The provision in the Act of the Legislature of Michigan, No. 90,
of the year 1891, amending the general railroad law, that one
thousand mile tickets shall be kept for sale at the principal
ticket. offices of all railroad companies in this state or carrying
on business partly within and partly without the limits of the
state at a price not exceeding twenty dollars in the Lower
Peninsula and twenty-five dollars in the Upper Peninsula; that such
one thousand mile tickets may be made nontransferable, but whenever
required by the purchaser, they shall be issued in the names of the
purchaser, his wife and children, designating the name of each on
such ticket, and in case such ticket is presented by any other than
the person or persons named thereon, the conductor may take it up
and collect fare, and thereupon such one thousand mile ticket shall
be forfeited to the railroad company; that each one thousand mile
ticket shall be valid for two years only after date of purchase,
and in case it is not wholly used within the time, the company
issuing the same shall redeem the unused portion thereof, if
presented by the purchaser for redemption within thirty days after
the expiration of such time, and shall on such redemption be
entitled to charge three cents per mile for the portion thereof
used, is a violation of that part of the Constitution of the United
States which forbids the taking of property without due process of
law, and requires the equal protection of the laws.
In so holding, the Court is not thereby interfering with the
power of the legislature over railroads, as corporations or common
carriers, to so legislate as to fix maximum rates, to prevent
extortion or undue charges, and to promote the safety, health,
convenience or proper protection of the public, but it only says
that the particular legislation in review in this
Page 173 U. S. 685
case does not partake of the character of legislation fairly or
reasonably necessary to attain any of those objects, and that it
does violate the federal Constitution as above stated.
May 21, 1891, by Act No. 90 of that year, the general railroad
law of the State of Michigan was amended by the legislature, a
portion of the ninth section of which reads as follows:
". . .
Provided, further, that one thousand mile
tickets shall be kept for sale at the principal ticket offices of
all railroad companies in this state or carrying on business partly
within and partly without the limits of the state at a price not
exceeding twenty dollars in the Lower Peninsula and twenty-five
dollars in the Upper Peninsula. Such one thousand mile tickets may
be made nontransferable, but whenever required by the purchaser,
they shall be issued in the names of the purchaser, his wife and
children, designating the name of each on such ticket, and in case
such ticket is presented by any other than the person or persons
named thereon, the conductor may take it up and collect fare, and
thereupon such one thousand mile ticket shall be forfeited to the
railroad company. Each one thousand mile ticket shall be valid for
two years only after date of purchase, and in case it is not wholly
used within the time, the company issuing the same shall redeem the
unused portion thereof if presented by the purchaser for redemption
within thirty days after the expiration of such time, and shall on
such redemption be entitled to charge three cents per mile for the
portion thereof used."
On April 19, 1893, and again on October 17, 1893, the defendant
in error demanded of the ticket agent of the plaintiff in error, in
the City of Adrian, Michigan, a thousand mile ticket, pursuant to
the provisions of the above section, in the names of himself and
his wife, Emma Watts Smith, which demand was refused. The defendant
in error then applied for a mandamus to the circuit court to compel
the railway company to issue such ticket upon the payment of the
amount of $20, and, after a hearing, the motion was granted. Upon
certiorari, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed that order
Page 173 U. S. 686
and held that the statute applied only to the railway lines of
the plaintiff in error operated within the State of Michigan.
The defense set up by the railway company was that, under the
charter from the state to one of the predecessors of the company to
whose rights it had succeeded, it had the right to charge three
cents a mile for the transportation of all passengers, and that
such charter constituted a contract between the state and the
company which the former had no right to impair by any legislative
action, and that the statute compelling the company to sell
thousand-mile tickets at the rate of two cents a mile was an
impairment of the contract, and was therefore void as in violation
of the Constitution of the United States. It also alleged that the
act was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States in that it deprived the company
of its property and liberty of contract without due process of law,
and also deprived it of the equal protection of the laws. The act
was also alleged to be in violation of the Constitution of the
State of Michigan on several grounds.
