Petitioner national labor union's constitution provides that
resignations from the union are not permitted during a strike. The
union fined 10 members who, in violation of this provision,
resigned during a strike by petitioner local unions and returned to
work. Respondent employer representative thereafter filed charges
with the National Labor Relations Board (Board), claiming that such
levying of fines constituted an unfair labor practice under §
8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, which makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of their § 7 rights. The Board agreed, and the
Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.
Held: In related cases this Court has invariably
yielded to Board decisions on whether fines imposed by a union
"restrained or coerced" employees. Moreover, the Board has
consistently construed § 8(b)(1)(A) as prohibiting the fining of
employees who have resigned from a union contrary to a restriction
in the union constitution. Therefore, the Board's decision in this
case is entitled to this Court's deference. Pp.
473 U. S.
100-116.
(a) The Board was justified in concluding that, by restricting
the right of employees to resign, the provision in question
impaired the congressional policy of voluntary unionism implicit in
§ 8(a)(3) of the Act. Pp.
473 U. S.
104-107.
(b) The proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), which states that nothing in §
8(b) (1)(A) shall
"impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein,"
was intended to protect union rules involving admission and
expulsion, and not to allow unions to make rules restricting the
right to resign. Accordingly, the Board properly concluded that the
provision in question is not a "rule with respect to the retention
of membership." Pp.
473 U. S.
108-110.
(c) The legislative history does not support petitioners'
contention that Congress did not intend to protect the right of
union members to resign. Pp.
473 U. S.
110-112.
Page 473 U. S. 96
(d) No is there any merit to petitioners' argument that, because
the common law does not prohibit restrictions on resignation, the
provision in question does not violate § 8(b)(1)(A). Pp.
473 U. S.
112-114.
724 F.2d 57, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
473 U. S. 116.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
473 U. S. 117.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
473 U. S.
133.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO (League), a
labor union, provides in its constitution that resignations are not
permitted during a strike or when a strike is imminent. The League
fined 10 of its members who, in violation of this provision,
resigned during a strike and returned to work. The National Labor
Relations Board held that these fines were imposed in violation of
§ 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(1)(A). We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in
order to decide whether § 8(b)(1)(A) reasonably may be construed by
the
Page 473 U. S. 97
Board as prohibiting a union from fining members who have
tendered resignations invalid under the union constitution.
I
The League is a national union composed of local associations
(locals). In May, 1976, its constitution was amended to provide
that
"[n]o resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or from the
League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time
when a strike or lockout appears imminent."
This amendment, known as League Law 13, became effective in
October, 1976, after being ratified by the League's locals. On May
5, 1977, when a collective bargaining agreement expired, two locals
began an economic strike against several manufacturing companies in
Rockford, Illinois, and Beloit, Wisconsin. Forty-three of the two
locals' members participated. In early September, 1977, after the
locals formally rejected a contract offer, a striking union member
submitted a letter of resignation to the Beloit Association.
[
Footnote 1] He returned to
work the following day. During the next three months, 10 more union
members resigned from the Rockford and Beloit locals and returned
to work. On December 19, 1977, the strike ended when the parties
signed a new collective bargaining agreement. The locals notified
10 employees who had resigned that their resignations had been
rejected as violative of League Law 13. [
Footnote 2] The locals further informed the
Page 473 U. S. 98
employees that, as union members, they were subject to sanctions
for returning to work. Each was fined approximately the equivalent
of his earnings during the strike.
The Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers' Association (Association)
had represented the employers throughout the collective bargaining
process. It filed charges with the Board against the League and its
two locals, the petitioners. Relying on § 8(b)(1)(A), the
Association claimed that levying fines against employees who had
resigned was an unfair labor practice. [
Footnote 3] Following a hearing, an Administrative Law
Judge found that petitioners had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by fining
employees for returning to work after tendering resignations.
Pattern Makers' League of North America, 265 N.L.R.B.
1332, 1339 (1982) (decision of G. Wacknov, ALJ). The Board agreed
that § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibited the union from imposing sanctions on
the 10 employees. [
Footnote 4]
Pattern Makers'
Page 473 U. S.
99
League of North America, supra. In holding that League
Law 13 did not justify the imposition of fines on the members who
attempted to resign, the Board relied on its earlier decision in
Machinists Local 127 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984
(1982),
enf. denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (CA9 1984). [
Footnote 5]
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
enforced the Board's order. 724 F.2d 57 (1983). The Court of
Appeals stated that, by restricting the union members' freedom to
resign, League Law 13 "frustrate[d] the overriding policy of labor
law that employees be free to choose whether to engage in concerted
activities."
Id. at 60. Noting that the "mutual reliance"
theory was given little weight in
NLRB v. Textile Workers,
409 U. S. 213
(1972), the court rejected petitioners' argument that their
members, by participating in the strike vote, had "waived their
Section 7 right to abandon the strike." 724 F.2d at 60-61. Finally,
the Court of Appeals reasoned that, under
Scofield
Page 473 U. S. 100
v. NLRB, 394 U.
S. 423 (1969), labor organizations may impose
disciplinary fines against members only if they are "free to leave
the union and escape the rule[s]." 724 F.2d at 61.
We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari, 469 U.S. 814
(1984), to resolve the conflict between the Courts of Appeals over
the validity of restrictions on union members' right to resign.
[
Footnote 6] The Board has held
that such restrictions are invalid and do not justify imposing
sanctions on employees who have attempted to resign from the union.
Because of the Board's "special competence" in the field of labor
relations, its interpretation of the Act is accorded substantial
deference.
NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.
S. 251,
420 U. S. 266
(1975). The question for decision today is thus narrowed to whether
the Board's construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable.
See
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.
S. 822,
465 U. S. 830
(1984). We believe that § 8(b)(1)(A) properly may be construed as
prohibiting the fining of employees who have tendered resignations
ineffective under a restriction in the union constitution. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals enforcing the
Board's order.
II
A
Section 7 of the Act, 29 U. S! C. § 157, grants employees the
right to "refrain from any or all [concerted] . . . activities. . .
." [
Footnote 7] This general
right is implemented by
Page 473 U. S. 101
§ 8(b)(1)(A). The latter section provides that a union commits
an unfair labor practice if it "restrain[s] or coerce[s] employees
in the exercise" of their § 7 rights. [
Footnote 8] When employee members of a union refuse to
support a strike (whether or not a rule prohibits returning to work
during a strike), they are refraining from "concerted activity."
Therefore, imposing fines on these employees for returning to work
"restrain[s]" the exercise of their § 7 rights. Indeed, if the
terms "refrain" and "restrain or coerce" are interpreted literally,
fining employees to enforce compliance with any union rule or
policy would violate the Act.
Despite this language from the Act, the Court in
NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175
(1967), held that § 8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit labor
organizations from fining current members. In
NLRB v. Textile
Workers, supra, and
Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U. S.
84 (1973) (per curiam), the Court found as a corollary
that unions may not fine former members who have resigned lawfully.
Neither
Textile Workers, supra, nor
Machinists,
supra, however, involved a provision like League Law 13,
restricting the members' right to resign. We decide today whether a
union is precluded from fining employees who have attempted to
resign when resignations are prohibited by the union's
constitution. [
Footnote 9]
Page 473 U. S. 102
B
The Court's reasoning in
Allis-Chalmers, supra,
supports the Board's conclusion that petitioners in this case
violated § 8(b)(1)(A). In
Allis-Chalmers, the Court held
that imposing court-enforceable fines against current union members
does not "restrain or coerce" the workers in the exercise of their
§ 7 rights. [
Footnote 10] In
so concluding, the Court relied on the legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act. It noted that the sponsor of § 8(b)(1)(A) never
intended for that provision "
to interfere with the internal
affairs or organization of unions,'" 388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 187,
quoting 93 Cong.Rec. 4272 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball), and that
other proponents of the measure likewise disclaimed an intent to
interfere with unions' "internal affairs." 388 U.S. at 388 U. S.
187-190. From the legislative history, the Court
reasoned that Congress did not intend to prohibit unions from
fining present members, as this was an internal matter. The Court
has emphasized that the crux of Allis-Chalmers' holding
was the distinction between "internal and external enforcement of
union rules. . . ." Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 428.
