The statute of Ohio relating to railroad companies in that state
which provides that
"Each company shall cause three, each way, of its regular trains
carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to
stop at a station, city or village, containing over three thousand
inhabitants,
Page 173 U. S. 286
for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers; if a
company or any agent or employee thereof violates or causes or
permits to be violated this provision, such company, agent or
employee shall be liable to a forfeiture of not more than one
hundred nor less than twenty-five dollars, to be recovered in an
action in the name of the state upon the complaint of any person
before a justice of the peace of the county in which the violation
occurs, for the benefit of the general fund of the county, and in
all cases in which a forfeiture occurs under the provisions of this
section, the company whose agent or employe caused or permitted
such violation shall be liable for the amount of the forfeiture,
and the conductor in charge of such train shall be held,
prima
facie, to have caused the violation,"
is not, in the absence of legislation by Congress on the
subject, repugnant to the Constitution of the United States when
applied to interstate trains carrying interstate commerce through
the Ohio on the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was commenced before a justice of the peace of the
County of Cuyahoga, Ohio, to recover the penalty prescribed by
section 3320 of the Revised Statutes of that state.
That section is a part of a chapter relating to railroad
companies, and, as amended by the Act of April 13, 1889,
provides:
"Each company shall cause three, each way, of its regular trains
carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to
stop at a station, city, or village containing over three thousand
inhabitants for a time sufficient to receive and let off
passengers; if a company, or any agent or employee thereof,
violates or causes or permits to be violated this provision, such
company, agents or employee shall be liable to a forfeiture of not
more than one hundred nor less than twenty-five dollars, to be
recovered in an action in the name of the state, upon the complaint
of any person before a justice of the peace of the county in which
the violation occurs for the benefit of the general fund of the
county, and in all cases in which a forfeiture occurs under the
provisions of this section,
Page 173 U. S. 287
the company whose agent or employee caused or permitted such
violation shall be liable for the amount of the forfeiture, and the
conductor in charge of such train shall be held,
prima
facie, to have caused the violation."
Laws Ohio, 1889, vol. 86, p. 291; Rev.Stat. Ohio 1890, ยง
3320.
The case was removed for trial into the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County, in which a judgment was rendered against the
railroad company for the sum of one hundred dollars. Upon writ of
error to the circuit court of that county, the judgment was
affirmed, and the judgment of the latter court was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Ohio.
The facts upon which the case was determined in the state court
were as follows:
The plaintiff, Lawrence, is a resident of West Cleveland, a
municipal corporation of Ohio having more than 3,000
inhabitants.
The defendant railway company is a corporation organized under
the respective laws of Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana,
Michigan, and Illinois, and owns and operates a railroad located
partly within the Village of West Cleveland. Its line extends from
Chicago through those states to Buffalo.
On the 9th day of October, 1890, as well as for some time prior
thereto and thereafter, the company caused to run daily both ways
over its road within the limits of West Cleveland three or more
regular trains carrying passengers, and on that day (which was not
Sunday), it did not stop or cause to be stopped within that village
more than one of such trains each way long enough to receive or let
off passengers.
On the day above named, and after that date, the company was
engaged in carrying both passengers and freight over its railroad
from Chicago and other stations in Indiana and Michigan through
each of said several states to and into New York, Pennsylvania, and
Ohio, and to Buffalo, and from Buffalo, through said states, to
Chicago. It did not on that day, nor shortly prior thereto, nor up
to the commencement of the present suit, run daily both ways or
either way over said road through the village of West Cleveland
three regular trains, nor more than one regular train each way
carrying passengers
"which were
Page 173 U. S. 288
not engaged in interstate commerce, or that did not have upon
them passengers who had paid through fare and were entitled to ride
in said trains going in the one direction from the City of Chicago
to the City of Buffalo through the states of Indiana, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, and those going the other direction from the City of
Buffalo . . . through said states, to the City of Chicago."
On or about the day named, the company operated but one regular
train carrying passengers each way that was not engaged in carrying
such through passengers, and that train did stop at West Cleveland
on that day for a time sufficient to receive and let off
passengers.
The through trains that passed westwardly through West Cleveland
on the 9th day of October, 1890, were a limited express train,
having two baggage and express cars, one passenger coach, and three
sleepers, from New York to Chicago, a fast mail train, having five
mail cars, one passenger coach, and one sleeper, from New York to
Chicago, and a train having one mail car, two baggage and express
cars, four passenger coaches, and one sleeper, from Cleveland to
Chicago. The trains running eastwardly on the same day through West
Cleveland were a limited express train having one baggage and
express car and three sleepers from Chicago to New York; a train
having one baggage and express car, three passenger coaches, and
two sleepers, from Chicago to New York; a train having one mail
car, two baggage and express cars, and seven passenger coaches from
Chicago to Buffalo, and a train having three mail cars and one
sleeper from Chicago to New York.
The average time required to stop a train of cars and receive
and let off passengers is three minutes.
The number of villages in Ohio containing 3,000 inhabitants
through which the above trains passed on the day named was
thirteen.
The trial court found as a conclusion of law that within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States, the statute of
Ohio was not a regulation of commerce among the states, and was
valid until Congress acted upon the subject. This general
Page 173 U. S. 289
view was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Cuyahoga County and by
the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The plaintiff in error contends that as the power to regulate
interstate commerce is vested in Congress, the statute of Ohio, in
its application to trains engaged in such commerce, is directly
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
In support of this contention, it insists that an interstate
railroad carrier has the right to start its train at any point in
one state and pass into and through another state without taking up
or setting down passengers within the limits of the latter state.
As applied to the present case, that contention means that the
defendant company, although an Ohio corporation deriving all its
franchises and privileges from that state, may, if it so wills,
deprive the people along its line in Ohio of the benefits of
interstate communication by its railroad -- in short, that the
company, if it saw fit to do so, could, beyond the power of Ohio to
prevent it, refuse to stop within that state trains that started
from points beyond its limits or even trains starting in Ohio
destined to places in other states.
In the argument at the bar as well as in the printed brief of
counsel, reference was made to the numerous cases in this Court
adjudging that what are called the police powers of the states were
not surrendered to the general government when the Constitution was
ordained, but remained with the several states of the Union. And it
was asserted with much confidence that, while regulations adopted
by competent local authority in order to protect or promote the
public health, the public morals, or the public safety have been
sustained where such regulations only incidentally affected
commerce among the states, the principles announced in former
adjudications condemn, as repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States, all local regulations that affect interstate
commerce in any degree if established merely to subserve the public
convenience.
One of the cases cited in support of this position is
Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299,
163 U. S. 303,
163 U. S. 308,
163 U. S. 317,
which involved the validity of a statute of Georgia providing
that
"if any freight train shall be run on any railroad in this
Page 173 U. S. 290
state on the Sabbath Day (known as Sunday), the superintendent
of such railroad company, or the officer having charge of the
business of that department of the railroad, shall be liable for
indictment for a misdemeanor in each county through which such
trains shall pass, and on conviction shall be punished: . . .
provided always that whenever any train on any railroad in
this state, having in such train one or more cars loaded with
livestock, which train shall be delayed beyond schedule time, shall
not be required to lay over on the line of road or route during
Sunday, but may run on to the point where, by due course of
shipment or consignment, the next stock pen on the route may be,
where said animals may be fed and watered, according to the
facilities usually afforded for such transportation. And it shall
be lawful for the freight trains on the different railroads in this
state, running over said roads on Saturday night, to run through to
destination:
provided the time of arrival, according to
the schedule by which the train or trains started on the trip,
shall not be later than eight o'clock on Sunday morning."
This Court said:
"The well settled rule is that if a statute purporting to have
been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or
the public safety has no real or substantial relation to those
objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law, it is the duty of courts to so adjudge, and
thereby give effect to the Constitution."
The contention in that case was that the running of railroad
cars laden with interstate freight was committed exclusively to the
control and supervision of the national government, and that
although Congress had not taken any affirmative action upon the
subject, state legislation interrupting interstate commerce even
for a limited time only, whatever might be its object and however
essential such legislation might be for the comfort, peace, or
safety of the people of the state, was a regulation of interstate
commerce forbidden by the Constitution of the United States.
After observing that the argument in behalf of the defendant
rested upon the erroneous assumption that the statute of Georgia
was such a regulation of interstate commerce as was
Page 173 U. S. 291
forbidden by the Constitution without reference to affirmative
action by Congress, and not merely a statute enacted by the state
under its police power, and which, although in some degree
affecting interstate commerce, did not go beyond the necessities of
the case, and therefore was valid at least until Congress
intervened, this Court, upon a review of the adjudged cases,
said:
"These authorities make it clear that the legislative enactments
of the states, passed under their admitted police powers and having
a real relation to the domestic peace, order, health, and safety of
their people, but which, by their necessary operation, affect to
some extent or for a limited time the conduct of commerce among the
states, are yet not invalid by force alone of the grant of power to
Congress to regulate such commerce, and if not obnoxious to some
other constitutional provision or destructive of some right secured
by the fundamental law, are to be respected in the courts of the
Union until they are superseded and displaced by some act of
Congress passed in execution of the power granted to it by the
Constitution. Local laws of the character mentioned have their
source in the power which the states reserved and never surrendered
to Congress of providing for the public health, the public morals,
and the public safety, and are not, within the meaning of the
Constitution, and considered in their own nature, regulations of
interstate commerce simply because, for a limited time or to a
limited extent, they cover the field occupied by those engaged in
such commerce. The statute of Georgia is not directed against
interstate commerce. It establishes a rule of civil conduct
applicable alike to all freight trains, domestic as well as
interstate. It applies to the transportation of interstate freight
the same rule precisely that it applies to the transportation of
domestic freight."
Again:
"We are of opinion that such a law, although in a limited degree
affecting interstate commerce, is not for that reason a needless
intrusion upon the domain of federal jurisdiction nor strictly a
regulation of interstate commerce, but, considered in its own
nature, is an ordinary police regulation designed to secure the
wellbeing and to promote the general welfare of the people within
the
Page 173 U. S. 292
state by which it was established, and therefore not invalid by
force alone of the Constitution of the United States."
It is insisted by counsel that these and observations to the
same effect in different cases show that the police powers of the
states, when exerted with reference to matters more or less
connected with interstate commerce, are restricted in their
exercise, so far as the national Constitution is concerned, to
regulations pertaining to the health, morals, or safety of the
public, and do not embrace regulations designed merely to promote
the public convenience.
This is an erroneous view of the adjudications of this Court.
