Rather than charging appellees with the crime of fraudulently
concealing assets while applying for and receiving public
assistance, the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) brought a
civil action against appellees in state court seeking only a return
of the welfare payments alleged to have been wrongfully received,
and as part of the action a writ of attachment was issued and
executed pursuant to the Illinois Attachment Act against appellees'
property without notice or hearing. Instead of seeking a prompt
hearing in the state court or moving there to quash the attachment
on federal constitutional grounds, appellees filed suit against
appellant IDPA officials in Federal District Court, alleging that
the Attachment Act was unconstitutional in that it provided for
deprivation of debtors' property without due process of law, and
seeking,
inter alia, return of the attached property.
Declining to dismiss the complaint under the doctrine of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, and
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, a
three-judge court held the Act unconstitutional and issued an
injunction directing return of appellees' attached property.
Held: The District Court should have dismissed
appellees' complaint under
Younger, supra, and
Huffman, supra, unless their state remedies were
inadequate to litigate their federal due process claim, since the
injunction asked for and issued by the court interfered with
Illinois' efforts to utilize the Attachment Act as an integral part
of the State's enforcement action. Pp.
431 U. S.
440-447.
(a) The principles of
Younger and
Huffman are
broad enough to apply to interference by a federal court with an
ongoing civil enforcement action such as this, brought by the State
in its sovereign capacity. Pp.
431 U. S.
443-444.
(b) For the federal court to have proceeded with the case rather
than remitting appellees to their remedies in the pending state
suit confronts the State with the choice of engaging in duplicative
litigation, thereby risking a temporary federal injunction, or of
interrupting its enforcement proceedings pending the federal
court's decision at some unknown time in the future; and forecloses
the state court's opportunity
Page 431 U. S. 435
to construe the challenged statute in the face of the federal
constitutional challenges that would also be pending for decision
before it. P.
431 U. S.
445.
(c) There was no basis for the District Court's proceeding to
judgment on the ground that extraordinary circumstances warranted
federal interference. There is no suggestion that the pending state
action was brought in bad faith or to harass appellees, and no
basis for finding that the Attachment Act violated
"express constitutional provisions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it."
Pp.
431 U. S.
446-447.
405 F Supp. 757, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN,
J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
431 U. S. 448.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
431 U. S. 450.
STEWART, J., filed a dissenting statement,
post, p.
431 U. S. 448.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
431 U. S.
460.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) filed a lawsuit in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., on October 30, 1974,
against appellees Juan and Maria Hernandez, alleging that they had
fraudulently concealed assets while applying for and receiving
public assistance. Such conduct is a crime under Illinois law,
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 23, § 11-21 (1973). The IDPA, however, proceeded
civilly, and sought only return of the money alleged to have been
wrongfully
Page 431 U. S. 436
received. The IDPA simultaneously instituted an attachment
proceeding against appellees' property. Pursuant to the Illinois
Attachment Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 11 (1973) (Act), the IDPA filed
an affidavit setting forth the nature and amount of the underlying
claim and alleging that the appellees had obtained money from the
IDPA by fraud. [
Footnote 1] The
writ of attachment was issued automatically [
Footnote 2] by the clerk of the court upon receipt
of this affidavit. [
Footnote 3]
The writ
Page 431 U. S. 437
was then given to the sheriff, who executed it, on November 5,
1974, on money belonging to appellees in a credit union. Appellees
received notice of the attachment, freezing their money in the
credit union, on November 8, 1974, when they received the writ, the
complaint, and the affidavit in support of the writ. The writ
indicated a return date for the attachment proceeding of November
18, 1974. [
Footnote 4]
Appellees appeared in court on November 18, 1974, and were informed
that the matter would be continued until December 19, 1974.
Appellees never filed an answer either to the attachment or to the
underlying complaint. [
Footnote
5] They did not seek a prompt hearing,
Page 431 U. S. 438
nor did they attempt to quash the attachment on the ground that
the procedures surrounding its issuance rendered it and the Act
unconstitutional. Instead appellees filed the instant lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois on December 2, 1974, seeking,
inter alia, return
of the attached money. The federal complaint alleged that the
appellees' property had been attached pursuant to the Act and that
the Act was unconstitutional in that it provided for the
deprivation of debtors' property without due process of law.
Appellees as plaintiffs sought to represent a class of those
"who have had or may have their property attached without notice
or hearing upon the creditor's mere allegation of fraudulent
conduct pursuant to the Illinois Attachment Act."
App. 6-7. They named as defendants appellants Trainor and
O'Malley, officials of the IDPA, and sought declaration of a
defendant class made up of all the court clerks in the Circuit
Courts of Illinois, and of another defendant class of all sheriffs
in Illinois. They sought an injunction against Trainor and O'Malley
forbidding them to seek attachments under the Act and an injunction
against the clerks and sheriffs forbidding them to issue or serve
writs of attachment under the Act. Appellees also sought
preliminary relief in the form of an order directing the Sheriff of
Cook County to release the property which had been attached.
Finally, appellees sought the convening of a three-judge court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
The District Court declined to rule on the request for
preliminary relief because the parties had agreed that one-half of
the money in the credit union would be returned. A three-judge
court was convened. It certified the suit as a plaintiff and
defendant class action as appellees had requested. App. 63. In an
opinion dated December 19, 1975, almost one year after the return
date of the attachment in state court, it
Page 431 U. S. 439
declined to dismiss the case under the doctrine of
Younger
v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37
(1971), and
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.
S. 592 (1975), stating:
"In
Huffman, the State of Ohio proceeded under a
statute which gave an exclusive right of action to the state. By
contrast, the Illinois Attachment Act provides a cause of action
for any person, public or private. It is mere happenstance that the
State of Illinois was the petitioner in this attachment proceeding.
It is likewise coincidental that the pending state proceedings may
arguably be quasi-criminal in nature; under the Illinois Attachment
Act, they need not be. These major distinctions preclude this Court
from extending the principles of
Younger, based on
considerations of equity, comity and federalism, beyond the
quasi-criminal situation set forth in
Huffman."
Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F.
Supp. 757, 760 (1975).
Proceeding to the merits, it held §§ 1, 2, 2a, 6, 8, 10, and 14
of the Act to be "on [their face] patently violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." 405 F. Supp. at 762. It ordered the clerk of the
court and the Sheriff of Cook County to return to appellees the
rest of their attached property; it enjoined all clerks and all
sheriffs from issuing or serving attachment writs pursuant to the
Act and ordered them to release any currently held attached
property to its owner; and it enjoined appellants Trainor and
O'Malley from authorizing applications for attachment writs
pursuant to the Act. App. 65-66. Appellants appealed to this Court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, claiming that under
Younger and
Huffman principles the District Court should have
dismissed the suit without passing on the constitutionality of the
Act, and that the Act is, in any event, constitutional. [
Footnote 6] Since we agree with
appellants that
Younger and
Page 431 U. S. 440
Huffman principles do apply here, we do not reach their
second claim.
Because our federal and state legal systems have overlapping
jurisdiction and responsibilities, we have frequently inquired into
the proper role of a federal court, in a case pending before it and
otherwise within its jurisdiction, when litigation between the same
parties and raising the same issues is or apparently soon will be
pending in a state court. More precisely, when a suit is filed in a
federal court challenging the constitutionality of a state law
under the Federal Constitution and seeking to have state officers
enjoined from enforcing it, should the federal court proceed to
judgment when it appears that the State has already instituted
proceedings in the state court to enforce the challenged statute
against the federal plaintiff and the latter could tender and have
his federal claims decided in the state court?
Younger v. Harris, supra, and
Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U. S. 66
(1971), addressed these questions where the already pending state
proceeding was a criminal prosecution and the federal plaintiff
sought to invalidate the statute under which the state prosecution
was brought. In these circumstances, the Court ruled that the
Federal District Court should issue neither a declaratory judgment
nor an injunction but should dismiss the case. The first
justification the Court gave for this rule was simply the
"basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity
should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a
criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy
at law and will not
Page 431 U. S. 441
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."
