The essential character of commerce determines whether it is
interstate or intrastate, and not mere billing or the place where
title passes.
Where, for the purpose of filling contracts with purchasers in
other states, coal is delivered, f.o.b. at the mine for
transportation to such purchasers, the movement and the facilities
required are those of interstate commerce.
Whether the rule or method of car distribution for mines
furnishing coal f.o.b. at the mines for shipment to other states as
practiced by a railroad company is unjustly discriminatory is one
which the Interstate Commerce Commission has authority to pass
upon.
Where the complaint involves an attack upon the rule or method
of car distribution practiced by the carrier in distributing cars
for interstate shipments, no action is maintainable in any court
for damages alleged to have been inflicted thereby until the
Commission has made its finding as to the reasonableness of such
rules and methods.
Under such conditions, the Interstate Commerce Commission has
authority to examine into, and report upon, the amount of damages
sustained by a shipper by reason of such discrimination, as rules
as to car distribution are within the provision of § 3 of the Act
to Regulate Commerce.
Where, as in this case, it appears that the Act to Regulate
Commerce has been violated and the requisite ruling as to the
unreasonableness of the practice assailed has been made by the
Commission, § 9 applies and is exclusive, and the shipper must
elect between a proceeding for reparation award before the
Commission or a suit in the federal court. He cannot resort to the
state court.
After a proceeding before, and award by, the Commission, suit
may be brought under § 16 of the act in either a state or a federal
court.
The Act to Regulate Commerce governs the shippers no less than
it governs the carrier.
Page 238 U. S. 457
Where a shipper goes before the Interstate Commerce Commission
with a complaint under that act against a carrier for
discrimination on car distribution and secures a finding of
illegality of the carrier's violation of the act, and obtains an
award, his claim for damages by reason of such violation can be
prosecuted only under the Interstate Commerce Act, and a suit
cannot be maintained therefor under the state statute, and this is
so notwithstanding the fact that the action in the state court is
brought before the Commission has made the award.
Penna. R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U.
S. 121, and
Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Mulberry Hill Coal
Co., ante, p.
238 U. S. 275,
distinguished, as in those cases, the shipper had not invoked the
jurisdiction of the Commission, attacking the carrier's rule.
241 Pa.St. 515, reversed.
The facts, which involve the right of a shipper of coal to
recover damages from a carrier for alleged inadequate and
discriminatory car service, and the construction of the statute of
Pennsylvania and of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act
applicable thereto, are stated in the opinion.
Page 238 U. S. 458
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought in January, 1912, by the Clark Brothers
Coal Mining Company (defendant in error) in the Court of Common
Pleas of Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, to recover damages for
inadequate and unjustly discriminatory car service and supply. The
complaint related to the action of the defendant company with
respect to cars required for the transportation of coal from the
plaintiff's mines known as Falcon, Nos. 2, 3,
Page 238 U. S. 459
and 4, in Clearfield County, and Falcon, Nos. 5 and 6, in
Indiana County, Pennsylvania, between October, 1905, and April 30,
1907. A statute of Pennsylvania [Act of June 4, 1883, P.L. 72, 4
Purdons 3906;
see Const. (Pa.) 1873, Art. 17] prohibits
undue or unreasonable discrimination by any common carrier "in
charges for or in facilities for the transportation of freight
within this state or coming from or going to any other state," and
provides that the carrier guilty of unjust discrimination shall be
liable "for damages treble the amount of injury suffered."
On behalf of the defendant (plaintiff in error), the
jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action was challenged
upon the ground that, with respect to car distribution, the
defendant was subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce, and that the
claim of the plaintiff was cognizable only by the Interstate
Commerce Commission or by the courts of the United States. It was
urged further that, in a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce
Commission which had been instituted by the plaintiff against the
defendant prior to the beginning of this action, the Commission had
found that the method of car distribution practised by the
defendant with respect to the plaintiff's mines known as Falcon,
Nos. 2, 3, and 4, was unjustly discriminatory, and that the
Commission had made an award of damages accordingly, and that, by
reason of this proceeding and the action of the Commission, the
plaintiff was precluded from maintaining the present action so far
as it related to the alleged loss sustained with respect to the
mines last described.
The trial court overruled these contentions of the defendant.
