The Interstate Commerce Act authorizes the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) to regulate interstate rail carriers' abandonment
of railroad lines, including branch lines. Under the Act, no such
carrier may abandon a line unless it first obtains a certificate
from the ICC that the present or future public convenience and
necessity permit such an abandonment. After petitioner interstate
rail carrier's branch line in Iowa had been damaged by mud slides,
it ultimately decided not to repair, and to stop using, the line,
so notified respondent brick manufacturer, which had shipped its
products over the line, and applied to the ICC for a certificate
permitting it to abandon the line. The ICC granted the application,
finding that petitioner had abandoned the line due to conditions
beyond its control, that further repairs would not have been
sufficient to insure continuous operation, that the abandonment was
not "willful," that respondent had no right to insist that the line
be maintained solely for its use, and that continued operation
would be an unnecessary burden on petitioner and on interstate
commerce. Respondent had appeared to oppose the application, but
never perfected its filing before the ICC and did not seek judicial
review of the ICC's decision, but, instead, brought a damages
action in an Iowa state court while the abandonment application was
still pending. It alleged that petitioner had violated an Iowa
statute and state common law by refusing to provide cars on the
branch line, by negligently failing to maintain the roadbed, and by
tortiously interfering with respondent's contractual relations with
its customers. The state trial court dismissed the action on the
ground that the Interstate Commerce Act preempted state law as to
the matters in contention. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed,
ruling that the state abandonment law was not preempted and that
the state and federal schemes complemented one another.
Held: The Interstate Commerce Act precludes a shipper
from pressing a state court action for danages against a regulated
rail carrier when, as here, the ICC, in approving the carrier'
application for abandonment, reaches the merit of the matter the
shipper seeks to raise in state court. Pp.
450 U. S.
317-332.
Page 450 U. S. 312
(a) "[T]here can be no divided authority over interstate
commerce, and . . . the acts of Congress on that subject are
supreme and exclusive."
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud,
267 U. S. 404,
267 U. S. 408.
Consequently, state efforts to regulate commerce must fall when
they conflict with or interfere with federal authority over the
same activity. Pp.
450 U. S.
317-319.
(b) The ICC's authority under the Interstate Commerce Act to
regulate railroad line abandonments is exclusive and plenary. This
authority is critical to the congresfional scheme, which
contemplates comprehensive administrative regulation of interstate
commerce. The Act's structure makes it clear that Congress intended
that an aggrieved shipper should seek relief in the first instance
from the ICC. Pp.
450 U.S.
319-323.
(c) Both the letter and spirit of the Interstate Commerce Act
are inconsistent with Iowa law as construed by the Iowa Court of
Appeals. That court's decision amounts to a holding that a State
can impose sanctions upon a regulated carrier for doing that which
only the ICC has the power to declare unlawful or unreasonable. A
system under which each State could, through its courts, impose on
railroad carriers its own version of reasonable service
requirements could hardly be more at odds with the uniformity
contemplated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act.
Even though the abandonment approval did not come here until after
respondent filed its civil suit, it would be contrary to the
language of the statute to permit litigation challenging the
lawfulness of the carrier's actions to go forward when the ICC has
expressly found them to be reasonable. Accordingly, Iowa's
statutory cause of action for failure to furnish cars cannot be
asserted against an interstate rail carrier on the facts of this
case. The same reasoning applies to respondent's asserted common
law causes of action, because they, too, are essentially attempts
to litigate the issues underlying petitioner's abandonment of the
branch line in issue. The questions respondent seeks to raise in
the state court -- whether roadbed maintenance was negligent or
reasonable and whether petitioner abandoned its line with some
tortious motive -- are precisely the sorts of concerns that
Congress intended the ICC to address in weighing abandonment
requests. Consequently, on the facts of this case, the Interstate
Commerce Act also preempts Iowa's common law causes of action when
the judgments of fact and of reasonableness necessary to the
decision havc already been made by the ICC. Pp.
450 U. S.
324-331.
295 N.W.2d
467, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 450 U. S. 313
JUSTICE MARSALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Through the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments, Congress
has granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to
regulate various activities of interstate rail carriers, including
their decisions to cease service on their branch lines. Under Iowa
state law, a shipper by rail who is injured as the result of a
common carrier's failure to provide adequate rail service has
available several causes of action for damages. In this case, we
are called upon to decide whether these state law actions may be
asserted against a regulated carrier when the Commission has
approved its decision to abandon the line in question.
I
Petitioner, an interstate common carrier by rail, is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. For some
time prior to April, 1973, petitioner operated a 5.6-mile railroad
branch line between the towns of Kalo and Fort Dodge in Iowa.
Respondent operated a brick manufacturing plant near Kalo, and used
petitioner's railroad cars and branch line to transport its
products to Fort Dodge and outward in interstate commerce.