Younger v. Harris, supra at
401 U. S.
43-44.
Beyond the accepted rule that equity will ordinarily not enjoin
the prosecution of a crime, however, the Court voiced a "more vital
consideration," 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 44,
namely, that, in a Union where both the States and the Federal
Government are sovereign entities, there are basic concerns of
federalism which counsel against interference by federal courts,
through injunctions or otherwise, with legitimate state functions,
particularly with the operation of state courts. Relying on cases
that declared that courts of equity should give "scrupulous regard
[to] the rightful independence of state governments,"
Beal v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U. S. 45,
312 U. S. 50
(1941), the Court held that, in this intergovernmental context, the
two classic preconditions for the exercise of equity jurisdiction
assumed new dimensions. Although the existence of an adequate
remedy at law barring equitable relief normally would be determined
by inquiring into the remedies available in the federal, rather
than in the state, courts,
Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman,
319 U. S. 293,
319 U. S. 297
(1943), here the inquiry was to be broadened to focus on the
remedies available in the pending state proceeding.
"'The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in
the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the
validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this
course would not afford adequate protection.'"
Younger v. Harris, supra at
401 U. S. 45,
quoting
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.
S. 240,
271 U. S.
243-244 (1926). Dismissal of the federal suit "naturally
presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a
competent state tribunal the federal issues involved."
Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564,
411 U. S. 577
(1973).
"The policy of equitable restraint . . . is founded on the
premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the
accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of
federal constitutional rights."
Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117,
421 U. S. 124
(1975).
Page 431 U. S. 442
The Court also concluded that the other precondition for
equitable relief -- irreparable injury -- would not be satisfied
unless the threatened injury was both great and immediate. The
burden of conducting a defense in the criminal prosecution was not
sufficient to warrant interference by the federal courts with
legitimate state efforts to enforce state laws; only extraordinary
circumstances would suffice. [
Footnote 7] As the
Page 431 U. S. 443
Court later explained, to restrain a state proceeding that
afforded an adequate vehicle for vindicating the federal
plaintiff's constitutional rights
"would entail an unseemly failure to give effect to the
principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility equally
with the federal courts"
to safeguard constitutional rights and would "reflec[t]
negatively upon the state court's ability" to do so.
Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U. S. 452,
415 U. S.
460-461,
415 U. S. 462
(1974). The State would be prevented not only from
"effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing
to perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to
vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those
policies."
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at
420 U. S.
604.
Huffman involved the propriety of a federal injunction
against the execution of a judgment entered in a pending state
court suit brought by the State to enforce a nuisance statute.
Although the state suit was a civil, rather than a criminal,
proceeding,
Younger principles were held to require
dismissal of the federal suit. Noting that the State was a party to
the nuisance proceeding and that the nuisance statute was "in aid
of and closely related to criminal statutes," the Court concluded
that a federal injunction would be
"an offense to the State's interest in the nuisance litigation
[which] is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this
a criminal proceeding."
420 U.S. at
420 U. S. 604.
Thus, while the traditional maxim that equity will not enjoin a
criminal prosecution strictly speaking did not apply to the
nuisance proceeding in
Huffman, the "
more vital
consideration'" of comity, id. at 420 U. S. 601,
quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 44,
counseled restraint as strongly in the context of the pending state
civil enforcement action as in the context of a pending criminal
proceeding. In these circumstances, it was proper that the federal
court stay its hand.
We have recently applied the analysis of
Huffman to
proceedings similar to state civil enforcement actions --
judicial
Page 431 U. S. 444
contempt proceedings.
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.
S. 327 (1977). The Court again stressed the "more vital
consideration" of comity underlying the
Younger doctrine,
and held that the state interest in vindicating the regular
operation of its judicial system through the contempt process --
whether that process was labeled civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal
-- was sufficiently important to preclude federal injunctive relief
unless
Younger standards were met.
These cases control here. An action against appellees was
pending in state court when they filed their federal suit. The
state action was a suit by the State to recover from appellees
welfare payments that allegedly had been fraudulently obtained. The
writ of attachment issued as part of that action. The District
Court thought that
Younger policies were irrelevant
because suits to recover money and writs of attachment were
available to private parties as well as the State; it was only
because of the coincidence that the State was a party that the suit
was "arguably" in aid of the criminal law. But the fact remains
that the State was a party to the suit in its role of administering
its public assistance programs. Both the suit and the accompanying
writ of attachment were brought to vindicate important state
policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of those
programs. The state authorities also had the option of vindicating
these policies through criminal prosecutions.
See supra at
431 U. S. 435.
Although, as in
Juidice, the State's interest here is
"[p]erhaps . . . not quite as important as is the State's
interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws . . . or even its
interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding . . .
,"
430 U.S. at
430 U. S. 335,
the principles of
Younger and
Huffman are broad
enough to apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing
civil enforcement action such as this, brought by the State in its
sovereign capacity. [
Footnote
8]
Page 431 U. S. 445
For a federal court to proceed with its case rather than to
remit appellees to their remedies in a pending state enforcement
suit would confront the State with a choice of engaging in
duplicative litigation, thereby risking a temporary federal
injunction, or of interrupting its enforcement proceedings pending
decision of the federal court at some unknown time in the future.
It would also foreclose the opportunity of the state court to
construe the challenged statute in the face of the actual federal
constitutional challenges that would also be pending for decision
before it, a privilege not wholly shared by the federal courts. Of
course, in the case before us, the
Page 431 U. S. 446
state statute was invalidated and a federal injunction
prohibited state officers from using or enforcing the attachment
statute for any purpose. The eviscerating impact on many state
enforcement actions is readily apparent. [
Footnote 9] This disruption of suits by the State in
its sovereign capacity, when combined with the negative reflection
on the State's ability to adjudicate federal claims that occurs
whenever a federal court enjoins a pending state proceeding, leads
us to the conclusion that the interests of comity and federalism on
which
Younger and
Samuels v. Mackell primarily
rest apply in full force here. The pendency of the state court
action called for restraint by the federal court and for the
dismissal of appellees' complaint unless extraordinary
circumstances were present warranting federal interference or
unless their state remedies were inadequate to litigate their
federal due process claim.
No extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable relief were
present here. There is no suggestion that the pending state action
was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing appellees.
It is urged that this case comes within the exception that we said
in
Younger might exist where a
Page 431 U. S. 447
state statute is
"'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to
apply it.'"
401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 554,
quoting
Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387,
313 U. S. 402
(1941). Even if such a finding was made below, which we doubt
(
see supra at
431 U. S.
439), it would not have been warranted in light of our
cases.
Compare North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. D-Chem,
Inc., 419 U. S. 601
(1975),
with Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.
S. 600 (1974).
As for whether appellees could have presented their federal due
process challenge to the attachment statute in the pending state
proceeding, that question, if presented below, was not addressed by
the District Court, which placed its rejection of
Younger
and
Huffman on broader grounds. The issue is heavily laden
with local law, and we do not rule on it here in the first
instance. [
Footnote 10]
The grounds on which the District Court refused to apply the
principles of
Younger and
Huffman were infirm; it
was therefore error, on those grounds, to entertain the action on
behalf of either the named or the unnamed plaintiffs and to reach
the issue of the constitutionality of the Illinois attachment
statute. [
Footnote 11]
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded
Page 431 U. S. 448
to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART substantially agrees with the views
expressed in the dissenting opinions of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE STEVENS. Accordingly, he respectfully dissents from the
opinion and judgment of the Court.
[
Footnote 1]
Under § 1 of the Act, a writ will issue only upon allegation in
the affidavit of one of the following nine grounds:
"First: Where the debtor is not a resident of this State."