See also NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S.
67, 412 U. S. 73
(1973).
The congressional purpose to preserve unions' control over their
own "internal affairs" does not suggest an intent to authorize
restrictions on the right to resign. Traditionally, union members
were free to resign and escape union discipline. [
Footnote 11]
Page 473 U. S. 103
In 1947, union constitutional provisions restricting the right
to resign were uncommon, if not unknown. [
Footnote 12] Therefore, allowing unions to "extend an
employee's membership obligation through restrictions on
resignation" would "expan[d] the definition of internal action"
beyond the contours envisioned by the Taft-Hartley Congress.
International Assn. of Machinists, Local 1414 (Neufeld
Porsche-Audi, Inc.), 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, p. 984. [
Footnote 13]
C
Language and reasoning from other opinions of this Court confirm
that the Board's construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable.
Page 473 U. S. 104
In
Scofield v. NLRB, supra, the Court upheld a union
rule setting a ceiling on the daily wages that members working on
an incentive basis could earn. The union members' freedom to resign
was critical to the Court's decision that the union rule did not
"restrain or coerce" the employees within the meaning of §
8(b)(1)(A). It stated that the rule was "reasonably enforced
against union members who [were] free to leave the union and escape
the rule."
Id. at
394 U. S. 430. The Court deemed it important that, if
members were unable to take full advantage of their contractual
right to earn additional pay, it was because they had "chosen to
become
and remain union members."
Id. at
394 U. S. 435
(emphasis added).
The decision in
NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.
S. 213 (1972), also supports the Board's view that §
8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from punishing members not free to
resign. There, 31 employees resigned their union membership and
resumed working during a strike. We held that fining these former
members "restrained or coerced" them, within the meaning of §
8(b)(1)(A). In reaching this conclusion, we said that "the vitality
of § 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from
the actions he endorsed in May."
Id. at
409 U. S.
217-218. Restrictions on the right to resign curtail the
freedom that the
Textile Workers Court deemed so
important.
See also Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U. S.
84 (1973).
III
Section 8(b)(1)(A) allows unions to enforce only those rules
that "impai[r] no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws. .
. ."
Scofield, supra, at
394 U. S. 430.
The Board has found union restrictions on the right to resign to be
inconsistent with the policy of voluntary unionism implicit in §
8(a)(3). [
Footnote 14]
Page 473 U. S. 105
See International Assn. of Machinists, Inc., Local 114
(Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.), supra; Machinists Local 127 (Dalmo
Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. at 992 (Chairman Van de Water and
Member Hunter, concurring). We believe that the inconsistency
between union restrictions on the right to resign and the policy of
voluntary unionism supports the Board's conclusion that League Law
13 is invalid.
Closed shop agreements, legalized by the Wagner Act in 1935,
[
Footnote 15] became quite
common in the early 1940's. Under these agreements, employers could
hire and retain in their employ only union members in good
standing. R. Gorman,
Page 473 U. S. 106
Labor Law, ch. 28, § 1, p. 639 (1976). Full union membership was
thus compulsory in a closed shop; in order to keep their jobs,
employees were required to attend union meetings, support union
leaders, and otherwise adhere to union rules. Because of mounting
objections to the closed shop, in 1947 -- after hearings and full
consideration -- Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act. Section
8(a)(3) of that Act effectively eliminated compulsory union
membership by outlawing the closed shop. The union security
agreements permitted by § 8(a)(3) require employees to pay dues,
but an employee cannot be discharged for failing to abide by union
rules or policies with which he disagrees. [
Footnote 16]
Full union membership thus no longer can be a requirement of
employment. If a new employee refuses formally to join a union and
subject himself to its discipline, he cannot be fired. Moreover, no
employee can be discharged if he initially joins a union, and
subsequently resigns. We think it noteworthy that § 8(a)(3)
protects the employment rights of the dissatisfied member, as well
as those of the worker who never assumed full union membership. By
allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3)
protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his
union.
League Law 13 curtails this freedom to resign from full union
membership. Nevertheless, petitioners contend
Page 473 U. S. 107
that League Law 13 does not contravene the policy of voluntary
unionism imbedded in the Act. They assert that this provision does
not interfere with workers' employment rights, because offending
members are not discharged, but only fined. We find this argument
unpersuasive, for a union has not left a "worker's employment
rights inviolate when it exacts [his entire] paycheck in
satisfaction of a fine imposed for working." Wellington, Union
Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 Yale L.J. 1022, 1023 (1976). Congress
in 1947 sought to eliminate completely any requirement that the
employee maintain full union membership. [
Footnote 17] Therefore, the Board was justified in
concluding that, by restricting the right of employees to resign,
League Law 13 impairs the policy of voluntary unionism.
IV
We now consider specifically three arguments advanced by
petitioners: (i) union rules restricting the right to resign are
protected by the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A); (ii) the legislative
history of the Act shows that Congress did not intend to protect
the right of union members to resign; and (iii) labor unions should
be allowed to restrict the right to resign because other voluntary
associations are permitted to do so. [
Footnote 18]
Page 473 U. S. 108
A
Petitioners first argue that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A)
expressly allows unions to place restrictions on the right to
resign. The proviso states that nothing in § 8(b)(1)(A) shall
"impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). Petitioners contend that,
because League Law 13 places restrictions on the right to withdraw
from the union, it is a "rul[e] with respect to the . . . retention
of membership" within the meaning of the proviso. [
Footnote 19]
Neither the Board nor this Court has ever interpreted the
proviso as allowing unions to make rules restricting the right
Page 473 U. S. 109
to resign. [
Footnote 20]
Rather, the Court has assumed that "rules with respect to the . . .
retention of membership" are those that provide for the expulsion
of employees from the union. [
Footnote 21] The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act is consistent with this interpretation. Senator Holland, the
proviso's sponsor, stated that § 8(b)(1)(A) should not outlaw union
rules "which ha[ve] to do with the admission
or the
expulsion of members." 93 Cong.Rec. 4271 (1947) (emphasis
added). Senator Taft accepted the proviso, for he likewise believed
that a union should be free to "refuse [a] man admission to the
union, or
expel him from the union."
Id. at 4272
(emphasis added). Furthermore, the legislative history of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §
401
et seq., confirms that the proviso was intended to
protect union rules involving admission and expulsion. [
Footnote 22]
Page 473 U. S. 110
Accordingly, we find no basis for refusing to defer to the
Board's conclusion that League Law 13 is not a "rule with respect
to the retention of membership," within the meaning of the
proviso.
B
The petitioners next argue that the legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act shows that Congress made a considered decision not
to protect union members' right to resign. Section 8(c) of the
House bill contained a detailed "bill of rights" for labor union
members. H.R. 3020, § 8(c), 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22-26 (1947).
Included was a provision making it an unfair labor practice to
"deny to any [union] member the right to resign from the
organization at any time." H.R. 3020,
supra, § 8(c)(4), at
23. The Senate bill, on the other hand, did not set forth specific
employee rights, but stated more generally that it was an unfair
labor practice to "restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of
their § 7 rights. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(b)(1)(A),
p. 81 (1947) (as passed by Senate). The Taft-Hartley Act contains
the Senate bill's general language, rather than the more specific
House prohibitions.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). The
petitioners contend that the omission of the House provision shows
that Congress expressly decided not to protect the "right to
resign."
The legislative history does not support this contention. The
"right to resign" apparently was included in the original House
bill to protect workers unable to resign because of "closed shop"
agreements. Union constitutions limiting the right to resign were
uncommon in 1947,
see n.
12 supra; closed shop agreements, however, often
impeded union resignations. The House Report H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), confirms that closed shop agreements
provided the impetus for the inclusion of a right to resign in
Page 473 U. S. 111
the House bill. The Report simply states that, even under the
proposed legislation, employees could be required to pay dues
pursuant to union security agreements.
Id. at 32. Because
the closed shop was outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act,
see
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), it is not surprising that
Congress thought it unnecessary explicitly to preserve the right to
resign.
Even if § 8(c)(4) of the House bill, H.R. 3020,
supra,
was directed at restrictive union rules, its omission from the
Taft-Hartley Act does not convince us that the Board's construction
of § 8(b)(1)(A) is unreasonable. The House Conference Report, upon
which petitioners primarily rely, does state that the specific
prohibitions of § 8(c) were "omitted . . . as unfair labor
practices," H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 46
(1947). But this language does not suggest that all employee rights
arguably protected by the House bill were to be left unprotected.