[
Footnote 1]
Page 450 U. S. 314
During the 1960's, the tracks on the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line
were damaged by three mud slides. Petitioner made repairs after the
first two slides, but following the last slide in 1967, when
portions of the embankment wholly vanished under the waters of the
Des Moines River, petitioner decided to stop using the branch line.
Petitioner instead leased part of another railroad's parallel
branch line to connect Kalo with Fort Dodge. In April, 1973, the
leased line was also damaged by a mud slide. By that time,
respondent was the only shipper using the Kalo-Fort Dodge line.
After inspecting the damage to the leased line, petitioner decided
not to repair it. Petitioner then notified respondent that it would
no longer provide service on the Kalo-Fort Dodge line, although it
would continue to make cars available at Fort Dodge if respondent
would ship its goods there by truck. Respondent determined that
shipment by truck was not economically feasible, and notified its
customers that it would complete existing contracts and then go out
of business. [
Footnote 2]
In November, 1973, petitioner filed with the Commission an
application for a certificate declaring that the public convenience
and necessity permitted it to abandon the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch
line. The United States Government intervened in support of
petitioner's application. Respondent was the sole party appearing
in opposition to the request, but failed to perfect its filing
before the Commission. [
Footnote
3] In a
Page 450 U. S. 315
decision issued in April, 1976, the Commission found that
petitioner had abandoned the line due to conditions beyond its
control, and granted the request for a certificate.
Chicago
& N.W. Transp. Co. Abandonment, AB1, Sub. No. 24 (Jan. 11,
1976), App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. Respondent made no attempt to
comply with the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act regarding
judicial review of the Commission's decision. [
Footnote 4] Instead, while the abandonment request
was still pending before the Commission, respondent filed this
damages action against petitioner in state court. The complaint
alleged that petitioner had violated Iowa Code §§ 479.3, 479.122
(1971) and state common law by refusing to provide cars on the
branch line, by negligently failing to maintain the roadbed, and by
tortiously interfering with respondent's contractual relations with
its customers. [
Footnote 5] The
state trial
Page 450 U. S. 316
court, holding that the Interstate Commerce Act wholly preempted
state law as to the matters in contention, dismissed the action.
The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that state abandonment
law was not preempted and that the state and federal schemes
represented "complimentary [
sic] alternative means of
relief for injured parties." [
Footnote 6] 295 N.W.2d
Page 450 U. S. 317
467, 469 (1979). After the Supreme Court of Iowa denied
petitioner's application for review, we granted certiorari, 446
U.S. 951 (1980). We reverse.
II
Preemption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not
favored "in the absence of persuasive reasons either that the
nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion
or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained."
Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.
S. 132,
373 U. S. 142
(1963).
See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.
S. 351,
424 U. S. 356
(1976). The underlying rationale of the preemption doctrine, as
stated more than a century and a half ago, is that the Supremacy
Clause invalidates state laws that "interfere with or are contrary
to, the laws of congress. . . ."
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 211
(1824). The doctrine does not, and could not, in our federal
system, withdraw from the States either the "power to regulate
where the activity regulated [is] a merely peripheral concern" of
federal law,
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U. S. 236,
359 U. S. 243
(1959), or the authority to legislate when Congress could have
regulated "a distinctive part of a subject which is peculiarly
adapted to local regulation, . . . but did not,"
Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52,
312 U. S. 68, n.
22 (1941). But when Congress has chosen to legislate pursuant to
its constitutional powers, then a court must find local law
preempted by federal regulation whenever the "challenged state
statute
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637,
402 U. S. 649
(1971), quoting Hines v. Dauidowitz, supra at 312 U. S. 67.
Making this determination
"is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the
construction of the two statutes and then determining the
constitutional question whether they are in conflict."
Perez v. Campbell, supra at
402 U. S. 644.
And in deciding whether any conflict is present, a court's concern
is necessarily with "the nature of the activities
Page 450 U. S. 318
which the States have sought to regulate, rather than on the
method of regulation adopted."
San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, supra at
359 U. S.
243.
The Interstate Commerce Act is among the most pervasive and
comprehensive of federal regulatory schemes, and has consequently
presented recurring preemption questions from the time of its
enactment. Since the turn of the century, we have frequently
invalidated attempts by the States to impose on common carriers
obligations that are plainly inconsistent with the plenary
authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission or with
congressional policy as reflected in the Act. These state
regulations have taken many forms. For example, as early as 1907,
the Court struck down a State's common law cause of action to
challenge as unreasonable a rail common carrier's rates because
rate regulation was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission, and a state court action "would be absolutely
inconsistent with the provisions of the act."
Texas &
Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.
