Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. ___ (2021)
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) restricts communications made with an “automatic telephone dialing system,” defined as equipment with the capacity both “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator,” and to dial those numbers, 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1). Facebook’s social media platform allows users to elect to receive text messages when someone attempts to log in to the user’s account from a new device. Facebook sent such texts to Duguid, alerting him to login activity on a Facebook account linked to his telephone number, but Duguid never created any Facebook account. Duguid tried, unsuccessfully, to stop the unwanted messages. He brought a putative class action, alleging that Facebook violated the TCPA by maintaining a database that stored phone numbers and programming its equipment to send automated text messages. The Ninth Circuit ruled in Duguid’s favor.
The Supreme Court reversed: To qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the TCPA, a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. The statutory context confirms that the TCPA’s autodialer definition excludes equipment that does not use a random or sequential number generator. Congress found autodialer technology harmful because autodialers can dial emergency lines randomly or tie up all of an entity's sequentially numbered phone lines. Duguid’s interpretation would encompass any equipment that stores and dials telephone numbers.
To qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 19–511. Argued December 8, 2020—Decided April 1, 2021
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) proscribes abusive telemarketing practices by, among other things, restricting certain communications made with an “automatic telephone dialing system.” The TCPA defines such “autodialers” as equipment with the capacity both “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator,” and to dial those numbers. 47 U. S. C. §227(a)(1). Petitioner Facebook, Inc., maintains a social media platform that, as a security feature, allows users to elect to receive text messages when someone attempts to log in to the user’s account from a new device or browser. Facebook sent such texts to Noah Duguid, alerting him to login activity on a Facebook account linked to his telephone number, but Duguid never created that account (or any account on Facebook). Duguid tried without success to stop the unwanted messages, and eventually brought a putative class action against Facebook. He alleged that Facebook violated the TCPA by maintaining a database that stored phone numbers and programming its equipment to send automated text messages. Facebook countered that the TCPA does not apply because the technology it used to text Duguid did not use a “random or sequential number generator.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that §227(a)(1) applies to a notification system like Facebook’s that has the capacity to dial automatically stored numbers.
Held: To qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the TCPA, a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator, or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. Pp. 4–12.
(a) This case turns on whether the clause “using a random or sequential number generator” in §227(a)(1)(A) modifies both of the two verbs that precede it (“store” and “produce”), as Facebook contends, or only the closest one (“produce”), as maintained by Duguid. The most natural reading of the text and other aspects of §227(a)(1)(A) confirm Facebook’s view. First, in an ordinary case, the “series-qualifier canon” instructs that a modifier at the end of a series of nouns or verbs applies to the entire series. Here, that canon indicates that the modifying phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” qualifies both antecedent verbs, “store” and “produce.” Second, the modifying phrase immediately follows a concise, integrated clause (“store or produce telephone numbers to be called”), which uses the word “or” to connect two verbs that share a common direct object (“telephone numbers to be called”). Given this structure, it would be odd to apply the modifier to just one part of the cohesive clause. Third, the comma in §227(a)(1)(A) separating the modifying phrase from the antecedents suggests that the qualifier applies to all of the antecedents, instead of just the nearest one. Pp. 4–6.
Duguid’s insistence that a limiting clause should ordinarily be read as modifying only the phrase that it immediately follows (the so-called “rule of the last antecedent”) does not help his cause for two reasons. First, the Court has declined to apply that rule in the specific context where, as here, the modifying clause appears after an integrated list. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 344, n. 4. Second, the last antecedent before the clause at issue in §227(a)(1)(A) is not “produce,” as Duguid argues, but rather “telephone numbers to be called.” Pp. 6–7.
(b) The statutory context confirms that the TCPA’s autodialer definition excludes equipment that does not use a random or sequential number generator. Congress found autodialer technology harmful because autodialers can dial emergency lines randomly or tie up all of the sequentially numbered phone lines at a single entity. Facebook’s interpretation of §227(a)(1)(A) better matches the scope of the TCPA to these specific concerns. Duguid’s interpretation, on the other hand, would encompass any equipment that stores and dials telephone numbers. Pp. 7–8.