The supreme court of the state decided that there was no
contract in relation to the rates which the company might charge
for the transportation of passengers, and that the statute violated
no provision either of the federal or the state constitution, but
was a valid enactment of the legislature, and therefore the court
affirmed the order for mandamus, the ticket to be good upon and
limited to the railway lines of the defendant railroad company
within the State of Michigan. 72 N.W. 328. The company sued out a
writ of error from this Court.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after stating the facts, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Page 173 U. S. 687
The only subject of inquiry for us in this case is whether the
act of the Legislature of the State of Michigan violates any
provision of the federal Constitution. If is not within our
province to review the decision of the supreme court upon the
question whether the act violates the Constitution of the
state.
The two questions of a federal nature that are raised in the
record are (1) whether the act violates the Constitution of the
United States by impairing the obligation of any contract between
the state and the railroad company, and (2) if not, does it
nevertheless violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
by depriving the company of its property or liberty without due
process of law or by depriving it of the equal protection of the
laws? If we should decide that this act violates any provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it would be unnecessary to examine the
question whether there was any contract between the state and the
company, as claimed by it. We will therefore first come to an
investigation of the legislative authority with reference to that
amendment.
If unhampered by contract, there is no doubt of the power of the
state to provide by legislation for maximum rates of charges for
railroad companies, subject to the condition that they must be such
as will admit of the carrier earning a compensation that, under all
the circumstances, shall be just to it and to the public, and
whether they are or not is a judicial question. If the rates are
fixed at an insufficient amount within the meaning of that term as
given by the courts, the law would be invalid as amounting to the
taking of the property of the company without due process of law.
Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company v. Wellman,
143 U. S. 339,
143 U. S. 344;
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 154 U.
S. 362,
154 U. S. 399;
St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. v. Gill,
156 U. S. 649;
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466,
169 U. S.
523.
The extent of the power of the state to legislate regarding the
affairs of railroad companies has, within the past few years, been
several times before this Court.
Wabash, St. Louis &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.
S. 557;
Illinois
Central
Page 173 U. S. 688
Railroad v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142;
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Ohio,
173 U. S. 285, and
cases cited. These cases arose under the commerce clause of the
federal Constitution, the inquiry being whether the legislation in
question violated that provision. In the cases in which the
legislation was upheld, it was on the ground that the state was but
exercising its proper authority under its general power to
legislate regarding persons and things within its jurisdiction,
sometimes described as its police power, and that, in exercising
that power in the particular cases, it did not violate the commerce
clause of the federal Constitution by improperly regulating or
interfering with interstate commerce. The extent of the right of
the state to legislate was examined in these various cases, so far
at least as it was affected by the commerce clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
In
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the state
statute imposed the duty upon the company of stopping its fast mail
train at the station at Cairo, to do which the train had to leave
the through route at a point three miles from that station and then
return to the same point in order to resume its journey. This
statute was held to be an unconstitutional interference with
interstate commerce, and therefore void.
In
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Ohio,
a statute of the State of Ohio required the company to stop certain
of its trains at stations containing 3,000 inhabitants for a time
sufficient to receive and let off passengers, and the statute was
held to be a valid exercise of legislative power, and not an
improper interference with interstate commerce. In the course of
the opinion of the Court, which was delivered by MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN, it was said that:
"The power, whether called police, governmental, or legislative,
exists in each state, by appropriate enactments not forbidden by
its own constitution or by the Constitution of the United States,
to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and
corporations within its jurisdiction, and therefore to provide for
the public convenience and the public good. This power in the
states is entirely distinct from any power granted to the general
government, although, when exercised, it may sometimes
Page 173 U. S. 689
reach subjects over which national legislation can be
constitutionally extended."
And again, speaking of cases involving state regulations more or
less affecting interstate or foreign commerce, it was said that
these cases
"were sustained upon the ground that they were not directed
against, nor were direct burdens upon, interstate or foreign
commerce, and having been enacted only to protect the public
safety, the public health, or the public morals, and having a real,
substantial relation to the public ends intended to be accomplished
thereby, were not to be deemed absolutely forbidden because of the
mere grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce, but to be regarded as only incidentally affecting such
commerce, and valid until superseded by legislation of Congress on
the same subject."
The police power is a general term used to express the
particular right of a government which is inherent in every
sovereignty. As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the course of
his opinion in the
License Cases,
5 How. 504,
46 U. S. 583,
in describing the powers of a state:
"They are nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And
whether a state passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish
offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain
instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own
limits, in every case it exercises the same power -- that is to
say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things
within the limits of its dominion."