"Second: When the debtor conceals himself or stands in defiance
of an officer, so that process cannot be served upon him."
"Third: Where the debtor has departed from this State with the
intention of having his effects removed from this State."
"Fourth: Where the debtor is about to depart from this State
with the intention of having his effects removed from this
State."
"Fifth: Where the debtor is about to remove his property from
this State to the injury of such creditor."
"Sixth: Where the debtor has within 2 years preceding the filing
of the affidavit required, fraudulently conveyed or assigned his
effects, or a part thereof, so as to hinder or delay his
creditors."
"Seventh: Where the debtor has, within 2 years prior to the
filing of such affidavit, fraudulently concealed or disposed of his
property so as to hinder or delay his creditors."
"Eighth: Where the debtor is about fraudulently to conceal,
assign, or otherwise dispose of his property or effects, so as to
hinder or delay his creditors."
"Ninth: Where the debt sued for was fraudulently contracted on
the part of the debtor: Provided, the statements of the debtor, his
agent or attorney, which constitute the fraud, shall have been
reduced to writing, and his signature attached thereto, by himself,
agent or attorney."
[
Footnote 2]
Under § 2 of the Act, in cases sounding in tort, the writ is not
issued until a judge has examined the plaintiff under oath and
determined that the damages suffered exceed the amount of the
attachment.
[
Footnote 3]
Section 2 of the Act provides in part:
"2. Affidavit -- Statement -- Examination under oath. § 2. To
entitle a creditor to such a writ of attachment, he or his agent or
attorney shall make and file with the clerk of the circuit court,
an affidavit setting forth the nature and amount of the claim, so
far as practicable, after allowing all just credits and set-offs,
and any one or more of the causes mentioned in section 1, and also
stating the place of residence of the defendants, if known, and if
not known, that upon diligent inquiry the affiant has not been able
to ascertain the same together with a written statement, either
embodied in such affidavit or separately in writing, executed by
the attorney or attorneys representing the creditor, to the effect
that the attachment action invoked by such affidavit does or does
not sound in tort, also a designation of the return day for the
summons to be issued in said action."
Since the State was a party, the normal requirement that the
plaintiff post a bond in an amount equal to twice the amount sued
for, did not apply and no bond was posted.
See § 4a of the
Act.
[
Footnote 4]
Section 6 of the Act provides:
"The writ of attachment required in the preceding section shall
be directed to the sheriff (and, for purpose only of service of
summons, to any person authorized to serve writs of summons), or in
case the sheriff is interested, or otherwise disqualified or
prevented from acting, to the coroner of the county in which the
suit is commenced, and shall be made returnable on a return day
designated by the plaintiff, which day shall not be less than ten
days or more than sixty days after its date."
[
Footnote 5]
Section 27 of the Act provides:
"The defendant may answer, traversing the facts stated in the
affidavit upon which the attachment issued, which answer shall be
verified by affidavit; and if, upon the trial thereon, the issue
shall be found for the plaintiff, the defendant may answer the
complaint or file a motion directed thereto as in other cases, but
if found for the defendant, the attachment shall be quashed, and
the costs of the attachment shall be adjudged against the
plaintiff, but the suit shall proceed to final judgment as though
commenced by summons."
[
Footnote 6]
Appellees argue that the sheriffs and clerks have not perfected
their appeals and that the IDPA officials cannot litigate in
connection with
their appeals the validity of the
injunction directing the clerk of the court to return appellees'
property in the credit union. The argument is meritless. The IDPA
officials were parties below; the order directing the clerk to
return the property attached for the benefit of IDPA affects their
interests in a vital way; and their ability to obtain review of
such an order cannot depend on whether the clerk -- over whom IDPA
has no control -- chooses to perfect his appeal.
[
Footnote 7]
See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.
S. 117,
421 U. S.
124-125 (1975):
"Although the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to
defend against a single criminal prosecution alone do not
constitute "irreparable injury" in the "special legal sense of that
term," [
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.] at
401 U.S. 46, the Court in
Younger left room for federal equitable intervention in a
state criminal trial where there is a showing of "bad faith" or
"harassment" by state officials responsible for the prosecution,
id. at
401 U. S. 54,
where the state law to be applied in the criminal proceeding is
"
flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions,'" id. at 401 U. S. 53, or
where there exist other"
"extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable
injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites
of bad faith and harassment."
"
Ibid. I n the companion case of
Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, the Court explained
that"
"[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken
by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid
conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where
irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief
against pending state prosecutions appropriate."
"
Id. at
401 U. S. 85.
See Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225,
407 U. S.
230-231."
"The policy of equitable restraint expressed in
Younger v.
Harris, in short, is founded on the premise that ordinarily a
pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and
sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional
rights.
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452,
415 U. S. 460. Only if
'extraordinary circumstances' render the state court incapable of
fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, can
there be any relaxation of the deference to be accorded to the
state criminal process. The very nature of 'extraordinary
circumstances,' of course, makes it impossible to anticipate and
define every situation that might create a sufficient threat of
such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant
intervention in state criminal proceedings. [Footnote omitted.] But
whatever else is required, such circumstances must be
'extraordinary' in the sense of creating an extraordinarily
pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely in
the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation."
[
Footnote 8]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides that
"[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments."
The section is not applicable here, because this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action is an express statutory exception to its application,
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225
(1972); but it is significant for present purposes that the section
does not discriminate between civil and criminal proceedings
pending in state courts. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 provides
that district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the
levy or collection of any tax under state law where there are
adequate remedies available in state tribunals.
Prior cases in this Court that at the time counseled restraint
in actions seeking to enjoin state officials from enforcing state
statutes or implementing public policies, did not necessarily
distinguish between the type of proceedings -- civil or criminal --
pending or contemplated by state officers.
Wilson v.
Schnettler, 365 U. S. 381,
365 U. S.
384-385 (1961);
Allegheny County v. Mashuda
Co., 360 U. S. 185,
360 U. S.
189-190 (1959);
Alabama Public Service Comm'n v.
Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341,
341 U. S.
349-350 (1951);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U. S. 315,
319 U. S.
317-318 (1943);
Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman,
319 U. S. 293,
319 U. S.
297-298 (1943);
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co.,
316 U. S. 491,
316 U. S.
494-495 (1942);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.
S. 387,
313 U. S.
400-401 (1941);
Beal v. Missouri Pacific R.
Co., 312 U. S. 45,
312 U. S. 49-50
(1941);
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S.
89,
295 U. S. 95-97
(1935);
Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.
S. 176,
294 U. S. 185
(1935);
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52,
288 U. S. 60-61
(1933);
Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.
S. 521,
284 U. S.
525-526 (1932);
Massachusetts State Grange v.
Benton, 272 U. S. 525,
272 U. S. 527
(1926);
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.
S. 240,
271 U. S. 243
(1926).
As in
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.
S. 327,
430 U. S. 336
n. 13 (1977), we have no occasion to decide whether
Younger principles apply to all civil litigation.
[
Footnote 9]
Appellees argue that the injunction issued below in no way
interfered with a pending state case. They point to the fact that
only the attachment proceeding was interfered with -- the
underlying fraud action may continue unimpeded -- and claim that
the attachment proceeding is not a court proceeding within the
doctrine of
Younger and
Huffman. In this regard,
they rely on
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U. S. 538
(1972);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S.
67 (1972); and
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.
S. 103 (1975). None of these cases control here.
In this case, the attachment was issued by a court clerk and is
very much a part of the underlying action for fraud. Moreover, the
attachment in this case contained a return date on which the
parties were to appear in
court and at which time the
appellees would have had an opportunity to contest the validity of
the attachment. Thus the attachment proceeding was "pending"
in
the state courts within the
Younger and
Huffman doctrine at the time of the federal suit.