Cf. id. at 43 ("[T]he primary strike for recognition . . .
was not prohibited"). Apparently, the Report was intended merely to
inform House Members that the detailed prohibitions of § 8(c) were
not separately included in the conference bill as "unfair labor
practices." We are reluctant to reach a contrary conclusion, and
thereby overturn the Board's decision, on the basis of this summary
statement in the House Conference Report. Congress must have been
aware that the broad language of § 8(b)(1)(A) would reach some of
the same union conduct proscribed by the detailed "bill of rights."
[
Footnote 23]
Page 473 U. S. 112
Petitioners concede that, "absent the legislative history," the
Board's construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) would be entitled to
deference. Tr. of Second Oral Arg. 15 (Apr.1985). They argue,
however, that, "in this instance, the legislative materials are too
clearly opposed to what the Board did to permit the result the
Board reached."
Id. at 17. We do not agree. The ambiguous
legislative history upon which petitioners rely falls far short of
showing that the Board's interpretation of the Act is unreasonable.
[
Footnote 24]
C
In
Textile Workers, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 216,
and
Machinists, 412 U.S. at
412 U. S. 88
(per curiam), the Court stated that, when a union constitution does
not purport to restrict the right to resign, the "law which
normally is reflected in our free institutions" is applicable.
Relying on this quoted language, petitioners
Page 473 U. S. 113
argue that League Law 13 is valid. They assert that, because the
common law does not prohibit restrictions on resignation, [
Footnote 25] such provisions are not
violative of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. We find no merit in this
argument.
Textile Workers, supra, and
Machinists,
supra, held only that, in the absence of restrictions on the
right to resign, members are free to leave the union at any time.
Although the Court noted that its decisions were consistent with
the common law rule, it did not state that the validity of
restrictions on the right to resign should be determined with
reference to common law.
The Court's decision in
NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding
Workers, 391 U. S. 418
(1968), demonstrates that many union rules, although valid under
the common law of associations, run afoul of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act. [
Footnote 26] There the
union expelled
Page 473 U. S. 114
a member who failed to comply with a rule requiring the
"exhaust[ion of] all remedies and appeals within the Union . . .
before . . . resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the
Union."
Id. at
391 U. S. 421.
Under the common law, associations may require their members to
exhaust all internal remedies.
See, e.g., Medical Soc. of
Mobile Cty. v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944).
Nevertheless, the
Marine Workers Court held that
"considerations of public policy" mandated a holding that the union
rule requiring exhaustion violated § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(1)(A). 391 U.S. at
391 U. S. 424;
see also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 430
(union rule is invalid under § 8(b)(1)(A) if it "impairs [a] policy
Congress has imbedded in the labor laws").
The Board reasonably has concluded that League Law 13 "restrains
or coerces" employees,
see § 8(b)(1)(A), and is
inconsistent with the congressional policy of voluntary unionism.
Therefore, whatever may have been the common law, the Board's
interpretation of the Act merits our deference.
V
The Board has the primary responsibility for applying "
the
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial
life.'" Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.
S. 488, 441 U. S. 496
(1979), quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.
S. 221, 373 U. S. 236
(1963), in turn citing NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U.
S. 357, 357 U. S.
362-363 (1958). Where the Board's construction of the
Act is reasonable, it should not be rejected "merely because the
courts might prefer another view of the statute." Ford Motor
Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 441 U. S. 497.
In this case, two factors suggest that we should be particularly
reluctant to hold that the Board's interpretation of the Act is
impermissible.
Page 473 U. S. 115
First, in related cases, this Court invariably has yielded to
Board decisions on whether fines imposed by a union "restrain or
coerce" employees. [
Footnote
27] Second, the Board consistently has construed § 8(b)(1)(A)
as prohibiting the imposition of fines on employees who have
tendered resignations invalid under a union constitution. [
Footnote 28] Therefore, we conclude
that the Board's decision here is entitled to our deference.
VI
The Board found that by fining employees who had tendered
resignations, the petitioners violated § 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Page 473 U. S. 116
Act, even though League Law 13 purported to render the
resignations ineffective. We defer to the Board's interpretation of
the Act, and so affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
enforcing the Board's order.
It s so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
William Kohl complained in his letter:
"I no longer feel that the union officers are acting in the best
interest of the men. We need fair and reasonable negotiators to
solve our problems."
3 Record, General Counsel Exhibit 2.
[
Footnote 2]
Kohl, the other employee who returned to work, was expelled from
the union. On January 14, 1978, the Beloit local notified Kohl's
employer that, because he was no longer a union member, he should
be discharged pursuant to the "union shop" agreement. Two weeks
later, the Beloit local informed Kohl that he could gain
readmission to the union, and thus remain employed, if he paid back
dues, a readmission fee, and $4,200 in "damages . . . for deserting
the strike by returning to work."
Pattern Makers' League of
North America, 265 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1337 (1982) (decision of G.
Wacknov, ALJ). Kohl was denied readmission to the union because he
refused to pay the amounts allegedly due. Nevertheless, he was not
discharged by his employer.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 3]
The Association also charged that petitioners committed the
following unfair labor practices: (i) threatening employees with
physical harm and loss of accrued pension benefits if they returned
to work during the strike; and (2) attempting to have Kohl and
another employee, John Nelson, discharged pursuant to a "union
shop" agreement.
Ibid. These charges are unrelated to the
question presented in this case. Therefore, we express no opinion
concerning the disposition of these claims by the ALJ, the Board,
and the Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 4]
Writing separately, Member Fanning asserted that a restriction
on the right to resign would not violate § 8(b)(1)(A) if it
functioned only to prevent members from removing their names from
the union's rolls. He agreed, however, that the employees could not
be fined for returning to work after tendering their resignations.
Pattern Makers' League of North America, supra, at 1335
(Member Fanning, concurring and dissenting in part). Member Jenkins
dissented, as he did in
Machinist Local 127 (Dalmo Victor
II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982),
enf. denied, 725 F.2d
1212 (CA9 1984).
See n
5,
infra.
[
Footnote 5]
In
Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), several
employees resigned from a union and returned to work during a
strike. The union constitution prohibited resignations during, or
within 14 days preceding, strikes. As in this case, the employees'
resignations were not accepted, and they were fined for aiding and
abetting the employer. The Board held that fining these employees
for returning to work after tendering resignations violated §
8(b)(1)(A).
Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter stated that no
restriction on the right to resign was permissible under the Act;
they reasoned that such a rule allowed the union to exercise
control over "external matters." Moreover, these Board members
thought that restrictions on resignation impaired the congressional
policy, embodied in § 8(a)(3), of voluntary unionism. Therefore,
they concluded that any discipline premised on such a rule violates
§ 8(b)(1)(A). 263 N.L.R.B. at 988.
Members Fanning and Zimmerman asserted that a rule legitimately
could restrict the right to resign for a period of 30 days. Because
the rule in question restricted the right to resign indefinitely,
however, they agreed that the union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A).
Id. at 987.
Member Jenkins, the lone dissenter, contended that the union's
restriction on resignation was protected by the proviso to §
8(b)(1)(A), which states that a union may "prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein."
Id. at 993.
[
Footnote 6]
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a union
may impose restrictions on its members' right to resign.
Machinists Local 127 (Dalmo Victor II), supra.
See n 5,
supra, for a discussion of the Board decision that the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce.
[
Footnote 7]
Section 7 of the Act, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 157,
provides:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title."
[
Footnote 8]
Section 8(b)(1)(A), as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A),
provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents -- "
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title:
Provided,
That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein. . . ."
[
Footnote 9]
In both
Textile Workers, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 217,
and
Machinists, 412 U.S. at
412 U. S. 88,
the Court explicitly left open the question of "the extent to which
contractual restriction on a member's right to resign may be
limited by the Act. "
Ibid.
[
Footnote 10]
The proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 168(b)(1)(A), states
that nothing in the section shall
"impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein."
