Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573,
held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a
routine felony arrest. Before
Payton was decided,
respondent was arrested on a federal charge by Secret Service
agents who had entered his home without an arrest warrant.
Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied respondent's
pretrial motion to suppress incriminating statements he made after
his arrest. This evidence was admitted at his trial, and he was
convicted. While his case was still pending on direct appeal,
Payton was decided. On the strength of
Payton,
the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that
Payton applied retroactively.
Held: A decision of this Court construing the Fourth
Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that
were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered, except
where a case would be clearly controlled by existing retroactivity
precedents. Hence,
Payton is to be applied retroactively
to respondent's case. Pp.
457 U. S.
542-563.
(a) Respondent's case does not present a retrospectivity problem
clearly controlled by existing precedent. Where a decision of this
Court merely has applied settled principles to a new set of facts,
it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case
applies in earlier cases. Conversely, where the Court has declared
a rule of criminal procedure to be "a clear break with the past,"
it almost invariably has found the new principle nonretroactive.
Also, this Court has recognized full retroactivity as a necessary
adjunct to a ruling that a trial court lacked authority to convict
or punish the defendant in the first place. Respondent's case does
not fit any of these categories, as
Payton did not apply
settled precedent to a new set of facts, did not announce an
entirely new and unanticipated principle of law, and did not hold
either that the trial court lacked authority to convict Payton or
that the Fourth Amendment immunized his conduct from punishment.
Pp.
457 U. S.
548-554.
(b) The retroactivity question presented here is fairly resolved
by applying the
Payton rule to all cases still pending on
direct appeal at the time
Payton was decided. To do so (1)
provides a principle of decisionmaking consonant with this Court's
original understanding in
Linkletter
Page 457 U. S. 538
v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, and
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.
S. 406, that all newly declared constitutional rules of
criminal procedure would apply retrospectively at least to
convictions not yet final when the rule was established; (2)
comports with this Court's judicial responsibility "to do justice
to each litigant on the merits of his own case,"
Desist v.
United States, 394 U. S. 244,
394 U. S. 259
(Harlan, J., dissenting), and to "resolve all cases before us on
direct review in light of our best understanding of governing
constitutional principles,"
Mackey v. United States,
401 U. S. 667,
401 U. S. 679
(separate opinion of Harlan, J.); and (3) furthers the goal of
treating similarly situated defendants similarly. Pp.
457 U. S.
554-556.
(c) There is no merit to the Government's arguments, based on
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.
S. 531, against adoption of the above approach to the
retroactivity question in this case. Pp.
457 U. S.
557-562.
626 F.2d 753, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ. joined. BRENNAN, J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
457 U. S. 563.
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
REHNQUIST and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
post, p.
457 U. S.
564.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 (1980), this Court held that the Fourth Amendment
[
Footnote 1] prohibits the
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a
suspect's
Page 457 U. S. 539
home to make a routine felony arrest. The question before us in
the present case is whether the rule announced in
Payton
applies to an arrest that took place before
Payton was
decided.
I
Special Agents Hemenway and Pickering of the United States
Secret Service suspected respondent Raymond Eugene Johnson and his
codefendant, Oscar Joseph Dodd, of attempting to negotiate a
misdelivered United States Treasury check. [
Footnote 2] Proceeding without an arrest warrant, on
May 5, 1977, the two agents went to respondent's Los Angeles home
and waited outside. Shortly thereafter, respondent and his wife
arrived and entered the house.
The agents drew their weapons, approached the doorway, and
knocked, identifying themselves by fictitious names. When
respondent opened the door, he saw the two agents with their guns
drawn and their badges raised. Respondent permitted the agents to
enter the house. While one agent stood with respondent in the
living room, the other searched the premises. The agents then
advised respondent of his constitutional rights and interrogated
him. When respondent revealed his involvement in the taking of the
misdelivered check, the agents formally arrested him. Respondent
later signed a written statement admitting his involvement with the
check.
Before trial, respondent sought to suppress his oral and written
statements as fruits of an unlawful arrest not supported
Page 457 U. S. 540
by probable cause. The United States District Court for the
Central District of California found respondent's arrest to be
proper, and admitted the evidence. App. 7. A jury then convicted
respondent of aiding and abetting obstruction of correspondence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1702. [
Footnote 3] The imposition of respondent's sentence was
suspended in favor of five years' probation.
By an unreported opinion filed December 19, 1978, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment
of conviction. Acknowledging that "[i]t certainly would have been
preferable had the agents obtained a warrant" for respondent's
arrest before entering his residence, the court nonetheless ruled
that
"if probable cause exists for the arrest, [respondent's]
constitutional rights were not violated by the warrantless arrest,
even though there may have been time [for the agents] to have
obtained a warrant for his arrest."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a-27a.
On April 15, 1980, while respondent's petition for rehearing was
still pending before the Ninth Circuit, this Court decided
Payton v. New York, supra. [
Footnote 4] On September 2,
Page 457 U. S. 541
1980, the Ninth Circuit granted respondent' petition for
rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and on the strength of
Payton, now reversed the judgment of conviction. 626 F.2d
753.
"In light of the strong language by the Court in
Payton
emphasizing the special protection the Constitution affords to
individuals within their homes,"
the Court of Appeals held that
"the warrantless arrest of Johnson, while he stood within his
home, after having opened the door in response to false
identification by the agents, constituted a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights."
Id. at 757. The Government petitioned for rehearing,
arguing that the principles of
Payton should not apply
retroactively to an arrest that had occurred before
Payton
was decided. The Court of Appeals disagreed, denied the petition
for rehearing, and amended its opinion to clarify that
Payton did apply retroactively. App. to Pet. for Cert.
12a. [
Footnote 5]
The Government sought review in this Court. We granted
certiorari to consider the retrospective effect, if any, of the
Fourth Amendment rule announced in
Payton. 454 U.S. 814
(1981). [
Footnote 6]
Page 457 U. S. 542
II
"[T]he federal constitution has no voice upon the subject" of
retrospectivity.
Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358,
287 U. S. 364
(1932). Before 1965, when this Court decided
Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S. 618,
"both the common law and our own decisions recognized a general
rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of
this Court . . . subject to [certain] limited exceptions."
Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505,
409 U. S. 507
(1973), citing
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.
S. 425,
118 U. S. 442
(1886), and
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U. S. 371
(1940). [
Footnote 7]
In
Linkletter, however, the Court concluded "that the
Constitution neither prohibits nor requires [that] retrospective
effect" be given to any "new" constitutional rule. 381 U.S. at
381 U. S. 629.
Since
Linkletter, the Court's announcement of a
constitutional rule in the realm of criminal procedure has
frequently been followed by a separate decision explaining whether,
and to what extent, that rule applies to past, pending, and future
cases.
See generally Beytagh, Ten Years of
Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va.L.Rev. 1557
(1975).