This power must, however, be exercised in subordination to the
provisions of the federal Constitution. If, in the assumed exercise
of its police power, the legislature of a state directly and
plainly violates a provision of the Constitution of the United
States, such legislation would be void.
The validity of this act is rested by the counsel for the
defendant in error upon the proposition that the state legislature
has the power of regulation over the corporations created by it,
and, in cases of railroad corporations, the same power of
regulation, and also full control over the subject of rates to be
charged by them as carriers for the transportation of persons
Page 173 U. S. 690
and property. Assuming that the state is not controlled by
contract between itself and the railroad company, the question is
how far does the authority of the legislature extend in a case
where it has the power of regulation, and also the right to amend,
alter, or repeal the charter of a company, together with a general
power to legislate upon the subject of rates and charges of all
carriers? It has no right, even under such circumstances, to take
away or destroy the property or annul the contracts of a railroad
company with third persons.
Greenwood v. Freight Company,
105 U. S. 13,
105 U. S. 17;
Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray 239;
People v.
O'Brien, 111 N.Y. 1, 52;
City of Detroit v. Detroit &
Howland Plankroad, 43 Mich. 140.
A railroad company, although a
quasi-public
corporation, and although it operates a public highway,
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway, 135 U.
S. 641;
Lake Shore &c. Railway v. Ohio,
173 U. S. 285,
173 U. S. 301,
has nevertheless rights which the legislature cannot take away
without a violation of the federal Constitution, as stated in
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466,
169 U. S. 544.
A corporation is a person within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v.
Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26;
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 522,
169 U. S. 526.
Although it is under governmental control, that control must be
exercised with due regard to constitutional guaranties for the
protection of its property.
The question is presented in this case whether the legislature
of a state, having power to fix maximum rates and charges for the
transportation of persons and property by railroad companies, with
the limitations above stated, and having power to alter, amend, or
repeal their charters within certain limitations, has also the
right, after having fixed a maximum rate for the transportation of
passengers, to still further regulate their affairs and to
discriminate and make an exception in favor of certain persons and
give to them a right of transportation for a less sum than the
general rate provided by law.
It is said that the power to create this exception is included
in the greater power to fix rates generally; that, having the right
to establish maximum rates, it therefore has power to
Page 173 U. S. 691
lower those rates in certain cases and in favor of certain
individuals while maintaining them or permitting them to be
maintained at a higher rate in all other cases. It is asserted also
that this is only a proper and reasonable regulation.
It does not seem to us that this claim is well founded. We
cannot regard this exceptional legislation as the exercise of a
lesser right which is included in the greater one to fix by statute
maximum rates for railroad companies. The latter is a power to make
a general rule applicable in all cases, and without discrimination
in favor of or against any individual. It is the power to declare a
general law upon the subject of rates beyond which the company
cannot go, but within which it is at liberty to conduct its work in
such a manner as may seem to it best suited for its prosperity and
success. This is a very different power from that exercised in the
passage of this statute. The act is not a general law upon the
subject of rates, establishing maximum rates, which the company can
in no case violate. The legislature, having established such
maximum as a general law, now assumes to interfere with the
management of the company while conducting its affairs pursuant to
and obeying the statute regulating rates and charges, and
notwithstanding such rates, it assumes to provide for a
discrimination -- an exception in favor of those who may desire and
are able to purchase tickets at what might be called wholesale
rates; a discrimination which operates in favor of the wholesale
buyer, leaving the others subject to the general rule. And it
assumes to regulate the time in which the tickets purchased shall
be valid and to lengthen it to double the period the railroad
company has ever before provided. It thus invades the general right
of a company to conduct and manage its own affairs, and compels it
to give the use of its property for less than the general rate to
those who come within the provisions of the statute, and to that
extent it would seem that the statute takes the property of the
company without due process of law. We speak of the general right
of the company to conduct and manage its own affairs, but, at the
same time, it is to be understood that the company is subject to
the unquestioned jurisdiction of the legislature in the exercise of
its power to
Page 173 U. S. 692
provide for the safety, the health, and the convenience of the
public, and to prevent improper exactions or extortionate charges
from being made by the company.
