A suit brought by the receivers of a railroad against the
Attorney General of the State of Alabama and the Solicitor of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of that state to restrain them, as
officers of the state, from taking steps to enforce against the
complainants the provisions of a law of that state reducing the
tolls which had been exacted of the public under a prior law for
crossing on a bridge of the railroad over a river, is a suit
against the state, and this Court accordingly reverses the judgment
of the court below, adjudging that the latter law was
unconstitutional and void, and that the defendants should not
institute or prosecute any indictment or criminal proceeding
against anyone for violating the provisions of that act, and
directed the court below to dissolve its injunction restraining the
institution or prosecution of indictments or other criminal
proceedings so instituted in the state courts, and to dismiss the
suit so brought by the receivers against the Attorney General of
Alabama and the Solicitor of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of that
state.
An act of the General Assembly of Alabama approved February 9,
1895, prescribed certain maximum rates of toll to be charged on the
bridge across the Tennessee River between the Counties of Colbert
and Lauderdale, in that state and known as the "Florence Bridge."
It also declared that, should the owners, lessees, or operators of
the bridge, by themselves or agents, demand or receive from any
person a higher rate of toll than was prescribed, he or they should
forfeit to such person $20 for each offense, to be recoverable
before any justice of the peace or notary public and
ex
officio justice of the peace of either of the counties
named.
When that act was passed, the cases of
Samuel Thomas against
Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company and
Central
Trust Company of New York against Memphis & Charleston Railroad
Company were pending in the court below, and on the 14th day
of February, 1895, Charles M. McGhee and Henry Fink, receivers of
the Memphis & Charleston Railroad in those causes, having first
obtained leave to do so,
Page 172 U. S. 517
filed a bill in the name of themselves and the railroad company
against "the State of Alabama, William C. Oates, as Governor of the
State of Alabama, and William C. Fitts, as Attorney General of the
State of Alabama."
After setting out their appointment as receivers, the order of
the court below authorizing the institution of the present suit,
the official character of the several defendants, the ownership by
the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company of the bridge in
question, the above act of February 9, 1895, the manner in which
that company acquired the right to construct and own the Florence
Bridge, the charters of the railroad company granted by Tennessee
and Alabama, the purchase in 1850 of the bridge by the railroad
company under the charter granted by Alabama, and its management of
the bridge under the charter of the Florence Bridge Company, the
plaintiffs averred that the act incorporating the bridge company
was a contract between the state and the owners of the bridge, that
the rights acquired by that company under its charter passed to the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company, that the rates of toll
fixed by the act were arbitrary, unreasonable, and amounted
virtually to the confiscation of the plaintiffs' property, and that
the act was in violation of the Constitution of the United States,
in that such a legislative enactment deprived the owners of the
bridge of their property without due process of law, and denied to
them the equal protection of the laws.
It was further alleged that the clause in the act imposing a
penalty for demanding or receiving higher rates of toll than those
prescribed was intended and had the effect to deter the plaintiffs
from questioning by legal proceedings the validity of such
legislation.
After stating that they were remediless except by a bill in
equity, the plaintiffs prayed that
"process of subpoena be issued to and served upon the State of
Alabama, the said Wm. C. Oates, as Governor of the State of
Alabama, and Wm. C. Fitts, as the Attorney General of the State of
Alabama"
requiring them, "in behalf of the state," to answer the bill,
and that
"an injunction be granted prohibiting and restraining the
Page 172 U. S. 518
said Wm. C. Oates, as Governor of the State of Alabama, and the
said Wm. C. Fitts, as the Attorney General of the State of Alabama,
and all persons whomsoever from instituting any proceeding against
the complainants or either of them under the forfeiture clause
above set out in the second section of said act of the General
Assembly of Alabama."
Subpoenas to appear, answer, or demur to the bill were issued
and served upon defendant Oates, as Governor, and upon defendant
Fitts, as Attorney General, of the state. A subpoena was also
issued against the state, and served upon the defendant Oates as
Governor.
A temporary injunction was issued, restraining and enjoining
William C. Oates, as Governor of Alabama, and William C. Fitts, as
Attorney General of the state, and "all persons whomsoever, from
instituting or prosecuting any proceedings" against the plaintiffs,
or either of them, under the forfeiture clause contained in the
above Act of February 9, 1895.