Linkletter itself addressed the question whether the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule of
Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643
(1961), should apply to state convictions that had become final
before
Mapp was decided. [
Footnote 8] At the outset, the
Linkletter Court
noted that cases still pending on direct review when
Mapp
was handed down had already received the
Page 457 U. S. 543
benefit of
Mapp's rule.
See 381 U.S. at
381 U. S. 622,
n. 4, citing
Ker v. California, 374 U. S.
23 (1963);
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S.
85 (1963); and
Stoner v. California,
376 U. S. 483
(1964). This limited retrospective application of
Mapp was
consistent with the common law rule, recognized in both civil and
criminal litigation, "that a change in law will be given effect
while a case is on direct review." 381 U.S. at
381 U. S. 627,
citing
United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801).
To determine whether a particular ruling should also extend to
cases that were already final,
Linkletter directed courts
to
"weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation."
381 U.S. at
381 U. S. 629.
Employing that test, the Court concluded that the
Mapp
rule should not apply to convictions that had become final before
Mapp was decided.
The following Term, in
Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U. S. 406
(1966), the Court applied
Linkletter's analysis to hold
the Fifth Amendment rule of
Griffin v. California,
380 U. S. 609
(1965) (barring comment on a state defendant's failure to testify),
nonretroactive to judgments of conviction made final before
Griffin was decided. The Court again found no "question of
the applicability of the
Griffin rule to cases still
pending on direct review at the time it was announced." 382 U.S. at
382 U. S. 409,
n. 3, citing
O'Connor v. Ohio, 382 U.
S. 286 (1965). Thus, after
Linkletter and
Shott, it appeared that all newly declared constitutional
rules of criminal procedure would apply retrospectively at least to
judgments of conviction not yet final when the rule was
established.
In
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.
S. 719 (1966), and
Stovall v. Denno,
388 U. S. 293
(1967), however, the Court departed from that basic principle.
Those cases held that, in the interest of justice, the Court may
balance three factors to determine whether a "new" constitutional
rule should be retrospectively
Page 457 U. S. 544
or prospectively applied:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards."
Id. at
388 U. S. 297.
See also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 728.
Because the outcome of that balancing process might call for
different degrees of retroactivity in different cases, the Court
concluded that "no distinction is justified between convictions now
final . . . and convictions at various stages of trial and direct
review."
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 300.
See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at
384 U. S.
732.
Because the balance of the three
Stovall factors
inevitably has shifted from case to case, it is hardly surprising
that, for some,
"the subsequent course of
Linkletter became almost as
difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search
of its intended victim."
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.
S. 667,
401 U. S. 676
(1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.). At one extreme, the Court
has regularly given complete retroactive effect to new
constitutional rules whose major purpose
"is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that
substantially impairs its truthfinding function and so raises
serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past
trials."
Williams v. United States, 401 U.
S. 646,
401 U. S. 653
(1971) (plurality opinion).
See also id. at
401 U. S. 653,
n. 6;
Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.
S. 323,
447 U. S.
328-330 (1980) (plurality opinion);
Hankerson v.
North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233,
432 U. S. 243
(1977);
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U. S. 665,
413 U. S. 679
(1973) (plurality opinion);
Ivan V. v. City of New York,
407 U. S. 203,
407 U. S. 205
(1972).
At the other extreme, the Court has applied some standards only
to future cases, denying the benefit of the new rule even to the
parties before the Court.
See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. S. 471,
408 U. S. 490
(1972) (establishing basic requirements applicable only to "future
revocations of parole").
Cf. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. at
384 U. S. 733,
citing
England
Page 457 U. S. 545
v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.
S. 411 (1964), and
James v. United States,
366 U. S. 213
(1961). As an intermediate position, the Court has applied a change
in the law to all future litigants, but retroactively only to the
parties at bar.
See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at
388 U. S. 301;
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631,
392 U. S. 633
(1968);
Adam v. Illinois, 405 U.
S. 278,
405 U. S.
284-285 (1972) (plurality opinion);
Michigan v.
Payne, 412 U. S. 47
(1973).
In a consistent stream of separate opinions since
Linkletter, Members of this Court have argued against
selective awards of retroactivity. Those opinions uniformly have
asserted that, at a minimum, all defendants whose cases were still
pending on direct appeal at the time of the law-changing decision
should be entitled to invoke the new rule. [
Footnote 9]
Page 457 U. S. 546
In
Desist v. United States, 394 U.
S. 244,
394 U. S. 256
(1969) (dissenting opinion), and
Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 675
(separate opinion), Justice Harlan presented a comprehensive
analysis in support of that principle. In his view, failure to
apply a newly declared constitutional rule at least to cases
pending on direct review at the time of the decision violated three
norms of constitutional adjudication.
First, Justice Harlan argued, the Court's "ambulatory
retroactivity doctrine,"
id. at
401 U. S. 681,
conflicts with the norm of principled decisionmaking.
"Some members of the Court, and I have come to regret that I was
among them, initially grasped this doctrine as a way of limiting
the reach of decisions that seemed to them fundamentally unsound.
Others rationalized this resort to prospectivity as a 'technique'
that provided an 'impetus . . . for the implementation of long
overdue reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably
effected.'"
Id. at
401 U. S. 676,
citing
Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.
S. 213,
395 U. S. 218
(1969). "The upshot of this confluence of viewpoints," 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 676,
was that the coalitions favoring nonretroactivity had realigned
from case to case, inevitably generating a welter of "incompatible
rules and inconsistent principles,"
Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 258.
See also Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. at
412 U. S. 61
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("principled adjudication requires the
Court to abandon the charade of carefully balancing countervailing
considerations when deciding the question of retroactivity").
Second, Justice Harlan found it difficult to accept the notion
that the Court, as a judicial body, could apply a
"'new' constitutional rule entirely prospectively, while making
an exception only for the particular litigant whose case was chosen
as the vehicle for establishing that rule."
Desist v.
Page 457 U. S. 547
United States, 394 U.S. at 258 (dissenting opinion). A
legislature makes its new rules "wholly or partially retroactive or
only prospective as it deems wise."
Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 677
(Harlan, J., dissenting). This Court, however,
"announce[s] new constitutional rules . . . only as a
correlative of our dual duty to decide those cases over which we
have jurisdiction and to apply the Federal Constitution as one
source of the matrix of governing legal rules. . . . Simply fishing
one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle
for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a
stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that
new rule constitute an indefensible departure from this model of
judicial review."
Id. at
401 U. S.
678-679.
Third, Justice Harlan asserted that the Court's selective
application of new constitutional rules departed from the principle
of treating similarly situated defendants similarly: [
Footnote 10]
"[W]hen another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we
must grant the same relief or give a principled reason for acting
differently. We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we
simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants
those who
Page 457 U. S. 548
alone will receive the benefit of a 'new' rule of constitutional
law."
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S.
258-259 (dissenting opinion).
Justice Harlan suggested one simple rule to satisfy all three of
his concerns.
"I have concluded that
Linkletter was right in
insisting that all 'new' rules of constitutional law must, at a
minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to
direct review by this Court at the time the 'new' decision is
handed down."