[
Footnote 10]
The parties are in disagreement on this issue, the State
squarely asserting, and the appellees denying, that the federal due
process claim could have been presented and decided in the pending
attachment proceeding. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, in dissent, offers
additional reasons -- not relied on by appellees and not addressed
by the State -- for concluding that the state suit did not offer an
adequate forum for litigating the federal claim. We do not resolve
these conflicting views.
[
Footnote 11]
Appellees have argued here that the relief granted in favor of
other class members is not barred by
Younger and
Huffman because state cases were not pending against some
of them. Since the class should never have been certified, we need
not address this argument.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, and write only to stress that the
substantiality of the State's interest in its proceeding has been
an important factor in abstention cases under
Younger v.
Harris, 401 U. S. 37
(1971), from the beginning. In discussing comity, the Court in
Younger clearly indicated that both federal and state
interests had to be taken into account:
"The concept does not mean blind deference to 'states' Rights'
any more than it means centralization of control over every
important issue in our National Government and its courts. The
Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does
represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in
which the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States."
Id. at
401 U. S.
44.
Consistently with this requirement of balancing the federal and
state interests, the Court in previous
Younger cases has
imposed a requirement that the State must show that it has an
important interest to vindicate in its own courts before the
federal court must refrain from exercising otherwise proper federal
jurisdiction. In
Younger itself, the Court relied on the
State's vital concern in the administration of its criminal laws.
In
Huffman v. Pursue, Inc., 420 U.
S. 592 (1975), the
Page 431 U. S. 449
Court stressed the fact that it dealt with a quasi-criminal
state proceeding to which the State was a party. The proceeding was
both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes. Thus, the
State's underlying policy interest in the litigation was deemed to
be as great as the interest found in
Younger. Similarly,
in
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327
(1977), the Court found that the State's interest in its contempt
procedures was substantial.
In cases where the State's interest has been more attenuated,
the Court has refused to order
Younger abstention. Thus,
in
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452
(1974), in which a state prosecution was merely threatened, the
federal court was free to reach the merits of the claim for a
declaratory judgment.
Id. at
415 U. S. 462.
In such a case,
"the opportunity for adjudication of constitutional rights in a
federal forum, as authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act,
becomes paramount."
Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U. S. 426,
421 U. S. 432
(1975).
See generally Kanowitz, Deciding Federal Law
Issues in Civil Proceedings: State Versus Federal Trial Courts, 3
Hastings Const.L.Q. 141 (1976).
Application of these principles to the instant case leads me to
agree with the Court's order reversing and remanding the case. Like
the Court, I am satisfied that a state proceeding was pending.
Ante at
431 U. S. 444,
431 U. S. 446
n. 9. I, too, find significant the fact that the State was a party
in its sovereign capacity to both the state suit and the federal
suit.
Ante at
431 U. S. 444.
Here, I emphasize the importance of the fact that the state
interest in the pending state proceeding was substantial. In my
view, the fact that the State had the option of proceeding either
civilly or criminally to impose sanctions for a fraudulent
concealment of assets while one applies for and receives public
assistance demonstrates that the underlying state interest is of
the same order of importance as the interests in
Younger
and
Huffman. The propriety of abstention should not depend
on the State's choice to vindicate its interests by a less drastic,
and perhaps more lenient,
Page 431 U. S. 450
route. In addition, as the Court notes, the state court
proceeding played an important role in safeguarding the fiscal
integrity of the public assistance programs. Since the benefits of
the recovery of fraudulently obtained funds are enjoyed by all the
taxpayers of the State, it is reasonable to recognize a distinction
between the State's status as creditor and the status of private
parties using the same procedures.
For me, the existence of the foregoing factors brings this case
squarely within the Court's prior
Younger abstention
rulings.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
The Court continues on, to me, the wholly improper course of
extending
Younger principles to deny a federal forum to
plaintiffs invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the decision of
meritorious federal constitutional claims when a
civil
action that might entertain such claims is pending in a state
court. Because I am of the view that the decision patently
disregards Congress' purpose in enacting § 1983 -- to open federal
courts to the decision of such claims without regard to the
pendency of such state civil actions -- and because the decision
indefensibly departs from prior decisions of this Court, I
respectfully dissent.
I
An attachment proceeding against appellees' credit union savings
was instituted by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA)
under the Illinois Attachment Act simultaneously with the filing of
a civil lawsuit in state court for the recovery of public welfare
funds allegedly fraudulently obtained. The attachment was initiated
when IDPA filled in the blanks on a standard form "Affidavit for
Attachment" stating:
"The defendants
Juan and
Maria Hernandez
within two years preceding the filing of this affidavit
fraudulently
Page 431 U. S. 451
concealed or disposed of property so as to hinder or delay
their creditors."
(Italics indicate matter inserted in blanks by IDPA.) App. 18
The wording of the affidavit repeats almost verbatim the language
of the Illinois Act, [
Footnote 2/1]
and provides no underlying factual allegations upon which a
determination can be made whether the conclusion of fraudulent
concealment or disposition of property is justified. [
Footnote 2/2] The writ of attachment was
issued as a matter of course by the clerk of the court upon receipt
of the affidavit, and the writ was executed on November 5,
1974.
Appellees appeared in state court on the return date, November
18, 1974, and were informed that the hearing on
Page 431 U. S. 452
the validity of the attachment was continued until December 19,
1974. In the meantime, appellees -- deprived of the use of their
savings -- faced pending rent and ar repair bills, and past due
electricity, gas, and telephone bills. On December 2, appellees
filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Federal District Court
seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction against
enforcement of the Illinois Attachment Act. On December 5, two
weeks before the continued state court hearing, appellees sought a
temporary restraining order to release their credit union savings
from the custody of the sheriff. The District Court effected an
agreement between the parties whereby IDPA agreed to the release of
one-half of the attached funds, and accordingly did not act on the
motion for the temporary restraining order. [
Footnote 2/3]
A three-judge District Court was convened. The District Court
found that it was not required to abstain from deciding the
constitutional merits of appellees' challenge, and enjoined the
enforcement of the Act on the ground that the Act was "patently and
flagrantly violative of the constitution."
Hernandez v.
Danaher, 405 F.
Supp. 757, 760 (ND Ill.1975). This Court reverses, and holds
that the District Court should have dismissed the suit, thus
continuing the course initiated in
Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U. S. 592
(1975), and furthered this Term in
Juidice v. Vail,
430 U. S. 327
(1977), of extending
Younger principles to pending civil
actions.
Page 431 U. S. 453
II
I have already set out at some length the reasons for my
disagreement with the Court's extension of
Younger
abstention principles to civil cases, particularly actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., supra at
420 U. S. 613
(dissenting opinion),
Juidice v. Vail, supra at
430 U. S. 341
(dissenting opinion), and will not repeat them here. The Court
suggests that this case, like
Huffman, involves a statute
enacted in aid of the criminal law. In
Huffman, the State
of Ohio brought a statutory nuisance suit in state court to close a
theater that had previously been adjudged to have shown obscene
films.
Huffman stated, in words quoted by the Court today,
that the nuisance proceeding "was
in aid of and closely related
to criminal statutes.'" Ante at 431 U. S. 443.
The Court states the precise question in this case to be:
"[S]hould the federal court proceed to judgment when it appears
that the State has already instituted proceedings in the state
court to enforce the challenged statute against the federal
plaintiff and the latter could tender and have his federal claims
decided in the state court?"
Ante at
431 U. S. 440.
Emphasizing that the State sued in state court to "vindicate
important state policies," the Court concludes that "the principles
of
Younger and
Huffman are broad enough to apply
to interference by a federal court with an ongoing civil
enforcement action such as this, brought by the State in its
sovereign capacity."
Ante at
431 U. S.
444.
In framing the question and its answer this narrowly, the Court
apparently desires once more to leave "for another day" the
question of the applicability of
Younger abstention
principles to civil suits generally.