The defendants appeared specially for the purpose of moving, and
did move, that the bill be dismissed upon the ground that the suit
was one against the state, and prohibited by the Constitution of
the United States.
The plaintiffs, by leave of the court, amended their bill by
adding thereto paragraphs to the effect that frequent and numerous
demands had been made by persons on foot, on horseback, and in
vehicles of the tollgate keeper at the bridge to pass them over at
the rate of toll fixed by the act, and upon the refusal of the
tollgate keeper to permit them to pass by the payment of the rates
so fixed, and his requiring them to pay the rates of toll fixed by
the plaintiffs, they had paid the tolls so required of them under
protest, and had threatened to institute suit or suits against the
plaintiffs under the penalty clause of the act, and had also
threatened to procure proceedings to be instituted in the courts by
the Governor and Attorney General in the name of the state, by a
mandamus or otherwise, to compel the plaintiffs to pass people over
the bridge at the rates fixed by the act; that those persons had
also threatened to procure proceedings to be instituted in the name
of the state for a forfeiture of the franchise of the Memphis
and
Page 172 U. S. 519
Charleston Railroad Company in and to the bridge property
because of the failure and refusal to observe and obey the
requirements of the act in reference to the rates of toll to be
charged over the bridge, and that the persons so protesting and
threatening suits were too numerous to be made parties to that
suit. Special reference was made to William H. Gilliam, a resident
citizen of Colbert County, Alabama, as one of the parties or
persons who had made threats of such suits and proceedings.
The bill was amended by making Gilliam a party defendant, and by
adding, before the prayer for general relief, a prayer
"that an injunction be granted prohibiting and restraining the
said William C. Oates, as the Governor of the State of Alabama, and
the said Wm. C. Fitts, as the Attorney General of the State of
Alabama, and the said Wm. H. Gilliam, and all persons whomsoever,
from instituting or procuring the institution of any proceedings
against these complainants, or either of them, by mandamus or
otherwise, to compel the observance and obedience of said act in
reference to the rate of tolls fixed thereby over the said bridge,
and also from instituting or procuring to be instituted any
proceeding against these complainants, or either of them, for the
forfeiture of the franchise of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
Company in and to the said bridge on account of the refusal to
charge the rates of toll over it fixed by said act."
Subsequently an order was made enjoining and restraining William
C. Fitts, as Attorney General of the State of Alabama, and William
H. Gilliam, and all persons whomsoever, until the further order of
the court, from instituting or procuring the institution of any
proceeding against the plaintiffs, or either of them, by mandamus
or otherwise, to compel the observance and obedience of the act in
reference to the rate of tolls fixed thereby over the Florence
Bridge, and from instituting, or procuring to be instituted, any
proceedings against the plaintiffs, or either of them, for the
forfeiture of the franchise of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
Company in and to the bridge on account of the refusal to charge
the rates of toll over it fixed by the act.
Page 172 U. S. 520
At a later date in the progress of the cause, the plaintiffs, by
leave of the court, inserted the following averments in the
bill:
"Complainants would further show unto your honors that at the
fall term, 1895, of the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County,
Alabama, a large number of indictments -- some one hundred in
number -- were found by the grand jury of said court against Thomas
Clem and G. W. Brabson, who are the tollgate keepers at the public
crossing of said bridge for complainants, the receivers of the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company. These indictments were
found under section 4151 of the Criminal Code of Alabama, which
reads as follows:"
" 4151 (4401). Any person, who, being or acting as an officer,
agent, servant or employee of any turnpike company, macadamized
road company or other incorporated road or bridge company, takes,
receives or demands any greater charge or toll for travel or
passage over such road or bridge than is authorized by the charter
of such company, or, if the charter does not specify the amount of
toll to be charged or taken, fixes, prescribes, takes, receives or
demands any unreasonable charge or toll, to be determined by the
jury, must, on conviction, be fined not more than one hundred
dollars."
"Complainants allege and show unto your honors that these
indictments were improperly and wrongfully found against said
tollgate keepers, and they are being improperly prosecuted thereby,
because the rate of toll which they have charged is only the rate
which has heretofore been fixed by the receivers, which was fixed
by them before the passage of said unconstitutional act of the
General Assembly of Alabama reducing the tolls, and is the same
rate of tolls which have been charged for more than twenty years by
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company for the use by the
public of said bridge, and the tolls so charged by said tollgate
keepers were authorized by this Court, and said indictments have
been found and are being prosecuted in violation of the authority
of this Court and of its orders in the premises, and in violation
of the constitutional rights and privileges, under the Constitution
of the United States, secured
Page 172 U. S. 521
to the owners of said bridge in the charging of tolls before
crossing it. A. H. Carmichael is the solicitor for said judicial
circuit, and as such is engaged in the prosecution of said
indictments."