It is stated upon the part of the defendant in error that the
act is a mere regulation of the public business, which the
legislature has a right to regulate, and its apparent object is to
promote the convenience of persons having occasion to travel on
railroads, and to reduce for them the cost of transportation; that
its benefit to the public who are compelled to patronize railroads
is unquestioned; that it brings the reduction of rates to two cents
per mile within the reach of all persons who may have occasion to
make only infrequent trips, and that there is no reason why the
legislature may not fix the period of time within which the holder
of the ticket shall be compelled to use it. The reduction of rates
in favor of those purchasing this kind of ticket is thus justified
by the reasons stated.
The right to claim from the company transportation at reduced
rates by purchasing a certain amount of tickets is classed as a
convenience. As so defined, it would be more convenient if the
right could be claimed without any compensation whatever. But such
a right is not a convenience at all, within the meaning of the term
as used in relation to the subject of furnishing conveniences to
the public. And also the convenience which the legislature is to
protect is not the convenience of a small portion only of the
persons who may travel on the road, while refusing such alleged
convenience to all others; nor is the right to obtain tickets for
less than the general and otherwise lawful rate to be properly
described as a convenience. If that were true, the granting of the
right to some portion of the public to ride free on all trains and
at all times might be so described. What is covered by the word
"convenience" it might be difficult to define for all cases, but we
think it does not cover this case. An opportunity to purchase a
thousand mile ticket for less than the standard rate, we think, is
improperly described as a convenience.
The power of the legislature to enact general laws regarding
Page 173 U. S. 693
a company and its affairs does not include the power to compel
it to make an exception in favor of some particular class in the
community, and to carry the members of that class at a less sum
than it has the right to charge for those who are not fortunate
enough to be members thereof. This is not reasonable regulation. We
do not deny the right of the legislature to make all proper rules
and regulations for the general conduct of the affairs of the
company relating to the running of trains, the keeping of ticket
offices open, and providing for the proper accommodation of the
public.
This act is not like one establishing certain hours in the day
during which trains shall be run for a less charge than during the
other hours. In such case, it is the establishing of maximum rates
of fare for the whole public during those hours, and it is not a
discrimination in favor of certain persons by which they can obtain
lower rates by purchasing a certain number of tickets, by reason of
which the company is compelled to carry them at the reduced rate,
and thus in substance to part with its property at a less sum than
it would be otherwise entitled to charge. The power to compel the
company to carry persons under the circumstances as provided for in
this act for less than the usual rates does not seem to be based
upon any reason which has hitherto been regarded as sufficient to
authorize an interference with the corporation, although a common
carrier and a railroad.
The act also compels the company to carry not only those who
choose to purchase these tickets, but their wives and children, and
it makes the tickets good for two years from the time of the
purchase. If the legislature can, under the guise of regulation,
provide that these tickets shall be good for two years, why can it
not provide that they shall be good for five or ten or even a
longer term of years? It may be said that the regulation must
provide for a reasonable term. But what is reasonable under these
circumstances? Upon what basis is the reasonable character of the
period to be judged? If two years would, and five years would not,
be reasonable, why not? And if five years would be reasonable, why
would not ten? If the power exist at all, what are the
Page 173 U. S. 694
factors which make it unreasonable to say that the tickets shall
be valid for five or for ten years? It may be said that
circumstances can change within that time. That is true, but
circumstances may change within two just as well as within five or
ten years. There is no particular time in regard to which it may be
said in advance, and as a legal conclusion, that circumstances will
not change. And can the validity of the regulation be made to
depend upon what may happen in the future, during the running of
the time in which the legislature has decreed the company shall
carry the purchaser of the ticket? Regulations for maximum rates
for present transportation of persons or property bear no
resemblance to those which assume to provide for the purchase of
tickets in quantities at a lower than the general rate, and to
provide that they shall be good for years to come. This is not
fixing maximum rates; nor is it proper regulation. It is an illegal
and unjustifiable interference with the rights of the company.
If this power exist, it must include the right of the
legislature, after establishing maximum freight rates, to also
direct the company to charge less for carrying freight where the
party offering it sends a certain amount, and to carry it at that
rate for the next two or five or ten years. Is that an exercise of
the power to establish maximum freight rates? Is it a valid
exercise of the power to regulate the affairs of a corporation? The
legislature would thus permit not only discrimination in favor of
the larger freighter as against the smaller one, but it would
compel it. If the general power exist, then the legislature can
direct the company to charge smaller rates for clergymen or
doctors, for lawyers or farmers or school teachers, for excursions,
for church conventions, political conventions, or for all or any of
the various bodies that might desire to ride at any particular time
or to any particular place.