Ante at
431 U. S. 445
n. 8;
Juidice, supra at
430 U. S. 345
n. (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);
see Huffman, supra at
420 U. S. 607.
But the Court's insistence that
"the interests of comity and federalism on which
Younger and
Samuels v. Mackell
Page 431 U. S. 454
primarily rest apply in full force here,"
ante at
431 U. S. 446,
is the signal that "merely the formal announcement is being
postponed,"
Juidice, supra at
430 U. S. 345
n. (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
Younger and
Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U. S. 66
(1971), dismissed federal court suits because the plaintiffs sought
injunctions against pending criminal prosecutions. I agreed with
those results because "[p]ending state criminal proceedings have
always been viewed as paradigm cases involving paramount state
interests."
Juidice, supra at
430 U. S. 345
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). But abstention principles developed to
avoid interfering with state criminal prosecutions are manifestly
inapplicable here.
In this case, the federal plaintiffs seek an injunction only
against the use of statutory attachment proceedings which, properly
speaking, are not part of the pending civil suit at all. The relief
granted here in no way interfered with or prevented the State from
proceeding with its suit in state court. It merely enjoined the use
of an unconstitutional mechanism for attaching assets from which
the State hoped to satisfy its judgment if it prevailed on the
merits of the underlying lawsuit. To say that the interest of the
State in continuing to use an unconstitutional attachment mechanism
to insure payment of a liability not yet established brings into
play "in full force" "all the interests of comity and federalism"
present in a state criminal prosecution is simply wrong.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67
(1972), a § 1983 suit challenging a prejudgment replevin statute,
addressed precisely this point. Since the plaintiffs had not
sought
"an injunction against any pending or future court proceeding as
such . . . , [but rather] challenged only the summary extrajudicial
process of prejudgment seizure of property,"
Fuentes concluded that
Younger principles
posed no bar to a federal court's granting the relief sought. 407
U.S. at
407 U. S. 71 n.
3.
See also Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.
S. 538,
420 U. S.
554-555 (1972), and
Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U. S. 103
(1975).
Page 431 U. S. 455
The application of
Younger principles here is also
inappropriate because even in the underlying lawsuit the State
seeks only a civil recovery of money allegedly fraudulently
received. The Court relies on the State's fortuitous presence as a
plaintiff in the state court suit to conclude that the suit is
closely related to a criminal suit, but I am hard pressed to
understand why the "mere happenstance," 405 F. Supp. at 760, that
the State of Illinois, rather than a private party, invoked the
Attachment Act makes this so. The Court's reliance on the presence
of the State here may suggest that it might view differently an
attachment under the same Act at the instance of a private party,
but no reason is advanced why the State as plaintiff should enjoy
such an advantage in its own courts over the ordinary citizen
plaintiff. [
Footnote 2/4] Under any
analysis, it seems to me that this solicitousness for the State's
use of an unconstitutional ancillary proceeding to a civil lawsuit
is hardly compelled by the great principles of federalism, comity,
and mutual respect between federal and state courts that account
for
Younger and its progeny.
The principles that give strength to
Younger simply do
not support an inflexible rule against federal courts' enjoining
state civil proceedings.
Younger was justified primarily
on the basis of the longstanding rule that "courts of equity . . .
particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution."
401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 43. A
comparably rigid rule against enjoining civil proceedings was never
suggested until
Huffman, for, in
Page 431 U. S. 456
civil proceedings, it cannot be assumed that state interests of
compelling importance outweigh the interests of litigants seeking
vindication of federal rights in federal court, particularly under
a statute expressly enacted by Congress to provide a federal forum
for that purpose. Even assuming that federal abstention might
conceivably be appropriate in some civil cases, the transformation
of what I must think can only be an exception into an absolute rule
crosses the line between abstention and abdication.
When it enacted § 1983, Congress weighed the competing demands
of "Our Federalism," and consciously decided to protect federal
rights in the federal forum. As we have previously recognized, §
1983 was enacted for the express purpose of altering the
federal-state judicial balance that had theretofore existed, and
of
"offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the
claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the
Constitution and the laws of the Nation."
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225,
407 U. S. 239
(1972). State courts are, of course, bound to follow the Federal
Constitution equally with federal courts, but Congress has clearly
ordained, as constitutionally it may, that the federal courts are
to be the "
primary and powerful reliances" for vindicating
federal rights under § 1983.
Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U. S. 452,
415 U. S. 464
(1974) (emphasis in original). If federal courts are to be flatly
prohibited, regardless of the circumstances of the individual claim
of violation of federal rights, from implementing this "uniquely
federal remedy" because of deference to purported state interests
in the maintenance of state civil suits, the Court has "effectively
cripple[d] the congressional scheme enacted in § 1983."
Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. at
430 U. S. 343
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
III
Even assuming,
arguendo, the applicability of
Younger principles, I agree with the District Court that
the Illinois
Page 431 U. S. 457
Attachment Act falls within one of the established exceptions to
those principles. As an example of an "extraordinary circumstance"
that might justify federal court intervention,
Younger
referred to a statute that
"'might be flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it.'"
401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 53-54,
quoting
Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387,
313 U. S. 402
(1941). Explicitly relying on this exception to
Younger,
the District Court held that the Illinois Act is "patently and
flagrantly violative of the constitution." 405 F. Supp. at 760. The
Court holds that this finding is insufficient to bring this case
within the
Younger exception because that exception
"might exist where a state statute is 'flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever
an effort might be made to apply it.' 401 U.S. at
401 U. S.
53-54, quoting
Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S.
387,
313 U. S. 402 (1941). Even
if such a finding was made below, which we doubt . . . , it would
not have been warranted in light of our cases."
Ante at
431 U. S.
446-447. I disagree.
Obviously, a requirement that the
Watson v. Buck
formulation must be literally satisfied renders the exception
meaningless, and, as my Brother STEVENS demonstrates,
post
at
431 U. S.
461-464, elevates to a literalistic definitional status
what was obviously meant only to be illustrative and nonexhaustive.
The human mind does not possess a clairvoyance that can foresee
whether "every clause, sentence and paragraph" of a statute will be
unconstitutional "in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it." The only sensible construction of the
test is to treat the "every clause, etc.," wording as redundant, at
least when decisions of this Court make clear that the challenged
statute is "patently and flagrantly violative of the Constitution."
I thought that
Page 431 U. S. 458
the Court had decided as much in
Kugler v. Helfant,
421 U. S. 117,
421 U. S. 124
(1975), in stating that
"
Younger left room for federal equitable intervention
in a state criminal trial . . .
where the state law to be
applied in the criminal proceeding is 'flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions.'"
(Emphasis supplied.) [
Footnote
2/5]
Clearly the Illinois Attachment Act is "patently and flagrantly
violative of express constitutional prohibitions" under the
relevant decisions of this Court.
North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601
(1975), struck down a Georgia garnishment statute that permitted
the issuance of a writ of garnishment by the court clerk upon the
filing of an affidavit containing only conclusory allegations, and
under which there was "no provision for an early hearing at which
the creditor would be required to demonstrate at least probable
cause for the garnishment."
Id. at
419 U. S. 607.
The Illinois Attachment Act is constitutionally indistinguishable
from the Georgia statute struck down in
North Georgia
Finishing. As in that case, the affidavit filed here contained
only conclusory allegations, which, in this case, were taken from a
preprinted form requiring only that the affiant fill in the names
of the persons whose property he wished to attach. Upon the filing
of this form affidavit, the court clerk issued the writ of
attachment as a matter of course. Far from requiring an "early
hearing" at which to challenge the validity of the attachment, the
Illinois Act provided that the party seeking the attachment could
unilaterally set the return date of the writ at any time from 10 to
60 days from the date of its execution.
Page 431 U. S. 459
Ill Rev.Stat., c 11, § 6 (1973). And, as this case demonstrates,
the 60-day interval does not necessarily represent the outer limit
for the actual hearing date, for the Illinois court here was
willing to grant a 30-day continuance beyond the date provided in
the writ of attachment, even though appellees appeared in court on
the proper date and wished to go forward with the hearing at that
time.