S. 426,
204 U. S. 446.
Similarly, in
Transit Comm'n v. United States,
289 U. S. 121,
289 U. S. 129
(1933), we held that the Interstate Commerce Commission's statutory
authority to regulate extensions of service was exclusive, and
therefore stripped a similar state commission of all power to act
in the same area. More recently, in
Chicago v. Atchison, T.
& S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77
(1958), we held that a city ordinance requiring a license from a
municipal authority before a railroad could transfer passengers, an
activity also subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce
Act, was facially invalid as applied to an interstate carrier.
"[I]t would be inconsistent with [federal] policy," we observed,
"if local authorities retained the power to decide" whether the
carriers could do what the Act authorized them to do.
Id.
at
357 U. S. 87.
The common rationale of these cases is easily stated: "[T]here can
be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and . . . the
acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive."
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v.
Stroud,
Page 450 U. S. 319
267 U. S. 404,
267 U. S. 408
(1925). Consequently, state efforts to regulate commerce must fall
when they conflict with or interfere with federal authority over
the same activity.
III
In deciding whether respondent's state law damages action is
preempted, we must determine what Congress has said about a
carrier's ability to abandon a line, what Iowa state law provides
on the same subject, and whether the two are inconsistent. To these
tasks we now turn.
A
The Interstate Commerce Commission has been endowed by Congress
with broad power to regulate a carrier's permanent or temporary
cessation of service over lines used for interstate commerce. Under
§§ 1(4) and 1(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, recodified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 11101(a) and 11121(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III), [
Footnote 7] the Commission is empowered
both to pass on the reasonableness of a carrier's temporary
suspension of its service and, if necessary, to order it resumed.
See ICC v. Chicago N.W. Transp. Co., 533 F.2d 1025, 1027,
n. 2 (CA8 1976);
ICC v. Maine Central R. Co., 505 F.2d
590, 593-594 (CA2 1974). In addition, and most relevant here, the
Act endows the Commission with broad authority over abandonments,
or permanent cessations of service.
The Commission's power to regulate abandonments by rail carriers
stems from the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91,
Page 450 U. S. 320
41 Stat. 477-478, which added to the Interstate Commerce Act a
new § 1(18), recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 10903(a) (1976 ed., Supp.
III). That section stated in pertinent part:
"[N]o carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon
all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof,
unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the
Commission a certificate that the present or future public
convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment."
This section, we have said, must be
"construed to make federal authority effective to the full
extent that it has been exerted and with a view of eliminating the
evils that Congress intended to abate."
Transit Comm'n v. United States, supra at
289 U. S. 128.
Among those evils is "[m]ultiple control in respect of matters
affecting [interstate railroad] transportation," because such
control, in the judgment of Congress, has proved "detrimental to
the public interest." 289 U.S. at
289 U. S. 127.
See Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., supra at
357 U. S. 87.
Consequently, we have in the past concluded that the authority of
the Commission to regulate abandonments is exclusive.
Alabama
Public Service Comm'n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.
S. 341,
341 U. S. 346,
n. 7 (1951).
See Colorado v. United States, 271 U.
S. 153,
271 U. S.
164-166 (1926). The Commission's authority over
abandonments is also plenary. So broad is this power that it
extends even to approval of abandonment of purely local lines
operated by regulated carriers when, in the Commission's judgment,
"the overriding interests of interstate commerce requir[e] it."
Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79,
308 U. S. 85
(1939). The broad scope of the Commission's authority under § 1(18)
has been clear since the Court first interpreted that provision in
Colorado v. United States, supra. There, the Court
rejected a challenge by the State of Colorado to the power of the
Commission to grant a certificate permitting an abandonment of a
wholly intrastate
Page 450 U. S. 321
branch line operated by an interstate carrier. Justice Brandeis
wrote for the Court:
"Congress has power to assume not only some control, but
paramount control, insofar as interstate commerce is involved. It
may determine to what extent and in what manner intrastate service
must be subordinated in order that interstate service may be
adequately rendered. The power to make the determination inheres in
the United States as an incident of its power over interstate
commerce. The making of this determination involves an exercise of
judgment upon the facts of the particular case. The authority to
find the facts and to exercise thereon the judgment whether
abandonment is consistent with public convenience and necessity,
Congress conferred upon the Commission."
271 U.S. at
271 U. S.
165-166.
The exclusive and plenary nature of the Commission's authority
to rule on carriers' decisions to abandon lines is critical to the
congressional scheme, which contemplates comprehensive
administrative regulation of interstate commerce. In deciding
whether to permit an abandonment, the Commission must balance
"the interests of those now served by the present line, on the
one hand, and the interests of the carrier and the transportation
system, on the other."
Purcell v. United States, 315 U.
S. 381,
315 U. S. 384
(1942). Once the Commission has struck that balance, its conclusion
is entitled to considerable deference.