Id. at
394 U. S.
258.
"[A] proper perception of our duties as a court of law, charged
with applying the Constitution to resolve every legal dispute
within our jurisdiction on direct review, mandates that we apply
the law as it is at the time, not as it once was."
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 681
(separate opinion).
We now agree with Justice Harlan that "
[r]etroactivity' must
be rethought," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 258
(dissenting opinion). We therefore examine the circumstances of
this case to determine whether it presents a retroactivity question
clearly controlled by past precedents, and if not, whether
application of the Harlan approach would resolve the retroactivity
issue presented in a principled and equitable manner.
III
A
At the outset, we must first ask whether respondent's case
presents a retrospectivity problem clearly controlled by existing
precedent. Reexamination of the post-
Linkletter decisions
convinces us that, in three narrow categories of cases, the answer
to the retroactivity question has been effectively determined not
by application of the
Stovall factors, but rather through
application of a threshold test. [
Footnote 11]
Page 457 U. S. 549
First, when a decision of this Court merely has applied settled
precedents to new and different factual situations, no real
question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply
retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion
that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases, because
the later decision has not, in fact, altered that rule in any
material way.
See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.
S. 200,
442 U. S. 206
(1979) (reviewing application of the rule in
Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U. S. 590
(1975));
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.
S. 410,
393 U. S. 412
(1969) ("further explicat[ing]" the principles of
Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U. S. 108
(1964));
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 263
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Conversely, where the Court has expressly declared a rule of
criminal procedure to be "a clear break with the past,"
Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 248,
it almost invariably has gone on to find such a newly minted
principle nonretroactive.
See United States v. Peltier,
422 U. S. 531,
422 U. S. 547,
n. 5 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). In this
second type of case, the traits of the particular constitutional
rule have been less critical than the Court's express threshold
determination that the "
new' constitutional interpretatio[n] .
. . so change[s] the law that prospectivity is arguably the proper
course," Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 659
(plurality opinion). Once the Court has found that the new rule was
unanticipated, the second and third Stovall factors --
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new rule -- have virtually
Page 457 U. S. 550
compelled a finding of nonretroactivity.
See, e.g., Gosa v.
Mayden, 413 U.S. at
413 U. S.
672-673,
413 U. S.
682-685 (plurality opinion);
Michigan v. Payne,
412 U.S. at
412 U. S. 55-57.
[
Footnote 12]
Third, the Court has recognized full retroactivity as a
necessary adjunct to a ruling that a trial court lacked authority
to convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first place. The
Court has invalidated inconsistent prior judgments where its
reading of a particular constitutional guarantee immunizes a
defendant's conduct from punishment,
see, e.g., United States
v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.
S. 715,
401 U. S. 724
(1971) (penalty against assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination), or serves "to prevent [his] trial from
taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that
govern the conduct of [that] trial,"
Robinson v. Neil, 409
U.S. at
409 U. S. 509
(double jeopardy). In such cases, the Court has relied less on the
technique of retroactive application than on the notion that the
prior inconsistent judgments or sentences were void
ab
initio. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.
S. 786,
408 U. S. 800
(1972) (retroactive application of Eighth Amendment ruling in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238
(1972));
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.
S. 436,
397 U. S. 437,
n. 1 (1970) (retroactive application of double jeopardy ruling in
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784
(1969)).
See also Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 693
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. at
412 U. S. 61
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (rulings are fully retroactive when the
"Court
Page 457 U. S. 551
has held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the
traditional sense").
Respondent's case neatly fits none of these three categories.
First,
Payton v. New York did not simply apply settled
precedent to a new set of facts. In
Payton, the Court
acknowledged that the "important constitutional question presented"
there had been "expressly left open in a number of our prior
opinions." 445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 574
and
445 U. S. 575,
n. 1, citing
United States v. Watson, 423 U.
S. 411,
423 U. S. 418,
n. 6 (1976);
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.
S. 103,
420 U. S. 113,
n. 13 (1975);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443,
403 U. S.
474-481 (1971); and
Jones v. United States,
357 U. S. 493,
357 U. S.
499-500 (1958).
By the same token, however,
Payton also did not
announce an entirely new and unanticipated principle of law. In
general, the Court has not subsequently read a decision to work a
"sharp break in the web of the law,"
Milton v. Wainwright,
407 U. S. 371,
407 U. S. 381,
n. 2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting), unless that ruling caused
"such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute
an entirely new rule which in effect replaced an older one,"
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
392 U. S. 481,
392 U. S. 498
(1968). Such a break has been recognized only when a decision
explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court,
see, e.g.,
Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244
(1969);
Williams v. United States, 401 U.
S. 646 (1971), or disapproves a practice this Court
arguably has sanctioned in prior cases,
see, e.g., Gosa v.
Mayden, 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 673
(plurality opinion);
Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at
405 U. S. 283;
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 731,
or overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this
Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower
court authority has expressly approved.
See, e.g., Gosa v.
Mayden, 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 673
(plurality opinion) (applying nonretroactively a decision that
"effected a decisional change in attitude that had prevailed for
many decades");
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at
388 U. S.
299-300.
See also Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U. S. 97,
404 U. S. 107
(1971);
Cipriano
Page 457 U. S. 552
v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701
(1969);
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. at
407 U. S.
381-382, n. 2 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("sharp break"
occurs when "decision overrules clear past precedent . . . or
disrupts a practice long accepted and widely relied upon").
Payton did none of these.
Payton expressly
overruled no clear past precedent of this Court on which litigants
may have relied. Nor did
Payton disapprove an established
practice that the Court had previously sanctioned. To the extent
that the Court earlier had spoken to the conduct engaged in by the
police officers in
Payton, it had deemed it of doubtful
constitutionality. [
Footnote
13] The Court's own analysis in
Payton makes it clear
that its ruling rested on both long-recognized principles of Fourth
Amendment law and the weight of historical authority as it had
appeared to the Framers of the Fourth Amendment. [
Footnote 14] Finally,
Payton
overturned no longstanding
Page 457 U. S. 553
practice approved by a near-unanimous body of lower court
authority. [
Footnote 15]
Payton therefore does not fall into that narrow class of
decisions whose nonretroactivity is effectively
Page 457 U. S. 554
preordained because they unmistakably signal "a clear break with
the past,"
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S.
248.
It is equally plain that
Payton does not fall into the
third category of cases that do not pose difficult retroactivity
questions.
Payton did not hold that the trial court lacked
authority to convict or sentence Theodore Payton, nor did
Payton's reading of the Fourth Amendment immunize Payton's
conduct from punishment. The holding in
Payton did not
prevent the defendant's trial from taking place; rather, it
reversed the New York Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for a
new trial to be conducted without unconstitutionally obtained
evidence.
B
Having determined that the retroactivity question here is not
clearly controlled by our prior precedents, we next must ask
whether that question would be fairly resolved by applying the rule
in
Payton to all cases still pending on direct appeal at
the time when
Payton was decided. Answering that question
affirmatively would satisfy each of the three concerns stated in
Justice Harlan's opinions in
Desist and
Mackey.