The plaintiffs asked that Carmichael, as such solicitor, be made
a party defendant, that all needful process issue against him, and
that a restraining order be issued enjoining him and all other
persons from the prosecution of said indictments.
By a supplemental bill, it was averred that writs of arrest had
been issued upon the above indictments against Clem and Brabson,
and placed in the hands of the sheriff, who in execution thereof
had arrested or would arrest the said employees of the receivers.
It was further alleged that these criminal proceedings were in
contempt of the order of the court below appointing the receivers,
as well as in violation of the injunction which the court had
issued, and which still remained in force, "enjoining the said
Governor, Attorney General, and all persons whomsoever from
instituting any suits or proceedings" under the above act of the
state.
After referring to the indictments, and the purpose on the part
of the state officers to proceed under them, the plaintiffs prayed
that the Act of February 9, 1895, be declared repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States and invalid, inoperative, null,
and void, and that an injunction be granted
"prohibiting and restraining William C. Oates, as Governor of
the State of Alabama, William C. Fitts, as Attorney General of the
State of Alabama, W. H. Gilliam, and A. H. Carmichael, solicitor as
aforesaid, and all other persons whomsoever, from instituting any
proceeding against these complainants or either of them, their
servants or agents, under the forfeiture clause set out in said
second section of said act of the General Assembly of Alabama,"
that said officers,
"and all persons whomsoever, be restrained and enjoined from
instituting, or procuring the institution of, any proceeding
against these complainants, or either of them, their agents,
servants, or employees, by a mandamus or otherwise, to compel the
observance and obedience to said act in reference to the rate of
tolls fixed thereby over said bridge, and also from instituting
Page 172 U. S. 522
or procuring to be instituted any proceeding against these
complaints, or either of them, for the forfeiture of the franchise
of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company in and to said
bridge on account of the refusal to charge the rates of toll over
it fixed by the said act,"
and that
"the said defendants and said Carmichael, solicitor as
aforesaid, and all persons whomsoever, be restrained and enjoined
from prosecuting said indictment against the said servants, agents,
and employees of the complainants, or from interfering in any way,
under and by virtue of the color of said unconstitutional act, with
the rights, privileges, and franchises and property of the
complainants, their servants or agents, with regard to said
bridge."
At this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiffs dismissed the
cause so far as the state was made a party defendant, and amended
the bill by striking out its name as a defendant, as well as the
words "in behalf of the state." The cause was then heard upon a
motion by the Governor and Attorney General to dismiss the bill
upon the ground that the suit was one against the state, in
violation of the Constitution of the United States.
Upon the filing of the last amendment to the original bill, it
was ordered by the court that A. H. Carmichael, as solicitor for
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Alabama, be enjoined and
restrained temporarily, and until the further orders of the
court,
"from instituting or prosecuting as such solicitor any
indictments or criminal proceedings against any one for a violation
of the alleged unconstitutional act of the legislature of Alabama
described in the bill."
The next step in the proceedings was the suing out of writs of
habeas corpus by Clem and Brabson, who were under arrest on process
issued on the above indictments. Each of the petitioners was
released upon his own recognizance in the sum of $150, conditioned
that he would appear in court from day to day until discharged.
Gilliam filed an answer, insisting upon the validity of the act
of the legislature which had been assailed by the bill as
unconstitutional.
Page 172 U. S. 523
A decree
pro confesso was taken against the Governor
and Attorney General of the state, as well as Carmichael as
solicitor aforesaid, all in their respective official capacities.
But that decree was set aside and the cause was heard upon
demurrers by the various defendants. The demurrers were overruled
and answers were filed by the Governor and Attorney General of the
state and by the Solicitor of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. There
were also motions to dissolve the injunction granted in the case
upon the ground that there was no equity in the bill and that the
injunctions were in violation of the Constitution and statutes of
the United States.