"The weight to be given to cost of a relocated line, as against
the adverse effects upon those served by the abandoned line, is a
matter which the experience of the Commission qualifies it to
decide. And, under the statute, it is not a matter for judicial
redecision."
Id. at
315 U. S.
385.
The breadth of the Commission's statutory discretion suggests a
congressional intent to limit judicial interference with the
agency's work. The Act in fact spells out with considerable
precision the remedies available to a shipper who is
Page 450 U. S. 322
injured either by the Commission's approval of an abandonment or
by a carrier's abandoning a line without securing Commission
approval. A shipper objecting to an abandonment may ask the
Commission to investigate the carrier's action. § 13(1), recodified
at 49 U.S.C. § 11701(b) (1976 ed., Supp. III). A shipper may also
oppose any request for abandonment filed before the Commission. 49
CFR § 1121.36 (1980). [
Footnote
8] If ultimately dissatisfied with the Commission's action, a
shipper may seek review of its action in the appropriate court of
appeals, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(a), 2342(5). In addition, at the time
that this action was filed in state court, § 1(20) of the Act
expressly provided that a shipper believing a carrier's abandonment
was unlawful could seek an injunction against it. [
Footnote 9] There is no provision in the Act
for a civil damages action against a carrier for an abandonment
Page 450 U. S. 323
that has been approved by the Commission. [
Footnote 10] The structure of the Act thus makes
plain that Congress intended that an aggrieved shipper should seek
relief in the first instance from the Commission.
In sum, the construction of the applicable federal law is
straightforward and unambiguous. Congress granted to the Commission
plenary authority to regulate, in the interest of interstate
commerce, rail carriers' cessations of service on their lines. And
at least as to abandonments, this authority is exclusive.
Equally clear are the meanings of the state statutory and common
law obligations that petitioner seeks to challenge. The Iowa ourt
of Appeals held that Iowa Code §§ 479.3 and 479.122 (1971)
"impos[e] on the railroads the unqualified and unconditional duty
to furnish car service and transportation to all persons who
apply," and that this state law duty was not preempted by the
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act imposing a similar duty.
295 N.W.2d at 469. According to respondent's complaint in the state
court, petitioner's failure to carry out these "duties of a common
carrier" injured it in the amount of $350,000. App. 78. The state
court also held that respondent could maintain its causes of action
for common law negligence based on petitioner's alleged failure to
maintain the roadbed and for common law tort for purported
interference with contractual relations
Page 450 U. S. 324
with respondent's customers. 295 N.W.2d at 471-472. The
negligehce count, as outlined in respondent's complaint, claimed
$150,000 in damages based on petitioner's alleged failure "to
maintain the track in a proper manner" and "to properly maintain
the railroad right-of-way." App. 79-80. The tort count alleged
that, "at all times material hereto, it was the avowed and
publicized purpose of [petitioner] to close all unproductive lines
under its control," and that this plan interfered with respondent's
contracts, and damaged it in the amount of $100,000.
Id.
at 81. These, then, are the claims that the Iowa Court of Appeals
held properly cognizable in the state courts.
B
Armed with these authoritative constructions of both the federal
regulatory scheme and the state law, we must next determine whether
they conflict. The Iowa Court of Appeals held that the two remedies
for abandonment merely complemented one another. We disagree. Both
the letter and the spirit of the Interstate Commerce Act are
inconsistent with Iowa law as construed by that court. The decision
below amounts to a holding that a State can impose sanctions upon a
regulated carrier for doing that which only the Commission, acting
pursuant to the will of Congress, has the power to declare unlawful
or unreasonable.
Cf. Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co., 357 U.S. at
357 U. S. 87. It
is true that not one of the three counts of respondent's state
court complaint mentions the word "abandonment," but compliance
with the intent of Congress cannot be avoided by mere artful
pleading. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the instant
litigation represents little more than an attempt by a disappointed
shipper to gain from the Iowa courts the relief it was denied by
the Commission. [
Footnote
11]
Page 450 U. S. 325
Respondent's main cause of action alleges an improper failure to
furnish cars on the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. In
Missouri
Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404
(1925), this Court confronted the precise question whether a state
court damages action would lie for a carrier's failure to furnish
cars to carry a shipper's goods in interstate commerce. [
Footnote 12] The Court held that,
because the lumber shipped by the carrier moved in interstate,
rather than intrastate, commerce, "[t]he state law has no
application. . . ."
Id. at
267 U. S. 408. In
the instant case, the bricks that respondent here shipped in
petitioner's cars, like the lumber in
Missouri Pacific,
were moving in interstate commerce. [
Footnote 13] Respondent, in essence, seeks to use state
law to compel petitioner to furnish cars in spite of the
congressional decision to leave regulation of car service to the
Commission. But "[t]he duty to provide cars is not absolute," and
the law "
exacts only what is reasonable of the railroads under
the existing circumstances.'" Milmine Grain Co. v. Norfolk $
Western R. Co., 352 I.C.C. 575, 585 (1976), citing Elgin
Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 277 F. Supp.
