as it is thus deprived, while other
Page 183 U. S. 511
persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their
invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection
of the laws.
Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
116 U. S. 345;
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v.
Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418;
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.
S. 362;
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.
S. 466;
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway
Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684.
We certainly have no disposition to overrule or disregard cases
so recently decided and so elaborately considered. And accordingly,
if it appeared, in the present case, that the railroad commission
had arbitrarily fixed rates of fare and freight, in respect to
which the railroad company was given no opportunity to be heard,
and which were confiscatory and amounted to depriving the plaintiff
in error of its property without due process of law, it would
doubtless be our duty to furnish the relief asked for. Nor yet are
we ready to carry the doctrine of the cited cases beyond the limits
therein established. For the federal courts to interfere with the
legislative department of the state government when acting within
the scope of its admitted powers is always the exercise of a
delicate power -- one that should not be resorted to unless the
reason for doing so is clear and unmistakable.
As we understand the condition of the statutes of Kentucky,
there was at the time when this case was tried in the Circuit Court
of Marion County, and when the Court of Appeals disposed of it, no
power in the railroad commission to fix or establish rates or tolls
which the railroad companies were bound to accept. Such power,
however, was given to the commission by the Act of March 10, 1900,
and it was to restrain the railroad commission from taking action
under that act that bills in equity were filed by the Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Company and other railroad companies in
the circuit court of the United States. But, in the present case,
we have only to do with the question of the validity of the action
of the railroad commission's proceeding under section 218 of the
Constitution and section 820 of the statutes, which prescribe
uniformity of rates for all distances, long or short, and make
penal disregard of such uniformity by railroad companies, except
when
Page 183 U. S. 512
authorized by the commission to charge less for longer than for
shorter distances. As we have seen, this Court held, on the appeals
from the circuit court of the United States, that it was not
competent for courts of equity to interfere with the action of the
commission in respect to fixing rates before the rates were fixed
at all, and when it could not appear whether the companies would
have any reason to complain of them.
Our present duty is to consider only the objections to the
validity of the long and short haul clauses in the Constitution and
the statutes.
It is scarcely necessary to say that courts do not sit in
judgment on the wisdom of legislative or constitutional enactments.
This is a general principle, but it is especially true of federal
courts when they are asked to interpose in a controversy between a
state and its citizens.
This Court, then, is not concerned with the wisdom of the people
of Kentucky when they declared in their Constitution that it should
be unlawful for any person or corporation owning or operating a
railroad in that state to charge or receive any greater
compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers,
or of property of like kind, under substantially similar
circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer
distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter
being included within the longer distance. Nor, as we have already
seen, is it for us to say that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
erred in so construing that enactment as to forbid a railroad
company from justifying a voluntary disregard of its command by
claiming that competition between its road and other modes of
transportation created substantially dissimilar circumstances and
conditions.
It does not call for argument that railroad companies are
incorporated to perform a public service, and that it is for the
state to define their powers and to control their exercise of such
powers. The question for us in the present case is whether the
state, by enacting a rule of action for such companies forbidding a
greater rate of charges for a shorter than for a longer distance
and by establishing a railroad commission of the kind and with the
functions disclosed in the Constitution and statutes,
Page 183 U. S. 513
deprives the plaintiff in error of its property without due
process of law and denies to it the equal protection of the
laws.
When the citizens of Kentucky voluntarily seek and obtain a
grant from the state of a charter to build and maintain a public
highway in the form of a railroad, it would seem to be evident that
it takes, holds, and operates its road subject to the
constitutional inhibition we are considering, and are without power
to challenge its validity. It may be that, in a given case, a
railroad company may be able to show that the state has disabled
itself from enforcing the provision by a contract previously made,
and it may be that cases may arise in which the provision cannot be
enforced because operating as an unlawful interference with
commerce between the states. Indeed, those very positions are taken
by the plaintiff in error in this case, and will receive our
attention hereafter. But, apart from such contentions, and looking
only at the case of a company voluntarily formed to carry on
business wholly within a state, we are unable to see how such a
company can successfully contend that it can be exempted by the
courts from the operation of the constitution of the state.