While cases to which counsel refer involved the validity of state
laws having reference directly to the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety, in no one of them was there any
occasion to determine whether the police powers of the states
extended to regulations incidentally affecting interstate commerce,
but which were designed only to promote the public convenience or
the general welfare. There are, however, numerous decisions by this
Court to the effect that the states may legislate with reference
simply to the public convenience, subject, of course, to the
condition that such legislation be not inconsistent with the
national Constitution, nor with any act of Congress passed in
pursuance of that instrument, nor in derogation of any right
granted or secured by it. As the question now presented is one of
great importance, it will be well to refer to some cases of the
latter class.
In
Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713,
70 U. S. 729,
which involved the validity of a state enactment authorizing the
construction of a permanent bridge over the Schuylkill River within
the limits of Philadelphia, and which bridge in fact interfered
with the use of the river by vessels of a certain size which had
been long accustomed to navigate it, the Court said:
"It must not be forgotten that bridges, which are connecting
parts of turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are means of commercial
transportation, as well as navigable waters, and that the commerce
with passes over a bridge may be much greater than would ever be
transported on the water it obstructs.
Page 173 U. S. 293
It is for the municipal power to weigh the considerations
which belong to the subject, and to decide which shall be
preferred, and how far either shall be made subservient to the
other. The states have always exercised this power, and, from
the nature and objects of the two systems of government, they must
always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in all cases, to
the paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the
states shall be exerted within the sphere of the commercial power
which belongs to the nation."
So, in
Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S.
459,
95 U. S. 464,
which was a case where obstructions -- piers and booms -- had been
placed under the authority of the State of Wisconsin in the
Chippewa River, one of the navigable waters of the United States,
it was said:
"There are within the State of Wisconsin and perhaps other
states many small streams navigable for a short distance from their
mouths in one of the great rivers of the country by steamboats, but
whose greatest value in water carriage is as outlets to saw logs,
sawed lumber, coal, salt, etc. In order to develop their greatest
utility in that regard, it is often essential that such structures
as dams, booms, piers, etc., should be used which are substantial
obstructions to general navigation, and more or less so to rafts
and barges. But to the legislature of the state may be most
appropriately confided the authority to authorize these structures
where their use will do more good than harm, and to impose such
regulations and limitations in their construction and use
as
will best reconcile and accommodate the interest of all concerned
in the matter. And since the doctrine we have deduced from the
cases recognizes the right of Congress to interfere and control the
matter whenever it may deem it necessary to do so, the exercise of
this limited power may all the more safely be confided to the local
legislatures."
The same principles were announced in
Escanaba Co. v.
Chicago, 107 U. S. 678,
107 U. S. 683.
That case involved the validity of a certain local ordinance
regulating the opening and closing of bridges over the Chicago
River within the limits of the City of Chicago. That ordinance
required the bridges to be closed at certain hours of the day so as
not to obstruct the passage over them of vast numbers of operatives
and other
Page 173 U. S. 294
people going to and from their respective places of business. It
was conceded that by the closing of the bridges at those hours,
vessels were obstructed in their use of the river. This Court in
that case said:
"The Chicago River and its branches must therefore be deemed
navigable waters of the United States, over which Congress, under
its commercial power, may exercise control to the extent necessary
to protect, preserve, and improve their free navigation. But the
states have full power to regulate, within their limits, matters of
internal police, including in that general designation whatever
will promote the peace, comfort,
convenience, and prosperity of
their people. This power embraces the construction of roads,
canals, and bridges, and the establishment of ferries, and it can
generally be exercised more wisely by the states than by a distant
authority. They are the first to see the importance of such means
of internal communication, and are more deeply concerned than
others in their wise management. Illinois is more immediately
affected by the bridges over the Chicago River and its branches
than any other state, and is more directly concerned for the
prosperity of the City of Chicago,
for the convenience and
comfort of its inhabitants, and the growth of its commerce.
And nowhere could the power to control the bridges in that city,
their construction, form, and strength, and the size of their
draws, and the manner and times of using them be better vested than
with the state, or the authorities of the city upon whom it has
devolved that duty. When its power is exercised so as to
unnecessarily obstruct the navigation of the river or its branches,
Congress may interfere and remove the obstruction. If the power of
the state and that of the federal government come in conflict, the
latter must control, and the former yield. This necessarily follows
from the position given by the Constitution to legislation in
pursuance of it as the supreme law of the land. But until Congress
acts on the subject, the power of the state over bridges across its
navigable streams is plenary."
It was consequently adjudged that the city ordinance was not to
be deemed such a regulation of interstate commerce as, in the
absence of national legislation, should be deemed invalid.
Page 173 U. S. 295
In
Cardwell v. American Bridge Company, 113 U.
S. 205,
113 U. S. 208,
it was held that a statute of California authorizing a bridge
without a draw or opening for the passage of vessels to be
constructed over a navigable water of the United States within that
state was not, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to be
deemed repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution. The
Court, referring to prior cases, said:
"In these cases, the control of Congress over navigable waters
within the states so as to preserve their free navigation under the
commercial clause of the Constitution, the power of the states
within which they lie to authorize the construction of bridges over
them until Congress intervenes and supersedes their authority, and
the right of private parties to interfere with their construction
or continuance have been fully considered, and we are entirely
satisfied with the soundness of the conclusions reached. They
recognize the full power of the states to regulate within their
limits matters of internal police, which embraces, among other
things, the construction, repair, and maintenance of roads and
bridges and the establishment of ferries; that the states are more
likely to appreciate the importance of these means of internal
communication, and to provide for their proper management, than a
government at a distance, and that, as to bridges over navigable
streams, their power is subordinate to that of Congress, as an act
of the latter body is, by the Constitution, made the supreme law of
the land; but that, until Congress acts on the subject, their power
is plenary. When Congress acts directly with reference to the
bridges authorized by the state, its will must control so far as
may be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams."
The doctrines of this case were reaffirmed in
Huse v.
Glover, 119 U. S. 543.
In
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U.
S. 650,
162 U. S. 662,
the question was presented whether a state enactment requiring
telegraph companies with lines of wires wholly or partly within the
state to receive telegrams, and, on payment of the charges thereon,
to deliver them with due diligence was not a regulation of
interstate commerce when applied to interstate telegrams. We held
that such enactments did not in any
Page 173 U. S. 296
just sense regulate interstate commerce. It was said in that
case:
"While it is vitally important that commerce between the states
should be unembarrassed by vexatious state regulations regarding
it, yet, on the other hand, there are many occasions where the
police power of the state can be properly exercised to ensure a
faithful and prompt performance of duty within the limits of the
state upon the part of those who are engaged in interstate
commerce. We think the statute in question is one of that class,
and, in the absence of any legislation by Congress, the statute is
a valid exercise of the power of the state over the subject."
So, in
Richmond & Alleghany Railroad v. Patterson
Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311,
169 U. S. 315,
it was adjudged that a statute of Virginia defining the obligation
of carriers who accepted for transportation anything directed to
points of destination beyond the termini of their own lines or
routes was not, in its application to interstate business, a
regulation of interstate commerce within the meaning of the
Constitution. This Court said:
"Of course, in a latitudinarian sense, any restriction as to the
evidence of a contract relating to interstate commerce may be said
to be a limitation on the contract itself. But this remote effect,
resulting from the lawful exercise by a state of its power to
determine the form in which contracts may be proven, does not
amount to a regulation of interstate commerce."
And the Court cited in support of its conclusion the case of
Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway v. Solan, 169 U.
S. 133,
169 U. S. 137,
which involved the validity of state regulations as to the
liability of carriers of passengers, and in which it was said:
"They are not in themselves regulations of interstate commerce,
although they control in some degree the conduct and liability of
those engaged in such commerce. So long as Congress has not
legislated upon the particular subject, they are rather to be
regarded as legislation in aid of such commerce, and as a rightful
exercise of the police power of the state to regulate the relative
rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its
limits."
Now it is evident that these cases had no reference to the
health, morals, or safety of the people of the state, but only
Page 173 U. S. 297
to the public convenience. They recognized the fundamental
principle that outside of the field directly occupied by the
general government under the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, all questions arising within a state that relate to
its internal order or that involve the public convenience or the
general good are primarily for the determination of the state, and
that its legislative enactments relating to those subjects and
which are not inconsistent with the state constitution are to be
respected and enforced in the courts of the Union if they do not by
their operation directly entrench upon the authority of the United
States or violate some right protected by the national
Constitution. The power here referred to is-to use the words of
Chief Justice Shaw -- the power
"to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to
be or the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of the subjects
of the same."
Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85. Mr. Cooley well
said:
"It cannot be doubted that there is ample power in the
legislative department of the state to adopt all necessary
legislation for the purpose of enforcing the obligations of railway
companies as carriers of persons and goods to accommodate the
public impartially, and to make every reasonable provision for
carrying with safety and expedition."
Cooley's Const.Lim. (6th ed.) p. 715. It may be that such
legislation is not within the "police power" of a state, as those
words have been sometimes, although inaccurately, used. But in our
opinion the power, whether called "police," "governmental," or
"legislative," exists in each state, by appropriate enactments not
forbidden by its own constitution or by the Constitution of the
United States, to regulate the relative rights and duties of all
persons and corporations within its jurisdiction, and therefore to
provide for the public convenience and the public good. This power
in the states is entirely distinct from any power granted to the
general government, although, when exercised, it may sometimes
reach subjects over which national legislation can be
constitutionally extended. When Congress acts with reference
Page 173 U. S. 298
to a matter confided to it by the Constitution, then its
statutes displace all conflicting local regulations touching that
matter, although such regulations may have been established in
pursuance of a power not surrendered by the states to the general
government.
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 210;
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227,
63 U. S. 243;
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Haber,
169 U. S. 613,
169 U. S.
626.
It is not contended that the statute in question is repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States when applied to railroad
trains carrying passengers between points within the State of Ohio.
But the contention is that to require railroad companies, even
those organized under the laws of Ohio, to stop their trains or any
of them carrying interstate passengers at a particular place or
places in the state for a reasonable time, so directly affects
commerce among the states as to bring the statute, whether Congress
has acted or not on the same subject, into conflict with the grant
in the Constitution of power to regulate such commerce. That such a
regulation may be in itself reasonable and may promote the public
convenience or subserve the general welfare is, according to the
argument made before us, of no consequence whatever, for, it is
said, a state regulation which to any extent or for a limited time
only interrupts the absolute continuous freedom of interstate
commerce is forbidden by the Constitution although Congress has not
legislated upon the particular subject covered by the state
enactment. If these broad propositions are approved, it will be
difficult to sustain the numerous judgments of this Court upholding
local regulations which in some degree or only incidentally
affected commerce among the states, but which were adjudged not to
be in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, but within the
police powers of the states and to be respected so long as Congress
did not itself cover the subject by legislation.