247, 250 (ED Tenn.1967). See Midland Valley R. Co. v.
Barkley, 276 U. S. 482,
276 U. S. 484
(1928). The judgment as to what constitutes reasonableness belongs
exclusively to the Commission. Cf. Purcell v. United
States, 315 U.S. at 315 U. S.
384-385. It would vitiate the overarching congressional
intent of creating "an efficient and nationally integrated railroad
system," ICC
v.
Page 450 U. S. 326
Railway Labor Executives Assn., 315 U.
S. 373,
315 U. S. 376
(1942), to permit the State of Iowa to use the threat of damages to
require a carrier to do exactly what the Commission is empowered to
excuse. A system under which each State could, through its courts,
impose on railroad carriers its own version of reasonable service
requirements could hardly be more at odds with the uniformity
contemplated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce
Act.
The conclusion that a suit under state law conflicts with the
purposes of the Act is merely bolstered when, as here, the
Commission has actually approved the abandonment. In reaching its
decision, the Commission expressly found that "the cessation of
service occurred because of conditions over which [petitioner] had
no control." App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. Because Congress granted
the exclusive discretion to make such judgments to the Commission,
there is no further role that the state court could play. Even
though the approval did not come until after respondent filed its
civil suit, it would be contrary to the language of the statute to
permit litigation challenging the lawfulness of the carrier's
actions to go forward when the Commission has expressly found them
to be reasonable.
See 49 U.S.C. § 1(17)(a), recodified at
49 U.S.C. § 10501(c) (1976 ed., Supp. III). We therefore hold that
Iowa's statutory cause of action for failure to furnish cars cannot
be asserted against an interstate rail carrier on the facts of this
case.
The same reasoning applies to respondent's other asserted causes
of action, because they, too, are essentially attempts to litigate
the issues underlying petitioner's abandonment of the Kalo-Fort
Dodge line. The questions respondent seeks to raise in the state
court -- whether roadbed maintenance was negligent or reasonable
and whether petitioner abandoned its line with some tortious motive
-- are precisely the sorts of concerns that Congress intended the
Commission to address in weighing abandonment requests from the
carriers
Page 450 U. S. 327
subject to its regulation. [
Footnote 14]
See Purcell v. United States, supra
at
315 U. S. 385;
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 35,
283 U. S. 42
(1931). That alone might be enough to prohibit respondent from
raising them in a state court.
Cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark
Bros. Coal Mining Co., 238 U. S. 456,
238 U. S. 469
(1915) (no damages action may be brought for car distribution
practices until Commission has ruled them unlawful).
But we need not decide whether a state court suit is barred when
the Commission is empowered to rule on the underlying issues,
because here the Commission has actually addressed the matters
respondent wishes to raise in state court. The Commission's order
approving the abandonment application found that, after the first
two landslides, petitioner "made necessary repairs to enable
continuation of service," that further repairs after the 1967 slide
would not have been "sufficient to insure continuous operations,"
that the abandonment was not "willful," that respondent has no
right to "insist that a burdensome line be maintained solely for
its own use," and that "continued operation of the line would be an
unnecessary burden on [petitioner] and on interstate commerce." App
to Pet. for Cert. 35a-36a. These findings by the Commission, made
pursuant to the authority delegated by Congress, simply leave no
room for further litigation over the matters respondent seeks to
raise in state court. Consequently, we hold that, on the facts of
this case, the Intertate Commerce Act also preempts Iowa's common
law causes of action for damages stemming from a carrier's
negligence and tort when the judgments of fact and of
reasonableness necesary to the decision have already been made by
the Commission.
Page 450 U. S. 328
Nothing in our decision in
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan
Coal Mining Co., 237 U. S. 121
(1915), compels a contrary result. But because both respondents and
the Iowa Court of Appeals rely heavily on its language, we discuss
the case in some detail. In
Puritan, this Court was called
upon for the first time to interpret what was then § 22 of the
Interstate Commerce Act as it related to a carrier's duty to
furnish cars. That section, which survives without substantive
change in the Act as recodified, [
Footnote 15] provided that nothing in the Act
"shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in
addition to such remedies."
Relying on this language, this Court held that a shipper could
pursue its state common law remedies for failure to provide cars
when the carrier had previously agreed to provide them, as long as
"there is no administrative question involved."
Id. at
237 U. S.
131-132. Without this provision, the opinion
explained,
"it might have been claimed that Congress having entered the
field, the whole subject of liability of carrier to shippers in
interstate commerce had been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the
state courts,"
so § 22 was added to make plain that the Act "was not intended
to deprive the state courts of their general and concurrent
jurisdiction."