If the legislature can interfere by directing the sale of
tickets at less than the generally established rate, it can compel
the company to carry certain persons or classes free. If the
maximum rates are too high in the judgment of the legislature, it
may lower them, provided they do not make them unreasonably low, as
that term is understood in the law,
Page 173 U. S. 695
but it cannot enact a law making maximum rates and then proceed
to make exceptions to it in favor of such persons or classes as in
the legislative judgment or caprice may seem proper. What right has
the legislature to take from the company the compensation it would
otherwise receive for the use of its property in transporting an
individual or classes of persons over its road, and compel it to
transport them free or for a less sum than is provided for by the
general law? Does not such an act, if enforced, take the property
of the company without due process of law? We are convinced that
the legislature cannot thus interfere with the conduct of the
affairs of corporations.
But it may be said that, as the legislature would have the power
to reduce the maximum charges for all to the same rate at which it
provides for the purchase of the thousand mile ticket, the company
cannot be harmed or its property taken without due process of law,
when the legislature only reduces the rates in favor of a few,
instead of in favor of all. It does not appear that the legislature
would have any right to make such an alteration. To do so might
involve a reduction of rates to a point insufficient for the
earning of the amount of remuneration to which a company is legally
entitled under the decisions of this Court. In that case, reduction
would be illegal. For the purpose of upholding this discriminatory
legislation, we are not to assume that the exercise of the power of
the legislature to make in this instance a reduction of rates as to
all would be legal, and therefore a partial reduction must be also
legal.
Prima facie, the maximum rates as fixed by the
legislature are reasonable. This, of course, applies to rates
actually fixed by that body.
There is no presumption, however, that certain named rates which
it is said the legislature might fix, but which it has not, would,
in case it did so fix them, be reasonable and valid. That it has
not so fixed them affords a presumption that they would be invalid,
and that presumption would remain until the legislature actually
enacted the reduction. At any rate, there is no foundation for a
presumption of validity in case it did so enact in order to base
the argument that a partial
Page 173 U. S. 696
reduction, by means of this discrimination, is therefore also
valid. And this argument also loses sight of the distinction we
made above between the two cases of a general establishment of
maximum rates and the enactment of discriminatory, exceptional, and
partial legislation upon the subject of the sale of tickets to
individuals willing and able to purchase a quantity at any one
time. The latter is not an exercise of the power to establish
maximum rates.
True it is that the railroad company exercises a public
franchise, and that its occupation is of a public nature, and the
public therefore has a certain interest in, and rights connected
with, the property, as was held in
Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 125,
and the other kindred cases. The legislature has the power to
secure to the public the services of the corporation for reasonable
compensation so that the public shall be exempted from unreasonable
exactions, and it has also the authority to pass such laws as shall
tend to secure the safety, convenience, comfort, and health of its
patrons and of the public with regard to the railroad. But in all
this we find it neither necessary nor appropriate, in order that
the legislature may exercise its full right over these
corporations, to make such a regulation as this, which
discriminates against it and in favor of certain individuals
without any reasonable basis therefor and which is not the fixing
of maximum rates or the exercise of any such power.
The legislature having fixed a maximum rate at what must be
presumed,
prima facie, to be also a reasonable rate, we
think the company, then, has the right to insist that all persons
shall be compelled to pay alike; that no discrimination against it
in favor of certain classes of married men or families,
excursionists, or others shall be made by the legislature. If
otherwise, then the company is compelled, at the caprice or whim of
the legislature, to make such exceptions as it may think proper,
and to carry the excepted persons at less than the usual and legal
rates, and thus to part in their favor with its property without
that compensation to which it is entitled from all others, and
therefore to part with its property without due process of law. The
affairs of the company are
Page 173 U. S. 697
in this way taken out of its own management not by any general
law applicable to all, but by a discrimination made by law to which
the company is made subject. Whether an act of this nature shall be
passed or not is not a matter of policy to be decided by the
legislature. It is a matter of right of the company to carry on and
manage its concerns, subject to the general law applicable to all,
which the legislature may enact in the legal exercise of its power
to legislate in regard to persons and things within its
jurisdiction.