The Court in
Allis-Chalmers assumed that the proviso
could not be read to authorize the imposition of court-enforceable
fines. 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 192.
See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67,
412 U. S. 71, n.
6 (1973) ("This Court . . in holding that court enforcement of
union fines was not an unfair labor practice in
NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., relied on congressional intent only
with respect to the first part of this section") (citation
omitted).
[
Footnote 11]
See Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 365, 117 N.E. 582,
587 (1917) ("The members of the organization . . . who are not
willing to obey the orders of the organization are at liberty to
withdraw therefrom");
Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of
Painters, 57 App.D.C. 322, 324, 23 F.2d 743, 745,
cert.
denied, 276 U.S. 631 (1928) (It is "not unlawful for . . .
unions to punish a member by fine, suspension, or expulsion for an
infraction of the union rules, since membership in the union is
purely voluntary");
Bayer v. Brotherhood of Painter, Decorator
and Paperhangers of America, Local 301, 108 N.J.Eq. 257, 262,
154 A. 759, 761 (1931) ("association is a voluntary one, and the
workmen may decline to become members or withdraw from membership,
if dissatisfied with the conduct of its affairs");
Mische v.
Kaminski, 127 Pa.Super. 66, 91-92, 193 A. 410, 421 (1937)
(members "had a right to leave the union");
Longshore Printing
Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 540, 38 P. 547, 551 (1894) ("No
resort can be had to compulsory methods of any kind either to
increase, keep up, or retain such membership").
[
Footnote 12]
Our attention has not been called to any provision limiting the
right to resign in a union constitution extant in 1947. Indeed,
even by the 1970's, very few unions had such restrictions in their
constitutions.
See Millan, Disciplinary Developments Under
§ 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 20 Loyola L.Rev.
245, 269 (1974); Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85
Yale L.J. 1022, 1042 (1976).
[
Footnote 13]
In
International Assn. of Machinists, Local 1414 (Neufeld
Porsche-Audi, Inc.), a majority of the Board held that any
restriction on the right to resign violates the Act. This was the
position taken by Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter in
Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984
(1982),
enf. denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (CA9 1984).
See n 5,
supra.
[
Footnote 14]
Section 8(a)(3), as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3),
provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -- "
"
* * * *"
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization:
Provided, That
nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the
beginning of such employment or the effective date of such
agreement, whichever is the later . . . :
Provided
further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A)
if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was
not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(2), complements § 8(a)(3) by providing that:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents -- "
"
* * * *"
"(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this
section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on
some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring
or retaining membership."
[
Footnote 15]
Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 452, generally
barred discrimination based on union membership. A proviso to that
section stated, however, that
"nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a
condition of employment membership therein. . . ."
[
Footnote 16]
Under § 8(a)(3), the only aspect of union membership that can be
required pursuant to a union shop agreement is the payment of dues.
See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S.
17,
347 U. S. 41
(1954) (union security agreements cannot be used for "any purpose
other than to compel payment of union dues and fees").
"
Membership,' as a condition of employment, is whittled down to
its financial core." NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
373 U. S. 734,
373 U. S. 742
(1963). See also Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.
S. 435 (1984) (under the Railway Labor Act, employees in
a "union shop" cannot be compelled to pay dues to support certain
union activities). Therefore, an employee required by a union
security agreement to assume financial "membership" is not subject
to union discipline. Such an employee is a "member" of the union
only in the most limited sense.
[
Footnote 17]
The focus of § 8(a)(3) on employment rights is understandable,
because union restrictions on the right to resign were not an issue
in 1947.
See n 12,
supra, and accompanying text. Senator Taft, for example,
stated that § 8(a)(3) was designed to prevent the discharge of
workers for reasons other than nonpayment of dues, 93 Cong.Rec.
4885-4886 (1947), because this was "the usual type of abuse, and is
the only type of abuse testified to."
Id. at 4886.
[
Footnote 18]
The dissent suggests that the Board's decision is inconsistent
with 29 U.S.C. § 163, which provides that nothing in the Act "shall
be construed so as . . . to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike." The Board does not believe, and
neither do we, that its interpretation of § 8(b)(1)(A) impedes the
"right to strike."
"It [will] not outlaw anybody striking who want[s] to strike. It
[will] not prevent anyone using the strike in a legitimate way. . .
. All it [will] do [is] . . . outlaw such restraint and coercion as
would prevent people from going to work if they wished to go to
work."
93 Cong.Rec. 4436 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
Moreover, we do not believe that the effectiveness of strikes
will be unduly hampered by the Board's decision. An employee who
voluntarily has joined a union will be reluctant to give up his
membership. As Dean Wellington has said:
"In making his resignation decision, the dissident must remember
that the union whose policies he finds distasteful will continue to
hold substantial economic power over him as exclusive bargaining
agent. By resigning, the worker surrenders his right to vote for
union officials, to express himself at union meetings, and even to
participate in determining the amount or use of dues he may be
forced to pay under a union security clause."
Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 Yale L.J. 1022,
1046 (1976).
[
Footnote 19]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissent asserts that League Law 13 is
protected by the proviso because the rule "literally involv[es] the
acquisition and retention of membership."
Post at
473 U. S. 121.
This interpretation of the proviso would authorize any union
restriction on the right to resign. The dissent does say that
restrictions on resignation would not be permitted if they
"furthered none of the purposes of collective action and
self-organization."
Post at
473 U. S. 132,
n. 5. This limitation is illusory. An absolute restriction on
resignations would enhance a union's collective bargaining power,
as would a rule that prohibited resignations during the life of the
collective bargaining agreement. In short, there is no limiting
principle to the dissent's reading of the proviso.
[
Footnote 20]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissent also interprets the proviso in a
novel manner. He asserts that the only union rules prohibited by §
8(b)(1)(A) are those which
"seek to coerce an employee by utilizing the employer's power
over his employment status, or otherwise compel him to take on
duties or join in concerted activities he never consented to."
Post at
473 U. S. 120.
This position is inconsistent with the Court's holding in
NLRB
v. Marine & Shipbuilding Worker, 391 U.
S. 418 (1968). In that case, the Court held invalid a
union rule requiring the "exhaust[ion of] all remedies and appeals
within the Union . . . before . . . resort to any court or other
tribunal outside of the Union."
Id. at
391 U. S. 421.
The rule was enforced by the imposition of fines, without
"utilizing the employer's power over the violating members'
employment status." Moreover, there was no suggestion that union
members had not voluntarily agreed to be bound by the rule
requiring exhaustion.
[
Footnote 21]
In
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 192,
the Court assumed that the proviso authorized unions to expel
members and to impose fines that carry the threat of expulsion.
[
Footnote 22]
During the House debates on the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401
et seq., it was
proposed that the pending bill be amended to prohibit unions from
expelling members for discriminatory reasons. 105 Cong.Rec. 15721
(1959). The two sponsors of the bill, Representatives Landrum and
Griffin, opposed this amendment on the ground that they did not
seek to repeal the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A).
Id. at
15722-15723. As this Court observed in
NLRB v.
Drivers, 362 U. S. 274,
362 U. S. 291
(1960):
"[W]hat Congress did in 1959 does not establish what it meant in
1947. However, as another major step in an evolving pattern of
regulation of union conduct, the 1959 Act is a relevant
consideration."
[
Footnote 23]
Section 8(c)(9) of the House bill, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 25, prohibited unions from "intimidat[ing a member's]
family." Although this specific provision was omitted from the
Taft-Hartley Act, it is unlikely that Congress intended to protect
all union conduct that § 8(c)(9) would have proscribed. Union
threats against the family of a member who crossed a picket line,
for example, would seem to "restrain or coerce" him in the exercise
of his § 7 rights.
The dissent by JUSTICE BLACKMUN suggests that, because the
Senate "explicitly has rejected" the specific prohibitions in §
8(c) of the House bill,
see post at
473 U. S. 121,
122, the Taft-Hartley Act leaves unregulated the relationship
between a union and its members. The legislative history shows,
however, that the Senate did not intend such a result. Senator Taft
stated that § 8(b)(1)(A) was designed to warn unions that "they do
not have the right to interfere with or coerce employees, either
their own members or those outside their union." 93
Cong.Rec. 4025 (1947) (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 24]
NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274
(1960), is not controlling. There, the Court held that
recognitional picketing did not "restrain or coerce" employees in
violation of § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). In so
concluding, the Court relied in part on the omission from the
Taft-Hartley Act of two provisions in the original House bill
explicitly banning recognitional picketing. Other evidence in that
case, however, was highly probative of a congressional intent to
protect recognitional picketing. The desirability of restrictions
on peaceful picketing was widely debated in Congress.