Cooley v.
Philadelphia, 12 How. 299,
53 U. S. 320;
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99,
93 U. S. 104;
Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455,
118 U. S. 463;
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465;
Nashville, Chattanooga &c. Railway v. Alabama,
128 U. S. 96,
128 U. S. 100;
Hennington v. Georgia, above cited;
Missouri, Kansas
& Texas Railway v. Haber, above cited, and
N.Y,
Page 173 U. S. 299
N.H. & Hartford Railroad v. New York, 165 U.
S. 628,
165 U. S.
631-632, were all cases involving state regulations more
or less affecting interstate or foreign commerce, but which were
sustained upon the ground that they were not directed against nor
were direct burdens upon interstate or foreign commerce, and having
been enacted only to protect the public safety, the public health,
or the public morals, and having a real, substantial relation to
the public ends intended to be accomplished thereby, were not to be
deemed absolutely forbidden because of the mere grant of power to
Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, but to be
regarded as only incidentally affecting such commerce, and valid
until superseded by legislation of Congress on the same
subject.
In the case last cited --
N.Y., N.H. & Hartford Railroad
v. New York -- the question was as to the validity, when
applied to interstate railroad trains, of a statute of New York
forbidding the heating of passenger cars in a particular mode. This
Court said:
"According to numerous decisions of this Court sustaining the
validity of state regulations enacted under the police powers of
the state, and which incidentally affected commerce among the
states and with foreign nations, it was clearly competent for the
State of New York, in the absence of national legislation covering
the subject, to forbid, under penalties, the heating of passenger
cars in that state by stoves or furnaces kept inside the cars of
suspended therefrom, although such cars may be employed in
interstate commerce. While the laws of the states must yield to
acts of Congress passed in execution of the powers conferred upon
it by the Constitution,
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 211, the mere grant to
Congress of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the states did not, of itself and without legislation by
Congress, impair the authority of the states to establish such
reasonable regulations as were appropriate for the protection of
the health, the lives, and the safety of their people. The statute
in question had for its object to protect all persons traveling in
the State of New York on passenger cars moved by the agency of
steam against the perils attending a particular mode of heating
such cars. . . .
Page 173 U. S. 300
The statute in question is not directed against interstate
commerce. Nor is it, within the necessary meaning of the
Constitution, a regulation of commerce, although it controls in
some degree the conduct of those engaged in such commerce. So far
as it may affect interstate commerce, it is to be regarded as
legislation in aid of commerce, and enacted under the power
remaining with the state to regulate the relative rights and duties
of all persons and corporations within its limits. Until displaced
by such national legislation as Congress may rightfully establish
under its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several states, the validity of the statute, so far as the
commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States is
concerned, cannot be questioned."
Consistently with these doctrines, it cannot be adjudged that
the Ohio statute is unconstitutional. The power of the state by
appropriate legislation to provide for the public convenience
stands upon the same ground precisely as its power by appropriate
legislation to protect the public health, the public morals, or the
public safety. Whether legislation of either kind is inconsistent
with any power granted to the general government is to be
determined by the same rules.
In what has been said, we have assumed that the statute is not
in itself unreasonable -- that is, it has appropriate relation to
the public convenience, does not go beyond the necessities of the
case, and is not directed against interstate commerce. In
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465,
95 U. S. 473,
reference was made to some decisions of state courts in relation to
statutes prohibiting the introduction into a state of cattle having
infectious diseases, and in which it was contended that it was for
the legislature, and not for the courts, to determine whether such
legislation went beyond the danger to be apprehended, and was
therefore something more than the exertion of the police power.
This Court said that it could not concur in that view; that, as the
police power of a state cannot obstruct either foreign or
interstate commerce "beyond the necessity for its exercise," it was
the duty of the courts to guard vigilantly against "needless
intrusion" upon the field
Page 173 U. S. 301
committed by the Constitution to Congress. As the cases above
cited show, and as appears from other cases, the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a state enactment is always an element in the
general inquiry by the court whether such legislation encroaches
upon national authority or is to be deemed a legitimate exertion of
the power of the state to protect the public interests or promote
the public convenience.
In our judgment, the assumption that the statute of Ohio was not
directed against interstate commerce, but is a reasonable provision
for the public convenience, is not unwarranted. The requirement
that a railroad company whose road is operated within the state
shall cause three each way of its regular trains carrying
passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at
any station, city, or village of 3,000 inhabitants for a time
sufficient to receive and let off passengers, so far from being
unreasonable, will greatly subserve the public convenience. The
statute does not stand in the way of the railroad company's running
as many trains as it may choose between Chicago and Buffalo without
stopping at intermediate points, or only at very large cities on
the route, if, in the contingency named in the statute, the
required number of trains stop at each place containing 3,000
inhabitants long enough to receive and let off passengers. It seems
from the evidence that the average time required to stop a train
and receive and let off passengers is only three minutes. Certainly
the State of Ohio did not endow the plaintiff in error with the
rights of a corporation for the purpose simply of subserving the
convenience of passengers traveling through the state between
points outside of its territory. "The question is no longer an open
one," this Court said in
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas
Railway, 135 U. S. 641,
135 U. S.
657,
"as to whether a railroad is a public highway, established
primarily for the convenience of the people, and to subserve public
ends, and therefore subject to governmental control and regulation.
It is because it is a public highway, and subject to such control,
that the corporation by which it is constructed and by which it is
to be maintained may be permitted, under legislative sanction, to
appropriate property
Page 173 U. S. 302
for the purpose of a right of way upon making just compensation
to the owner in the mode prescribed by law."
In the construction and maintenance of such a highway under
public sanction, the corporation really performs a function of the
state.
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466,
169 U. S. 544.
The plaintiff in error accepted its charter subject necessarily to
the condition that it would conform to such reasonable regulations
as the state might from time to time establish that were not in
violation of the supreme law of the land. In the absence of
legislation by Congress, it would be going very far to hold that
such an enactment as the one before us was in itself a regulation
of interstate commerce. It was for the state to take into
consideration all the circumstances affecting passenger travel
within its limits, and, as far as practicable, make such
regulations as were just to all who might pass over the road in
question. It was entitled, of course, to provide for the
convenience of persons desiring to travel from one point to another
in the state on domestic trains. But it was not bound to ignore the
convenience of those who desired to travel from places in the state
to places beyond its limits, or the convenience of those outside of
the state who wished to come into it. Its statute is in aid of
interstate commerce of that character. It was not compelled to look
only to the convenience of those who desired to pass through the
state without stopping. Any other view of the relations between the
state and the corporation created by it would mean that the
directors of the corporation could manage its affairs solely with
reference to the interests of the stockholders and without taking
into consideration the interests of the general public. It would
mean not only that such directors were the exclusive judges of the
manner in which the corporation should discharge the duties imposed
upon it in the interest of the public, but that the corporation
could so regulate the running of its interstate trains as to build
up cities and towns at the ends of its line or at favored points,
and by that means destroy or retard the growth and prosperity of
those at intervening points. It would mean also that, beyond the
power of the state to prevent it, the defendant railway company
could run all its trains
Page 173 U. S. 303
through the state without stopping at any city within its
limits, however numerous its population, and could prevent the
people along its road within the state who desired to go beyond its
limits from using its interstate trains at all, or only at such
points as the company chose to designate. A principle that in its
application admits of such results cannot be sanctioned.
We perceive in the legislation of Ohio no basis for the
contention that the state has invaded the domain of national
authority or impaired any right secured by the national
Constitution. In the recent case of
Jones v. Brim,
165 U. S. 180,
165 U. S. 182,
it was adjudged that embraced within the police powers of a state
was the establishment, maintenance, and control of public highways,
and that under such powers, reasonable regulations incident to the
right to establish and maintain such highways could be established
by the state. And the State of Ohio, by the statute in question,
has done nothing more than to so regulate the use of a public
highway established and maintained under its authority as will
reasonably promote the public convenience. It has not unreasonably
obstructed the freedom of commerce among the states. Its
regulations apply equally to domestic and interstate railroads. Its
statute is not directed against interstate commerce, but only
incidentally affects it. It has only forbidden one of its own
corporations from discriminating unjustly against a large part of
the public for whose convenience that corporation was created and
invested with authority to maintain a public highway within the
limits of the state.
It has been suggested that the conclusion reached by us is not
in accord with
Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S.
485,
95 U. S. 488,
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois,
118 U. S. 556,
and
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,
163 U. S. 142,
163 U. S.
153-154, in each of which cases certain state enactments
were adjudged to be inconsistent with the grant of power to
Congress to regulate commerce among the states.
In
Hall v. De Cuir, a statute of Louisiana relating to
carriers of passengers within that state and which prohibited any
discrimination against passengers on account of race or color
was
Page 173 U. S. 304
held -- looking at its necessary operation -- to be a regulation
of and a direct burden on commerce among the states, and therefore
unconstitutional. The defendant, who was sued for damages on
account of an alleged violation of that statute, was the master and
owner of a steamboat enrolled and licensed under the laws of the
United States for the coasting trade and plying as a regular packet
for the transportation of freight and passengers between New
Orleans, Louisiana, and Vicksburg, Mississippi, touching at the
intermediate landings both within and without Louisiana as occasion
required. He insisted that it was void as to him because it
directly regulated or burdened interstate business. The Court
distinctly recognized the principle upon which we proceed in the
present case -- that state legislation relating to commerce is not
to be deemed a regulation of interstate commerce simply because it
may to some extent or under some circumstances affect such
commerce. But, speaking by Chief Justice Waite, it said:
"We think it may be safely said that state legislation which
seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or to
interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the
exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration,
in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the
business through the local instruments to be employed after coming
within the state, but directly upon the business as it comes into
the state from without or goes out from within. While it purports
only to control the carrier when engaged within the state, it must
necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management
of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of
passengers taken up and put down within the state, or taken up
within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or
less degree those taken up without and brought within, and
sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the
cabin set apart for the use of whites without the state must, when
the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with
such colored persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is
enforced. It was to meet just such a case that the commercial
clause in the Constitution was adopted. The
Page 173 U. S. 305
River Mississippi passes through or along the borders of ten
different states, and its tributaries reach many more. . . . No
carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to
himself or comfort to those employing him if on one side of a state
line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to
occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate.
Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from
one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business,
and to secure it, Congress, which is untrammeled by state lines,
has been invested with the exclusive legislative power of
determining what such regulations shall be. If this statute can be
enforced against those engaged in interstate commerce, it may be as
well against those engaged in foreign, and the master of a ship
clearing from New Orleans for Liverpool, having passengers on
board, would be compelled to carry all, white and colored, in the
same cabin during his passage down the river or be subject to an
action for damages, 'exemplary as well as actual,' by anyone who
felt himself aggrieved because he had been excluded on account of
his color."
The import of that decision is that in the absence of
legislation by Congress, a state enactment may so directly and
materially burden interstate commerce as to be in itself a
regulation of such commerce. We cannot perceive that there is any
conflict between the decision in that case and that now made. The
Louisiana statute, as interpreted by the Court, embraced every
passenger carrier coming into the state. The Ohio statute does not
interfere at all with the management of the defendant's trains
outside of the state, nor does it apply to all its trains coming
into the state. It relates only to the stopping of a given number
of its trains within the state at certain points, and then only
long enough to receive and let off passengers. It so manifestly
subserves the public convenience, and is, in itself, so just and
reasonable, as wholly to preclude the idea that it was, as the
Louisiana statute was declared to be, a direct burden upon
interstate commerce or a direct interference with its freedom.
The judgment in
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v.
Illinois is entirely consistent with the views herein
expressed.
Page 173 U. S. 306
A statute of Illinois was construed by the Supreme Court of that
state as prescribing rates not simply for railroad transportation
beginning and ending within Illinois, but for transportation
between points in Illinois and points in other states under
contracts for continuous service covering the entire route through
several states. Referring to the principle contained in the
statute, this Court held that if restricted to transportation
beginning and ending within the limits of the state, it might be
very just and equitable, but that it could not be applied to
transportation through an entire series of states without imposing
a direct burden upon interstate commerce forbidden by the
Constitution. In the case before us, there is no attempt upon the
part of Ohio to regulate the movement of the defendant company's
interstate trains throughout the whole route traversed by them. It
applies only to the movement of trains while within the state, and
to the extent simply of requiring a given number, if so many are
daily run, to stop at certain places long enough to receive and let
off passengers.
Nor is
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois
inconsistent with the views we have expressed. In that case, a
statute of Illinois was held in certain particulars to be
unconstitutional (although the legislation of Congress did not
cover the subject) as directly and unnecessarily burdening
interstate commerce. The Court said:
"The effect of the statute of Illinois, as construed and applied
by the supreme court of the state, is to require a fast mail train
carrying interstate passengers and the United States mail from
Chicago in the State of Illinois to places south of the Ohio River
over an interstate highway established by authority of Congress to
delay the transportation of such passengers and mails by turning
aside from the direct interstate route and running to a station
three miles and a half away from a point on that route, and back
again to the same point, and thus traveling seven miles which form
no part of its course, before proceeding on its way, and to do this
for the purpose of discharging and receiving passengers at that
station, for the interstate travel to and from which, as is
admitted in this case, the railway company furnishes
Page 173 U. S. 307
other and ample accommodation. This Court is unanimously of
opinion that this requirement is an unconstitutional hindrance and
obstruction of interstate commerce, and of the passage of the mails
of the United States."
Again:
"It may well be, as held by the courts of Illinois, that the
arrangement made by the company with the Post Office Department of
the United States cannot have the effect of abrogating a reasonable
police regulation of the state. But a statute of the state which
unnecessarily interferes with the speedy and uninterrupted carriage
of the mails of the United States cannot be considered as a
reasonable police regulation."
The statute before us does not require the defendant company to
turn any of its trains from their direct interstate route. Besides,
it is clear that the particular question now presented was not
involved in
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, for it
is stated in the Court's opinion that
"the question whether a statute which merely required interstate
railroad trains, without going out of their course, to stop at
county seats would be within the constitutional power of the state
is not presented, and cannot be decided, upon this record."
The above extracts show the full scope of that decision. Any
doubt upon the point is removed by the reference made to that case
in
Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427,
166 U. S.
431.
It has been suggested also that the statute of Ohio is
inconsistent with section 5258 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, authorizing every railroad company in the United
States operated by steam, its successors and assigns,
"to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries
all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight, and
property on their way from any state to another state, and to
receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other
states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the
same to the place of destination."
In
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Haber,
169 U. S. 613,
169 U. S. 638,
above cited, it was held that the authority given by that statute
to railroad companies to carry "freight and property" over their
respective roads from one state to another state did not authorize
a railroad company to carry into a state
Page 173 U. S. 308
cattle known or which by due diligence might be known to be in
such condition as to impart or communicate disease to the domestic
cattle of such state, and that a statute of Kansas prescribing as a
rule of civil conduct that a person or corporation should not bring
into that state cattle known or which by proper diligence could be
known to be capable of communicating disease to domestic cattle
could not be regarded as beyond the necessities of the case, nor as
interfering with any right intended to be given or recognized by
section 5258 of the Revised Statutes. And we adjudge that the above
statutory provision was not intended to interfere with the
authority of the states to enact such regulations, with respect at
least to a railroad corporation of its own creation, as were not
directed against interstate commerce, but which only incidentally
or remotely affected such commerce and were not in themselves
regulations of interstate commerce, but were designed reasonably to
subserve the convenience of the public.
Imaginary cases are put for the purpose of showing what might be
done by the state that would seriously interfere with or
discriminate against interstate commerce if the statute in question
be upheld as consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
Without stopping to consider whether the illustrations referred to
are apposite to the present inquiry, it is sufficient to say that
it is always easy to suggest extreme cases for the application of
any principle embodied in a judicial opinion. Our present judgment
has reference only to the case before us, and when other cases
arise in which local statutes are alleged not to be legitimate
exertions of the police powers of the state, but to infringe upon
national authority, it can then be determined whether they are to
be controlled by the decision now rendered. It would be
impracticable as well as unwise to attempt to lay down any rule
that would govern every conceivable case that might be suggested by
ingenious minds.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Ohio is
Affirmed.
Page 173 U. S. 309
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS filed the following dissenting opinion:
The Constitution of the United States, in its eighth section,
confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes and
to establish post offices and post roads.
In pursuance of this power, Congress, on June 15, 1866, enacted
that
"every railroad company in the United States whose road is
operated by steam, its successors and assigns, is hereby authorized
to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges and ferries all
passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight and
property on their way from any state to another state, and to
receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other
states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the
same to the place of destination."
Rev.Stat. ยง 5258.
By the Act of February 4, 1887, entitled "An Act to Regulate
Commerce," 24 Stat. 379, Congress created the Interstate Commerce
Commission and enacted that the provisions of that act should
"apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the
transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or
partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under a
common control, management or arrangement, for a continuous
carriage or shipment from one state or territory of the United
States, or the District of Columbia, to any other state or
territory of the United States . . . ,"
and that it should be unlawful for any common carrier subject to
the provisions of the act to enter into any combination, contract,
or agreement, expressed or implied, to prevent, by change of time
schedules, carriage in different cars, or by other means or
devices, the carriage of freight from being continuous from the
place of shipment to the place of destination.
It was said by this Court in
California v. Central Pacific
Railroad, 127 U. S. 39,
that:
"It can to at the present day be doubted that Congress, under
the power to regulate commerce among the several states as well as
to provide for
Page 173 U. S. 310
postal accommodations and military exigencies, had authority to
pass such laws. The power to construct or to authorize individuals
or corporations to construct national highways and bridges from
state to state is essential to the complete control and regulation
of interstate commerce. Without authority in Congress to establish
and maintain such highways and bridges, it would be without
authority to regulate one of the most important adjuncts of
commerce. This power in former times was exerted to a very limited
extent, the Cumberland or National Road being the most notable
instance. Its exertion was but little called for, as commerce was
then mostly conducted by water, and many of our statesmen
entertained doubts as to the existence of the power to establish
ways of communication by land. But since, in consequence of the
expansion of the country, the multiplication of its products, and
the invention of railroads and locomotion by steam, land
transportation has so vastly increased, a sounder consideration of
the subject has prevailed and led to the conclusion that Congress
has plenary power over the whole subject. Of course the authority
of Congress over the territories of the United States and its power
to grant franchises exercisable therein are, and ever have been,
undoubted. But the wider power was very freely exercised, and much
to the general satisfaction, in the creation of the vast system of
railroads connecting the East with the Pacific, traversing states
as well as territories, and employing the agency of state as well
as federal corporations."
In the case of
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific
Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.
S. 184, the validity of the Act of February 4, 1887, was
sustained, and its provisions were held applicable even to a
railroad company whose entire road was within the limits of the
state of its creation when, by agreeing to receive goods by virtue
of foreign through bills of lading and to participate in through
rates and charges, it became part of a continuous line of
transportation.
By an Act approved February 23, 1869, the State of Louisiana
forbade common carriers of passengers to make discrimination
Page 173 U. S. 311
on account of race or color. A person of color took passage upon
a steamboat plying between New Orleans and Vicksburg in the State
of Mississippi, and was carried from New Orleans to her place of
destination within Louisiana, and being refused accommodations, on
account of her color, in the cabin specially set apart for white
persons, brought an action in the District Court for the Parish of
New Orleans under the provisions of the act above referred to. By
way of defense, it was insisted that the statute was void in
respect to the matter complained of because, as to the business of
the steamboat, it was an attempt to regulate commerce between the
states, and therefore in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States. The state court held that the statute was valid, and
the case was brought to this Court, where the judgment of the state
court was reversed. The reasoning of the Court is so closely
applicable to the case before us that we quote a considerable part
of the opinion:
"We think it may be safely said that state legislation which
seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce or to
interfere directly with its freedom does encroach upon the
exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration,
in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the
business through the local instruments to be employed after coming
within the state, but directly upon the business as it come into
the state from without or goes out from within. While it purports
only to control the carrier when engaged within the state, it must
necessarily influence his conduct, to some extent, in the
management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His
disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the state,
or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a
greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within,
and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in
the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the state must,
when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin
with such colored persons as may come on board afterwards if the
law is enforced. "
Page 173 U. S. 312
"It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in
the Constitution was adopted. The River Mississippi passes through
or along the borders of ten different states, and its tributaries
reach many more. The commerce upon these waters is immense, and its
regulation clearly a matter of national concern. If each state was
at liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while within its
jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could not but be
productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardships. Each
state could provide for its own passengers, and regulate the
transportation of its own freight, regardless of the interests of
others. Nay, more, it could prescribe rules by which the carrier
must be governed within the state in respect to passengers and
property brought from without. On one side of the river or its
tributaries, he might be required to observe one set of rules, and
on the other, another. Commerce cannot flourish in the midst of
such embarrassments. No carrier of passengers can conduct his
business with satisfaction to himself or comfort to those employing
him if on one side of a state line his passengers, both white and
colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the
other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he
is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a
necessity in his business, and, to secure, it, Congress, which is
untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive
legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be. If
this statute can be enforced against those engaged in interstate
commerce, it may as well be against those engaged in foreign, and
the master of a ship clearing from New Orleans for Liverpool,
having passengers on board, would be compelled to carry all (white
and colored) in the same cabin during his passage down the river or
be subject to an action for damages, exemplary as well as actual,
by anyone who felt himself aggrieved because he had been excluded
on account of his color."
