Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. ___ (2022)
Kemp and seven codefendants were convicted of drug and gun crimes. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated their appeals and, in November 2013, affirmed their convictions and sentences. In April 2015, Kemp moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed Kemp’s motion as untimely because it was not filed within one year of “the date on which [his] judgment of conviction [became] final.” Kemp did not appeal. In 2018, Kemp sought to reopen his section 2255 proceedings, arguing that the one-year limitations period on his 2255 motion did not begin to run until his codefendants’ rehearing petitions were denied in May 2014. The Eleventh Circuit agreed that his section 2255 motion was timely but concluded that because Kemp alleged judicial mistake, his FRCP 60(b) motion fell under Rule 60(b)(1), with a one-year limitations period and was untimely.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s one-year limitations period. The Court rejected Kemp’s arguments for limiting Rule 60(b)(1) to non-judicial, non-legal errors and applying Rule 60(b)(6), which allows a party to seek relief “within a reasonable time” for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but is available only when the other grounds for relief specified in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5) are inapplicable.
The term “mistake” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which authorizes a court to reopen a final judgment, includes a judge’s errors of law.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
Kemp v. United States
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
No. 21–5726. Argued April 19, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022
Petitioner Dexter Kemp and seven codefendants were convicted of various drug and gun crimes. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated their appeals and, in November 2013, affirmed their convictions and sentences. In April 2015, Kemp moved the District Court to vacate his sentence under 28 U. S. C. §2255. The District Court dismissed Kemp’s motion as untimely because it was not filed within one year of “the date on which [his] judgment of conviction [became] final.” §2255(f)(1). Kemp did not appeal. Then, in June 2018, Kemp sought to reopen his §2255 proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which authorizes a court to reopen a final judgment under certain enumerated circumstances. As relevant here, a party may seek relief within one year under Rule 60(b)(1) based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” A party may also seek relief “within a reasonable time” under Rule 60(b)(6) for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only when the other grounds for relief specified in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5) are inapplicable. Kemp’s motion to reopen his §2255 proceedings invoked Rule 60(b)(6), but his motion sought reopening based on a “mistake” covered by Rule 60(b)(1). Specifically, Kemp argued that the 1-year limitations period on his §2255 motion did not begin to run until his codefendants’ rehearing petitions were denied in May 2014, making his April 2015 motion timely. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Kemp that his §2255 motion was timely but concluded that because Kemp alleged judicial mistake, his Rule 60(b) motion fell under Rule 60(b)(1), was subject to Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period, and was therefore untimely.
Held: The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period. Pp. 3–10.
(a) As a matter of text, structure, and history, a “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. When the Rule was adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” applied to any “misconception,” “misunderstanding,” or “fault in opinion or judgment.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1383. Likewise, in its legal usage, “mistake” included errors “of law or fact.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1195. Thus, regardless whether “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) carries its ordinary meaning or legal meaning, it includes a judge’s mistakes of law. Rule 60(b)(1)’s drafters could have used language to connote a narrower understanding of “mistake,” yet they chose not to qualify that term. Similarly, the Rule’s drafters could have excluded mistakes by judges from the Rule’s reach. In fact, the Rule used to read that way. When adopted in 1938, Rule 60(b) initially referred to “his”—i.e., a party’s—“mistake,” so judicial errors were not covered. The 1946 revision to the Rule deleted the word “his,” thereby removing any limitation on whose mistakes could qualify. Pp. 4–6.
(b) Neither the Government nor Kemp offers a reason to depart from this reading of Rule 60(b)(1). Pp. 6–10.
(1) The Government contends that the term “mistake” encompasses only so-called “obvious” legal errors. This contention—also held by several Courts of Appeals—is unconvincing. None of the dictionaries from the time the Rule was adopted and revised suggests this “obviousness” gloss. Nor does the text or history of Rule 60(b)(1) limit its reach only to flagrant cases that would have historically been corrected by courts sitting in equity. Finally, requiring courts to decide not only whether there was a mistake but also whether that mistake was sufficiently “obvious” raises questions of administrability. P. 6.
(2) Kemp’s arguments for limiting Rule 60(b)(1) to non-judicial, non-legal errors are also unconvincing. He claims that Rule 60(b)(1)’s other grounds for relief—“inadvertence,” “surprise,” and “excusable neglect”—involve exclusively non-legal, non-judicial errors, and thus “mistake” should be similarly limited. But courts have found that excusable neglect may involve legal error, see, e.g., Lenaghan v. Pepsico, Inc., 961 F.2d 1250, 1254–1255, and they have a similar history of granting relief based on “judicial inadvertence,” Larson v. Heritage Square Assocs., 952 F.2d 1533, 1536. Kemp argues that Rule 60’s structure favors interpreting the term “mistake” narrowly to include only non-legal errors, and the Court’s contrary interpretation would create confusing overlap between Rule 60(b)(1) and relief available under other parts of Rule 60 not subject to Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period. But the overlap Kemp suggests would exist even if “mistake” reached only factual errors. Courts of Appeals have well-established tests for distinguishing between these Rules. And should such overlap ever create an irreconcilable conflict, courts may then resort to ordinary interpretive rules to determine which Rule to apply. As for Kemp’s worry that the Court’s interpretation would allow parties to evade other time limits by, for example, repackaging a tardy motion under Rule 59(e), the risk Kemp identifies would exist even under his own interpretation. And, in any event, the alleged specter of litigation gamesmanship and strategic delay is overstated because a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, like all Rule 60(b) motions, must be made “within a reasonable time.” Finally, Kemp protests that this Court’s reading is inconsistent with the history of Rule 60(b). But his argument is based on the mistaken notions that Rule 60(b)(1)’s list of grounds for reopening was understood to be a “term of art” when adopted, and that Rule 60(b)(6) alone was intended to afford relief for judicial legal errors that had previously been remedied by bills of review. Pp. 6–10.
857 Fed. Appx. 573, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
JUDGMENT ISSUED |
Adjudged to be AFFIRMED. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion. |
Argued. For petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. For respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. |
Reply of Dexter Earl Kemp submitted. |
Reply of petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of United States of America submitted. |
Brief of respondent United States filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of respondent United States of America filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of respondent United States of America filed. (Distributed) |
CIRCULATED |
The record from the U.S.C.A. 11th Circuit is electronic and located on PACER. |
The record from the U.S.D.C. Southern Dist. of Florida (Miami) is electronic and located on Pacer. |
Record requested from the U.S.C.A. 11th Circuit. |
ARGUMENT SET FOR Tuesday, April 19, 2022. |
Amicus brief of New Civil Liberties Alliance submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of New Civil Liberties Alliance filed. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED. |
Brief of petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp filed. |
Brief of Dexter Earl Kemp submitted. |
Motion of Dexter Earl Kemp to dispense with joint appendix submitted. |
Motion of Dexter Earl Kemp to dispense with joint appendix submitted. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp. |
Motion to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for a writ of certiorari GRANTED. |
Reply of petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp filed. (Distributed) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/7/2022. |
Waiver of the 14-day waiting period under 15.5 filed. |
Brief of respondent United States in opposition filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including December 3, 2021. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from November 19, 2021 to December 3, 2021, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including November 19, 2021. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from October 20, 2021 to November 19, 2021, submitted to The Clerk. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due October 20, 2021) |