No one could seriously contend that the Illinois Act even
remotely resembles that sustained in
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co., 416 U. S. 600
(1974), and thus falls within the exception to
Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337
(1969),
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S.
67 (1972), and
North Georgia Finishing, supra,
carved out by that case.
W. T. Grant upheld a Louisiana
sequestration statute under which a writ of sequestration was
issued only after the filing of an affidavit in which "
the
grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ clearly appear[ed]
from specific facts,'" 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 605.
The showing of grounds for the issuance of the writ was made before
a judge, rather than a court clerk, id. at 416 U. S. 606,
and the debtor was entitled "immediately [to] have a full hearing
on the matter of possession following the execution of the writ,"
id. at 416 U. S. 610.
None of those procedural safeguards is provided by the Illinois
Act. The three-judge District Court unanimously and correctly
concluded that the Act "is, on its face, patently violative of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 405 F. Supp. at
762.
The Court gives only bare citations to
North Georgia
Finishing and
W. T. Grant, ante at
431 U. S. 447,
and declines to discuss or analyze them in even the most cursory
manner. These decisions so clearly support the District Court's
holding under any sensible construction of the
Younger
exception that the Court's silence, and its insistence upon
compliance with the literal wording of
Watson v. Buck,
only confirms my conviction that the Court is determined to extend
to "state civil proceedings generally the holding of
Younger,"
Huffman v.
Page 431 U. S. 460
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at
420 U. S. 613,
and to give its exceptions the narrowest possible reach. I
respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Illinois Rev.Stat., c. 11, § 1 (1973), provides:
"In any court of competent jurisdiction, a creditor having a
money claim . . . may have an attachment against the property of
his debtor . . . either at the time of instituting suit or
thereafter . . . in any one of the following cases:"
"
* * * *"
"Seventh: Where the debtor has, within 2 years prior to the
filing of such affidavit, fraudulently concealed or disposed of his
property so as to hinder or delay his creditors."
[
Footnote 2/2]
In fact, it appears that appellees had not "concealed or
disposed of property so as to hinder or delay their creditors" even
if the allegations of the unsworn attachment complaint are taken as
true. The complaint only alleges that they fraudulently concealed
personal property in order to obtain public assistance, not that
this concealment was undertaken to avoid payment to creditors. If
any part of the form affidavit is applicable to appellees, it
appears to be § 1(i), which tracks Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 11, § 1
(Ninth) (1973):
"The debt sued for was fraudulently contracted on the part of
the defendant _______ and statements of _______ agent _______ or
attorney, which constitute the fraud, have been reduced to writing
and _______ signature _______ attached thereto, by _______ sel[f]
_______ agent _______ or attorney _______."
App. 18. However, IDPA did not fill in the blanks of this
portion of the form, and did not rely on it in seeking the writ of
attachment.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The precise date of the agreement to release half of the
attached funds does not appear in the record.
The Court points out that the District Court did not issue its
opinion in this case until about one year after the date on which
appellees could have had their continued hearing in state court to
challenge the validity of the attachment.
Ante at
431 U. S.
438-439. This is irrelevant, since the motion for a
temporary restraining order, filed two weeks before the continued
hearing in state court, resulted in the agreement to release half
of appellees' savings. Thus, as a practical matter, appellees
received important relief in the Federal District Court at a time
when any relief in state court was highly speculative.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Even if the presence of the State as a plaintiff in the state
court proceeding is held to be of some significance, I fail to see
why the federal courts should accord greater deference to the
State's fiscal interest here than to the far more basic function of
collecting state taxes. As my Brother STEVENS conclusively
demonstrates,
post at
431 U. S.
464-466, the standard applied by the Court today goes
well beyond the statutory standard for a federal court's enjoining
the collection of taxes, which is predicated only upon a finding of
no "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" under state law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The quotation, in 421 U.S. at
421 U. S. 125
n. 4, of the complete
Buck sentence was carefully
identified in
Kugler as merely "one example of the type of
circumstances that could justify federal intervention. . . ."
Curiously, the Court,
ante at
431 U. S. 442
n. 7, quotes
Kugler's abridged formulation, but makes no
attempt to explain this reference when it finally applies the
"every clause, sentence and paragraph" test as the basis for its
decision.
Ante at
431 U. S. 446-447.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Today the Court adds four new complexities to a doctrine that
has bewildered other federal courts for several years. [
Footnote 3/1] First, the Court finds a
meaningful difference between a state procedure which is "patently
and flagrantly violative of the Constitution" and one that is
"flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to
apply it." [
Footnote 3/2] Second,
the Court holds that an unconstitutional collection procedure may
be used by a state agency, though not by others, because there is
"a distinction between the State's status as creditor and the
status of private parties using the same procedures." [
Footnote 3/3] Third, the Court's
application of the abstention doctrine in this case provides even
greater protection to a State when it is proceeding as an ordinary
creditor than the statutory protection mandated by Congress for the
State in its capacity as a tax collector. Fourth, without
disagreeing with the District Court's conclusion that the Illinois
attachment procedure is unconstitutional, the Court remands in
order to enable the District Court to decide whether that invalid
procedure provides an adequate remedy for the vindication of
appellees' federal rights. A comment on each of these complexities
may shed light on the character of the abstention doctrine as now
viewed by the Court.
Page 431 U. S. 461
I
The District Court found the Illinois attachment procedure
"patently and flagrantly violative of the constitution."
Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F.
Supp. 757, 760 (ND Ill 1975). This Court, on the other hand,
writes:
"It is urged that this case comes within the exception that we
said in
Younger might exist where a state statute is"
"flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to
apply it."
"401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 53-54, quoting
Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387,
313 U. S.
402 (1941). Even if such a finding was made below,
which we doubt . . . , it would not have been warranted in
light of our cases."
Ante at
431 U. S.
446-447 (emphasis added). [
Footnote 3/4] Since there is no doubt whatsoever as to
what the District Court actually said, this Court's expression of
doubt can only refer to its uncertainty as to whether a finding
that the crux of the statute is patently and flagrantly
unconstitutional is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the
statute be patently and flagrantly unconstitutional "in every
clause, sentence and paragraph. . . ." It is, therefore,
appropriate to consider what is left of this exception to the
Younger doctrine after today's decision.
The source of this exception is the passage Mr. Justice Black
had written some years earlier in
Watson v. Buck,
313 U. S. 387,
313 U. S. 402,
a case which involved a complicated state antitrust Act. On the
basis of its conclusion that certain sections were
unconstitutional, a three-judge District Court had enjoined
Page 431 U. S. 462
enforcement of the entire Act. [
Footnote 3/5] This Court reversed, holding: first, that
the invalidity of a part of a statute would not justify an
injunction against the entire At; and second, that, in any event,
the eight sections in question were valid.
In his explanation of the first branch of the Court's holding,
Mr. Justice Black pointed out that there are few, if any, statutes
that are totally unconstitutional in every part. [
Footnote 3/6] Since
Watson involved a new
statute which had not been construed by any state court, and since
such construction might have affected its constitutionality, Mr.
Justice Black's comment emphasized the point that an untried state
statute should not be invalidated by a federal court before the
state court has an opportunity to construe it. This consideration
is not present in a case involving an attack on a state statute
that has been in use for more than a century. Nothing in
Watson implies that a limited injunction against an
invalid portion of a statute of long standing would be
improper.
When he wrote the Court's opinion in
Younger v. Harris,
401 U. S. 37, Mr.
Justice Black quoted the foregoing excerpt from the
Watson
case as an example of a situation in which it would be appropriate
for a federal court to enjoin a pending
Page 431 U. S. 463
state criminal prosecution. [
Footnote 3/7] He did not, however, imply that his
earlier language rigidly defined the boundaries of one kind of
exception from the equitable rationale underlying the
Younger decision itself.