The final decree in the case was as follows:
"This cause coming on to be heard, the submission at the former
term of the court is hereby set aside, and, it being made to appear
to the court that the defendant William C. Oates has ceased to be
the Governor of the State of Alabama, it is thereupon ordered that
the said cause be discontinued as to him, and the cause is now
resubmitted at this term of the court for final decree upon the
pleadings and testimony offered by the parties, and upon due
consideration thereof, it is considered by the court that the
complainants are entitled to relief. It is thereupon ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the act of the Legislature of the State
of Alabama referred to and set up in the original bill of complaint
in the cause, which act was approved February 9, 1895, and
entitled"
"An act to fix the maximum of tolls to be charged by the owners,
lessees, or operators of the road bridge across the Tennessee River
between the Counties of Colbert and Lauderdale, and known as the
Florence Bridge, and to fix the penalty for demanding or receiving
a higher rate of tolls,"
"is violative of the constitutional rights of the owners of said
bridge and of the complainants as their representatives in that it
fixes a rate of tolls for said bridge which are not fairly and
reasonably compensatory, and it is therefore hereby declared to be
invalid and inoperative, and the injunctions heretofore granted in
the cause are hereby made perpetual. It is further ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the defendants pay the costs of this
proceeding, for which let execution issue. "
Page 172 U. S. 524
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts as above reported,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question before us is whether this suit is one of
which a circuit court of the United States may take cognizance
consistently with the Constitution of the United States.
From the history given of the proceedings below, it appears that
the circuit court adjudged:
That the legislative enactment of February 9, 1895, was
unconstitutional and void in that it did not permit the owners of
the Florence Bridge, and the plaintiffs as their representatives,
to charge rates of toll that were fairly and reasonably
compensatory, and
That the defendants Fitts and Carmichael, holding, respectively,
the offices of Attorney General of Alabama and Solicitor of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of the state, should not institute or
prosecute any indictment or criminal proceeding against anyone for
violating the provisions of that act.
Is this a suit against the State of Alabama? It is true that the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States does
not in terms declare that the judicial power of the United States
shall not extend to suits against a state by citizens of such
state. But it has been adjudged by this Court, upon full
consideration, that a suit against a state by one of its own
citizens, the state not having consented to be sued, was unknown to
and forbidden by the law as much so as suits against a state by
citizens of another State of the Union, or by citizens or subjects
of foreign states.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.
1,
134 U. S. 10,
134 U. S. 15;
North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S.
22. It is therefore an immaterial circumstance in
Page 172 U. S. 525
the present case that the plaintiffs do not appear to be
citizens of another state than Alabama, and may be citizens of that
state.
What is and what is not a suit against a state has so frequently
been the subject of consideration by this Court that nothing of
importance remains to be suggested on either side of that question.
It is only necessary to ascertain, in each case as it arises,
whether it falls on one side or the other of the line marked out by
our former decisions.
We are of opinion that the present case comes within the
principles announced in
In re Ayers, 123 U.
S. 443,
123 U. S. 485,
123 U. S.
496-500,
123 U. S. 505.
It appears from the report of that case that the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, in
Cooper v. Marye, made an order forbidding the Attorney
General of Virginia and other officers of that commonwealth from
bringing suits under a certain statute of Virginia, in its name and
on its behalf, for the recovery of taxes in payment of which the
taxpayers had previously tendered tax receivable coupons. The state
officers did not obey this order, and, having been proceeded
against for contempt of court, they sued out writs of habeas corpus
and asked to be discharged upon the ground that the circuit court
had no power to make the order for disobeying which the proceedings
in contempt were commenced. This Court said that the question
really was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain
the suit in which that order was made, the sole purpose and prayer
of the bill therein being by final decree to enjoin the defendants,
officers of Virginia, from taking any steps in execution of the
statute the validity of which was questioned.
It was adjudged that although Virginia was not named on the
record as a party defendant, nevertheless, when the nature of the
case against its officers was considered, that commonwealth was to
be regarded as the actual party in the sense of the constitutional
prohibition. The Court said:
"It follows therefore in the present case that the personal act
of the petitioners sought to be restrained by the order of the
circuit court, reduced to the mere bringing of an action
Page 172 U. S. 526
in the name of and for the state against taxpayers, who,
although they may have tendered the tax receivable coupons, are
charged as delinquents, cannot be alleged against them as an
individual act in violation of any legal or contract rights of such
taxpayers."