This case differs from that which has just been decided.
Lake Shore &c. Company v. Ohio, 173 U.
S. 285. In that case, the convenience of the public in
the state was the basis of the decision, regard being also had to
the convenience of the public outside of and beyond the state. It
included all the public who desired to ride from the stations
provided for in the act, and the convenience to the people in
taking a train at these stations was held by this Court to be so
substantial as to justify the enactment in question.
But in this case, it is not a question of convenience at all,
within the proper meaning of that term. Aside from the rate at
which the ticket may be purchased, the convenience of purchasing
this kind of a ticket is so small that the right to enact the law
cannot be founded upon it. It is no answer to the objection to this
legislation to say that the company has voluntarily sold thousand
mile tickets good for a year from the time of their sale. What the
company may choose voluntarily to do furnishes no criterion for the
measurement of the power of a legislature. Persons may voluntarily
contract to do what no legislature would have the right to compel
them to do. Nor does it furnish a standard by which to measure the
reasonableness of the matter exacted by the legislature. The action
of the company upon its own volition, purely as a matter of
internal administration, and in regard to the details of its
business which it has the right to change at any moment, furnishes
no argument for the existence of a power in a legislature to pass a
statute in relation to the same business imposing additional
burdens upon the company.
To say that the legislature has power to absolutely repeal
Page 173 U. S. 698
the charter of the company, and thus to terminate its legal
existence, does not answer the objection that this particular
exercise of legislative power is neither necessary nor appropriate
to carry into execution any valid power of the state over the
conduct of the business of its creature. To terminate the charter,
and thus end the legal life of the company, does not take away its
property, but, on the contrary, leaves it all to the shareholders
of the company after the payment of its debts.
In
Attorney General v. Old Colony Railroad, 160 Mass.
62, the statute required every railroad corporation in the
commonwealth to have on sale certain tickets which should be
received for fare on all railroad lines in the commonwealth, etc.,
and the statute was held invalid. The precise question involved in
this case was not there presented, and the court said it was not
necessary or practicable to attempt to determine in that case just
how far the legislature could go by way of regulating the business
of railroad companies, or just where were the limits of its
power.
The power to enact legislation of this character cannot be
founded upon the mere fact that the thing affected is a
corporation, even when the legislature has power to alter, amend,
or repeal the charter thereof. The power to alter or amend does not
extend to the taking of the property of the corporation, either by
confiscation or indirectly by other means. The authority to
legislate in regard to rates comes from the power to prevent
extortion or unreasonable charges or exactions by common carriers
or others exercising a calling and using their property in a manner
in which the public have an interest.
In this case, there is not an exercise of the power to fix
maximum rates. There is not the exercise of the acknowledged power
to legislate so as to prevent extortion or unreasonable or illegal
exactions. The fixing of the maximum rate does that. It is a pure,
bald, and unmixed power of discrimination in favor of a few of the
persons having occasion to travel on the road, and permitting them
to do so at a less expense than others, provided they buy a certain
number of tickets at one time. It is not legislation for the
Page 173 U. S. 699
safety, health, or proper convenience of the public, but an
arbitrary enactment in favor of the persons spoken of, who, in the
legislative judgment, should be carried at a less expense than the
other members of the community. There is no reasonable ground upon
which the legislation can be rested, unless the simple decision of
the legislature should be held to constitute such reason. Whether
the legislature might not, in the fair exercise of its power of
regulation, provide that ordinary tickets purchased from the
company should be good for a certain reasonable time is not a
question which is now before us, and we need not express any
opinion in regard to it.
In holding this legislation a violation of that part of the
Constitution of the United States which forbids the taking of
property without due process of law, and requires the equal
protection of the laws, we are not, as we have stated, thereby
interfering with the power of the legislature over railroads as
corporations or common carriers to so legislate as to fix maximum
rates, to prevent extortion or undue charges, and to promote the
safety, health, convenience, or proper protection of the public. We
say this particular piece of legislation does not partake of the
character of legislation fairly or reasonably necessary to attain
any of those objects, and that it does violate the federal
Constitution, as above stated.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan
should be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court, and it is so
ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE GRAY and MR. JUSTICE McKENNA
dissented.