Michigan v. Tucker,
Annotate this Case
417 U.S. 433 (1974)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)
Michigan v. Tucker
Argued March 20, 1974
Decided June 10, 1974
417 U.S. 433
Respondent, who had been arrested for rape, was questioned by police. Before the commencement of the interrogation (which antedated this Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436), respondent was advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel (but not of his right to the appointment of counsel if he was indigent). Respondent related an alibi that he was with a friend (Henderson), at the time of the crime, but the police later elicited from Henderson information tending to incriminate respondent. Before trial, respondent made a motion to exclude Henderson's expected testimony because respondent had revealed Henderson's identity without having received the full warnings mandated by the intervening Miranda decision. The motion was denied, Henderson testified, and respondent was convicted. Following affirmance on appeal, respondent sought habeas corpus relief, which the District Court granted, finding that Henderson's testimony was inadmissible because of the Miranda violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. The police conduct in this case, though failing to afford respondent the full measure of procedural safeguards later set forth in Miranda, did not deprive respondent of his privilege against self-incrimination since the record clearly shows that respondent's statements during the police interrogation were not involuntary or the result of potential legal sanctions. Pp. 417 U. S. 439-446.
2. The evidence derived from the police interrogation was admissible. Pp. 417 U. S. 446-452.
(a) The police's pre-Miranda failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel under all the circumstances of this case involved no bad faith, and would not justify recourse to the exclusionary rule, which is aimed at deterring willful or negligent deprivation of the accused's rights. Pp. 417 U. S. 446-448.
(b) The failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel had no bearing upon the reliability of Henderson's testimony, which was subjected to the normal testing process of an adversary trial. Pp. 417 U. S. 448-449.
(c) The use of the testimony of a witness discovered by the police as a result of the accused's statements under these circumstances does not violate any requirements under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments relating to the adversary system. Pp. 417 U. S. 449-450.
480 F.2d 927, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 417 U. S. 453. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 417 U. S. 453. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 417 U. S. 460. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 417 U. S. 461.