Payton v. New York
Annotate this Case
445 U.S. 573 (1980)
U.S. Supreme Court
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
Payton v. New York
Argued March 26, 1979
Reargued October 9, 1979
Decided April 15, 1980
445 U.S. 573
These appeals challenge the constitutionality of New York statutes authorizing police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine felony arrest. In each of the appeals, police officers, acting with probable cause but without warrants, had gone to the appellant's residence to arrest the appellant on a felony charge and had entered the premises without the consent of any occupant. In each case, the New York trial judge held that the warrantless entry was authorized by New York statutes and refused to suppress evidence that was seized upon the entry. Treating both cases as involving routine arrests in which there was ample time to obtain a warrant, the New York Court of Appeals, in a single opinion, ultimately affirmed the convictions of both appellants.
Held: The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Pp. 445 U. S. 583-603.
(a) The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests, but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home, which is too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, in the absence of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause is present. In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. Pp 445 U. S. 583-590.
(b) The reasons for upholding warrantless arrests in a public place, cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, do not apply to warrantless invasions of the privacy of the home. The common law rule on warrantless home arrests was not as clear as the rule on arrests in public places; the weight of authority as it appeared to the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment was to the effect that a warrant was required for a home arrest, or, at the minimum, that there were substantial risks in proceeding without one. Although a majority of the States that have taken a position on the question permit warrantless home arrests even in the absence of exigent circumstances, there is an obvious declining trend, and there is by no means the kind of virtual unanimity on this question that was present in United States v. Watson, supra, with regard to warrantless public arrests. And, unlike the situation in Watson, no federal statutes have been cited to indicate any congressional determination that warrantless entries into the home are "reasonable." Pp. 445 U. S. 590-601.
(c) For Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. Pp. 445 U. S. 602-603.
45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 445 U. S. 603. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 445 U. S. 603. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 445 U. S. 620.