First, retroactive application of
Payton to all
previously nonfinal convictions would provide a principle of
decisionmaking consonant with our original understanding of
retroactivity in
Linkletter and
Shott. Moreover,
such a principle would be one capable of general applicability,
satisfying Justice Harlan's central concern:
"Refusal to apply new constitutional rules to all cases arising
on direct review . . . tends to cut this Court loose from the force
of precedent, allowing us
Page 457 U. S. 555
to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately
created by extant law, and thereby mitigate the practical force of
stare decisis, . . . a force which ought properly to bear
on the judicial resolution of any legal problem."
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S.
680-681 (separate opinion).
Second, application of
Payton to cases pending on
direct review would comport with our judicial responsibilities "to
do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case,"
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 259
(Harlan, J., dissenting), and to "resolve all cases before us on
direct review in light of our best understanding of governing
constitutional principles."
Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. at
401 U. S. 679
(separate opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court of Appeals held that
the circumstances of respondent's arrest violated
Payton,
and the Government does not dispute that contention.
See
n 6,
supra. It would
be ironic indeed were we now to reverse a judgment applying
Payton's rule when, in
Payton itself, we reversed
a directly contrary judgment of the New York Court of Appeals. As
Justice Harlan noted in
Desist:
"If a 'new' constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should
not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we
affirm those which have rejected the very arguments we have
embraced."
394 U.S. at
394 U. S.
259.
Third, application of the Harlan approach to respondent's case
would further the goal of treating similarly situated defendants
similarly. The Government contends that respondent may not invoke
Payton, because he was arrested before
Payton was
decided. Yet it goes without saying that Theodore Payton also was
arrested before
Payton was decided, and he received the
benefit of the rule in his case. Furthermore, at least one other
defendant whose conviction was not final when
Payton
issued benefited from
Payton's rule, although he, too, was
arrested before
Payton was decided. [
Footnote 16]
Page 457 U. S. 556
An approach that resolved all nonfinal convictions under the
same rule of law would lessen the possibility that this Court might
mete out different constitutional protection to defendants
simultaneously subjected to identical police conduct. [
Footnote 17]
Page 457 U. S. 557
IV
Against adoption of this approach, the Government raises four
arguments based on
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.
S. 531 (1975). None is persuasive.
The Government first cites
Peltier's holding: that the
Fourth Amendment rule announced in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266
(1973), should not apply retroactively to a case pending on appeal
when
Almeida-Sanchez was announced. By so holding, the
Government suggests,
Page 457 U. S. 558
Peltier declared a principle that controls the issue of
retroactivity for all Fourth Amendment rulings. [
Footnote 18]
Upon examination, however, the retroactivity question posed here
differs from that presented in
Peltier. As the Government
concedes,
Payton overturned neither a statute nor any
consistent judicial history approving nonconsensual, warrantless
home entries.
See Brief for United States 30, n. 18. Thus,
its nonretroactivity is not preordained under the "clear break"
principles stated above. In
Peltier, in contrast, the
Court noted that
Almeida-Sanchez had invalidated a form of
search previously sanctioned by "a validly enacted statute,
supported by longstanding administrative regulations and continuous
judicial approval." 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 541.
See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 278
(POWELL, J., concurring) ("While the question is one of first
impression in this Court," the practice disapproved had "been
consistently approved by the judiciary");
id. at
413 U. S.
298-299, n. 10 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (35 of 36 judges
in 20 Court of Appeals cases had approved the invalidated
practice).
Because
Almeida-Sanchez had overturned a longstanding
practice to which this Court had not spoken, but which a
near-unanimous body of lower court authority had approved, it
represented a "clear break" with the past. For that reason alone,
under controlling retroactivity precedents, the nonretroactive
application of
Almeida-Sanchez would have been appropriate
even if the case had involved no Fourth Amendment question. In that
respect,
Peltier resembles several earlier decisions that
held "new" Fourth Amendment
Page 457 U. S. 559
doctrine nonretroactive, not on the ground that all Fourth
Amendment rulings apply only prospectively, but because the
particular decisions being applied "so change[d] the law that
prospectivity [was] arguably the proper course."
Williams v.
United States, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 659
(plurality opinion) (refusing to apply retroactively
Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752
(1969), which overruled
United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56
(1950), and
Harris v. United States, 331 U.
S. 145 (1947)).
See also Desist v. United
States, 394 U. S. 244
(1969) (refusing to apply retroactively
Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347
(1967), which overruled
Goldman v. United States,
316 U. S. 129
(1942), and
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.
S. 438 (1928)).
The Government bases its second argument on
Peltier's
broad language:
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful
police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be
suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer
had
knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge,
that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment"
(emphasis added). 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 542.
The Government reads this language to require that new Fourth
Amendment rules must be denied retroactive effect in all cases
except those in which law enforcement officers failed to act in
good faith compliance with then-prevailing constitutional
norms.
The Government does not seriously suggest that the retroactivity
of a given Fourth Amendment ruling should turn solely on the
subjective state of a particular arresting officer's mind. Instead,
it offers an "objective" test: that law enforcement officers "may
properly be charged with knowledge" of all "settled" Fourth
Amendment law. Under the Government's theory, because the state of
Fourth Amendment law regarding warrantless home arrests was
"unsettled" before
Payton, that ruling should not apply
retroactively even to cases pending on direct appeal when
Payton was decided.
See Brief for United States
14-19, 34-38.
Page 457 U. S. 560
Yet the Government's reading of
Peltier would reduce
its own "retroactivity test" to an absurdity. Under this view, the
only Fourth Amendment rulings worthy of retroactive application are
those in which the arresting officers violated preexisting
guidelines clearly established by prior cases. But as we have seen
above, cases involving simple application of clear, preexisting
Fourth Amendment guidelines raise no real questions of
retroactivity at all. Literally read, the Government's theory would
automatically eliminate
all Fourth Amendment rulings from
consideration for retroactive application.
The Government's third claim is that
Peltier's logic
suggests that retroactive application of Fourth Amendment decisions
like
Payton -- even to cases pending on direct review --
would not serve the policies underlying the exclusionary rule.
Cf. 422 U.S. at 536-542. Yet viewed in the light of
Peltier's holding, this assertion also fails.
Peltier suggested only that retroactive application of a
Fourth Amendment ruling that worked a "sharp break" in the law,
like
Almeida-Sanchez, would have little deterrent effect,
because law enforcement officers would rarely be deterred from
engaging in a practice they never expected to be invalidated.
See 422 U.S. at
422 U. S.
541-542.
This logic does not apply to a ruling like
Payton, that
resolved a previously unsettled point of Fourth Amendment law.
Because this Court cannot rule on every unsettled Fourth Amendment
question, years may pass before the Court finally invalidates a
police practice of dubious constitutionality.
See, e.g., Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 275
(Fortas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "physical trespass"
wiretap rule of
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.