Id.
at
362 U. S.
287-288. Moreover, the Conference Report stated that
"
the primary strike for recognition . . . was not prohibited.'"
Id. at 362 U. S. 289,
quoting H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 (1947).
Finally, § 8(b)(4), as added by the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(4), limits the use of other economic weapons (such as
strikes and secondary boycotts) to compel recognition by an
employer. See 362 U.S. at 362 U. S.
282-284. It is clear that a compromise was reached by
the 1947 Congress; recognitional picketing was to be allowed, while
the use of other economic weapons to compel recognition was
curtailed. There is no evidence of such a compromise with respect
to the "right to resign."
[
Footnote 25]
It is at least open to question whether all restrictions on the
right to resign are valid under the "common law of associations."
See, e.g., Haynes v. Annandale Golf Club, 4 Cal. 2d 28, 47
P.2d 470 (1935) (a bylaw purporting to allow the association to
deny a member's right of resignation by merely withholding its
consent is invalid because unreasonable and arbitrary). Our
conclusion that the common law is irrelevant makes it unnecessary
to resolve this question.
[
Footnote 26]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissent suggests that the relationship
between a union and its members should be governed by contract law.
Post at
473 U. S. 119.
The rationale of this theory is that a member, by joining the
union, "enters into a contract, the terms of which are expressed in
the union constitution and by-laws." Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Discipline, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049, 1054 (1951).
Marine
Workers shows, of course, that union discipline cannot be
analyzed primarily in terms of the common law of contracts.
The dissent repeatedly refers to the "promise" made by the
employees involved in this case.
Post at
473 U. S. 129.
Because they were members of the union when League Law 13 was
adopted, the dissent reasons that the employees "promised" not to
resign during a strike. But the "promise" to which the dissent
refers is unlike any other in traditional contract law. As a
commentator has recognized:
"Membership in a union contemplates a continuing relationship
with changing obligations as the union legislates in monthly
meetings or in annual conventions. It creates a complex cluster of
rights and duties expressed in a constitution. In short, membership
is a special relationship. It is as far removed from the main
channel of contract law as the relationships created by marriage,
the purchase of a stock certificate, or the hiring of a
servant."
Summers,
supra, at 1055-1056.
[
Footnote 27]
In holding that unions may impose fines against members who
return to work during a strike, the Court in
NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175
(1967), "essentially accepted the position of the National Labor
Relations Board."
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.
S. 423,
394 U. S. 428
(1969). In
Scofield, the Court deferred to the Board's
ruling that § 8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit unions from fining
members who accept daily wages in excess of a union-imposed
ceiling. Four years later, the Court again relied on the Board in
holding that § 8(b)(1)(A) has nothing to say about whether union
fines are "reasonable" in amount.
NLRB v. Boeing Co.,
412 U. S. 67
(1973). Finally, in
NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.
S. 213 (1972), and
Machinists v. NLRB,
412 U. S. 84 (1973)
(per curiam), the Court deferred to the Board's conclusion that §
8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from fining former members who have
resigned lawfully.
[
Footnote 28]
In
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers, Local 647 (General Electric Co.), 197 N.L.R.B. 608
(1972), the Board held that § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits a union from
fining employees who have resigned, even when a provision in the
union constitution purports to make the resignations invalid.
There, two employees resigned during a strike and returned to work.
Their resignations were ineffective under a union constitutional
provision permitting resignations only during the last 10 days of
the union's fiscal year. The Board nevertheless held that the
employees could not be fined for crossing the picket line. It noted
that imposing fines on these employees was inconsistent with
Scofield v. NLRB, supra, for they effectively were denied
"a voluntary method of severing their relationship with the Union."
197 N.L.R.B. at 609. The Board reached the same conclusion in
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers, Local 469 (Master Lock Co.), 221 N.L.R.B. 748 (1975).
See also Local 184, United Automobile, Aerospace &
Agricultural Implement Workers (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 219 N.L.R.B.
729 (1975).
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
I agree with the Court that the Board's construction of §§ 7 and
8(b)(1)(A) is a permissible one, and should be upheld. The
employee's rights under § 7 include, among others, the right to
refrain from joining or assisting a labor organization and from
engaging in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. The
right to join or not to join a labor union includes the right to
resign, and § 8(b)(1)(A) forbids unions to interfere with that
right except to the extent, if any, that such interference is
permitted by the proviso to that section, which preserves the
union's right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership. The proviso might be read
as permitting restrictions on resignation during a strike, since
they would seem to relate to the "retention" of membership. But it
can also be sensibly read to refer only to the union's right to
determine who shall be allowed to join and to remain in the union.
The latter is the Board's interpretation. Under that view,
restrictions on resignations are not saved by the proviso, and the
rule at issue in this case may not be enforced.
For the Act to be administered with the necessary flexibility
and responsiveness to "the actualities of industrial relations,"
NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357,
357 U. S.
362-364 (1958), the primary responsibility for
construing its general provisions must be with the Board, and that
is where Congress has placed it. "[W]e should
recognize without
hesitation the primary function and responsibility of the Board'"
to apply these provisions to particular, and often complex,
situations. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.
S. 488, 441 U. S. 496
(1979), quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.
S. 477, 361 U. S. 499
(1960).
Page 473 U. S. 117
Where the statutory language is rationally susceptible to
contrary readings, and the search for congressional intent is
unenlightening, deference to the Board is not only appropriate, but
necessary.
This is such a case. The Board has adopted a sensible
construction of the imprecise language of §§ 7 and 8 that is not
negated by the legislative history of the Act. That Congress
eliminated from the bill under consideration a provision that would
have made certain restrictions on resignation unfair labor
practices falls short of indicating an intention to foreclose the
Board's reading. By the same token, however, there is nothing in
the legislative history to indicate that the Board's interpretation
is the only acceptable construction of the Act, and the relevant
sections are also susceptible to the construction urged by the
union in this case. Therefore, were the Board arguing for that
interpretation of the Act, I would accord its view appropriate
deference.
Because I do not understand it to be inconsistent with the
foregoing views, I join the Court's opinion.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
Today the Court supinely defers to a divided-vote determination
by the National Labor Relations Board that a union commits an
unfair labor practice when it enforces a worker's promise to his
fellow workers not to resign from his union and return to work
during a strike, even though the worker freely made the decision to
join the union and freely made the promise not to resign at such a
time, and even though union members democratically made the
decision to strike in full awareness of that promise. The Court
appears to adopt the NLRB's rule that enforcement of any such
promise, no matter how limited and no matter how reasonable,
violates the breaching worker's right to refrain from concerted
activity. The Board's rule, however, finds no support in either the
language
Page 473 U. S. 118
of §§ 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act on
which the Court purports to rely or in the general goals of the
Act, which it ignores. Accordingly, the undeserved deference
accorded that rule has produced a holding that improperly restricts
a union's federally protected right to make and enforce its own
rules, and at the same time traduces the broader aim of federal
labor policy implicated by this right: to preserve the balance of
power between labor and management by guaranteeing workers an
effective right to strike.
I
A
Having determined that the individual worker, standing alone,
lacked sufficient bargaining power to achieve a fair agreement with
his employer over the terms and conditions of his employment,
Congress passed the NLRA in order to protect employees' rights to
join together and act collectively.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
Thus, the heart of the Act is the protection of workers' § 7 rights
to self-organization and to free collective bargaining, which are
in turn protected by § 8 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158.
Because the employees' power protected in the NLRA is the power
to act collectively, it has long been settled that the collective
has a right to promulgate rules binding on its members, so long as
the employee's decision to become a member is a voluntary one and
the rules are democratically adopted. When these requirements of
free association are met, the union has the right to enforce such
rules "through reasonable discipline," including fines.
See
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.
S. 175,
388 U. S. 181
(1967). Unless internal rules can be enforced, the union's status
as bargaining representative will be eroded, and the rights of the
members to act collectively will be jeopardized.