The jury, finding discrimination, assessed the damage at $41,481
and trebled the amount, making $124,443. Motions in arrest of
judgment and for a new trial and for judgment
non obstante
veredicto upon the grounds above stated (and others) were
denied. Judgment for the total amount of the verdict was entered,
and
Page 238 U. S. 460
was affirmed by the supreme court of the state, 241 Pa. 515. And
this writ of error has been sued out.
It clearly appeared that the proceeding before the Interstate
Commerce Commission as to the mines Falcon Nos. 2, 3, and 4
embraced substantially the same claim as that litigated in this
action. As the trial judge said: "It [the plaintiff] did get an
award of damages for what we understand to be practically the same
subject matter." That proceeding was instituted by the plaintiff in
June, 1907. Its petition, among other things, alleged that it had
been, and was, "engaged in mining and shipping coal to points and
places of delivery and to the coal markets beyond the State of
Pennsylvania," and that it had, during all the period mentioned,
to-wit, "from the 15th day of October, 1905, to the date of the
filing of this complaint," orders for coal to be mined and shipped
"beyond the lines of said state." It complained of the rating of
its mines by the defendant and also of unjust and unreasonable
discrimination against it in the daily distribution of cars "for
the transportation of its coal into the interstate markets," that
it had suffered "great loss and damage in its business as a
producer, shipper, and seller of bituminous coal" in the interstate
coal trade, and that such damage amounted in the aggregate to
$36,401.12. It prayed for hearing, for an ascertainment of the
damages which it had sustained in its interstate business by reason
of unreasonable preferences given to its competitors, as alleged,
and for a determination of the proper basis of car distribution to
be observed. After hearing, the Commissioner made its report on
March 7, 1910. 19 I.C.C. 392. On the same day, the Commission
rendered its decision in Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v.
Pennsylvania R. Co. (19 I.C.C. 356), involving similar questions as
to the method practiced by the defendant in distributing "its
available coal car equipment." Upon this point, the Commission
there said:
"Under a rule announced by it on February 1, 1903,
Page 238 U. S. 461
the defendant seems to have charged all railroad cars,
regardless of ownership, and private cars not owned by the operator
loading them, against the distributive share of each mine, but it
treated its own fuel cars as a special allotment in addition to the
distributive share. On March 28, 1905, a notice was sent to
shippers of bituminous coal from mines on the lines of the
defendant advising them that thereafter all railroad cars,
regardless of ownership, and all private cars not owned by the
operator loading them, should be considered as cars available for
distribution, except its own company fuel cars and fuel cars sent
upon its lines by foreign companies and specially consigned to
particular mines."
"On January 1, 1906, the defendant divided all cars into two
classes which it designated as 'assigned' and 'unassigned' cars. In
the former class were its own fuel cars, foreign railway fuel cars,
and individual or private cars loaded by their owners or assigned
by their owners to particular mines. The rule then made effective
and still in force provides that the capacity in tons of any
'assigned' cars shall be deducted from the rated capacity in tons
of the particular mine receiving such cars, and that the remainder
is to be regarded as the rated capacity of the mine in the
distribution of all 'unassigned' or system cars."
Id., p. 362.
After illustrating the operation of this system and the
advantage in distribution thus given to mines having assigned cars
(
id., pp. 363, 364), the Commission concluded:
"Upon all the facts shown of record, the Commission therefore
finds that, throughout the period of the action, the system upon
which the defendant distributed its available coal car equipment,
including system fuel cars, foreign railway fuel cars, and
individual or private cars, has subjected the complainant to an
undue and an unlawful discrimination. "
Page 238 U. S. 462
In the case of the plaintiff's petition, the Commission held
that, so far as the rating of its mines was concerned, "there was
no substantial basis for any finding of discrimination." But, in
the matter of car distribution, unjust discrimination was found.
The Commission said (19 I.C.C. 394-396):
"There are a number of mines on the Moshannon branch of the
defendant that are owned by other operators, but in this connection
it will suffice to mention only the six mines operated by or for
the Berwind-White Coal Mining Company, one of which, known as
Eureka No. 27, immediately adjoins the complainant's Falcon No. 2.
The same 'D' coal vein is worked in these two mines. The quality of
the coal is therefore the same, and it is claimed that the
capacities of the two mines were substantially the same at the
period involved in the first of these two complaints. . . ."