S. 438 (1928), had been moribund for 17 years before it
was formally overruled). Long before
Payton, for example,
this Court had questioned the constitutionality of warrantless home
arrests.
See n 13,
supra. Furthermore, the Court's
Page 457 U. S. 561
opinions consistently had emphasized that, in light of the
constitutional protection traditionally accorded to the privacy of
the home, police officers should resolve any doubts regarding the
validity of a home arrest in favor of obtaining a warrant.
See,
e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10,
333 U. S. 14
(1948) ("Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant
will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant
would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers").
If, as the Government argues, all rulings resolving unsettled
Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, in close
cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err
on the side of constitutional behavior. [
Footnote 19] Official awareness of the dubious
constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by
official certainty that, so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the
area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through the questionable
practice would be excluded only in the one case definitively
resolving the unsettled question. Failure to accord
any
retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would "encourage
police or other courts to disregard the plain purport of our
decisions and to adopt a
let's wait until it's decided'
approach." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 277
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
The Government finally argues that retroactive application of
Payton, even to a case pending on direct appeal, would
accomplish nothing but the discharge of a wrongdoer. Justice Harlan
gave the answer to this assertion.
"We do not release a criminal from jail because we like to do
so, or because we think it wise to do so, but only because the
government has offended constitutional principle in the conduct of
his case. And when another similarly situated defendant comes
Page 457 U. S. 562
before us, we must grant the same relief or give a principled
reason for acting differently."
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 258
(dissenting opinion). Applying
Payton to convictions that
were not yet final when
Payton issued would accomplish the
first step toward
"turning our backs on the
ad hoc approach that has so
far characterized our decisions in the retroactivity field, and
proceeding to administer the doctrine on principle."
Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 224
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
V
To the extent necessary to decide today's case, we embrace
Justice Harlan's views in
Desist and
Mackey. We
therefore hold that, subject to the exceptions stated below, a
decision of this Court construing the Fourth Amendment is to be
applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at
the time the decision was rendered.
By so holding, however, we leave undisturbed our precedents in
other areas. First, our decision today does not affect those cases
that would be clearly controlled by our existing retroactivity
precedents. Second, because respondent's case arises on direct
review, we need not address the retroactive reach of our Fourth
Amendment decisions to those cases that still may raise Fourth
Amendment issues on collateral attack. [
Footnote 20]
Cf. n 10,
supra. Third, we express no view on the
retroactive application of decisions construing any constitutional
provision other than the Fourth Amendment. [
Footnote 21]
Page 457 U. S. 563
Finally, all questions of civil retroactivity continue to be
governed by the standard enunciated in
Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. at
404 U. S.
106-107.
See n 12,
supra.
Respondent's case was pending on direct appeal when
Payton
v. New York was decided. Because the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the rule in
Payton should apply to
respondent's case, its judgment is affirmed. [
Footnote 22]
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The Fourth Amendment reads:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."
[
Footnote 2]
On March 30, 1977, the United States Postal Service mistakenly
delivered to Lena Kearney a Treasury check for $4,681.41, payable
to Elihu Peterson. Kearney and her sister-in-law sought Dodd's
assistance in cashing the check. Accompanied by respondent Johnson
and another man, Dodd went to Kearney's residence to discuss
methods of cashing the check. The three men eventually departed,
taking the check with them.
After Kearney and her sister-in-law related the foregoing events
to Special Agent Hemenway, he obtained a warrant for Dodd's arrest.
He, however, did not obtain a warrant to arrest respondent.
See 626 F.2d 753 754-755 (CA9 1980).
[
Footnote 3]
The jury acquitted respondent on a separate count of aiding and
abetting the receipt of stolen Government property.
See 18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 641. Respondent's codefendant Dodd was convicted on
both counts. In an unreported decision, Dodd's conviction was
affirmed summarily on appeal, and is not before us.
See United
States v. Dodd, No. 79-1030 (CA9 Feb. 4, 1980),
rehearing
denied, Mar. 5, 1980.
[
Footnote 4]
The Court noted probable jurisdiction in
Payton on
December 11, 1978. 439 U.S. 1044. On March 5, 1979, the Ninth
Circuit deferred decision on respondent's petition for rehearing
and rehearing en banc pending this Court's decision in
Payton. App. 8. The Court heard argument in
Payton on March 26, 1979, but restored the case to the
calendar for reargument.
See 441 U.S. 930 (1979).
On August 20, 1979, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed respondent's
conviction, in the process amending its initial opinion and denying
respondent's petition for rehearing. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a.
Respondent timely filed a second petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc, which was still pending in the
Court of Appeals when
Payton was decided.
[
Footnote 5]
In a decision issued three months before its initial ruling
here, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit had anticipated
Payton, holding that,
"absent exigent circumstances, police who have probable cause to
arrest a felony suspect must obtain a warrant before entering a
dwelling to carry out the arrest."
United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (1978).
Upon denial of the Government's petition for rehearing in
respondent's case, the Court of Appeals made clear that its
post-
Payton reversal of respondent's conviction "rests
chiefly upon basic principles common to our decision in
Prescott and that of the Supreme Court in
Payton." App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. The court also noted
that it had already held that its ruling in
Prescott
should apply retroactively.
See United States v. Blake,
632 F.2d 731 (1980).
[
Footnote 6]
For the purposes of this case, the Government assumes the
correctness of the Court of Appeals' ruling that, if applied to
these facts,
Payton would require exclusion of
respondent's statements. Brief for United States 12-13, n. 6. We
therefore need not examine the Court of Appeals' conclusion on that
issue.
[
Footnote 7]
The pre-1965 requirement that all constitutional rules receive
full retroactive application derived from the Blackstonian notion
"that the duty of the court was not to
pronounce a new law, but
to maintain and expound the old one.'" Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S. 618,
381 U. S.
622-623 (1965), citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 69
(15th ed. 1809).
[
Footnote 8]
"By final, we mean where the judgment of conviction was
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for
petition for certiorari had elapsed [or a petition for certiorari
finally denied, all] before our decision in
Mapp v.
Ohio."
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at
381 U. S. 622,
n. 5.
See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U. S. 406,
382 U. S. 409,
n. 3 (1966).
[
Footnote 9]
See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.
S. 323,
447 U. S. 337
(1980) (POWELL, J., with whom STEVENS, J., joined, concurring in
judgment);
Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.
S. 459,
439 U. S. 460
(1979) (POWELL, J., concurring in judgments);
Hankerson v.
North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233,
432 U. S. 245
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment);
id. at
432 U. S. 246
(POWELL, J., concurring in judgment);
United States v.
Peltier, 422 U. S. 531,
422 U. S. 543
(1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Daniel v. Louisiana,
420 U. S. 31,
420 U. S. 33,
and n. (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433,
417 U. S. 461
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Michigan v. Payne,
412 U. S. 47,
412 U. S. 58
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at
412 U. S. 59
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Adams v. Illinois,
405 U. S. 278,
405 U. S. 286
(1972) (Douglas, J., with whom MARSHALL, J., concurred,
dissenting);
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.