"This power of regulation may be exercised without legislation
as well as with it. By refraining from action, Congress in effect
adopts as its own regulations those which the common law, or the
civil law where that prevails, has provided
Page 173 U. S. 313
for the government of each business, and those which the states,
in the regulation of their domestic concerns, have established
affecting commerce, but not regulating it, within the meaning of
the Constitution. In fact, Congressional legislation is only
necessary to cure defects in existing laws as they are discovered,
and to adapt such laws to new developments of trade. As was said by
Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the Court in
Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U. S. 282: 'Inaction by
Congress is equivalent to a declaration that interstate commerce
shall remain free and untrammeled.' Applying that principle to the
circumstances of this case, Congressional inaction left the captain
of the steamboat to adopt such reasonable rules and regulations for
the disposition of passengers upon his boat, while pursuing her
voyage within Louisiana or without, as seemed to him most for the
interest of all concerned. The statute under which this suit is
brought, as construed by the state court, seeks to take away from
him that power so long as he is within Louisiana, and while
recognizing to the fullest extent the principle which sustains a
statute, unless its unconstitutionality is clearly established, we
think this statute, to the extent that it requires those engaged in
the transportation of passengers among the states to carry colored
passengers in Louisiana in the same cabin with whites, is
unconstitutional and void. If the public good requires such
legislation, it must come from Congress, and not from the
states."
Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485.
I am not able to think that this decision is satisfactorily
disposed of in the principal opinion by citing it and then
dismissing it with the observation that it is not perceived that
there is any conflict between it and that now made.
The State of Illinois enacted that if any railroad corporation
shall charge, collect, or receive for the transportation of any
passenger or freight of any description upon its railroad for any
distance within the state the same or a greater amount of toll or
compensation than is at the same time charged, collected, or
received for the transportation in the same direction of any
passenger or like quantity of freight of the same class over a
greater distance of the same road, all
Page 173 U. S. 314
such discriminating rates, charges, collections, or receipts,
whether made directly or by the means of rebate, drawback, or other
shift or evasion, shall be deemed and taken against any such
railroad company as
prima facie evidence of unjust
discrimination prohibited by the provisions of the act. The act
further provided a penalty of not over $5,000, and also that the
party aggrieved should have a right to recover three times the
amount of damages sustained, with costs and attorney's fees.
Rev.Stat. Ill. c. 114, ยง 126.
An action to recover penalties under this statute was brought by
Illinois against the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company,
an Illinois corporation, in which the allegations were that the
railroad company had charged Elder & McKinney for transporting
goods from Peoria, in the State of Illinois, to New York City at
the rate of fifteen cents per one hundred pounds for a carload;
that, on the same day, the railroad company had charged one Bailey
for transporting similar goods from Gilman to New York City at the
rate of twenty-five cents per one hundred pounds per car load; that
the car load for Elder & McKinney was carried eighty-six miles
further in the State of Illinois than the other car load of the
same weight; that this freight being of the same class in both
instances, and over the same road, except as to the difference in
the distance, made a discrimination forbidden by the statute,
whether the charge was regarded for the whole distance from the
terminal point in Illinois to New York City or the proportionate
charge for the haul within the State of Illinois. Judgment went
against the company in the courts of the State of Illinois, and the
case was brought to this Court.
It was here strenuously contended that in the absence of
congressional legislation, a state legislature has the power to
regulate the charges made by the railroads of the state for
transporting goods and passengers to and from places within the
state when such goods and passengers are brought from or carried to
points without the state and are therefore in the course of
transportation from any state or to another state. And of that view
were several Justices of this Court who, in the opinion filed on
their behalf, cited the very cases
Page 173 U. S. 315
that are cited and relied on in the majority opinion in the
present case.
But the Court did not so hold,
Wabash, St. Louis &
Pacific Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557,
118 U. S.
572,and its reasoning is so plainly applicable to the
question now before us that it may well be quoted at some
length.
After having reviewed some of the previous cases, and having
quoted those passages in the opinion of the court in
Hall v. Du
Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, which
have hereinbefore been quoted, Mr. Justice Miller, giving the
opinion of the Court, proceeded as follows:
"The applicability of this language to the case now under
consideration, of a continuous transportation of goods from New
York to Central Illinois, or from the latter to New York, is
obvious, and it is not easy to see how any distinction can be made.
Whatever may be the instrumentalities by which this transportation
from the one point to the other is effected, it is but one voyage
-- as much so as that of the steamboat on the Mississippi River. It
is not the railroads themselves that are regulated by this act of
the Illinois legislature so much as the charge for transportation,
and, in the language just cited, if each one of the states through
whose territories these goods are transported can fix its own rules
for prices, for modes of transit, for terms and modes of delivery,
and all the other incidents of transportation to which the word
'regulation' can be applied, it is readily seen that the
embarrassments upon interstate transportation, as an element of
interstate commerce, might be too oppressive to be submitted to.
'It was,' in the language of the Court cited above, 'to meet just
such a case that the commerce clause of the Constitution was
adopted.'"
"It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the right of
continuous transportation from one end of the country to the other
is essential in modern times to that freedom of commerce from the
restraints which the states might choose to impose upon it, that
the commerce clause was intended to secure. This clause, giving to
Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states and with
foreign nations, as this Court has said before, was among the most
important of the
Page 173 U. S. 316
subjects which prompted the formation of the Constitution.
Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 574;
Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 446. And it would be a very feeble and almost useless
provision, but poorly adapted to secure the entire freedom of
commerce among the states which was deemed essential to a more
perfect union by the framers of the Constitution, if at every stage
of the transportation of goods and chattels through the country the
state within whose limits a part of this transportation must be
done could impose regulations concerning the price, compensation,
or taxation, or any other restrictive regulation interfering with
and seriously embarrassing this commerce."
"The argument on this subject can never be better stated than it
is by Chief Justice Marshall in
Gibbons v. Ogden. He there
demonstrates that commerce among the states, like commerce with
foreign nations, is necessarily a commerce which crosses state
lines, and extends into the states, and the power of Congress to
regulate it exists wherever that commerce is found. Speaking of
navigation as an element of commerce -- which it is only as a means
of transportation, now largely superseded by railroads -- he
says:"
"The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation within the
limits of every state in the Union, so far as that navigation may
be in any manner connected with commerce with foreign nations or
among the several states or with the Indian tribes. It may, of
consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New York, and act upon
the very waters -- the Hudson River -- to which the prohibition now
under consideration applies."
"So the same power may pass the line of the State of Illinois,
and act upon its restriction upon the right of transportation
extending over several states, including that one."
"In the case of
Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S.
460, the Court held that a telegraph company occupies
the same relation to commerce, as a carrier of messages, that a
railroad company does as a carrier of goods, and that both
companies are instruments of commerce, and their business is
commerce itself. . . . In the case of
Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U.S.
Page 173 U. S. 317
275, it was said:"
"It will not be denied that that portion of commerce with
foreign nations and between the states which consists in the
transportation and exchange of commodities is of national
importance, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation. The
very object of investing this power in the general government was
to insure this uniformity against discriminating state
legislation."
"And in
County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S.
702, the same idea is very clearly stated in the
following language:"
"Commerce with foreign countries and among the states, strictly
considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these
terms navigation, and the transportation and transit of persons and
property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of
commodities. For the regulation of commerce as thus defined there
can be only one system of rules, applicable alike to the whole
country, and the authority which can act for the whole country can
alone adopt such a system. Action upon it by separate states is
not, therefore, permissible. Language affirming the exclusiveness
of the grant of power over commerce, as thus defined, may not be
inaccurate, when it would be so if applied to legislation upon
subjects which are merely auxiliary to commerce. . . ."
"We must therefore hold that it is not, and never has been, the
deliberate opinion of a majority of this Court that the statute of
a state which attempts to regulate the fares and charges by
railroad companies within its limits for a transportation which
constitutes a part of commerce among the states is a valid
law."
"Let us see precisely what is the degree of interference with
the transportation of property or person from one state to another
which this statute proposes. A citizen of New York has goods which
he desires to have transported by the railroad companies from that
city to the interior of the State of Illinois. A continuous line of
rail, over which a car loaded with these goods can be carried and
is carried habitually, connects the place of shipment with the
place of delivery. He undertakes to make a contract with a person
engaged in the carrying business at the end of this route from
whence the goods are to start, and he is told by the carrier,"
"I am free to make a fair
Page 173 U. S. 318
and reasonable contract for this carriage to the line of the
State of Illinois, but when the car which carries these goods is to
cross the line of that state, pursuing at the same this continuous
track, I am met by a law of Illinois which forbids me to make a
free contract concerning this transportation within that state and
subjects me to certain rules by which I am to be governed as to the
charges which the same railroad company in Illinois may make, or
has made, with reference to other persons and other places of
delivery."
"So that while that carrier might be willing to carry these
goods from the City of New York to the City of Peoria at the rate
of fifteen cents per hundred pounds, he is not permitted to do so,
because the Illinois railroad company has already charged at the
rate of twenty-five cents per hundred pounds for carriage to
Gilman, in Illinois, which is eighty-six miles shorter than the
distance to Peoria."
"So, also, in the present case, the owner of corn, the principal
product of the country, desiring to transport it from Peoria, in
Illinois, to New York, finds a railroad company willing to do this
at the rate of fifteen cents per hundred pounds for a carload; but
he is compelled to pay at the rate of twenty-five cents per hundred
pounds because the railroad company has received from a person
residing at Gilman twenty-five cents per hundred pounds for the
transportation of a carload of the same class of freight over the
same line of road from Gilman to New York. Thus the result of the
statute of Illinois in its endeavor to prevent unjust
discrimination as construed by the supreme court of that state. The
effect of it is that whatever may be the rate of transportation per
mile charged by the railroad company from Gilman to Sheldon, a
distance of twenty-three miles, in which the loading and unloading
of the freight is the largest expense incurred by the railroad
company, the same rate per mile must be charged from Peoria to the
City of New York."