Ibid.
"Union activity, by its very nature, is group activity, and is
grounded on the notion that strength can be garnered from unity,
solidarity,
Page 473 U. S. 119
and mutual commitment. This concept is of particular force
during a strike, where the individual members of the union draw
strength from the commitments of fellow members, and where the
activities carried on by the union rest fundamentally on the mutual
reliance that inheres in the 'pact.'"
NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.
S. 213,
409 U. S. 221
(1972) (dissenting opinion);
see Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S.
at
388 U. S.
181.
It is in the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A),
that Congress preserved for the union the right to establish "the
contractual relationship between union and member."
Textile
Workers, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 217.
Recognizing "the law which normally is reflected in our free
institutions,"
id. at
409 U. S. 216,
Congress in the proviso preserved a union's status as a voluntary
association free to define its own membership. The proviso states
that the creation of a union unfair labor practice for a violation
of the workers' right to refrain from collective action does not
"impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). As the Court has recognized
previously and now concedes, the legislative history indicates that
the proviso was meant to ensure that the employees' "right to
refrain" would not be understood "to interfere with the internal
affairs or organization of unions."
Ante at
473 U. S. 102,
quoting
Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 187,
in turn quoting 93 Cong.Rec. 4272 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball).
The "right to refrain" simply
"was not intended to give the Board power to regulate internal
union affairs, including the imposition of disciplinary fines, with
their consequent court enforcement, against members who violate the
unions' constitutions and bylaws."
NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67,
412 U. S. 71
(1973).
See also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.
S. 423,
394 U. S. 428
(1969).
Sensitive to both the Act's central goal of facilitating
collective action and the Taft-Hartley Act's protection against
coercion of employees, the Court previously has interpreted the
proviso to distinguish between two kinds of union rules.
Page 473 U. S. 120
Reasonable union rules that represent obligations voluntarily
incurred by members were intended to be free from federal
regulation under § 8, while union rules that seek to coerce an
employee by utilizing the employer's power over his employment
status, or otherwise compel him to take on duties or join in
concerted activities he never consented to, were intended to be
subject to regulation by the Board. Because rules that regulate the
relationship between the union and his employer could be used to
coerce an employee into becoming involved with the union in order
to protect his job, such rules would impair the employee's free
association rights.
"[T]he repeated refrain throughout the debates on § 8(b)(1)(A)
and other sections [was] that Congress did not propose any
limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside
from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to
affect a member's employment status."
Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 195.
The proviso was designed
"to make it clear that . . . [a]ll we are trying to cover [in §
8] is the coercive and restraining acts of the union in its efforts
to organize unorganized employees."
93 Cong.Rec. 4433 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball). Until today,
the Court has rejected the proposition that the proviso does not
protect a union rule merely because the rule has an impact beyond
the confines of the labor organization,
Scofield, 394 U.S.
at
394 U. S.
431-432, or because it is not a rule about the expulsion
of members.
Cf. ante at
473 U. S.
108-110.
League Law 13 is an internal union rule, a "rule with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership" protected by the
proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A). It requires that employees who freely
choose to join the union promise to remain members during a strike
or lockout, as well as during the time when a strike or lockout
appears imminent. In other words, the rule imposes a condition upon
members of the bargaining unit who would like to acquire membership
rights. The rule stands for the proposition that, to become a union
member, one must be willing to incur a certain obligation upon
Page 473 U. S. 121
which others may rely; as such, it is a rule literally involving
the acquisition and retention of membership. Conversely, League Law
13 does not in any way affect the relationship between the employee
and the employer. An employee who violates the rule does not risk
losing his job, and the union cannot seek an employer's coercive
assistance in collecting any fine that is imposed. The rule neither
coerces a worker to become a union member against his will nor
affects an employee's status as an employee under the Act. Thus, it
clearly falls within the powers of any voluntary association to
enact and enforce "the requirements and standards of membership in
the union itself," so as to permit the association effectively to
pursue collective goals. 93 Cong.Rec. 4433 (1947) (remarks of Sen.
Ball).
B
The Court nonetheless finds that League Law 13 violates an
employee's right to refrain from collective activity and is not
protected by the proviso. It reaches this conclusion by giving the
proviso a cramped reading as a provision protecting only rules
concerning the expulsion of members,
see ante at
473 U. S.
108-110, ignoring in the process both the plain meaning
and the legislative history of the proviso. Further, the Court
never addresses the fact that the rule is a prerequisite of union
membership much like any other internal union rule. Indeed, the
Court entirely fails to explain why League Law 13 is not a rule
"with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership," even
given its own enervating understanding of the proviso. The rule,
after all, is one to which a member was obliged to agree when he
acquired or decided to retain membership in the union.
Moreover, Congress explicitly has rejected the Court's
interpretation of §§ 7 and 8(b)(1)(A). The "right to refrain"
language upon which the Court relies was contained in § 7(a) of the
House version of the Act, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)
(House bill). Section 7 of the House bill was
Page 473 U. S. 122
divided into subsection (a), granting "employees" the right to
refrain from concerted activity, and subsection (b), granting
"[m]embers of any labor organization" rights concerning the
"affairs of the organization." Corresponding to these provisions
were § 8(b), which made it an unfair labor practice for anyone to
interfere with an employee's § 7(a) rights, and § 8(c), which made
it an unfair labor practice to interfere with an employee's § 7(b)
rights. In particular, § 8(c) created a bill of rights for union
members in their dealings with their union, establishing 10 unfair
labor practices which regulated the major facets of the
member-union relationship. Among these specifically enumerated
rights was § 8(c)(4), which made it an unfair labor practice "to
deny to any member the right to resign from the organization at any
time."
Thus, the House regarded the "right to refrain" of § 7(a) as the
right not to join in union activity, making it illegal for
"representatives and their partisans and adherents to harass or
abuse employees into joining labor organizations." H.R.Rep. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 (1947). And the House believed that
§ 7(b) and § 8(c) of its bill, which included a proscription of
internal rules concerning a member's right to resign, regulated the
member-union relationship. There is no suggestion that the House
considered the right to refrain to include the right to abandon an
agreed-upon undertaking at will, nor to relate to the rights
against the union protected by §§ 7(b) and 8(c) of the House bill,
including the right to resign at will. Rather, these distinct
rights arose from separate sections of the House bill.
It is critical to an understanding of the Taft-Hartley bill,
therefore, to recognize that the Senate explicitly rejected the
House bill's §§ 7(b) and 8(c). It did so not, as the Court
intimates, because it considered the specific provisions of §§ 7(b)
and 8(c) to encompass the "right to refrain" language adopted from
§ 7(a), but because it decided that
"the formulation of a code of rights for individual members of
trade unions . . . should receive more extended study by a special
joint congressional
Page 473 U. S. 123
committee."
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947). Senator Taft's
summary of the bill provides a clear and nonmysterious explanation
of the Senate's stance on regulation of the union-member
relationship:
"In the House bill, union initiation fees were among 10
provisions providing for certain rights and immunities of members
of labor organizations against arbitrary action by the officers of
a union to which they belonged. This was the so-called bill of
rights subsection in the House bill. The Senate conferees refused
to agree to the inclusion of this subsection in the conference
agreement, since they felt that it was unwise to authorize an
agency of the Government to undertake such elaborate policing of
the internal affairs of unions as this section contemplated without
further study of the structure of unions."
93 Cong.Rec. 6443 (1947). And the House Conference Report,
though reflecting the understatement of the vanquished, is equally
clear:
"Section 8(c) of the House bill contained detailed provisions
dealing with the relations of labor organizations with their
members. One of the more important provisions of this section --
[involving initiation fees in union shops] -- is included in the
conference agreement . . . and has already been discussed. The
other parts of this subsection are omitted from the conference
agreement as unfair labor practices. . . ."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1947). In the
face of this substantial legislative history indicating that the
House provisions were rejected on the merits, the Court's treatment
of that history,
see ante at
473 U. S. 111,
is both inaccurate and inadequate. [
Footnote 2/1]
Page 473 U. S. 124
Not surprisingly, the Court reaches for an alternative
explanation as to why the "right to resign" provision was omitted
from the Taft-Hartley amendments. We are told that the "right to
resign" provision was omitted from the bill because the House,
having won a provision making the closed shop illegal, was willing
to give in on the right to resign.