Today the Court seems to be saying that the "patently and
flagrantly unconstitutional" exception to
Younger-type
abstention is unavailable whenever a statute has a legitimate
title, or a legitimate severability clause, or some other equally
innocuous provision. If this is a fair reading of the Court's
opinion, the Court has given Mr. Justice Black's illustrative
language definitional significance. In effect, this treatment
preserves an illusion of flexibility in the application of a
Younger-type abstention, but it actually eliminates one of
the exceptions from the doctrine. For the typical constitutional
attack on a statute focuses on one, or a few, objectionable
features. Although, as Mr. Justice Black indicated in
Watson, it is conceivable that there are some totally
unconstitutional statutes, the possibility is quite remote. More
importantly, the Court has never explained why all sections of any
statute must be considered invalid in order to justify an
injunction against a portion that is itself flagrantly
unconstitutional. Even if this Court finds the constitutional issue
less clear than did the District Court, I do not understand what
governmental
Page 431 U. S. 464
interest is served by refusing to address the merits at this
stage of the proceedings.
II
The Court explicitly does not decide "whether
Younger
principles apply to all civil litigation."
Ante at
431 U. S. 445
n. 8. Its holding in this case therefore rests squarely on the fact
that the State, rather than some other litigant, is the creditor
that invoked the Illinois attachment procedure. This rationale
cannot be tenable unless principles of federalism require greater
deference to the State's interest in collecting its own claims than
to its interest in providing a forum for other creditors in the
community. It would seem rather obvious to me that the amount of
money involved in any particular dispute is a matter of far less
concern to the sovereign than the integrity of its own procedures.
Consequently, the fact that a State is a party to a pending
proceeding should make it less objectionable to have the
constitutional issue adjudicated in a federal forum than if only
private litigants were involved. I therefore find it hard to accept
the Court's contrary evaluation as a principled application of the
majestic language in Mr. Justice Black's
Younger
opinion.
III
The State has a valid interest in collecting taxes or other
obligations. In recognition of that need and in a desire to
minimize federal interference with state matters, Congress has
provided that a federal court may not enjoin the collection of
state taxes if the taxpayer has a "plain, speedy and efficient
remedy" under state law. [
Footnote
3/8] Congress has not, however, placed any restriction on the
power of a federal court to decide whether the taxpayer's remedy
is, in fact, plain, speedy, and efficient. [
Footnote 3/9] Quite the contrary, by qualifying the
prohibition
Page 431 U. S. 465
against enjoining the collection of state taxes, Congress has
actually directed the federal courts to review the adequacy of a
taxpayer's remedies.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that, when a state
remedy is uncertain, the federal court must provide relief. As Mr.
Justice Holmes put it, "we ought not to leave the plaintiffs to a
speculation upon what the State Court might say if an action at law
were brought."
Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S.
66,
253 U. S. 68.
[
Footnote 3/10]
The doctrine in
Younger developed from the same
equitable principles that have been applied to interpret 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341. [
Footnote 3/11] In cases
in which this Court has been confronted
Page 431 U. S. 466
with that statutory restriction, it has not been reluctant to
decide in the first instance whether a state remedy is adequate.
Congress has provided no special protection from federal
interference for a state agency suing to collect nontax
obligations. Equitable considerations (as well as considerations of
comity and federalism) do preclude unwarranted interference with
litigation brought by such an agency, but surely the agency is
entitled to no greater protection than the state tax collector.
Nevertheless, the Court is now fashioning a nonstatutory abstention
doctrine which requires even greater deference to the State as an
ordinary litigant than Congress regarded as appropriate for the
State's more basic fiscal needs.
IV
The Court's decision to remand this litigation to the District
Court to decide whether the Illinois attachment procedure
Page 431 U. S. 467
provides a debtor with an appropriate forum in which to
challenge the constitutionality of the Illinois attachment
procedure is ironic. For that procedure includes among its
undesirable features a set of rules which effectively foreclose any
challenge to its constitutionality in the Illinois courts.
Although it is true that § 27 of the Illinois Attachment Act,
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 11, § 27 (1973), allows the defendant to file a
motion to quash the attachment, the purpose of such a motion is to
test the sufficiency and truth of the facts alleged in the
affidavit or the adequacy of the attachment bond. Section 28 of the
Act precludes consideration of any other issues. [
Footnote 3/12] Even if -- contrary to a fair
reading -- the statute might be construed to allow consideration of
a constitutional challenge on a motion to quash, a trial judge may
summarily reject such a challenge without fear of reversal; for an
order denying such a motion is interlocutory and nonappealable.
[
Footnote 3/13] The ruling on the
validity of an attachment does not become final until the
underlying tort or contract claim is resolved. At that time, the
attachment issue will, of course, be moot, because the prevailing
party will then be entitled to the property regardless of the
validity of the attachment.
Because it is so clear that the proceeding pending in the state
court did not afford the appellees in this case an adequate
Page 431 U. S. 468
remedy for the violation of their federal constitutional rights,
[
Footnote 3/14] the Court's
disposition points up the larger problem confronting litigants who
seek to challenge any state procedure
Page 431 U. S. 469
as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
As I suggested in my separate opinion in
Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U. S. 327,
430 U. S. 339,
a principled application of the rationale of
Younger v.
Harris, 401 U. S. 37,
forecloses abstention in cases in which the federal challenge is to
the constitutionality of the state procedure itself. [
Footnote 3/15] Since this federal
plaintiff raised
Page 431 U. S. 470
a serious question about the fairness of the Illinois attachment
procedure, and since that procedure does not afford a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy for his federal claim, it necessarily
follows that
Younger abstention is inappropriate.
Thirty years ago, Mr. Justice Rutledge characterized a series of
Illinois procedures which effectively foreclosed consideration of
the merits of federal constitutional claims as a "procedural
labyrinth . . . made up entirely of blind alleys."
Marino v.
Ragen, 332 U. S. 561,
332 U. S. 567.
Today Illinois litigants may appropriately apply that
characterization to the Court's increasingly Daedalian doctrine of
abstention.
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 3/1]
See, for example, Judge Pell's search for a
synthesizing principle in his article, Abstention -- A Primrose
Path by Any Other Name, 21 DePaul L.Rev. 926 (1972).
[
Footnote 3/2]
The Court,
ante at
431 U. S. 447,
quotes this excerpt from
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.
S. 387,
313 U. S. 402,
which in turn was quoted in
Younger v. Harris,
401 U. S. 37,
401 U. S.
53-54.
[
Footnote 3/3]
See MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurring opinion,
ante at
431 U. S.
450.
[
Footnote 3/4]
The cavalier statement that a finding of obvious
unconstitutionality would not have been warranted by prior cases
simply ignores the careful analysis of the serious defects in the
Illinois statute identified in the opinion of the District Court,
405 F. Supp. at 760-762, and in MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting
opinion.
[
Footnote 3/5]
The Florida legislation involved in
Watson v. Buck
regulated the business of persons holding music copyrights and
declared certain combinations of such persons illegal as in
restraint of trade. A three-judge District Court held that 8
sections of that statute conflicted with the federal copyright laws
and, without considering the validity of the remaining 13 sections,
enjoined enforcement of all 21 sections.
[
Footnote 3/6]
"Passing upon the possible significance of the manifold
provisions of a broad statute in advance of efforts to apply the
separate provisions is analogous to rendering an advisory opinion
upon a statute or a declaratory judgment upon a hypothetical case.
It is, of course, conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in
every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it."
313 U.S. at
313 U. S.
402.
[
Footnote 3/7]
"There may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which
the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence
of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment. For
example, as long ago as the
Buck case,
supra, we
indicated:"
"'It is, of course, conceivable that a statute might be
flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to
apply it.' 313 U.S. at
313 U. S. 402."
"Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might
also arise, but there is no point in our attempting now to specify
what they might be."
401 U.S. at
401 U. S.
53-54.