It is said that, while it is true that railroad companies
receive their rights to exist and to maintain their roads from the
state, yet that their ownership of such roads is property, and, as
such, is protected from arbitrary interference by the state. But
though it be conceded that ownership in a railroad is property, it
is property of a kind that is subject to the regulations prescribed
by the state. We do not wish to be understood as intimating that if
hereafter the railroad commission should fix and establish rates of
a confiscatory character, the company would be without the
protection which courts of equity have heretofore given in cases of
that description. What we now say is that a state corporation
voluntarily formed cannot exempt itself from the control reserved
to itself by the state by its Constitution, and that the plaintiff
in error, if not protected by a valid contract, cannot successfully
invoke the interposition of the federal courts in respect to the
long and short haul clause in the state constitution on the ground
simply that the railroad is property. Nor is there any foundation
for the objection
Page 183 U. S. 514
that the provision in question denies to the plaintiff in error
the equal protection of the laws. The evil sought to be prevented
was the use of public highways in such a manner as to prefer, by
difference of rates, one locality to another, and the remedy
adopted by the state was to declare such preferences illegal, and
to prohibit any person, corporation, or common carrier from
resorting to them. That remedy included in its scope everyone,
without distinction, whose calling, public in its character, gave
an opportunity to do the mischief which the state desired to
prevent. The practical inefficiency of this remedy to reach the
desired end, and the resulting injury to the welfare of both the
producers and the consumers of an article like coal, when brought
into competition with coal brought from without the state, are
strongly urged on behalf of the plaintiff in error; but however
well founded such objections may be, they go to the wisdom and
policy of the enactment, not to its validity in a federal point of
view. The people of Kentucky, if it can be shown that their laws
are defective in their conception or operation, have the remedy in
their own hands.
It is further contended that the indictment and proceedings in
this case were void because of the nature of the proviso in section
218 of the Constitution. That proviso is in the following
words:
"Provided that, upon application to the railroad commission,
such common carrier, or person, or corporation owning or operating
a railroad in this state may in special cases, after investigation
by the commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than for
shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property,
and the commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to
which such common carrier or person or corporation owning or
operating a railroad in this state may be relieved from the
operations of this section."
The argument is that,
"even if it were proper to prohibit absolutely the charging of
more for short than long hauls, yet, where the law does not do so,
but recognizes that there may be legitimate traffic which could
thereby be interfered with, it is unconstitutional to entrust the
dispensation of the right to engage
Page 183 U. S. 515
in such legitimate traffic to a mere administrative tribunal,
without any rules by which it may be guided, without specifying any
conditions upon which the carriers shall be entitled to enjoy such
legitimate traffic, and absolutely free to give or withhold its
consent at its own pleasure or will, in any and all cases, without
judicial review or control."
But if it be competent for the state, as this argument supposes,
to wholly forbid, in every case and by every carrier, the charging
of more for a short than a long haul, it is not easy to see why the
state may not permit such charges through the action of a tribunal
authorized to investigate the subject, and to afford relief in
cases deemed proper. Such a provision is
ex gratia, and in
the direction of exonerating the carrier from what the argument
concedes to be a lawful limitation. Such an exercise of discretion
by the railroad commission would be no more arbitrary than if the
constitution had authorized the legislature to allow in special
cases a greater charge for the shorter than for the longer
distance, and to prescribe the extent of such excess. We are not
prepared to accept the view that the railroad commission, in acting
under section 218, is merely an administrative body, and as such
subject to judicial review. It is rather a constitutional tribunal,
empowered,
upon the application of the carrier, to
investigate the special circumstances and conditions which are
claimed to justify the relief of the carrier from the operation of
this section. It is not compulsory upon the carrier to make such
application for relief to the commission. If he does not choose to
do so, he will continue to operate his railroad under and subject
to the constitutional prohibition. If he elects to resort to the
commission, he can no more complain that its judgment is final when
it is against his contention than the community affected can
complain when its judgment is in his favor. Finality is a
characteristic of the judgments of all tribunals unless the laws
provide for a review. Nothing is more common than the appointment
of juries or commissioners to find the value of lands taken for
public use or to assess damages to them whose findings are deemed
final. Yet the evidence on which they act is not preserved, nor do
the courts go into any inquiry into the various sources and grounds
of judgment
Page 183 U. S. 516
upon which the appraisers have proceeded. If there are charges
of fraud or corruption, the courts may consider them; but it has
never been held that the finality of their findings made the action
of the appraisers unconstitutional or void.
Shoemaker v. United
States, 147 U. S. 282,
147 U. S.
305.
The plaintiff in error did not choose to avail itself of the
right to apply for relief to the railroad commission, perhaps for
the reason that doing so might be regarded as an acquiescence in or
waiver of the right to object to the validity of the proviso.
However this may be, it is difficult to see how a federal
question is presented by the apprehensions which the plaintiff may
entertain that a resort to the commission might be futile. As
already said, the railroad company must be deemed to have accepted
its grant subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and this
presumption is as applicable to the method provided for exoneration
from the prohibition as to the prohibition itself.