"But neither Falcon No. 2 nor the mines of the complainant, the
Clark Brothers Coal & Mining Company, was placed on an equal
footing with the mines of the Berwind-White Coal Mining Company in
the matter of the distribution of the defendant's available coal
car equipment during the period of the actions. . . ."
"It is established with reasonable clearness on the record that
the Berwind-White mines during the years 1906 and 1907, as well as
to a period immediately preceding those dates, were daily in
receipt of coal cars in large numbers and were therefore kept in
operation almost continuously, while the complainants received an
inadequate supply, and were not able therefore to run their mines
to the best advantage. This difference is largely explained by the
fact that the Berwind-White Coal Mining Company owned a large
number of private cars, and also enjoyed contracts for supplying
the defendant and its connection with coal."
Under the rules of defendant, fully explained in Hillsdale Coal
& Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
supra, the
ownership
Page 238 U. S. 463
of such private cars and the enjoyment of these contracts
resulted in the special allotment to the mines of that company of
these so-called assigned cars. For the reasons explained at some
length in that case, those rules operated as an undue
discrimination against these complainants, and we so find. But, for
the present and for the reasons there explained, we shall limit our
order to a finding that, in the several respects here mentioned,
the defendant was guilty of a discrimination against these
complainants, leaving for determination after further argument the
question of the extent to which the complainants may have been
damaged thereby.
Order was entered accordingly, condemning the defendant's rule
and practice of distribution (as stated) as a violation of § 3 of
the Act to Regulate Commerce, requiring the defendant to desist
from that practice, and reserving the question of damages for
further consideration. Subsequently, in April, 1911, this question
was submitted, and it was determined on March 11, 1912. 23 I.C.C.
191. The Commission then made its report as follows:
"We now find that the damages sustained by this claimant as
result thereof [the discrimination found] amounted to $31,127.96,
and that it is entitled to an award of reparation in that sum, with
interest from June 25, 1907."
The Commission set forth its primary findings of fact upon which
this ultimate finding was based, showing its calculations with
respect to shipments, selling prices, cost of production, and
profits, during the times in question. It found the number of tons,
in case of each of the mines, actually shipped, and the amount
which would have been shipped and sold, with a proper car supply,
for "interstate destinations" -- that is, for points without the
State of Pennsylvania.
This action was brought after the first report of the
Commission, and while the question of damages was under
Page 238 U. S. 464
its consideration. The trial judge, in charging the jury,
described the system of car distribution in use and the practice of
the defendant prior to and after January 1, 1906. Referring to the
rule promulgated on that date, it was recognized that it in effect
gave a distinct advantage to the mine having "assigned cars" over
one that did not have them, but the jury were instructed that, "for
the purposes of this case," it might "be considered that it was a
fair rule of distribution." The subject committed to them was thus
stated in the concluding portion of the instructions:
"In considering the damages, therefore, in case you find
discrimination, you must first ascertain what would have been,
under all the circumstances testified to, a fair rating of the
plaintiff's mines in both regions. Second, if, after having such
fair rating, comparison with the alleged preferred shippers would
entitle it to an increased number of cars, and what that increased
number of cars would be, and if the evidence at the same time shows
that the preferred shipper received day by day and month by month
throughout the period of the action, an excess over its proper
pro rata share, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover
at your hands a verdict for what you may find its fair share of
such excess of cars amounted to in tons, estimated just as we have
laid down the rule with respect to the method of calculating. Now,
then, if you allow for discrimination, then you may disregard all
question as to inadequacy or insufficiency of car supply, because
you cannot allow for both. For discrimination, after you have made
an estimate of the amount of damages and found a definite sum as
compensation for the injuries which it sustained, that would be
single damages, and if you find that there was discrimination, as
claimed by the plaintiff's counsel, then you can go to the question
as to whether there shall be treble damages under the Act of 1883.
. . . If you find discrimination, therefore, and you arrive at or
estimate the amount of single damages which you believe
Page 238 U. S. 465
the plaintiff has sustained by reason of such undue and
unreasonably discriminatory acts practiced against it, it is for
you to say whether or not that amount should be trebled -- that is,
multiplied by three."
The jury, as we have said, did find discrimination, and trebled
the damages.
In considering the right of the plaintiff to maintain this
action, despite the proceeding before the Commission, an initial
question is presented as to the nature of the commerce involved.