Ante at
473 U. S.
110-111. If this indeed explains the House's actions,
its concession merely reinforces what the rest of the legislative
history makes explicit: that the Senate was willing to agree to
proscribe the closed shop and union shop because it agreed that
they improperly coerced an employee into becoming a union member in
order to keep his job. But the Senate was not willing to impose
conditions on the contractual relationship between the union and
its members, including a rule giving members a right to resign at
will, insofar as such regulation did not affect the employment
relationship. The House may have thought that the closed shop rules
and the rules regulating the internal affairs of unions were
similar rules aimed at preventing a union from limiting the freedom
of choice of employees in what it considered impermissible ways.
Drawing a different distinction, the Senate less narrowly
circumscribed union discretion: rules that coerced an employee into
taking collective action against his will by threatening his
employment rights were prohibited, while rules that were a
prerequisite of acquisition or retention of membership were to be
left unregulated for the time being. Perhaps the House believed
that the proscription against the closed shop and the proscription
on limitations on a member's right to resign were aimed at the same
evil. But the Senate obviously did not, and it prevailed.
Page 473 U. S. 125
The Court thus faces the same situation it addressed when it
rejected the Board's interpretation of the recognitional picketing
provisions of the Act in
NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U.
S. 274 (1960) (
Curtis Bros.).
"Plainly, the [union's] conduct in the instant case would have
been prohibited if the House bill had become law. . . . But the
House conferees abandoned the House bill in conference and accepted
the Senate proposal."
Id. at
362 U. S. 289.
As in
Curtis Bros., it is therefore appropriate to recall
that
"'the Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked degree, the result of
conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply
held views on the role of organized labor in the free economic life
of the Nation. . . . This is relevant in that it counsels wariness
in finding by construction a broad policy . . . as such when, from
the words of the statute itself, it is clear that those interested
in just such a condemnation were unable to secure its embodiment in
enacted law.'"
Id. at
362 U. S.
289-290, quoting
Carpenters v. NLRB,
357 U. S. 93,
357 U. S. 99-100
(1958). Here, too, the legislative history "strongly militates
against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it
expressly declined to enact."
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving
Co., 419 U. S. 186,
419 U. S. 200
(1974). [
Footnote 2/2]
The Court also attempts to justify its result by suggesting that
League Law 13 impairs a federal labor policy mandating "voluntary
unionism" implicit in § 8(a)(3) of the Act, and thus
Page 473 U. S. 126
is unenforceable under § 8(a)(1) of the Act.
See ante
at
473 U. S. 104,
quoting
Scofield, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 430.
Thus, the Court says, for the same reason that Congress determined
that the closed shop should be prohibited as a violation of an
employee's right to refrain from concerted activity, a promise not
to leave the union during a strike should not be enforceable. Both
rules, the Court intimates, "protec[t] the employment rights of the
dissatisfied member."
Ante at
473 U. S.
106.
The Court, however, again ignores the distinction between
internal and external rules fashioned in its prior cases, and so
misunderstands the concept of "voluntary unionism" implicated by
the Act. The purpose of the union unfair labor practice provisions
added to § 8(a)(3) was to "preven[t] the union from inducing the
employer to use the emoluments of the job to enforce the union's
rules."
Scofield, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 429.
By outlawing the closed shop and the union shop, Congress ensured
that a union's disciplinary rules can have no effect on the
employment rights of the member, and so cannot impinge upon the
policy of voluntary unionism protected by § 8(a)(3) of the Act.
The proviso serves a fundamentally different purpose -- to make
manifest that § 8 did not grant the Board the authority to impair
the basic right of all membership associations to establish their
own reasonable membership rules. League Law 13 is such a rule. It
binds members to a reciprocal promise not to resign and return to
work during a strike. It does not involve use of the employer's
power or affect an individual's employment status, and so does not
implicate § 8(a)(3). A member who violates the union rule may be
fined, or even expelled from the union, but his employment status
remains unaffected. Despite the Court's suggestions to the
contrary, "voluntary unionism" does not require that an employee
who has freely chosen to join a union and retain his membership
therein, in full knowledge that by those decisions he has accepted
specified obligations to other members, nevertheless has a
federally protected right to disregard
Page 473 U. S. 127
those obligations at will, regardless of the acts of others
taken in reliance on them. [
Footnote
2/3]
At bottom, the Court relies on an unspoken concept of voluntary
unionism that, carried to its extreme, would deny to the union
member -- in the name of having his participation in the union be
voluntary -- the right to make any meaningful promise to his
coworkers. The Court understands voluntariness to mean freedom from
enforceable commitment, treating the union member as a juvenile or
incompetent whose promise may not be enforced against him because
it is presumed not to have been made with awareness of the
consequences of the promise. Not only is the Court's paternalism
misplaced and offensive to the member, but it threatens the power
to act collectively that is at the center of the Act.
II
Congress' decision not to intervene in the internal affairs of a
union reflects Congress' understanding that membership in a union
-- if not a precondition for one's right to employment -- is a
freely chosen membership in a voluntary association. The Court
therefore has looked to "the law which
Page 473 U. S. 128
normally is reflected in our free institutions" to determine
whether any given membership rule is lawful.
NLRB v. Textile
Workers, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 216.
And the common law of associations establishes that an association
may place reasonable restrictions on its members' right to resign
where such restrictions are designed to further a basic purpose for
which the association was formed [
Footnote 2/4] -- here, where the restriction "reflects a
legitimate union interest."
Scofield, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 430.
The Pattern Makers evidently promulgated League Law 13 to protect
the common interest in maintaining a united front during an
economic strike. Such a rule protects individual union members'
decisions to place their own and their families' welfare at risk in
reliance on the reciprocal decisions of their fellow workers, and
furthers the union's ability to bargain with the employer on equal
terms, as envisioned by the Act. As such, the rule comports with
the broader goals of federal labor policy, which guarantees workers
the right to collective action and, in particular, the right to
strike.
Specifically, Congress has mandated that nothing in the Act,
including the "right to refrain" relied upon by the Court
today,
"shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right."
29 U.S.C. § 163. The strike or the threat to strike is the
workers' most effective means of pressuring employers, and so lies
at the center of the collective activity protected by the Act. "The
economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in
labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms."
Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 181.
Consequently, the Court
Page 473 U. S. 129
has recognized that "
[t]he power to fine or expel
strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective
bargaining agent.'" Ibid., quoting Summers, Legal
Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049
(1951).
To be effective, the decision to strike, like the decision to
bargain collectively, must be respected by the minority until
democratically revoked. The employees' collective decision to
strike is not taken lightly, and entails considerable costs.
See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.
S. 333,
304 U. S. 345
(1938) (employer has right permanently to replace workers on
economic strike). Before workers undertake such a course, it is
reasonable that they have some assurance that collectively they
will have the means to withstand the pressures the employer is able
lawfully to impose on them. A voluntarily and democratically
adopted rule prohibiting resignations during a strike is one such
means. By ensuring solidarity during a strike, it enforces the
union's
"legitimate interest in presenting a united front . . . and in
not seeing its strength dissipated and its stature denigrated by
subgroups within the unit separately pursuing what they see as
separate interests."
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization, 420 U. S. 50,
420 U. S. 70
(1975).
Once an employee freely has made the decision to become a member
of the union, has agreed not to resign during a strike, and has had
the opportunity to participate in the decision to strike, his
faithfulness to his promise is simply the
quid pro quo for
the benefits he has received as a result of his decision to band
together with his fellow workers and to join in collective
bargaining. For the dissatisfied member to return to work in
violation of his promise, while his fellows remain on strike --
forgoing their wages and risking their jobs in a now-weakened
effort to pressure the employer into making concessions -- is to
allow the breaching individual to become a free rider, enjoying the
benefits of his bargain without having to live with the risks that
all who sought those benefits agreed to share.