"The obvious injustice of such a rule as this, which railroad
companies are compelled by heavy penalties to conform to, in regard
to commerce among the states, when applied to transportation which
includes Illinois in a long line of carriage
Page 173 U. S. 319
through several states, shows the value of the constitutional
provision which confides the power of regulating interstate
commerce to the Congress of the United States, whose enlarged view
of the interests of all the states and of the railroads concerned
betters fits it to establish just and equitable rates."
"Of the justice or propriety of the principle which lies at the
foundation of the Illinois statute it is not the province of this
Court to speak. As restricted to a transportation which begins and
ends within the limits of the state, it may be very just and
equitable, and it certainly is the province of the state
legislature to determine that question. But when it is attempted to
apply to transportation through an entire series of states a
principle of this kind, and each one of the states shall attempt to
establish its own rates of transportation, its own methods to
prevent discrimination in rates, or to permit it, the deleterious
influence upon the freedom of commerce among the states and upon
the transit of goods through those states cannot be overestimated.
That this species of regulation is one which must be, if
established at all, of a general and national character, and cannot
be safely and wisely remitted to local rules and local regulations,
we think is clear from what has already been said. And if it be a
regulation of commerce, as the Illinois court concedes it is and as
the Illinois court concedes it to be, it must be of that national
character, and the regulation can only appropriately exist by
general rules and principles, which demand that it should be done
by the Congress of the United States under the commerce clause of
the Constitution."
This case, so recent and so elaborately considered, has not
received adequate attention in the opinion of the Court in the
present case.
The Legislature of Illinois, by the statute of February 10,
1851, incorporated the Illinois Central Railroad Company and
empowered it to construct and maintain a railroad with one or more
tracks from the southern terminus of the Illinois & Michigan
Canal to a point at the City of Cairo, with the same to the City of
Chicago, on Lake Michigan, and also a branch
Page 173 U. S. 320
via the City of Galena to a point on the Mississippi River
opposite the Town of Dubuque, in the State of Iowa. The Chicago,
St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad Company, which was a
consolidated company formed under the Legislatures of the states of
Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky, whose line
extended from New Orleans to the Ohio River, built a railroad
bridge across the Ohio River to low water mark on the Illinois
side, to which the jurisdiction of the State of Kentucky extended.
The north end of this bridge was at a part of Cairo about two miles
north of the station of the Illinois Central Railroad Company in
that city, and the peculiar conformation of the land and water made
it impracticable to put the bridge nearer the junction of the Ohio
and Mississippi Rivers. By this bridge, the road of the Illinois
Central Railroad Company was thereby connected with that of the
Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad Company. Thereafter the
Illinois Central Railroad Company put on a daily fast-mail train,
to run from Chicago to New Orleans carrying passengers as well as
the United States mail, not going to or stopping at its station in
Cairo, but local trains adequate to afford accommodations for
passengers to or from Cairo were run daily on that part of the
railroad between the bridge junction and Cairo. By a subsequent act
of 1889 it was enacted by the Legislature of Illinois that
"every railroad corporation shall cause its passenger trains to
stop upon its arrival at each station, advertised by such
corporation as a place for receiving and discharging passengers
upon and from such trains, a sufficient length of time to receive
and let off such passengers with safety:
provided all
regular passengers trains shall a stop a sufficient length of time
at the railroad station of county seats to receive and let off
passengers with safety."
In April, 1891, a petition was filed in the Circuit Court for
Alexander County in the State of Illinois, by the county attorney
in behalf of the state, alleging that the Illinois Central Railroad
Company ran its southbound fast-mail train through the City of
Cairo, two miles north of its station in that city, and over a
bridge across the station in that city, and over road with other
roads south of that river, without stopping
Page 173 U. S. 321
at its station in Cairo, and praying for a writ of mandamus to
compel it to cause all its passenger trains coming into Cairo to be
brought down to that station and there stopped a sufficient length
of time to receive and let off passengers with safety.
The railroad company contended that the statute did not require
its fast-mail train to be run to and stopped at its station in
Cairo, and that the statute was contrary to the Constitution of the
United States as interfering with interstate commerce and with the
carrying of the United States mail. The court granted the writ of
mandamus, and the railroad company appealed to the supreme court of
the state, which affirmed the judgment and held that the statute of
Illinois concerning the stoppage of fast-mail train obliged the
defendant to cause its fast-mail train to be taken into its station
at Cairo and be stopped there long enough to receive and let off
passengers with safety, and that statute, so construed, was not an
unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce or with the
carrying of the United States mails. The case was brought to this
Court, where the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois was
reversed in a unanimous opinion delivered by MR. JUSTICE GRAY.
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 163 U.
S. 142. After reciting several statutes of Illinois and
of Congress, particularly the Act of June 15, 1866, wherein
Congress, for the declared purpose of facilitating commerce among
the several states and the postal and military communications of
the United States, authorized every railroad company in the United
States whose road was operated by steam to carry over its road,
bridges, and ferries as well passengers and freight as government
mails, troops, and supplies, from one state to another, and to
connect, in any state authorizing it to do so, with roads of other
states, so as to form a continuous line of transportation, the
Court proceeded to say:
"The effect of the statute of Illinois, as construed and applied
by the supreme court of the state, is to require a fast-mail train,
carrying interstate passengers and the United States mails from
Chicago, in the State of Illinois, to places south of the Ohio
River over an interstate highway established
Page 173 U. S. 322
by authority of Congress, to delay the transportation of such
passengers and mail by turning aside from the direct interstate
route and running to a station three miles and a half away from a
point on that route, and back again to the same point, and thus
traveling seven miles which form no part of its course before
proceeding on its way, and to do this for the purpose of
discharging and receiving passengers at that station for the
interstate travel to and from which, as is admitted in this case,
the railroad company furnishes other and ample accommodation. This
Court is unanimously of opinion that this requirement is an
unconstitutional hindrance and obstruction of interstate commerce,
and of the passage of the mails of the United States. Upon the
state of facts presented by this record, the duties of the Illinois
Central Railroad Company were not confined to those which it owed
to the State of Illinois under the charter of the company and other
laws of the state, but included distinct duties imposed upon the
corporation by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
"The state may doubtless compel the railroad company to perform
the duty imposed by its charter of carrying passengers and goods
between its termini within the state. But so long, at least, as
that duty is adequately performed by the company, the state cannot,
under the guise of compelling its performance, interfere with the
performance of paramount duties to which the company has been
subjected by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
"The state may make reasonable regulations to secure the safety
of passengers, even on interstate trains, while within its borders.
But the state can do nothing which will directly burden or impede
the interstate traffic of the company or impair the usefulness of
its facilities for such traffic."
Beyond the bare allegation that the case of
Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois is not inconsistent with the views
expressed in the present case, no attempt is made to compare or
reconcile the principles involved in the two cases. It is indeed
said that the Ohio statute "does not require the defendant company
to turn any of its trains from their direct interstate route," and
the remark of the court in the
Illinois case is
Page 173 U. S. 323
cited in which it was said,
"The question whether a statute which merely required interstate
railroad trains, without going out of their course, to stop at
county seats would be within the constitutional power of the state
is not presented, and cannot be decided, upon this record."
Reference is also made to the case of
Gladson v.
Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, as
removing any doubt as to the scope of the decision in the
Illinois case.
But an examination of that case will show that no question was
presented or decided as to the power of a state to compel
interstate railroad trains to stop at all county seats through
which they might pass. On the contrary, the Court was careful to
say (distinguishing it from the
Illinois case),
"But in the case at bar, the train in question ran wholly within
the State of Minnesota, and could have stopped at the county seat
of Pine County without deviating from its course,"
and to point out that the statute of Minnesota expressly
provided that "
this act shall not apply to through railroad
trains entering this state from any other state, or to
transcontinental trains of any railroad."
On what, then, does the Court's opinion rely to distinguish the
Illinois case from the present case? Merely that the
through train in the one case was obliged to go out of its direct
route some three or four miles, while in the other the obligation
is to stop at towns through which the trains pass. But what was the
reason why this Court held that the Illinois statute was void as an
interference with interstate commerce? Was not the delay thus
caused the sole reason? And is there any difference between a delay
caused by having to go a few miles out of a direct course in a
single instance, and one caused by having to stop at a number of
unimportant towns? Probably the excursion to the Cairo station did
not detain the Illinois train more than half an hour, and it is
admitted in the present case that the number of villages in Ohio
through which the trains passed were thirteen, and that the average
time required to stop a train of cars and receive and leave off
passengers would be three minutes at each station, to say nothing
of the time expended in losing and in regaining headway. Besides
the delays thus caused, there would be many
Page 173 U. S. 324
inconveniences to the railroad companies and to the traveling
public occasioned by interfering with regulations made for the
comfort and safety of through passengers.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U.
S. 650, is cited by the Court as sustaining its present
position. But that was a case in which the legislation of the state
was of a nature that was in aid of the performance of the duty of
the company that would exist in the absence of any such statute,
and was in no wise obstructive of its duty as a telegraph company,
and the decision of this Court was expressly put upon that ground.
It was pointed out in the opinion that the legislation in question
could in no way affect the conduct of the company with regard to
the performance of its duties in other states, and that such
important particular distinguished the case from
Hall v. De
Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, and
from
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton,
122 U. S. 347.
Richmond & Alleghany Railroad v. Patterson Tobacco
Co., 169 U. S. 311, is
cited as adjudging that a statute of Virginia defining the
obligations of carriers who accept for transportation anything
directed to points of destination beyond the termini of their own
lines of routes was not, in its application to interstate business,
a regulation of interstate commerce within the meaning of the
Constitution. But the holding in that case simply was that the
statute in question did not attempt to substantially regulate or
control interstate shipments, but merely established a rule of
evidence, ordaining the character of proof by which a carrier may
show that, although it received goods for transportation beyond its
own line, nevertheless, by agreement, its liability was limited to
its own line; that the lawful exercise by a state of its power to
determine the form in which contracts may be proven does not amount
to a regulation of interstate commerce. The reasoning of the Court
went upon the assumption that if the statute was not merely a rule
of evidence, but an attempt to regulate interstate commerce, it
would have been void.
Reference is also made in the principal opinion to
Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Railway v. Haber, 169 U.