The appeared, as stated by the state court, that practically all
the coal mined by the plaintiff was sold f.o.b. cars at the mines.
About 95 or 98 percent was sold in this way. Hence, it is said, it
is "not subject to interstate commerce regulation."
We do not understand that it is questioned that a very large
part of the damages recovered in this action pertain to coal which,
with a fair method of car distribution, would have been shipped
from the mines to purchasers in other states. There is no
controversy as to the course of business. The plaintiff sold to
persons within and without the State of Pennsylvania. The coal was
loaded on cars to be transported to various points of destination
not only in Pennsylvania, but in other states. The transportation
to other states absolutely depended upon a proper supply of cars,
and it is manifest that unjust discrimination against the plaintiff
in car distribution would improperly obstruct the freedom of such
transportation, in which the plaintiff had a direct interest. And
the question presented is whether unjust discrimination of this
character is a subject which falls without the scope of the
jurisdiction conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission --
that is, whether there is an absence of such jurisdiction merely
because the plaintiff sold its product, which was to be transported
to other states, f.o.b. at its mines.
This question must be answered in the negative. In
Page 238 U. S. 466
determining whether commerce is interstate or intrastate, regard
must be had to its essential character. Mere billing, or the place
at which title passes, is not determinative. If the actual movement
is interstate, the power of Congress attaches to it, and provisions
of the Act to Regulate Commerce, enacted for the purpose of
preventing and redressing unjust discrimination by interstate
carriers, whether in rates or facilities, apply.
Rearick v.
Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507,
203 U. S. 512;
Sou. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Inter. Com. Comm., 219 U.
S. 498,
219 U. S.
526-527;
Ohio R. Comm'n v. Worthington,
225 U. S. 101,
225 U. S.
108-110;
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.
S. 501,
225 U. S. 520;
Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.
S. 111,
227 U. S. 127;
Louisiana R. Comm. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 229 U.
S. 336;
Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Louisiana R.
Comm., 236 U. S. 157,
236 U. S. 163.
Thus, in the case of
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.
S. 498,
219 U. S.
526-527, cotton seed cake which had been purchased by
one Young at various places in Texas was shipped to him at the port
of Galveston, where it was prepared for export. The court sustained
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect
to the transportation to Galveston, although between Texas points,
it being an incident to the export movement, and held that the
special privileges given by the Terminal Company to Young on the
wharf were undue preferences. As the commodity was destined for
export, it made no difference, said the Court,
"that the shipments of the products were not made on through
bills of lading, or whether their initial points were Galveston or
some other points in Texas."
In
Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington,
225 U. S. 101,
225 U. S.
108-110, it appeared that the State Commission had
established a rate on what was called "lake cargo coal" transported
from a coal field in eastern Ohio to ports in the same state on
Lake Erie for carriage thence by lake vessels to other states.
Ordinarily, the shipper had the coal transported "upon bills of
lading to himself, or to
Page 238 U. S. 467
another for himself," at Huron, Ohio. The rate covered the
transportation to Huron and the placing of the coal on the vessels
and trimming it for its interstate journey. In view of the proved
nature of the movement, the court held that the action of the
State Commission was an attempt directly to regulate interstate
commerce, and the enforcement of the order of the State Commission
was enjoined. Again, in
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.
S. 501,
225 U. S. 520,
the complainant was a manufacturer in Minnesota and sold his
commodity to purchasers in Indiana, the delivery being f.o.b. cars
at Minneapolis for transportation to Indiana in the original
unbroken packages, the freight being paid by the purchasers.
Referring to an objection similar to the one here urged, the Court
said:
"In answer, it must again be said that 'commerce among the
states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one,
drawn from the course of business.'
Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U. S. 375,
196 U. S.
398;
Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S.
507,
203 U. S. 512. It clearly
appears from the bill that the complainant was engaged in dealing
with purchasers in another state. His product, manufactured in
Minnesota, was, in pursuance of his contracts of sale, to be
delivered to carriers for transportation to the purchasers in
Indiana. This was interstate commerce, in the freedom of which from
any unconstitutional burden the complainant had a direct
interest."