S. 667,
401 U. S. 675
(1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.);
id. at
401 U. S. 713
(Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., concurred, dissenting);
Williams v. United States, 401 U.
S. 646,
401 U. S. 665
(1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1,
399 U. S. 19
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U. S. 814,
395 U. S. 817
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in result);
Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U. S. 213,
395 U. S. 222
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Desist v. United States,
394 U. S. 244,
394 U. S. 255
(1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at
394 U. S. 256
(Harlan, J., dissenting);
id. at
394 U. S. 269
(Fortas, J., dissenting);
Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S.
80,
393 U. S. 82
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
DeStefano v. Woods,
392 U. S. 631,
392 U. S. 635
(1968) (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., joined, dissenting);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293,
388 U. S. 302
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at
388 U. S. 303
(Black, J., dissenting);
Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U. S. 719,
384 U. S. 736
(1966) (Black, J., with whom Douglas, J., joined, dissenting);
Whisman v. Georgia, 384 U. S. 895
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Tehan v. United States ex
rel. Shott, 382 U.S. at
382 U. S. 419
(Black, J., with whom Douglas, J., joined, dissenting);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at
381 U. S. 640
(Black, J., with whom Douglas, J., joined, dissenting).
[
Footnote 10]
Evenhanded justice for similarly situated litigants was the
principal theme sounded by the dissenting opinions of Justices
Black and Douglas.
See cases cited in
n 9,
supra. The views of these Justices
diverged from those of Justice Harlan, however, on the question
whether equal treatment also requires retroactive application of
newly announced constitutional rules to all cases arising on
collateral attack.
Compare Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. at
394 U. S. 255
(Douglas, J., dissenting),
with id. at
394 U. S.
260-269 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See also Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. at
405 U. S. 287, and n. 4 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Members of the Court continue to offer views on this troublesome
question.
Compare Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. at
432 U. S. 246,
and n. (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment),
with id. at
432 U. S. 248
(POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).
[
Footnote 11]
These cases therefore have not proved "readily susceptible of
analysis under the
Linkletter line of cases."
Robinson
v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505,
409 U. S. 508
(1973). The dissent's accusation that these categories exclude the
"most obvious" line of cases -- those announcing rules relating to
the truthfinding function,
post at
457 U. S. 567
-- misses our point. In those cases, the retroactivity decision
has, in fact, turned on a traditional application of the
Stovall factors, with the central issue in dispute often
being the major purpose to be served by the new standard.
Compare Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.
S. 323 (1980) (plurality opinion),
with id. at
447 U. S. 337
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (disagreeing over the "major purpose"
of the unanimous six-person jury rule of
Burch v.
Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130
(1979)).
[
Footnote 12]
In the civil context, in contrast, the "clear break" principle
has usually been stated as he threshold test for determining
whether or not a decision should be applied nonretroactively.
See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S.
97,
404 U. S. 106
(1971). Once it has been determined that a decision has
"establish[ed] a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed,"
the Court has gone on to examine the history, purpose, and
effect of the new rule, as well as the inequity that would be
imposed by its retroactive application.
Id. at
404 U. S.
106-107.
See also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481,
392 U. S. 499
(1968).
[
Footnote 13]
At least since
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616,
116 U. S. 630
(1886), the Court had acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment
accords special protection to the home.
McDonald v. United
States, 335 U. S. 451,
335 U. S. 456
(1948), stated that "the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass
on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the
home."
See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10,
333 U. S. 13-15
(1948). While ultimately declining to decide whether a warrant is
necessary to effect a home arrest,
Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
403 U. S.
474-475 (1971) (footnote omitted), had declared that
"a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without
a warrant is
per se unreasonable unless the police can
show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of
exceptions based on the presence of 'exigent circumstances.'"
See also United States v. United States District Court,
407 U. S. 297,
407 U. S. 313
(1972) ("physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed");
United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543,
428 U. S. 561
(1976) ("the sanctity of private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection").
[
Footnote 14]
The
Payton Court relied on the "
basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 586,
citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 477.
The Court further recognized that the express language of the
Fourth Amendment "has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the
house" in "terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to
seizures of persons." 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 590.
After examining the common law understanding of an officer's
authority to arrest a suspect in his own home, id. at
445 U. S.
591-598, the Court concluded that
"the weight of authority as it appeared to the Framers [of the
Fourth Amendment] was to the effect that a warrant was required
[before a home arrest], or, at the minimum, that there were
substantial risks in proceeding without one."
Id. at
445 U. S.
596.
[
Footnote 15]
While the practice invalidated in
Payton had found
support in some state courts, those decisions evinced "by no means
the kind of virtual unanimity,"
id. at
445 U. S. 600,
required to make
Payton a clear break with the past. In
Payton, the Court noted that, at the time of its decision,
"[o]nly 24 of the 50 States currently sanction warrantless entries
into the home to arrest, . . . and there is an obvious declining
trend."
Ibid. In California, where the present
respondent's case arose, the State Supreme Court had held more than
a year before respondent's arrest that, under the Fourth Amendment
and its state constitutional counterpart, warrantless arrests
within the home were
per se unreasonable in the absence of
exigent circumstances.
See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d
263, 275-276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1340-1341,
cert. denied,
429 U.S. 929 (1976).
Of the seven United States Courts of Appeals that had considered
the question before
Payton, five had expressed the view
that warrantless home arrests were unconstitutional. 445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 575,
and n. 4. Three other Circuits had assumed, without expressly
deciding, that such searches were unlawful.
Ibid. After
one of those decisions, in 1978, the Department of Justice
instructed federal law enforcement agencies to follow the practice
of procuring arrest warrants before entering a suspect's home to
arrest him without exigent circumstances. Brief for United States
33, n. 20.
In the Ninth Circuit, where respondent was arrested, it has been
said that "law enforcement officials knew that th[e] circuit's law
was unsettled, but that there was some drift toward a warrant
requirement."
United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d at 736.
United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1135 (CA9 1974),
had suggested in dictum that warrants are required before officers
may enter a private dwelling to effect an arrest. In
United
States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102 (CA9 1976),
cert.
denied sub nom. Stephenson v. United States, 429 U.S. 1064
(1977), it was observed that the Government had agreed that, absent
exigent circumstances, a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a
suspect's home would be illegal.
United States v.
Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1360, then squarely held such arrests
unconstitutional.
See n 6,
supra.
[
Footnote 16]
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Payton's conviction along
with that of Obie Riddick.
See Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. at
445 U. S.
578-579. This Court noted probable jurisdiction in
Riddick's appeal, consolidated it with
Payton's, then
reversed both convictions.
Id. at
445 U. S.
603.
In theory, the Court could have held Riddick's jurisdictional
statement pending the disposition in Payton's case, then vacated
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
Payton. Such a course was taken in seven other nonfinal
cases.