Id. at
237 U. S. 130.
The Iowa Court of Appeals relied on this broad-sounding language in
concluding that respondent's causes of action survived the
enactment of and the various amendments to the Interstate Commerce
Act. Respondent urges essentially the same point in this Court.
This analysis fails to take into account the fact that the
Commission's exclusive jurisdiction over abandonments arises from
the Transportation Act of 1920, and its authority over car service
from the Esch Car Service Act, ch. 23, 40 Stat. 101. Our decision
in
Puritan preceded these amendments to the Interstate
Commerce Act, so it can hardly be viewed as
Page 450 U. S. 329
an authoritative construction of the Act as amended. [
Footnote 16] And even assuming, for
the sake of argument, the continuing validity of that opinion's
reasoning, it does not control the disposition of the instant case.
The Court, in
Puritan, expressly noted that the matters
presented to the state courts for decision involved no questions of
law or questions calling for an administrative judgment, and, in
particular, no issue as to the reasonableness of the carrier's
policies. 237 U.S. at
237 U. S.
131-132. Instead, the state court was called upon to
decide only the factual question whether the railroad had carried
out the duties that it had agreed to undertake. The Court's opinion
in
Puritan recognized the importance of this
distinction:
"[I]t must be borne in mind that there are two forms of
discrimination, -- one in the rule, and the other in the manner of
its enforcement; one in promulgating a discriminatory rule, the
other in the unfair enforcement of a reasonable rule. In a suit
where the rule of practice itself is attacked as unfair or
discriminatory, a question is raised which calls for the exercise
of the judgment and discretion of the administrative power which
has been vested by Congress in the Commission. . . . Until that
body has declared the practice to be discriminatory and unjust, no
court has jurisdiction of a suit against an interstate carrier for
damages occasioned by its enforcement. . . ."
"But if the carrier's rule, fair on its face, has been unequally
applied, and the suit is for damages, occasioned by its violation
or discriminatory enforcement, there is
Page 450 U. S. 330
no administrative question involved, the courts being called
upon to decide a mere question of fact."
Ibid.
Here we face the reverse of the situation that gave rise to the
Puritan case. The questions presented to the state court
in the instant litigation all involve evaluations of the
reasonableness of petitioner's abandonment of the branch line.
These issues call for the type of administrative evaluations and
conclusions that Congress has entrusted to the informed discretion
of the Commission.
See Midland Valley R. Co. v. Barkley,
276 U.S. at
276 U. S.
484-486;
Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator
Co., 259 U. S. 285,
259 U. S. 291
(1922). Under the
Puritan analysis, "no court has
jurisdiction" of a suit such as respondent's until the Commission
"has declared the practice to be . . . unjust." 237 U.S. at
237 U. S. 131.
And the Commission, in an exercise of its discretion, has done
precisely the opposite; it has decided that the abandonment was
proper. [
Footnote 17]
Respondent has chosen not to seek judicial review of the
Commission's judgment through the means provided by Congress.
[
Footnote 18] For all of
these reasons, to the extent that
Page 450 U. S. 331
the
Puritan anaiysis has any application here, it
supports petitioner's and the Commission's arguments that the Iowa
courts lack jurisdiction to entertain respondent's suit for damages
arising from petitioner's abandonment of the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch
line.
Our decision today does not leave a shipper in respondent's
position without a remedy if it is truly harmed. On the contrary,
an aggrieved shipper is still free to pursue the avenues for relief
set forth in the statute. Respondent could have gone to the
Commission and challenged petitioner's refusal to provide service
before any abandonment application was filed, but it did not. After
petitioner filed its request for a certificate, respondent had the
opportunity to present evidence to the Commission in support of its
allegation, but failed to do so. Having lost its battle there,
respondent could have followed the congressionally prescribed path
by seeking review in the appropriate United States court of
appeals. This, too, respondent failed to do. The Act creates no
other express remedies for a shipper who is damaged by a carrier's
abandonment of a line. In particular, nothing in the Act suggests
that Congress contemplated permitting a shipper to bring a civil
damages action in state court. And such a right to sue, with its
implied threat of sanctions for failure to comply with what the
courts of each State consider reasonable policies, is plainly
contrary to the purposes of the Act. We are thus not free to assume
that it has been preserved.
IV
We hold that the Interstate Commerce Act precludes a shipper
from pressing a state court action for damages against a regulated
carrier when the Interstate Commerce Commission, in approving the
carrier's application for abandonment, reaches the merits of the
matters the shipper seeks to raise
Page 450 U. S. 332
in state court. We reserve for another day the question whether
such a cause of action lies when no application is made to the
Commission. The judgment of the Iowa Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Repondent used petitioner' branch line only for the shipment of
brick that were traveling in interstate commerce. All of the bricks
that respondent shipped intratate traveled by truck.