Page 473 U. S. 130
More perniciously, a dissenting individual's decision to return
to work predictably could have a snowballing effect, as apparently
it did in this case, causing the strike to lose its effectiveness
even though the majority of workers, having commenced collective
action in reliance on a now-breached promise of solidarity, would
wish to continue that action. It is hardly inconsistent with
federal labor policy to enact a rule to ensure that the collective
decision to remain out on strike be revocable only by procedures
agreed upon collectively, not by the decision of a few dissenting
individuals who believe it is in their individual interests to
return to work, breaking the promise they made to abide by the
majority's will. In a strike setting, therefore,
"[t]he mutual reliance of his fellow members who abide by the
strike for which they have all voted outweighs . . . the admitted
interests of the individual who resigns to return to work."
NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 223
(dissenting opinion).
Enforcement of a promise not to resign during a strike, then, is
not a limitation of a § 7 right, but is a vindication of that right
to act collectively and engage in collective bargaining, so long as
the promise is voluntarily made. It is a way to effectuate
"
[t]he majority-rule concept [that] is today unquestionably at
the center of our federal labor policy.'" Allis-Chalmers,
388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 180,
quoting Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation:
Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1333
(1958). As such, League Law 13 is a condition on union membership
that a union might reasonably impose to advance its legitimate
ends, and so is an internal union rule protected by the proviso
preserving a union's right to enact reasonable rules defining the
conditions of union membership.
III
In sum, the Court defers to the Board although the Board's
position cannot fairly be said to rest on any principled
application of the policies of our national labor laws. Because
Page 473 U. S. 131
a majority of the Board has interpreted the terms of the
NLRA in a manner inconsistent with the congressional purpose
clearly expressed in the legislative scheme and amply
documented in the legislative history, the Court's deference
is misplaced.
"The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to
slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized
assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by
Congress."
American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.
S. 300,
380 U. S. 318
(1965). We are not here
"to stand aside and rubber-stamp . . . administrative decisions
that [are] inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate
the congressional policy underlying a statute."
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278,
380 U. S.
291-292 (1965).
See also Chemical Workers v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157,
404 U. S. 166
(1971); 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A) and (C).
IV
The Court previously has recognized that it violates precepts of
voluntary unionism to bind a member to promises he did not
knowingly make.
See Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U. S.
84,
412 U. S. 89
(1973). The Board therefore properly could prevent enforcement of a
rule like League Law 13 if there were evidence that the members
were not aware of the provision until they had lost the ability to
escape its force.
Id. at
412 U. S. 91
(opinion concurring in judgment). Though the § 7 right not to
participate may be waived, as it was here,
see Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U. S. 693,
460 U. S. 705
(1983);
Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 180;
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.
S. 270,
350 U. S. 280
(1956), a waiver "must be clear and unmistakable."
Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, supra, at
460 U. S. 708.
The Court for that reason has agreed with the Board that it is an
unfair labor practice for a union to attempt to collect a fine
against a member who resigned from the union during a strike when
it was not made explicit to the member that, as a condition of
membership, he had to agree
Page 473 U. S. 132
not to resign during the strike.
See Machinists v. NLRB,
supra. [
Footnote 2/5]
There is no similar suggestion in the record before us that the
union members here were unaware of the promises they had made to
their fellow members. If the dissenting members disagreed either
with the decision to enact League Law 13, or with the decision to
strike, they were free to try to influence their colleagues to
their view. If they did not agree with the enactment of League Law
13, they were free as well to resign from the union when the rule
was promulgated over their objection. Once the strike had begun, if
they believed that the union officers were no longer acting in
their best interest, they were free to try to convince their
colleagues to end the strike, to replace their leaders, or even to
decertify their union.
See Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 191.
Having failed to persuade the majority to their view, they should
not be free to break their promise to their fellow workers.
Page 473 U. S. 133
"[T]he principle of fidelity to one's word is an ancient one."
C. Fried, Contract As Promise 2 (1981). The assumption that one's
freedom has been limited by being held to one's freely made bargain
is as misguided in the context of the labor law as when stated as a
general principle. By focusing exclusively on the right to refrain
from collective action, by assuming an arid and artificial
conception of the proviso circumscribing that right, and by
ignoring Congress' intentions in promulgating the NLRA in the first
instance, the Board and the Court abandon their proper role as
mediators between any conflicting interests protected by the labor
laws. In the name of protecting individual workers' rights to
violate their contractual agreements, the Court debilitates the
right of all workers to take effective collective action. The
conclusion that freedom under the NLRA means freedom to break a
freely made promise to one's fellow workers after they have relied
on that promise to their detriment is not only a notion at odds
with the structure and purpose of our labor law, but is an affront
to the autonomy of the American worker. I dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Moreover, any claim that the language of § 8(b)(1)(A) as enacted
is broad enough to allow the Board to find in it a prohibition on
union rules governing the right to resign ignores the fact that the
Senate also rejected the House's broader version of that section
that at least would have lent some support for that assertion. In
particular, the Senate rejected the House's proscription on union
efforts "by intimidating practices . . . to compel or seek to
compel any individual to become
or remain a member of any
labor organization."
See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 8(b)(1) (1947) (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court finds
Curtis Bros. not controlling because
there was evidence in that case that a compromise had been reached
between the House and the Senate as regards restrictions on
peaceful picketing.
See ante at
473 U. S. 112,
n. 24. Today the Court finds "no evidence of such a compromise with
respect to the
right to resign.'" Ibid. The Court is
correct: there was no compromise because the Conference rejected
entirely the House's attempt to regulate internal union affairs in
the Taft-Hartley Act. I am not persuaded that it is more acceptable
for the Court to adopt a rule entirely rejected by Congress than to
adopt one that was rejected as part of a compromise.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The Court's response is that a right to fine a member is an
infringement on a worker's employment rights. It reasons,
apparently, that, because workers work for money and fines are
exacted in the same currency, a fine permits a union to take away
what the worker gains in employment.
See ante at
473 U. S.
106-107. This, of course, is to say that any fine
imposed for a violation of an internal union rule violates a
member's employment rights, a proposition explicitly rejected in
both
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.
S. 175 (1967), and
Scofield v. NLRB,
394 U. S. 423
(1969). The Court's reasoning is obviously circular: enforcement of
a union rule prohibiting resignation during a strike is different
from enforcement of other union rules because it violates policies
of voluntary unionism. It violates those policies because it works
an infringement on employment rights. It works an infringement on
employment rights because it imposes fines. And these fines are
impermissible, while fines for violation of other union rules are
appropriate, because -- the rule here violates voluntary
unionism.
[
Footnote 2/4]
See, e.g., Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Corning, 45
Barb. 231, 256-257 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1864);
Leon v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 358 F.
Supp. 877, 886-888 (NJ 1973),
affirmance order, 474
F.2d 1340 (CA3 1974).
See also Note, A Union's Right to
Control Strike-Period Resignations, 85 Colum.L.Rev. 339, 354-355,
and nn. 107-110 (1985) (Columbia Note).
[
Footnote 2/5]
See Gould, Solidarity Forever -- Or Hardly Ever: Union
Discipline, Taft-Hartley, and the Right of Union Members to Resign,
66 Cornell L.Rev. 74, 106-114 (1980); Columbia Note 366-367.
The principle that free associations may make rules to further
the ends of the association, guaranteed to unions in the proviso,
does not necessarily protect any kind of internal union rule that
implicates a worker's right to refrain from collective action. For
example, a union rule that impinged on a member's right to refrain
from collective activity but furthered none of the purposes of
collective action and self-organization protected by the labor law
would not fit comfortably within the proviso.
See id. at
367-369;
cf. Local 1384, UAW, 227 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1977)
(rule allowing members to resign in a 10-day period once a year
illegitimate because it does not vindicate any legitimate union
interest). Thus in
NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.
S. 418 (1968), the Court held invalid an internal union
rule that denied members access to the NLRB because the rule
violated policies of speedy access to the Board implicated by §
10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), and attempted to further
policies "beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization."
391 U.S. at
391 U. S. 424.
The Court today inconsistently labels this standard "illusory,"
ante at
473 U. S. 108,
n.19, and then inaccurately chastises the dissent for not following
it.
Ante at
473 U. S. 109,
n. 20.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The legislative history of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
1947, discussed in
473 U. S.
coupled with the plain language in the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A),
persuades me that the "right to refrain" protected by § 7 of the
Act does not encompass the "right to resign." Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.