See Gonzalez v. New York, 446 U.S. 902 (1980);
Brown v. Florida, 446 U.S. 902 (1980);
Busch v.
Florida, 446 U.S. 902 (1980);
Vidal v. New York,
446 U. S. 903
(1980);
Gordon v. New York, 446 U.
S. 903 (1980);
Gayle v. New York, 446 U.S. 905
(1980); and
Dunagan v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 905 (1980).
Alternatively, the Court could have given all these cases plenary
review.
Potential for unequal treatment is inherent in this process. As
Justice Douglas "recalled" when the Court decided
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966):
"[S]ome 80 cases were presented raising the same question. We
took four of them and held the rest, and then disposed of each of
the four, applying the new procedural rule retroactively. But as
respects the rest of the pending cases, we denied any relief. . . .
Yet it was sheer coincidence that those precise four were chosen.
Any other single case in the group or any other four would have
been sufficient for our purposes."
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 255
(dissenting opinion).
The dissent argues that
"we long ago resolved the problem of the appearance of inequity
that arises whenever we limit the retroactive reach of a new
principle of law."
Post at
457 U. S. 566.
But the dissent mischaracterizes both the problem and this Court's
treatment of it. The problem is not merely the appearance of
inequity, but the actual inequity that results when the Court
chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the
chance beneficiary of a retroactively applied rule. As the
persistently voiced dissatisfaction with the Court's "ambulatory
retroactivity doctrine" has revealed,
see n 9,
supra, until now, this Court
has not "resolved" this problem so much as it has chosen to
tolerate it. The time for toleration has come to an end.
[
Footnote 17]
We are aware, of course, that many considerations affect a
defendant's progress through the judicial system, and that the
speed of appellate review will differ from State to State, Circuit
to Circuit, and case to case. Even under our approach, it may be
unavoidable that some similarly situated defendants will be treated
differently.
Cf. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 667, and
n. 9 (plurality opinion).
The Government suggests an approach, however, that virtually
ensures that such anomalies will occur. The Government concedes
that the
Payton rule should apply to any
pre-
Payton case arising in a Circuit where the United
States Court of Appeals already had held authoritatively that
Payton-type searches were unlawful. Brief for United
States 22-26. When respondent was arrested, two Courts of Appeals
had invalidated warrantless home arrests conducted in the absence
of exigent circumstances.
See Dorman v. United States, 140
U.S.App.D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (1970);
United States v.
Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (CA6 1974). Thus, under the Government's
theory, the statements of a suspect arrested in the District of
Columbia, on the same day as respondent was arrested in Los Angeles
and under identical circumstances, should be excluded while
respondent's statements should not. Moreover, under the
Government's reasoning, this Court would be obliged to reverse a
ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit excluding
those statements, but not an identical ruling from the District of
Columbia Circuit in a parallel case.
The dissent takes a different tack. Arguing that "inherent
arbitrariness" arises whenever lines are drawn in this area, the
dissent suggests that the "best way to deal with this problem" is
to continue to make retroactivity decisions by picking and choosing
from among similarly situated defendants.
See post at
457 U. S. 568.
By clinging to this view, the dissent, and not the Court, "is
fooling itself."
Ibid. This Court has no power to speed up
or slow down the appellate process in the many tribunals throughout
the country to ensure similar treatment of similarly situated
defendants. The Court does, however, have the power to eliminate
the obvious unfairness that results when it gives only the most
conveniently situated defendant the retrospective benefit of a
newly declared rule.
[
Footnote 18]
The dissent shares this mistaken impression. In support of its
claim, the dissent cites
Peltier's suggestion that every
decision by this Court involving the exclusionary rule has been
"accorded only prospective application."
Post at
457 U. S. 564,
citing 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 535.
As
Peltier recognized with discomfort, however,
Linkletter itself -- the first of the modern retroactivity
cases -- acknowledged the application of the
Mapp
exclusionary rule to cases that were pending on direct review at
the time that
Mapp was decided.
See 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 535,
n. 5.
[
Footnote 19]
The record in this case, for example, does not explain why
respondent's arresting officers failed to obtain a warrant for his
arrest when they did obtain a warrant to arrest his codefendant.
See n 2,
supra.
[
Footnote 20]
After
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.
S. 465 (1976), the only cases raising Fourth Amendment
challenges on collateral attack are those federal habeas corpus
cases in which the State has failed to provide a state prisoner
with an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim,
analogous federal cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and collateral
challenges by state prisoners to their state convictions under
postconviction relief statutes that continue to recognize Fourth
Amendment claims.
[
Footnote 21]
The logic of our ruling, however, is not inconsistent with our
precedents giving complete retroactive effect to constitutional
rules whose purpose is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial
that substantially impairs its truthfinding function.
See,
e.g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.
S. 233 (1977);
Ivan V. v. City of New York,
407 U. S. 203
(1972). Depending on the constitutional provision involved,
additional factors may warrant giving a particular ruling
retroactive effect beyond those cases pending on direct review.
See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. at
432 U. S. 248,
n. 2 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).
Curiously, the dissent faults us not only for limiting our
ruling to the only context properly presented by this case -- the
Fourth Amendment -- but also for preserving, rather than
overruling, clearly controlling retroactivity precedents.
See
post at
457 U. S. 568.
The dissent then recasts those precedents in its own simplistic
way, arguing that rules related to truthfinding automatically
receive full retroactive effect, while implying that all other
rules -- including Fourth Amendment rules -- should receive
none.
There are, however, two problems with this. First, the Court's
decisions regularly giving complete retroactive effect to
truthfinding rules have in no way required that newly declared
Fourth Amendment rulings be denied all retroactive effect. For the
reasons already stated, retroactive application of Fourth Amendment
rules at least to cases pending on direct review furthers the
policies underlying the exclusionary rule. Second, and more
important, the Fourth Amendment "rule" urged by the dissent is far
from a "perfectly good" one.
Ibid. As we already have
shown, that "rule" condones obviously inequitable treatment of
similarly situated litigants and judicial injustice to individual
litigants.
[
Footnote 22]
The question on which we granted certiorari encompassed one
other issue: whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that
its own decision in
United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d
1343 (1978), applies retroactively to respondent's arrest.
See n 5,
supra. Because we hold that the principles of our decision
in
Payton apply retroactively to respondent's case, we
need not disturb the Court of Appeals' ruling regarding the
retroactive application of its own prior decision.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that the decision
leaves undisturbed our retroactivity precedents as applied
Page 457 U. S. 564
to convictions final at the time of decision.
See Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U. S. 293
(1967).
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
In my view, this case is controlled by
United States v.
Peltier, 422 U. S. 531
(1975).
Peltier established two propositions. First,
retroactive application of a new constitutional doctrine is
appropriate when that doctrine's major purpose is
"'to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially
impairs its truthfinding function and so raises serious questions
about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials.'"
Id. at
422 U. S. 535,
quoting
Williams v. United States, 401 U.