S. 613. There, an attack was made on the validity of
legislation of the State
Page 173 U. S. 325
of Kansas subjecting any person or persons who should bring into
that state any cattle liable or capable of communicating "Texas or
splenetic fever" to any domestic cattle of Kansas to a civil action
for damages. In such an action, it was contended on behalf of the
defendant that the Kansas statutes were an interference with the
freedom of interstate commerce, and also covered a field of action
actually occupied by Congressional legislation known as the "Animal
Industry Act." But it appeared that the Kansas act under which the
action was brought was passed in 1885 and amended in 1891, and that
Congress had previously invited the authorities of the states and
territories concerned to cooperate for the extinction of contagious
or communicable cattle diseases. Act of May 29, 1884, c. 60, 23
Stat. 31. And accordingly a majority of this Court held that the
statutory provisions or Kansas were not inconsistent with the
execution of the act of Congress, but constituted an exercise of
the cooperation desired. Otherwise the case would have fallen
within the ruling in
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S.
465, where a similar statute of the State of Missouri,
passed before the legislation of Congress and prohibiting the
bringing of Texas cattle into the State of Missouri between certain
times fixed by the statute, was held to be in conflict with the
commerce clause of the Constitution, and not a legitimate exercise
of the police power of the state.
The case of
Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.
S. 299, demands notice. In it was involved the validity
of what is known as the "Sunday Law" of Georgia. That statute
forbade the running in Georgia of railroad freight trains on the
Sabbath day. The Supreme Court of Georgia held the statute to be a
regulation of internal police, and not of commerce, and that it was
not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, even as
to freight trains passing through the state from and to adjacent
states and laden exclusively with freight received on board before
the trains entered Georgia, and consigned to points beyond its
limits.
It was shown in that case that it had been the policy of Georgia
from the earliest period of its history to forbid all persons,
under penalties, from using the Sabbath as a day of
Page 173 U. S. 326
labor and for pursuing their ordinary callings, and that the
legislation in question was enacted in the exercise of that policy.
It was said in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia, which
was brought to this Court for review, that
"with respect to the selection of the particular day in each
week which has been set apart by our statute as the rest day of the
people, religious views and feelings may have had a controlling
influence. We doubt not that they did have, and it is notable that
the same views and feelings had a very powerful influence in
dictating the policy of setting apart any day whatever as a day of
enforced rest."
And it was said in the opinion of this Court that
"in our opinion, there is nothing in the legislation in question
which suggests that it was enacted with the purpose to regulate
interstate commerce or with any other purpose than to prescribe a
rule of civil duty for all who on the Sabbath day are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the state."
If, as has often been said, Christianity is part of the common
law of the several states, and if the United States, in their
legislative and executive departments throughout the country, since
the foundation of the government, have recognized Sunday as a day
of rest and freedom from compulsory labor, then such a law as that
of Georgia, being based upon a public policy common to all the
states, might be sustained.
But if put upon the ground now declared in the opinion of the
court in the present case -- namely, as an exercise of the police
power of the state -- and as such paramount to the control of
Congress in administering the commerce clause of the Constitution,
then it is apparent, as I think, that the decision in
Hennington v. Georgia was wrong, and the judges dissenting
in that case were right.
For if, as a mere matter of local policy, one state may forbid
interstate trains from running on the Christian Sabbath, an
adjoining state may select the Jewish or Seventh-Day Sabbath as the
day exempt from business. Another state may choose to consecrate
another day of the week, in commemoration of the Latter-Day Saint
and Prophet who founded such state, as the proper day for cessation
from daily labor.
Page 173 U. S. 327
Or, what is more probable, one or more of the states may think
fit to declare that one day in seven is not a sufficient portion of
the time that should be exempted from labor, and establish two or
more days of rest. The destructive effect of such inconsistent and
diverse legislation upon interstate commerce carried on in trains
running throughout the entire country is too obvious to require
statement or illustration.
But whatever may be said of the decision in
Hennington v.
Georgia, it is, as I think, quite apparent that the Ohio
legislation now under consideration cannot be reconciled with the
principles and conclusions of the other cases cited.
The principal facts of this case, as found by the trial court,
were:
"That the defendant company is a corporation organized under the
laws of the States of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,
Michigan, and Illinois, and that its railroad is operated from
Chicago to Buffalo. That said defendant was on and prior to October
9, 1890, and has been ever since, engaged in carrying passengers
and freight over said railroad, through and into each of said
several states, and is, and was then, engaged in the business of
interstate commerce both in the carriage of passengers and freight
from, into, and through said states. That said defendant did not on
said 9th day of October, 1890, nor shortly prior thereto, or since,
up to the time of the commencement of this suit, run daily, both
ways or either way, over said road, through the Village of West
Cleveland, three regular trains, nor more than one regular train
each way, carrying passengers, which were not engaged in interstate
commerce, and that did not have upon them passengers who had paid
through fare, and were entitled to ride on said trains going in the
one direction from the City of Chicago to the City of Buffalo, and
those going in the other direction from the City of Buffalo through
said states to the City of Chicago. That on or about the said day,
the defendant operated but one regular train, carrying passengers
each way, that was not engaged in carrying such through passengers,
and said train did stop at West Cleveland on the day aforesaid for
a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers. That the
through trains that passed through West Cleveland
Page 173 U. S. 328
on the said day were train No. 1 (limited express), with two
express cars, one coach, and three sleepers, from New York to
Chicago; train No. 11 (fast mail), with five United States mail
cars, one coach and sleeper, from New York to Chicago; Train No. 21
had one United States mail car, two baggage and express cars, four
coaches, and one sleeper, from Cleveland to Chicago -- these were
western trains -- that the eastern trains were limited express No.
4, with one baggage and express car and three sleepers, from
Chicago to New York; train No. 6, with one baggage and express car,
three coaches, and two sleepers, from Chicago to New York; train
No. 24, with one United States mail, two baggage and express cars,
and seven coaches, from Chicago to Buffalo; train No. 14, with
three United States mail cars and one sleeper, from Chicago to New
York. That the average time of delay necessarily required to stop a
train of cars, and sufficient time to receive and let off
passengers, would be three minutes; and that the number of cities
and villages in the State of Ohio, containing three thousand
inhabitants each, through which the aforesaid trains of the
defendant passed on said day was thirteen."
It is therefore a conceded fact in the case that the through
trains which the Legislature of Ohio seeks to compel to stop at
prescribed villages and towns in that state are engaged in carrying
on interstate commerce by the transportation of freight and
passengers. It is obvious, further, that such trains are within
section 5258 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
authorizing such railroad companies
"to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges and ferries,
all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight and
property on their way from any state to another state, and to
receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other
states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the
same to the place of destination."
It is also plain that the defendant railroad company and such of
its trains as were engaged in interstate commerce are within the
scope and subject to the regulations contained in the "Act to
Regulate Commerce," approved February 4, 1887, creating the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
Page 173 U. S. 329
The theory on which passenger trains to traverse several states
or the entire continent are prepared is necessarily and widely
different from that followed in making up ordinary trains to do a
wayside business. There must be provision for sleeping at night and
for furnishing meals. In order that each and every passenger may
receive the accommodation for which he pays, the seats are sold in
advance, and with reference to the number of through passengers. To
enable such trains to maintain the speed demanded, the number of
the cars for each train must be limited, and they are advertised
and known as "limited" trains. A traveler purchasing tickets on
such trains has a right to expect that he will be carried to his
journey's end in the shortest possible time consistent with safety.
The railroad companies compete for business by holding out that
they run the fastest trains and those most certain to arrive on
time. A company which, by its own regulations or under coercion of
a state legislature, stopped its through trains at every village
would soon lose its through business, to the loss of the company
and the detriment of the traveling public.
Nor must the necessity of the speedy transit of the United
States mails be overlooked. The government has not thought fit to
build and operate railroads over which to transport its mails, but
relies upon the use of roads owned by state corporations operating
connecting roads. And it appears from the findings in this case
that the defendant's through trains are engaged by the government
in the transportation of its mails. The business, public and
private, that depends on hourly and daily communication by mail is
enormous, and it would be intolerable if such necessary rapidity of
intercourse could be controlled and trammeled by legislation like
that in question.
It was pointed out in
Hall v. De Cuir that, although
the statute of Louisiana which sought to regulate the manner in
which white and colored passengers should be carried was restricted
by its own terms to the limits of the state, yet such regulation
necessarily affected steamboats running through and beyond the
state, because such regulation might change at every state
line.
Page 173 U. S. 330
A similar but much greater inconvenience would be occasioned by
attempting by state legislation to interfere with the movements of
through trains. If, for instance, and as is often the case, the
through trains were full of through passengers, there would be no
advantage to local travel for them to stop at the way stations, for
there would be no room or accommodation for the occasional
passengers. Nor would that difficulty be obviated by attaching to
each train coaches for use at the way stations. Such additional
coaches would impede the speed of the through trains and interfere
with the business of the local trains.
In
Wabash Railway Company v. Illinois, it was said,
replying to the argument that the state statute applied in terms
only to transportation within the state:
"Whatever may be the instrumentalities by which this
transportation from the one point to the other is effected, it is
but one voyage -- as much so as that of the steamboat on the
Mississippi River. It is not the railroads themselves that are
regulated by this act of the Illinois Legislature so much as the
charge for transportation, and if each one of the states through
whose territories these goods are transported can fix its own rules
for prices, for modes of transit, for times and modes of delivery,
and all the other incidents of transportation to which the word
'regulation' can be applied, it is readily seen that the
embarrassments upon interstate transportation, as an element of
interstate commerce, might be too oppressive to be submitted to. .
. . As restricted to a transportation which begins and ends within
the limits of the state, it [the regulation] may be very just and
equitable, and it certainly is the province of the state
legislature to determine that question. But when it is attempted to
apply to transportation through an entire series a principle of
this kind, and each one of the states shall attempt to establish
its own rates of transportation, its own methods to prevent
discrimination in freights, or to permit it, the deleterious
influence upon the freedom of commerce among the states and upon
the transit of goods through those states cannot be
overestimated."
In
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, stress was
justly
Page 173 U. S. 331
laid on the manifest purpose of Congress to establish a railroad
in the center of the continent, connecting the waters of the Great
Lakes with those of the Gulf of Mexico, for the benefit of
interstate commerce as well as of the military and postal
departments of the government.
A similar purpose has been manifested by Congress in the
legislation hereinbefore referred to by authorizing the formation
of continuous lines of transportation, by creating a permanent
commission to supervise the transactions of railroad companies so
far as they affect interstate commerce, and by employing such
continuous and connecting roads for the transportation of its
mails, troops, and supplies.
These views by no means result in justifying the railroad
company defendant in failing to supply the towns and villages
through which it passes with trains adequate and proper to transact
local business. Such failure is not alleged in this case, nor found
to be a fact by the trial court. And if the fact were otherwise,
the remedy must be found in suitable legislation or legal
proceedings, not in an enactment to convert through into local
trains.