[
Footnote 2]
It is undisputed that, at this time, petitioner had not made a
decision whether to abandon the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. An
abandonment "is characterized by an intention of the carrier to
cease permanently or indefinitely all transportation service on the
relevant line."
ICC v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 533
F.2d 1025, 1028 (CA8 1976).
See ICC v. Chicago, R. I. & P.
R. Co., 501 F.2d 908, 911 (CA8 1974),
cert. denied,
420 U.S. 972 (1975). An embargo, by contrast, is a temporary
emergency suspension of service initiated by filing of a notice
with the Commission.
ICC v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co.,
supra, at 1027, n. 2.
[
Footnote 3]
In particular, respondent "did not file a verified statement in
opposition, as required," and was therefore "deemed to be in
default and entitled to no further formal proceedings."
Chicago
& N.W. Tranp. Co. Abandonment, AB1, Sub. No. 24 (Jan. 11,
1976), App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a-35a. The reason for this default,
according to respondent, was that it had gone out of business, and
therefore had no continuing interest in forcing petitioner to
continue its service on the branch line.
[
Footnote 4]
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(a), 2342(5), 2343, 2344.
[
Footnote 5]
Iowa Code § 479.3 (1971) provides in relevant part:
"Every railway corporation shall upon reasonable notice, and
within a reasonable time, furnish suitable cars to any and all
persons who may apply therefor, for the transportation of any and
all kinds of freight, and receive and tranport such freight with
all reasonable dispatch. . . ."
Iowa Code § 479.122 (1971) provides:
"Every corporation operating a railway shall be liable for all
damages sustained by any person, including employees of such
corporation, in consequence of the neglect of the agents, or by any
mismanagement of the engineers, or other employees thereof, and in
consequence of the willful wrongs, whether of commission or
omission, of such agents, engineers, or other employees, when such
wrongs are in any manner connected with the use and operation of
any railway on or about which they shall be employed, and no
contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or
binding."
The conclusion that these statute create a state court damages
action for failure to provide proper ervice is not a new one under
Iowa law.
See, e.g., Baird Bros. v. Minneapolis & St. L.
R., 181 Iowa 1104, 165 N.W. 412 (1917).
After respondent filed its state court action, petitioner sought
to remove the case to federal court, but the federal court, finding
that diversity of citizenship was lacking, remanded the case to
state court. The Iowa Court of Appeals correctly held that this
federal court ruling had no relevance to its inquiry into whether
the preemption doctrine barred the state courts from exercising
their jurisdiction.
295 N.W.2d
467, 468-469 (1979).
See Brancadora v. Federal Nat.
Mortgage Assn., 344 F.2d 933, 935 (CA9 1965);
Alaska v. K
& L Distributors, Inc., 318 F.2d 498, (CA9 1963).
[
Footnote 6]
The Iowa court also held the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
in the sense of initial deferral to the expertise of the
Commission, had no application to this litigation. 295 N.W.2d at
471-472. Petitioner, as well as the United States and the
Commission as
amici curiae, argues that the primary
jurisdiction doctrine precludes respondent's suit on the facts of
this case, but we have no occasion to address that question.
Although we agree with petitioner and
amici that the
Commission has special expertise in the matters respondent wishes
to raise in state court,
see infra, at
450 U.S. 326-327, and n. 14, we do not
rely on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. As we have stated in
interpreting another provision of the Interstate Commerce Act:
"[T]he survival of a judicial remedy . . . cannot be determined
on the presence or absence in the Commission of primary
jurisdiction to decide the basic question on which relief depends.
Survival depends on the effect of the exercise of the remedy upon
the statutory scheme of regulation."
Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc.,
371 U. S. 84,
371 U. S. 89
(1962). Even if the primary jurisdiction doctrine were applicable
here, it would, at best, require the state courts to postpone any
action until the Commission had an opportunity to address the
administrative questions raised in the civil damages action. But
here the Commission has actually ruled, and the state trial on
liability and damages has not yet taken place. Consequently, the
requirements of the doctrine have been complied with in spirit,
even if not through any intent of respondent. We save for a later
case a decision on the proper application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine when the Commission has not yet ruled.
[
Footnote 7]
Under Pub.L. 9573, 92 Stat. 1337, the Interstate Commerce Act
and its various amendments have been completely recodified as
Subtitle IV of Title 49 of the United States Code. In the main,
this recodification is without substantive change. In this opinion,
we cite to the original Act for ease in referring to the decision
below and to our precedents. Where appropriate, we also give
parallel cites to the Act as recodified.
[
Footnote 8]
A carrier who files an application for a certificate permitting
abandonment must make reasonable efforts to give notice to all
shippers who have used the line in the past 12 months. 49 U.S.C. §
10904(a)(3)(D) (1976 ed., Supp. III).