We do not put the disability of the company to raise these
questions upon the ground of an estoppel, strictly speaking, but
upon the proposition that the company takes and holds its
franchises and property subject to the conditions and limitations
imposed by the state in its Constitution.
Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113;
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97;
Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.
S. 307.
We are next to inquire whether the plaintiff in error has been
exonerated from these constitutional conditions and regulations by
a valid contract subsisting between it and the state.
We do not understand that the counsel for the plaintiff in error
claims that, by any provision of its charter, power was given to
the company to fix its own rates of charge or to discriminate in
its rates between different places on its line of railroad, and
that the constitutional prohibition as to the long and short haul,
subsequently enacted, operates, if enforced, as a withdrawal or
defeat of that power.
No right, in express terms or by necessary implication, is
pointed in the company's charter granting to the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Company the privilege of discriminating in its
tariff of tolls or charges in favor of longer over shorter
distance
Page 183 U. S. 517
points. On February 14, 1856, there was passed a general act
reserving to the state an unlimited power to amend all charters and
amendments thereafter granted. Laws of Kentucky, 1855-1856, c. 148.
It is true that an amendment to plaintiff in error's charter was
granted by an act passed February 28, 1860, by section 1 of which
the board of directors were granted authority, "in their adjustment
of a tariff for freight and passengers, to make discrimination in
favor of freights and passage for long over short distances." But
it does not seem to be contended that, by this amendment of 1860 an
irrevocable contract was effected between the state and the company
which could not be affected by a subsequent constitutional
enactment. It is scarcely necessary to argue or to cite authority
for the proposition that a contract of exemption from future
general legislation, either by a constitutional provision or by an
act of the legislature, cannot be deemed to exist unless it is
given expressly, or unless it follows by an implication equally
clear with express words.
But what is claimed is that a railroad company, by mere force of
its legal organization and the construction of its road, has a
necessarily implied power to fix reasonable rates, and especially
has the right to differ rates when competition exists from rates
applicable where there is no competition. Such rights, it is said,
are essential to enable the company to engage in perfectly
legitimate business, and hence that an interference therewith, even
by a constitutional enactment, not only deprives the company of its
property or the reasonable use of it, but also impairs the
obligation of the contract implied in the grant of its charter.
So far as the question of an implied contract is concerned, we
perceive no distinction between the case of a railroad company
incorporated before and that of one incorporated after the
constitutional enactment in question. As it has been said of the
one, so it may be said of the other -- that the charter is taken
and held subject to the power of the state to regulate and control
the grant in the interest of the public.
In
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Miller, 132 U. S.
75, it was held that neither the original charter of the
railroad company nor subsequent acts conferring additional
privileges constituted
Page 183 U. S. 518
such a contract between the state and the company as exempted
the latter from the operation of the subsequently adopted
Constitution of Pennsylvania; that a constitutional provision, as
applied to the company, in respect to cases afterwards arising, did
not impair the obligation of any contract between it and the state,
and that the company took its charter subject to the general law of
the state and to such changes as might be made in such general law,
and subject to future constitutional provision and future general
legislation, since there was no prior contract with it exempting it
from such enactments.
The same principle was announced in
Louisville Water Co. v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 1, and in
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Kentucky,
161 U. S. 677.
In the absence, then, of any express prior contract between the
state and the company exempting the latter from future
constitutional enactments, and without conceding that even such a
contract would avail to relieve the company from constitutional
changes in the exercise of the general police power of the state,
it is sufficient to say that we do not find in section 218 of the
Constitution of Kentucky and impairment of an existing contract
between the state and the plaintiff in error.
The final contention, that section 218 of the Constitution of
Kentucky operates as an interference with interstate commerce, and
is therefore void, need not detain us long.
It is plain that the provision in question does not in terms
embrace the case of interstate traffic. It is restricted in its
regulation to those who own or operate a railroad within the state,
and the long and short distances mentioned are evidently distances
upon the railroad line within the state. The particular case before
us is one involving only the transportation of coal from one point
in the State of Kentucky to another by a corporation of that
state.
It may be that the enforcement of the state regulation
forbidding discrimination in rates in the case of articles of a
like kind carried for different distances over the same line may
somewhat affect commerce generally, but we have frequently held
that such a result is too remote and indirect to be regarded as an
interference with interstate commerce, that the interference
Page 183 U. S. 519
with the commercial power of the general government, to be
unlawful, must be direct, and not the merely incidental effect of
enforcing the police powers of a state.
New York, Lake Erie and
Western Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.
S. 431,
158 U. S. 439;
Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U.
S. 150.
A discussion of this subject will be found in the opinion of
this Court in
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v.
Kentucky, 161 U. S. 701,
where the same conclusion was reached.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.