Some observations may be ventured on the reasoning employed in
the opinion of the court. It is said:
"In what has been said, we have assumed that the statute is not
in itself
unreasonable. In our judgment, this assumption
is not unwarranted. The requirement that a railroad company whose
road is operated within the state shall cause three, each way, of
its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily,
Sundays excepted, to stop at any station, city, or village of three
thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off
passengers, so far from being
unreasonable, will subserve
the public convenience."
But the question of the
reasonableness of a public
statute is never open to the courts. It was not open even to the
Supreme Court of the State of Ohio to say whether the act in
question was reasonable or otherwise. Much less does the power of
the Legislature of Ohio to pass an act regulating a railroad
corporation depend upon the judgment or opinion of
this
Court as to the reasonableness of such an act.
Page 173 U. S. 332
And again:
"It was for the State of Ohio to take into consideration all the
circumstances affecting passenger travel within its limits, and, as
far as practicable, make such regulations as far as practicable,
make such regulations as were just to all who might pass to ignore
the convenience of its own people, whether traveling on this road
from one point to another within the state, or from places in the
state to places beyond its limits, or the convenience of those
outside the state who wished to come into it, and look only to the
convenience of those who desired to pass through the state without
stopping."
It was, I respectfully submit, just such action on the part of
the State of Ohio, and just such reasoning made to support that
action, that are forbidden by the Constitution of the United States
and by the decisions of this Court hereinbefore cited. If each and
every state through which these interstate highways run could take
into consideration all the circumstances affecting passenger travel
within its limits, and make such regulations as in the opinion of
its legislature are "
just and for the convenience of its own
people," then we should have restored the confusion that
existed in commercial transactions before the adoption of the
Constitution, and thus would be overruled those numerous decisions
of this Court nullifying state legislation proceeding on such
propositions.
Again it is said:
"Any other view of the relations between the state and the
corporation created by it would mean that the directors of the
corporation could manage its affairs solely with reference to the
interests of stockholders, and without taking into consideration
the interests of the general public. It would mean not only that
such directors were the exclusive directors of the manner in which
the corporation should discharge the duties imposed upon it in the
interest of the public, but that the corporation, by reason of
being engaged in interstate commerce, could build up cities and
towns at the ends of its line, or at favored points, and by that
means destroy or retard the growth and prosperity of intervening
points. It would mean that the defendant railway company could,
beyond the
Page 173 U. S. 333
power of the state to prevent it, run all of its trains through
the state without stopping at any city within its limits, however
numerous the population of such cities."
I am unable to perceive in the views that prevailed in the
Louisiana and
Illinois cases any foundation
whatever for such observations. In those cases it was expressly
conceded that, in the regulation of commerce within the state and
in respect to the management of trains so engaged, the authority of
the state legislature is supreme. And in the argument in behalf of
the defendant company in this case a similar admission is made.
It is fallacious, as I think, to contend that the Ohio
legislation in question was enacted to promote
the public
interest. That can only mean the public interest of the State
of Ohio, and the reason why such legislation is pernicious and
unsafe is because it is based upon a discrimination in favor of
local interests, and is hostile to the larger public interest and
convenience involved in interstate commerce. Practically, there may
be no real or considerable conflict between the public interest
that is local and that which is general. But as the state
legislatures are controlled by those who represent local demands,
their action frequently results in measures detrimental to the
interests of the greater public, and hence it is that the people of
the United States have, by their Constitution and the acts of
Congress, removed the control and regulation of interstate commerce
from the state legislatures.
Countenance seems to be given in the opinion of the majority to
the contention that the power of Congress over the regulation of
interstate commerce is not exclusive by the observation that
"the plaintiff in error accepted its charter subject necessarily
to the condition that it would conform to such reasonable
regulations as the state might from time to time establish that
were not in violation of the supreme law of the land. In the
absence of legislation by Congress, it would be going very far to
hold that such an enactment as the one before us was in itself a
regulation of interstate commerce"
when applied to trains carrying passengers from one state to
another.
Page 173 U. S. 334
But it has already been shown that Congress has legislated
expressly in relation to interstate trains and railroads, has made
rules and regulations for their control, and has established a
tribunal to make other rules and regulations.
Besides, as was observed by Mr. Webster in his argument in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 17:
"The state may legislate, it is said, whenever Congress has not
made a plenary exercise of its power. But who is to judge whether
Congress has made this plenary exercise of power? It has done all
that it deemed wise, and are the states now to do whatever Congress
has left undone? Congress makes such rules as in its judgment the
case requires, and those rules, whatever they are, constitute the
system. All useful regulations do not consist in restraint, and
that which Congress sees fit to leave free is a part of the
regulation as much as the rest."
Attention is called to the fact that, in the cases of
De
Cuir v. Hall, Wabash Railway Company v. Illinois, and
Illinois Railroad v. Illinois, there were no specific
regulations by Congress as to providing separate accommodations for
white and black passengers, as to rates of freight to be charged on
interstate commerce, or as to stopping through trains at prescribed
places, yet legislation by the states on those subjects was held
void by this Court as a trespass on the field of interstate
commerce.
"The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several
states, when the subjects of that power are national in their
nature is also exclusive. The Constitution does not provide that
interstate commerce shall be free, but, by the grant of this
exclusive power to regulate it, it was left free except as Congress
might impose restraint. Therefore it has been determined that the
failure of Congress to exercise this exclusive power in any case is
an expression of its will that the subject shall be free from
restrictions or impositions upon it by the several states."
In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
The statute is held not to be repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States, because it is assumed to be but an exercise
Page 173 U. S. 335
of the lawful police power of the state, providing for the local
convenience of its inhabitants. On this hypothesis, the statute is
held valid, although it is conceded that it indirectly touches
interstate commerce and remotely imposes a burden thereon. To my
mind the Ohio statute, however, does not come within the purview of
the reasoning advanced to support it, and therefore such
considerations become irrelevant and it is unnecessary to form any
judgment as to their correctness.
My conception of the statute is that it imposes, under the guise
of a police regulation for local convenience, a direct burden on
interstate commerce, and besides expressly discriminates against
such commerce, and therefore it is in conflict with the
Constitution even by applying the rules laid down in the
authorities which are relied on as upholding its validity. Now what
does the statute provide? Does it require all railroads within the
state to operate a given number of local trains, and to stop them
at designated points? Not at all. It commands railroads,
if
they run three trains a day, to cause at least three of such
trains to be local trains by compelling them to stop such trains at
the places which the statute mentions. It follows then that, under
the statute, one railroad operating in the state may be required to
run only one local train a day, and to stop such train, as the
statute requires, and another railroad, reaching exactly the same
territory and passing the same places, may be required to operate
three trains a day, and make the exacted stops with each of such
trains. That is to say, although the same demands and the same
local interest may exist as to the two roads, upon one is imposed a
threefold heavier burden than upon the other. That this result of
the statute is a discrimination, it seems to me, in reason, is
beyond question. If, then, the discrimination is certain, the only
question which remains is is it a discrimination against interstate
commerce? If it is, confessedly the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States. Whence, then, does the
discrimination arise, and upon what does it operate? It arises
alone from the fact that the statute bases its requirement, not
upon the demands of local convenience,
Page 173 U. S. 336
but upon the volume of business done by the road, since it
requires the road operating three trains to stop three as local
trains, and the road operating one train to stop only one. But the
number of trains operated is necessarily dependent upon the amount
of business done, and the amount of business embraces interstate
commerce as well as local business. But making the number of local
trains dependent upon the volume of business is but to say that if
a railroad has enough interstate business, besides its local
business, to cause it to run one local and two interstate commerce
trains each way each day, the increased trains thus required for
the essential purposes of interstate commerce shall be local
trains, while another railroad, which has no interstate commerce,
but only local business, requiring but one train a day, shall
continue only to operate the one local train.
While the power of the State of Ohio to direct all the railroads
within its territory to operate a sufficient number of local trains
to meet the convenience of the inhabitants of the state may be,
arguendo, conceded -- although such question does not
arise in this case, and is not therefore necessary, in my opinion,
to be decided -- that state cannot, without doing violence to the
commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, impose
upon the railroads operating within its borders a burden based not
upon local convenience, but upon the amount of interstate commerce
business which the roads may do, thereby causing every interstate
commerce railroad to have a burden resting upon it entirely
disproportioned to local convenience and greatly more onerous than
that resting upon roads doing a local business and which have not a
sufficient interstate business to compel them to operate three
trains. To answer this reasoning by saying that the statute does
not compel roads to operate the three trains and stop them, since
it only compels them to stop them if they operate them, is to admit
the discrimination, and to state the fact that the duty is not made
by the statute dependent upon the local convenience, but upon the
whole volume of business, which, of course, therefore includes
interstate commerce business.
As the statute makes its exaction depend not upon a rule
Page 173 U. S. 337
by which the local wants are ascertained and supplied, but upon
the business done, it therefore directly operates upon the volume
of business, and only indirectly considers the possible local
convenience. Under a law which thus proceeds, my mind refuses the
conclusion that the law directly considers local convenience, and
only indirectly and remotely affects interstate commerce, when the
reverse, it seems to me, is patent on the face of the statute. The
repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution of the United States
is shown by the principle decided by this Court in
Osborne v.
Florida, 164 U. S. 650. In
that case, the State of Florida Imposed a license on the business
of express companies. In construing the statute, the supreme court
of the state held that it applied only to business done solely
within the state, and not to business interstate in its character.
This Court, in reviewing and affirming the decision of the state
court, said that, as construed by the Florida court, the statute
was not repugnant to the Constitution, because it applied to
business done solely within the state, and that the contrary would
have been manifestly the case if, for the purpose of taxation, the
state had taken into consideration the whole volume of business,
including that of an interstate character. Now if a taxing law of a
state is repugnant to the Constitution because it operates upon the
whole volume of business, both state and interstate, a law of the
character of that now under consideration, which operates upon the
whole volume of business of a railroad, state and interstate, is
equally repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
Whether, in the enactment of the statute, it was intended to
discriminate is not the question, for whatever may have been the
intention of the lawmaker, if the necessary effect of the criterion
established by the law is to cause its enforcement to produce an
unlawful discrimination against interstate commerce by imposing a
greater burden on the roads engaged in such commerce than upon
other roads which do a purely local business, the statute is, I
think, repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and
should not be upheld.
For these reasons, without meaning to imply that I do not assent
to the conclusions stated by my brethren who have also
Page 173 U. S. 338
on other grounds dissented, I prefer to place my dissent on what
seems to me the discrimination which the statute inevitably
creates.