See In re Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P. R. Co., 611 F.2d 662, 668 (CA7 1979).
[
Footnote 9]
Section 1(20), which was, like § 1(18), added by the
Transportation Act of 1920, provided that "any court of competent
jurisdiction" could enjoin a carrier's abandonment of a line when
application for approval has not been made to the Commission. The
right of a private party to seek an injunction was repealed by the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub.L.
94-210, 90 Stat. 127-130. Under the Act as amended and recodified,
only the United States, the government of a State, or the
Commission itself may sue to enjoin most illegal abandonments.
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 11505 (action by state), 11702 (action by
the Commission), 11703 (action by the United States) (1976 ed.,
Supp. III). A private person may seek injunctive relief only to
prevent illegal abandonment of a freight forwarding service.
See 49 U.S.C. § 11704 (1976 ed., Supp. III). The fact that
shippers in the position of respondent no longer have available the
remedy of injunction does not affect our decision, because numerous
other remedies for improper cessations of service still exist.
"[T]he absence of
any judicial remedy [would] plac[e]
the shipper entirely at the mercy of the carrier, contrary to the
overriding purpose of the Act."
Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371
U.S. at
371 U. S. 88
(emphasis added).
[
Footnote 10]
Although §§ 8 and 9, recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (1976 ed.,
Supp. III), provide a general right to seek damages when injured by
a carrier's violation of the Act, this Court stated, in
Powell
v. United States, 300 U. S. 276,
300 U. S. 287
(1937), that the injunctive remedy,
see n 9,
supra, was "the only method for
enforcing" what was then § 1(18) of the Act. Because the carrier's
actions here have been approved by the Commission, there has been
no violation of the Act, and this damages remedy could have no
application to this case. We therefore need not decide whether the
language of
Powell means that a damages action can never
be brought for an illegal abandonment, or, if such an action can be
brought, whether Congress might have intended that state and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. We thus reserve those
questions for a proper case.
[
Footnote 11]
The fact that respondent did not perfect its filing before the
Corrmission,
see n 3,
supra, does not affect either the validity or the finality
of the Commission's findings with respect to the reasonableness of
petitioner's actions. These findings remain valid if supported by
substantial evidence,
see Illinois Central R. Co. v. Norfolk
& Western R. Co., 385 U. S. 57,
385 U. S. 66
(1966), and, in any case, are not ordinarily subject to revision
via collateral attack in a civil action.
[
Footnote 12]
The Commission's authority over furnishing cars was reflected in
§§ 1(4) and 1(11) of the Act, recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 11101(a)
and 11121(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III).
[
Footnote 13]
See n 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 14]
Most of the Commision's abandonment decisions turn in part on
factors such as those respondent wishes the state court to decide.
See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. Abandonment, 354
I.C.C. 121, 125-126 (1977);
Baltimore & Annapolis R. Co.
Abandonment, 348 I.C.C. 678, 700-703 (1976);
Missouri
Pacific R. Co. Abandonment, 342 I.C.C. 643, 644 (1972).
[
Footnote 15]
See 49 U.S.C. § 10103 (197 ed., Supp. III).
[
Footnote 16]
The Transportation Act of 1920, moreover, also added to the
Interstate Commerce Act a new § 1(17)(a), recodified at 49 U.S.C. §
10501(c) (1976 ed., Supp. III), which expressly invalidates state
remedies when they are "inconsistent with an order of the
Commission" or prohibited under any provision of the Act.
See
supra at
450 U.S. 326.
The
Puritan Court obviously could not have considered this
provision when deciding that a shipper could, in some
circumstances, bring a state court action for failure to furnish
cars.
[
Footnote 17]
The court below apparently recognized the distinction for
jurisdictional purposes between state court actions raising
strictly factual claims and those calling for an exercise of
administrative discretion.
See 295 N.W.2d at 472. If it is
assumed that
Puritan remains good law, then the state
court erred only in concluding that a suit such as respondent's
raises only questions of fact that do not call for any expertise.
Repondent itself concedes that, even under its theory of the
case,
"the
sole issue for determination is whether or not the
service was terminated by compelling circumstances beyond the
control of the carrier."
Brief for Respondent 6 (emphasis in original). That is exactly
the kind of question Congress intended that the Commission decide,
and, in the case before us, the Commission has, of course, already
decided it.
[
Footnote 18]
Respondent's reliance on
ICC v. Chicago N.W. Transp.
Co., 533 F.2d 1025 (CA8 1976), is also misplaced. That case
held only that a federal court suit seeking injunctive relief on
behalf of the Commission, which is among the express remedies
enumerated in the Act, could go forward without awaiting the
Commission's decision on a pending request for an abandonment. We
express no opinion as to the merits of that case, but we do note
that its facts bear little relation to those before us.