In
Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co.,
227 U. S. 111,
227 U. S. 127,
it was found that the Powell Company bought lumber for export to
different ports in Europe through the ports of Sabine and Port
Arthur, both in Texas. To fill its export contracts, it purchased
of the Sabine Tram Company a large amount of lumber, which,
according to the seller's option, was delivered f.o.b. cars at
Sabine, Texas. There were separate bills of lading for delivery at
Sabine to the Sabine Tram Company. Upon arrival at Sabine, the
lumber was carried a short distance beyond the station to the dock,
where it was unloaded from
Page 238 U. S. 468
cars into water of the slip, ready for loading upon ships. The
Sabine Tram Company had no connection with the further carriage.
The railroad company collected, over protest, the rates fixed by
tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the
Sabine Tram Company brought suit to recover the difference between
the amount thus paid and the amount which would have been payable
at the rate fixed by the State Commission. The Court held that the
rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission was applicable, as
the lumber was destined for export, and that, as the movement was
one actually in the course of transportation to a foreign
destination, the form of the billing to Sabine, and the
transactions there, were not determinative.
Thus, in varying circumstances, the same principle has been
applied in these cases and in the others cited, and that principle
is that the jurisdiction of the Commission is determined by the
essential character of the commerce in question. In the present
case, to repeat, it appears that, for the purpose of filling
contracts with purchasers in other states, coal is delivered f.o.b.
at the mines for transportation to such purchasers. The movement
thus initiated is an interstate movement, and the facilities
required are facilities of interstate commerce. A very large part
of what in fact is the interstate commerce of the county is
conducted upon this basis, and the arrangements that are made
between seller and purchaser with respect to the place of taking
title to the commodity, or as to the payment of freight, where the
actual movement is interstate, does not affect either the power of
Congress or the jurisdiction of the Commission which Congress has
established.
In this view, we come to the consideration of the effect of the
proceeding before the Commission.
1. The question whether the rule or method of car distribution
practised by the railroad company as unjustly
Page 238 U. S. 469
discriminatory was one which the Commission had authority to
pass upon.
Inter. Com. Comm. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.,
215 U. S. 452;
Same v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 215 U.
S. 479;
Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Penna. R. Co.,
230 U. S. 304,
230 U. S. 313;
Penna. R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U.
S. 121,
237 U. S. 131.
Further, by reason of the nature of the question involved in an
attack upon the rule or method of the company in distributing cars,
no action was maintainable in any court to recover damages alleged
to have been inflicted thereby until the Commission had made its
finding as to the reasonableness of the rule.
Tex. & Pac.
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.
S. 426,
204 U. S. 441,
204 U. S. 448;
Balt. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 215 U.
S. 481,
215 U. S. 493;
Robinson v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 222 U.
S. 506,
222 U. S. 511;
United States v. Pacific & Arctic Co., 228 U. S.
87,
228 U. S. 107;
Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Penna. R. Co.,supra;
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., supra. The
Commission also had authority to make examination and report upon
the amount of damages which the plaintiff had suffered from the
unjust discrimination alleged in its complaint. We deem the
provisions of the act to be clear upon this point.
See §§
8, 9, 13, 16. There is nothing in the act to suggest that the
damages which may thus be ascertained are only those arising from
unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory rates. Rules as to car
distribution that are unjustly discriminatory are within the
purview of § 3, and damages thereby occasioned, as well as those
due to the exaction of unreasonable rates, arise from the violation
of the act, and their ascertainment is within the scope of the
Commission's authority.
See Inter. Com. Comm. v. Illinois Cent.
R. Co., supra; Mitchell Coal Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 230 U.
S. 247,
230 U. S. 257;
Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Penn. R. Co., supra; Pennsylvania
Railroad v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U.
S. 121.
2. Where, as in this case, it appears that the act has
Page 238 U. S. 470
been violated and the requisite ruling as to the
unreasonableness of the practice assailed has been made by the
Commission, the provisions of § 9 are applicable. This section
provides:
"SEC. 9. That any person or persons claiming to be damaged by
any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act may either
make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or
may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery of the
damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the
provisions of this act, in any district or circuit court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person or persons
shall not have the right to pursue both of said remedies, and must
in each case elect which one of the two methods of procedure herein
provided for he or they will adopt. . . ."
This provision defines the remedies to which a person in the
situation of the plaintiff is entitled, and the terms of the
provision clearly indicate that these remedies are exclusive. The
express requirement of an election between the proceeding before
the Commission and suit in the federal court leaves no room for the
conclusion that there is an option in such case to resort to the
state court. Where the proceeding has been had before the
Commission and reparation awarded, suit under § 16 (as amended in
1910) may be brought in either a state or a federal court, but this
is after the Commission's award has been made.