(c) Duguid’s other counterarguments do not overcome the clear commands of the statute’s text and broader context. First, he claims that his interpretation best accords with the “sense” of the text. It would make little sense however, to classify as autodialers all equipment with the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers, including virtually all modern cell phones. Second, Duguid invokes the “distributive canon,” which provides that a series of antecedents and consequents should be distributed to one another based on how they most naturally relate in context. But that canon is less suited here because there is only one consequent to match to two antecedents, and in any event, the modifying phrase naturally relates to both antecedents. Third, Duguid broadly construes the TCPA’s privacy-protection goals. But despite Congress’ general concern about intrusive telemarketing practices, Congress ultimately chose a precise autodialer definition. Finally, Duguid argues that a random or sequential number generator is a “senescent technology,” i.e., one likely to become outdated quickly. That may or may not be the case, but either way, this Court cannot rewrite the TCPA to update it for modern technology. Congress’ chosen definition of an autodialer requires that the equipment in question must use a random or sequential number generator. That definition excludes equipment like Facebook’s login notification system, which does not use such technology. Pp. 8–11.
926 F.3d 1146, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
JUDGMENT ISSUED. |
Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. |
Argued. For petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D. C. For respondent United States in support of petitioner: Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent Noah Duguid: Bryan A. Garner, Dallas, Tex. |
Reply of petitioner Facebook, Inc. filed. (Distributed) |
Reply of respondent United States in support of petitioner filed. (Distributed) |
Motion for divided argument filed by petitioner GRANTED. |
CIRCULATED |
Brief amicus curiae of Main Street Alliance filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of 21 Members of Congress filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of Electronic Privacy Information Center, et al. filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of State of North Carolina, et al. filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of National Consumer Law Center, et al. filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amicus curiae of Dr. Henning Schulzrinne filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of John McCurley and Dan Deforest filed. (Distributed) |
Motion for divided argument filed by petitioner Facebook, Inc. |
Brief of respondent Noah Duguid filed. |
Record requested from the U.S.C.A. 9th Circuit. |
Record received from the U.S.C.A. 9th Circuit is electronic and located on PACER. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Tuesday, December 8, 2020. |
Brief amici curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Credit Union National Association, Inc. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Midland Credit Management, Inc. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Salesforce.com, Inc. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Home Depot, Inc. filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Life Insurance Direct Marketing Association, American Property Casualty Insurance Association and Consumer Credit Industry Association filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Healthcare Companies filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Quicken Loans, LLC filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Retail Litigation Center, Inc., et al. filed. |
Brief amici curiae of “On-Demand” Technology Platforms filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Washington Legal Foundation filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Professional Association for Customer Engagement and Noble Systems Corporation filed. |
Brief of respondent United States in support filed. |
Joint appendix filed. |
Brief of petitioner Facebook, Inc. filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file the briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including September 4, 2020. The time to file respondents' brief on the merits is extended to and including October 16, 2020. |
Motion for an extension of time filed. |
Petition GRANTED limited to Question 2 presented by the petition. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 7/8/2020. |
Supplemental brief of respondent Noah Duguid filed. |
Supplemental brief of petitioner Facebook, Inc. filed. (Distributed) |
Reply of petitioner Facebook, Inc. filed. (Distributed) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/24/2020. |
Letter waiving the 14-day waiting period for the distribution of the petition pursuant to Rule 15.5 filed. |
Brief of respondent Noah Duguid in opposition filed. |
Response Requested. (Due January 3, 2020) |
Reply of petitioner Facebook, Inc. filed. (Distributed) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/13/2019. |
Waiver of the 14-day waiting period under Rule 15.5 filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Midland Credit Management, Inc. and Encore Capital Group, Inc. filed. |
Brief of respondent United States filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Credit Union National Association, Inc. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of ACA International, Inc. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Retail Litigation Center, Inc. filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and Business Roundtable filed. |
Waiver of right of respondent Noah Duguid to respond filed. |
Blanket Consent filed by Petitioner, Facebook, Inc. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due November 20, 2019) |