Again:
"The relief sought is against the defendants, not in their
individual but in their representative capacity as officers of the
State of Virginia. The acts sought to be restrained are the
bringing of suits by the State of Virginia in its own name and for
its own use. If the state had been made a defendant to this bill by
name, charged according to the allegations it now contains --
supposing that such a suit could be maintained -- it would have
been subjected to the jurisdiction of the court by process served
upon its Governor and Attorney General according to the precedents
in such cases.
New Jersey v. New York, 5
Pet. 284,
30 U. S. 288-290;
Kentucky
v. Dennison, 24 How. 66,
65 U. S.
96-97; Rule 5 of 1884, 108 U.S. 574. If a decree could
have been rendered enjoining the state from bringing suits against
its taxpayers, it would have operated upon the state only through
the officers who by law were required to represent it in bringing
such suits,
viz., the present defendants, its Attorney
General, and the commonwealth's attorneys for the several counties.
For a breach of such an injunction these officers would be amenable
to the court as proceeding in contempt of its authority, and would
be liable to punishment therefor by attachment and imprisonment.
The nature of the case as supposed is identical with that of the
case as actually presented in the bill, with the single exception
that the state is not named as a defendant. How else can the state
be forbidden by judicial process to bring actions in its name
except by constraining the conduct of its officers, its attorneys,
and its agents? And if all such officers, attorneys, and agents are
personally subjected to the process of the court so as to forbid
their acting in its behalf, how can it be said that the state
itself is not subjected to the jurisdiction of the court as an
actual and real defendant?"
One of the arguments made in the
Ayers case was that
the circuit court had jurisdiction to restrain by injunction
officers
Page 172 U. S. 527
of the state from executing the provisions of state enactments
void by reason of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United
States. In support of that position, reference was made to
Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738. But this Court said:
"There is nothing, therefore, in the judgment in that cause as
finally defined which extends its authority beyond the prevention
and restraint of the specific act done in pursuance of the
unconstitutional statute of Ohio and in violation of the act of
Congress chartering the bank which consisted of the unlawful
seizure and detention of its property. It was conceded throughout
that case, in the argument at the bar and in the opinion of the
court, that an action at law would lie, either of trespass or
detinue, against the defendants as individual trespassers guilty of
a wrong in taking the property of the complainant illegally, vainly
seeking to defend themselves under the authority of a void act of
the General Assembly of Ohio. One of the principal questions in the
case was whether equity had jurisdiction to restrain the commission
of such a mere trespass, a jurisdiction which was upheld upon the
circumstances and nature of the case and which has been repeatedly
exercised since. But the very ground on which it was adjudged not
to be a suit against the state, and not to be one in which the
state was a necessary party, was that the defendants personally and
individually were wrongdoers against whom the complainants had a
clear right of action for the recovery of the property taken, or
its value, and that therefore it was a case in which no other
parties were necessary. The right asserted and the relief asked
were against the defendants as individuals. They sought to protect
themselves against personal liability by their official character
as representatives of the state. This they were not permitted to do
because the authority under which they professed to act was
void."
And these were stated by the Court to be the grounds upon which
it had proceeded in other cases, citing
Allen v. Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad Co., 114 U. S. 311;
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270,
114 U. S. 282;
United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196. The
Court further said:
"The very object and purpose of the
Page 172 U. S. 528
Eleventh Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a
state to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance
of private parties. It was thought to be neither becoming nor
convenient that the several states of the Union, invested with that
large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the
United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer the
complaints of private persons, whether citizens of other states or
aliens, or that the course of their public policy and the
administration of their public affairs should be subject to and
controlled by the mandates of judicial tribunals without their
consent and in favor of individual interests. To secure the
manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption guarantied by the
Eleventh Amendment requires that it should be interpreted not
literally and too narrowly, but fairly and with such breadth and
largeness as effectually to accomplish the substance of its
purpose. In this spirit it must be held to cover not only suits
brought against a state by name, but those also against its
officers, agents, and representatives where the state, though not
named as such, is, nevertheless, the only real party against which
alone in fact the relief is asked, and against which the judgment
or decree effectively operates. But this is not intended in any way
to impinge upon the principle which justifies suits against
individual defendants who, under color of the authority of
unconstitutional legislation by the state, are guilty of personal
trespasses and wrongs, nor to forbid suits against officers in
their official capacity either to arrest or direct their official
action by injunction or mandamus where such suits are authorized by
law and the act to be done or omitted is purely ministerial, in the
performance or omission of which the plaintiff has a legal
interest."