[
Footnote 3/8]
828 U.S.C. § 1341.
[
Footnote 3/9]
Indeed, that kind of determination is routine business in a
federal court.
See, e.g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc.,
429 U. S. 68.
[
Footnote 3/10]
See Hopkins v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 275 U.
S. 393,
275 U. S. 400;
Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of
Montana, 299 U. S. 167,
299 U. S. 170
("A
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy' cannot be predicated
upon a problematical outcome of future consideration"); Spector
Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.
S. 101, 323 U. S. 106. As
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote:
"[T]here is such uncertainty concerning the [state] remedy as to
make it speculative . . . whether the State affords
full
protection to the federal rights."
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.
S. 620,
326 U. S. 625
(emphasis added), cited with approval just this Term in
Tully
v. Griffin, Inc., supra at
429 U. S. 76. In
Hillsborough, this Court decided in the first instance
that the state remedies were uncertain to the extent of being
inadequate. Finally, in
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S.
37,
252 U. S. 48,
this Court held that, even though state procedures might be
adequate to remedy the federal question as to the validity of the
tax, there were no procedures to remedy the federal wrong in
connection with the tax collection procedures.
"Hence, on this ground at least, resort was properly had to
equity for relief; and since a court of equity does not 'do justice
by halves,' and will prevent, if possible, a multiplicity of suits,
the jurisdiction extends to the disposition of all questions raised
by the bill."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 3/11]
The equitable principles relied upon in
Younger are of
ancient vintage. In the first Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
directed that equity be withheld if a "plain, adequate and complete
remedy may be had at law." In
Scott v. Neely, 140 U.
S. 106,
140 U. S. 110,
this Court noted that Congress' prohibition was
"declaratory of the rule obtaining and controlling in equity
proceedings from the earliest period in England, and always in this
country. And so it has been often adjudged that, whenever,
respecting any right violated, a court of law is competent to
render a judgment affording a plain, adequate and complete remedy,
the party aggrieved must seek his remedy in such court, not only
because the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by
jury, but because of the prohibition of the act of Congress to
pursue his remedy in such cases in a court of equity."
One of the major cases relied upon by the Court,
Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.
S. 293,
319 U. S. 299,
held that although Congress in § 1341 had not specifically
prohibited declaratory judgments concerning the validity of state
statutes, nonetheless, equitable principles required the same
result.
"[W]e find it unnecessary to inquire whether the words of the
statute may be so construed as to prohibit a declaration by federal
courts concerning the invalidity of a state tax. For we are of the
opinion that those considerations which have led federal courts of
equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in
exceptional cases, require a like restraint in the use of the
declaratory judgment procedure."
319 U.S. at
319 U. S. 299.
This pronouncement has been read as prohibiting declaratory
judgments to the same extent as injunctive suits under § 1341.
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Howlett, 525 F.2d 178 (CA7
1975) (Sprecher, J.).
[
Footnote 3/12]
Section 28, Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 11, § 28 (1973), provides that
"[n]o writ of attachment shall be quashed, nor the property
taken thereon restored, . . . if the plaintiff . . . shall cause a
legal and sufficient affidavit or attachment bond to be filed, or
the writ to be amended, . . . and in that event the cause shall
proceed as if such proceedings had originally been sufficient."
Thus, under § 28, the only valid question raised in a proceeding
concerning the attachment is whether the facts pleaded in the
affidavit or writ were true. And, of course, § 28 allows amendment
of any improperly pleaded writ or affidavit.
[
Footnote 3/13]
Smith v. Hodge, 13 Ill. 2d
197,
148 N.E.2d
793 (1958);
Brignall v. Merkle, 296 Ill.App. 250, 16
N.E.2d 150 (1938);
Rabits v. Live Oak, Perry & Gulf R.
Co., 245 Ill.App. 589 (1927);
American Mortgage Corp. v.
First National Mortgage Corp., 345 F.2d 527, 528 (CA7
1965).
[
Footnote 3/14]
In the present case, the appellees appeared on the return date
of the writ of attachment, November 18, 1974 (10 days after their
property had been attached), and "were informed that the matter
would be continued until December 19, 1974,"
ante at
431 U. S. 437,
31 days later. As the opinion below points out, the person who sues
out the writ of attachment has absolute discretion under § 6 of the
Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 11, § 6 (1973), to set the return date of
the writ of attachment anywhere from 10 to 60 days after the
property has been attached. 405 F. Supp. at 762. The return date
appears to be the first chance an attachment can be challenged; and
as this case points up, the proceedings on the return date can be
summarily continued for at least a month, if not longer. Thus,
property may well be attached for three months or longer before
even a § 27 motion will be entertained.
As the court below also noted, "[s]ection 27 . . . does not give
defendant an absolute right to a hearing on the attachment issue
immediately after seizure." 405 F. Supp. at 762. Indeed, the
Attachment Act contains no provision for a prompt hearing on the
validity of the attachment. This should be compared with § 29 of
the Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 11, § 29 (1973), which requires "the
court [to] immediately . . . direct a jury to be impaneled to
inquire into the right of the property" in cases in which a person
other than the defendant claims an interest in the
property being attached. This deference to the needs for prompt
action in response to an interpleading claimant signifies the
general lax attitude the Act takes with regard to the rights of
persons whose property has been attached.
The Court states that the appellees (who appeared on the return
date "and were informed that the matter would be continued" for a
month)
"did not seek a prompt hearing, nor did they attempt to quash
the attachment on the ground that the procedures surrounding its
issuance rendered it and the Act unconstitutional."
Ante at
431 U. S.
437-438. The State suggests that § 26 of the Act,
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 11, § 26 (1973), allows appellees to make an
appropriate motion that the attachment statute is unconstitutional.
However, § 26 provides that "provisions of the Civil Practice Act .
. . shall apply to all proceedings hereunder,
except as
otherwise provided in this Act." (Emphasis added.) As we note
in our discussion of § 28,
supra, the statute does not
authorize raising unconstitutionality as a defense to an
attachment.
The State also cites Ill.Sup.Ct. Rule 184, which provides that a
party may "call up a motion for disposition before or after" the
time for its normal disposition. This, however, does not provide a
prompt hearing; it only allows appellees to ask for one. The
request may or may not be granted in the discretion of the court.
Neither § 26 nor Rule 184 assures appellees a prompt hearing, and
neither overrides the fact that § 28 appears to foreclose any
defense of unconstitutionality in attacking an attachment.
[
Footnote 3/15]
There should be no abstention unless the state procedure affords
a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy for the federal wrong;
indeed, the opinion in
Younger, in basing its decision on
basic equity principles, acknowledges this as the fundamental
requirement in application of the abstention doctrine. The majority
opinion in this case states the question presented as whether
abstention is proper when a "State has already instituted
proceedings . . . and the [appellees] could tender and have [their]
federal claims decided in the state court."
Ante at
431 U. S. 440.
It then proceeds to quote from numerous cases requiring an adequate
state remedy for application of the abstention doctrine.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37,
401 U. S. 45,
quoting
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.
S. 240,
271 U. S.
243-244 (requiring the federal plaintiff to "first set
up and rely on his defense in the state courts, even though this
involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it
plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate
protection");
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.
S. 564,
411 U. S. 577
(dismissal of the federal suit as "naturally presuppos[ing] the
opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state
tribunal the federal issues involved");
Kugler v. Helfant,
421 U. S. 117,
421 U. S. 124
(abstention founded "on the premise that ordinarily a pending state
prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity
for vindication of federal constitutional rights").
Ante
at
431 U. S. 441.
In my judgment, when a state procedure is challenged, an adequate
forum must be one that is sufficiently independent of the alleged
unconstitutional procedure to judge it impartially and to provide
prompt relief if the procedure is found wanting. No Illinois
procedure has been pointed to as providing such relief, and where
the remedy is "uncertain," federal jurisdiction exists.