In
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Puritan Coal Co., supra,
construing § 9, the Court said:
"It will be seen that this section does more than create a right
and designate the court in which it is to be enforced. It gives the
shipper the option to proceed before the Commission or in the
federal courts. The express grant of the right of choice between
those two remedies was the exclusion of any other remedy in a state
court. . . . In
Mitchell
Page 238 U. S. 471
Coal Co. v. Penna. R. Co., 230 U. S.
250, the same view of the statute was taken in
discussing another, but related, question. This construction is
also supported by the legislative history of the state. For, while
the Hepburn Act, as a convenience to shippers, permitted suits on
reparation orders to be brought in the federal court of the
district where the plaintiff resided or the company had its
principal office, and while the Act of 1910 (36 Stat. 554), in
further aid of shippers, permitted suits on reparation orders to be
brought in state or federal courts, it made no change in §§ 8 and
9, which, as shown above, gave the shipper the option to make
complaints to the Commission or to bring suit in a United States
court."
Referring to the proviso in § 22 with respect to the
preservation of existing remedies, it was then pointed out that the
proviso was not intended to nullify other parts of the act, but to
maintain existing rights which were not inconsistent with those
which the statute created. And finally, with regard to a case such
as the present one, where the Commission, at the instance of the
injured party, has made its ruling as to the unreasonableness or
unjustly discriminatory character of the practice attacked, the
Court thus defined the remedy available:
"Until that body [the Commission] has declared the practice to
be discriminatory and unjust, no court has jurisdiction of a suit
against an interstate carrier for damages occasioned by its
enforcement. When the Commission has declared the rule to be
unjust, redress must be sought before the Commission or in the
United States courts of competent jurisdiction, as provided in §
9."
3. It is said that the present action is brought to recover
damages caused by the violation or discriminatory enforcement of
the carrier's own rule, and that, in such case, no administrative
question being involved, resort to the Commission was not
necessary. And this, it is urged,
Page 238 U. S. 472
was held in the
Puritan case.
See also Illinois
Central R. Co. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co., ante, p.
238 U. S. 275. The
distinction, however, is apparent. In the cases cited, the
plaintiff had not invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission. In
this case, it had done so. It went before the Commission with its
complaint under the act, assailing the rule of the company, and it
secured from the Commission a finding as to the illegality of the
rule and the violation of the act. This proceeding established the
character of the claim so far as interstate transactions were
concerned, and it could be prosecuted solely under the federal
statute. This follows necessarily from the supremacy of the federal
legislation in relation to interstate commerce. So long as the
creative provisions of the federal act did not appear to be
involved, and the wrong was not disclosed in the aspect presented
by the Commission's finding, the plaintiff was free to avail itself
of common law remedies or of those afforded by local statutes. But
when, as a result of its own insistence upon its federal right
under the act, it appeared that the act had been violated and that
the special remedial provisions of the act were applicable, it was
not possible for the plaintiff to ignore the statute it had thus
called into play and disregard its provisions for the purpose of
measuring relief by local standards. The federal statute governed
the plaintiff no less than the defendant. In the situation in which
the plaintiff stood after the Commission's finding, that statute
determined the extent of the damages it was entitled to recover
with respect to interstate sales and shipments, and the plaintiff
was not free to seek another remedy in the state court, and there
to secure treble damages under the state statute with respect to
the same transactions.
This is not to say that the finding of the Commission as to the
amount of damages has any other effect than
Page 238 U. S. 473
that prescribed in §16 of the act. It is simply to hold that the
plaintiff, having demanded and obtained the appropriate ruling from
the Commission as to the discrimination which had been practised,
was then entitled to proceed for the recovery of damages in
accordance with the act, and not otherwise. The fact that the
Commission had not made its award of damages at the time the action
was brought is immaterial. The proceeding before the Commission was
pending, and the plaintiff's right and remedy were fixed by the
federal act.
We conclude, therefore, that with respect to the damage
sustained by the plaintiff in its interstate business by reason of
the unjustly discriminatory distribution of cars for interstate
shipments, the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain this action
under the state statute. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.