It was accordingly adjudged that the suit in which injunctions
were granted against officers of Virginia was, in substance and in
law, one against that commonwealth of which the circuit court of
the United States could not take cognizance.
If these principles be applied in the present case, there is
no
Page 172 U. S. 529
escape from the conclusion that although the State of Alabama
was dismissed as a party defendant, this suit against its officers
is really one against the state. As a state can act only by its
officers, an order restraining those officers from taking any steps
by means of judicial proceedings in execution of the statute of
February 9, 1895, is one which restrains the state itself, and the
suit is consequently as much against the state as if the state were
named as a party defendant on the record. If the individual
defendants held possession or were about to take possession of or
to commit any trespass upon any property belonging to or under the
control of the plaintiffs in violation of the latter's
constitutional rights, they could not resist the judicial
determination, in a suit against them, of the question of the right
such possession by simply asserting that they held or were entitled
to hold the property in their capacity as officers of the state. In
the case supposed, they would be compelled to make good the state's
claim to the property, and could not shield themselves against suit
because of their official character.
Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204,
167 U. S. 222.
No such case is before us.
It is to be observed that neither the Attorney General of
Alabama nor the Solicitor of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of the
state appear to have been charged by law with any special duty in
connection with the Act of February 9, 1895. In support of the
contention that the present suit is not one against the state,
reference was made by counsel to several cases, among which were
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270;
Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 114 U.
S. 311;
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S.
1;
In re Tyler, 149 U.
S. 164;
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U. S. 362,
154 U. S. 388;
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, and
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466.
Upon examination, it will be found that the defendants in each of
those cases were officers of the state, specially charged with the
execution of a state enactment alleged to be unconstitutional, but
under the authority of which, it was averred, they were committing,
or were about to commit, some specific wrong or trespass to the
injury of the plaintiffs' rights. There is a wide difference
between a suit
Page 172 U. S. 530
against individuals, holding official positions under a state,
to prevent them, under the sanction of an unconstitutional statute,
from committing by some positive act a wrong or trespass, and a
suit against officers of a state merely to test the
constitutionality of a state statute, in the enforcement of which
those officers will act only by formal judicial proceedings in the
courts of the state. In the present case, as we have said, neither
of the state officers named held any special relation to the
particular statute alleged to be unconstitutional. They were not
expressly directed to see to its enforcement. If, because they were
law officers of the state, a case could be made for the purpose of
testing the constitutionality of the statute by an injunction suit
brought against them, then the constitutionality of every act
passed by the legislature could be tested by a suit against the
Governor and the Attorney General based upon the theory that the
former, as the executive of the state, was, in a general sense,
charged with the execution of all its laws, and the latter, as
Attorney General, might represent the state in litigation involving
the enforcement of its statutes. That would be a very convenient
way for obtaining a speedy judicial determination of questions of
constitutional law which may be raised by individuals, but it is a
mode which cannot be applied to the states of the Union
consistently with the fundamental principle that they cannot,
without their assent, be brought into any court at the suit of
private persons. If their officers commit acts of trespass or wrong
to the citizen, they may be individually proceeded against for such
trespasses or wrongs. Under the view we take of the question, the
citizen is not without effective remedy, when proceeded against
under a legislative enactment void for repugnancy to the supreme
law of the land, for whatever the form of proceeding against him,
he can make his defense upon the ground that the statute is
unconstitutional and void. And that question can be ultimately
brought to this Court for final determination.
What has been said has reference to that part of the final
decree which holds the Act of February 9, 1895, to be invalid and
inoperative. Whether the owners of the bridge, and the plaintiffs
as their representatives, were denied by the statute
Page 172 U. S. 531
fair and reasonable compensation for the use of the property by
the public was a question that could not be considered in this
case. That is not a matter to be determined in a suit against the
state, for of such a suit the circuit court could not take
cognizance.
It remains only to consider the case so far as the final decree
assumes to enjoin the officers of the state from instituting or
prosecuting any indictment or criminal proceedings having for their
object the enforcement of the statute of 1895. We are of opinion
that the circuit court of the United States, sitting in equity, was
without jurisdiction to enjoin the institution or prosecution of
these criminal proceedings commenced in the state court. This view
is sustained by
In re Sawyer, 124 U.