S. 646,
401 U. S. 653
(1971). Second, new extensions of the exclusionary rule do not
serve this purpose and, therefore, will not generally be applied
retroactively. There was surely nothing extraordinary about our
ruling in
Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 (1980), that would justify an exception to this
general rule.
Peltier was only the latest of a number of cases
involving the question of whether rulings extending the reach of
the exclusionary rule should be given retroactive effect. We noted
there that,
"in every case in which the Court has addressed the
retroactivity problem in the context of the exclusionary rule . . .
, the Court has concluded that any such new constitutional
principle would be accorded only prospective application."
422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 535.
We suggested that there were two reasons for this consistent
pattern of decisions, and that these two reasons were directly
related to the justifications for the exclusionary rule.
That rule has traditionally been understood to serve two
purposes: first, it preserves "judicial integrity"; second, it acts
as a deterrent to unconstitutional police conduct. Neither of these
purposes, however, is furthered by retroactive application of new
extensions of the rule. First,
"if the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good
faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial, the
'imperative
Page 457 U. S. 565
of judicial integrity' is not offended by the introduction into
evidence of that material."
Id. at
422 U. S. 537.
Second, a deterrence purpose can only be served when the evidence
to be suppressed is derived from a search which the law enforcement
officers knew or should have known was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.
Id. at
422 U. S.
542.
In focusing on the purpose of the exclusionary rule in order to
decide the question of retroactivity, the Court was following
settled principles. In
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.
S. 618 (1965), which the majority agrees is the first of
the modern retroactivity cases, the Court set forth a three-pronged
model for analysis of the retroactivity question presented
there:
"[W]e must look to the purpose of the
Mapp rule; the
reliance placed upon the
Wolf doctrine; and the effect on
the administration of justice of a retrospective application of
Mapp."
Id. at
381 U. S. 636.
This three-prong analysis was consistently applied in the cases
which followed,
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U. S. 406,
382 U. S. 419
(1966);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.
S. 719,
384 U. S. 727
(1966);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.
S. 293,
388 U. S. 297
(1967). Indeed, in
Stovall, the Court specifically
announced that these three considerations -- purpose of the new
rule, reliance on the old rule, and effect on the administration of
justice -- were generally to guide resolution of all retroactivity
problems relating to constitutional rules of criminal procedure. In
each of these cases, the purpose of the new rule was the first
consideration. That this was not accidental was made absolutely
clear in
Desist v. United States, 394 U.
S. 244,
394 U. S. 249
(1969): "Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be served
by the new constitutional rule."
* And as we went
on
Page 457 U. S. 566
to say there, "[t]his criterion strongly supports prospectivity
for a decision amplifying the evidentiary exclusionary rule."
Ibid.
Moreover, up until today's decision, it was clear that these
same principles governed the question of whether a new decision
should retroactively apply to cases pending on appeal at the time
of its announcement.
Peltier itself was just this sort of
a case: Peltier's case was on appeal at the time of the
announcement of the decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266
(1973). Indeed, we reversed the Court of Appeals' holding in that
case that the
"rule announced . . . in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States . . . should be applied to similar cases pending on
appeal on the date the Supreme Court's decision was announced."
United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985, 986 (CA9 1974)
(footnote omitted). I had thought that we long ago resolved the
problem of the appearance of inequity that arises whenever we limit
the retroactive reach of a new principle of law. As JUSTICE BRENNAN
stated for the Court in
Stovall, supra, at
388 U. S.
301:
"Inequity arguably results from according the benefit of a new
rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced, but not
to other litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate
process who have raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that
the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant
cost for adherence to sound principles of decisionmaking."
All of these principles are well settled, and require reversal
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The majority, in an
intricate and confusing opinion disagrees. Two reasons for its
disagreement seem to be presented.
First, the majority discerns no consistent reading of our
precedents that would control this case.
Ante at
457 U. S. 554
("Having determined that the retroactivity question here is not
clearly controlled by our prior precedents . . ."). Given the
clarity with which we have previously set out the applicable
Page 457 U. S. 567
principles and the consistent application of those principles in
cases involving extensions of the exclusionary rule, this is surely
a strange conclusion. Eschewing the straightforward reading of the
cases set forth above, which looks primarily to the substantive
purpose of the relevant rule of law, the majority replaces it with
an exceedingly formal set of three categories.
Ante at
457 U. S.
549-551. Because these categories turn out to be dicta
only, they merit little comment. Suffice it to say that their
inadequacy is obvious from even a moment's reflection: that
category to which the majority agrees "the Court has regularly
given complete retroactive effect" is nowhere included in this
formal scheme -- cases announcing new constitutional rules whose
major purpose
"'is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that
substantially impairs its truthfinding function, and so raises
serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past
trials.'"
Ante at
457 U. S. 544,
quoting
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 653
(plurality opinion). It is little wonder that the majority finds
this case difficult, when it has failed to learn the most obvious
lessons of the previous cases.
Second, the majority seems to think that the problems of
principle that Justice Harlan struggled with in his dissent in
Desist v. United States, supra, are unanswerable under any
rule that fails to give the benefits of a new constitutional ruling
to all criminal defendants whose cases are pending on appeal at the
time of the announcement. These problems are not new. and were, I
believe, adequately answered by JUSTICE BRENNAN in
Stovall. The majority's approach, however, does not
resolve these theoretical problems; it simply draws what is
necessarily an arbitrary line in a somewhat different place than
the Court had previously settled upon. Anything less than full
retroactivity will necessarily appear unjust in some instances; it
will provide different treatment to similarly situated individuals.
The majority recognizes that the vagaries of the appellate process
will cause this same problem to reappear under its proposed rule:
"Even under
Page 457 U. S. 568
our approach, it may be unavoidable that some similarly situated
defendants will be treated differently."
Ante at
457 U. S.
556-557, n. 17. We had previously held that the best way
to deal with this problem of inherent arbitrariness was to abide by
the substantive principles outlined in
Stovall. The
majority makes no better suggestion today, and is fooling itself if
it believes that its proposal is a reasoned response to this
problem of arbitrariness, rather than an exercise in
line-drawing.
The insubstantiality of the majority's analysis and proposal is
well illustrated by its conclusion. Despite the appearance of
having resolved the difficult problem of the apparent injustice of
any rule of partial retroactivity, the Court announces at the end
that its decision today applies only to decisions "construing the
Fourth Amendment," and asserts that it is not disturbing any of our
retroactivity precedents.
Ante at
457 U. S. 562.
That is, it returns from its abstract procedural approach to the
substantive rule of law at issue. There are two problems with this,
however. First, there is no connection between the analysis and the
conclusion. Second, and more important, we already had a perfectly
good rule for resolving retroactivity problems involving the Fourth
Amendment.
Accordingly, I dissent.
*
See also 394 U.S. at
394 U. S.
251:
"It is to be noted also that we have relied heavily on the
factors of the extent of reliance and consequent burden on the
administration of justice only when the purpose of the rule in
question did not clearly favor either retroactivity or
prospectivity."