S. 200,
124 U. S.
209-210. It was there said:
"Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the
distinction between common law and equity, as existing in England
at the time of the separation of the two countries, has been
maintained, although both jurisdictions are vested in the same
courts.
Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 481,
62 U. S. 484-487;
Thompson
v. Railroad Companies, 6 Wall. 134;
Heine v.
Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655."
Again:
"The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless
enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection of
rights of property. It has no jurisdiction over the prosecution,
the punishment, or the pardon of crimes and misdemeanors, or over
the appointment and removal of public officers. To assume such a
jurisdiction or to sustain a bill in equity to restrain or relieve
against proceedings for the punishment or offenses, or for the
removal of public officers is to invade the domain of the courts of
common law, or of the executive and administrative departments of
the government."
At the present term of the Court, in
Harkrader v.
Wadley, 172 U. S. 148,
172 U. S.
169-170, we said: "In proceeding by indictment to
enforce a criminal statute, the state can only act by officers or
attorneys, and to enjoin the latter is to enjoin the state."
Again:
"Much more are we of opinion that a circuit court of the United
States, sitting in equity in the administration of civil remedies,
has no jurisdiction to stay by injunction proceedings pending in a
state court in the name of a state to
Page 172 U. S. 532
enforce the criminal laws of such state."
Undoubtedly the courts of the United States have the power,
under existing legislation, by writ of habeas corpus, to discharge
from custody any person held by state authorities under criminal
proceedings instituted under state enactments if such enactments
are void for repugnancy to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States. But even in such case, we have held that this
power will not be exercised in the first instance except in
extraordinary cases, and the party will be left to make his defense
in the state court.
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.
S. 241;
New York v. Eno, 155 U. S.
89;
Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.
S. 231;
Baker v. Grice, 169 U.
S. 284. But the existence of the power in the courts of
the United States to discharge upon habeas corpus by no means
implies that they may, in the exercise of their equity powers,
interrupt or enjoin proceedings of a criminal character in a state
court. The plaintiffs state that the toll gatherers in their
service had been indicted in a state court for violating the
provisions of the act of 1895 in respect of tolls. Let them appear
to the indictment and defend themselves upon the ground that the
state statute is repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States. The state court is competent to determine the question thus
raised, and is under a duty to enforce the mandates of the supreme
law of the land.
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.
S. 624. And if the question is determined adversely to
the defendants in the highest court of the state in which the
decision could be had, the judgment may be reexamined by this Court
upon writ of error. That the defendants may be frequently indicted
constitutes no reason why a federal court of equity should assume
to interfere with the ordinary course of criminal procedure in a
state court.
It appears from the record that Clem and Brabson were indicted
in the state court under section 4151 of the Criminal Code of
Alabama. Having been arrested under those indictments, they sued
out, as we have seen, writs of habeas corpus upon the ground that
they were indicted for taking tolls in violation of the above Act
of February 9, 1895, which they alleged to be unconstitutional, and
that their arrest was in disregard
Page 172 U. S. 533
of the injunction of the circuit court restraining the
institution and prosecution of indictments or other criminal
proceedings in execution of that act. The circuit court discharged
the petitioners upon their own recognizances. It was error to
discharge them, and thereby interfere with their trial in the state
court. As already indicated, the circuit court, sitting in equity,
was without jurisdiction to prohibit the institution or prosecution
of these criminal proceedings in the state court. Further, even if
the circuit court regarded the act of 1895 as repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States, the custody of the accused by
the state authorities should not have been disturbed by any order
of that court, and the accused should have been left to be dealt
with by the state court, with the right, after the determination of
the case in that court, to prosecute a writ of error from this
Court for the reexamination of the final judgment so far as it
involved any privileges secured to the accused by the Constitution
of the United States.
Ex Parte Royall, New York v. Eno, Whitten
v. Tomlinson, and
Baker v. Grice, above cited. There
were no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances in these cases
to have justified the interference by the circuit court, under
writs of habeas corpus, with the trial of the indictments found in
the state courts.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, with
directions to dissolve the injunction restraining the institution
or prosecution of indictments or other criminal proceedings in the
state court, to dismiss the suit brought by the receivers against
the Attorney General of Alabama and the solicitor of the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit of the state, and to remand Clem and Brabson to
the custody of the proper state authority.
