Respondent employee sued his employer for severance pay under a
collective bargaining agreement existing between his union and
employer, which was subject to the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA). Judgment for respondent was affirmed in the state courts on
the ground that the state law did not require him to exhaust
contract grievance procedures before suit, which he had not
done.
Held: under federal policy reflected in the LMRA,
contract grievance procedures, which apply to severance as well as
other types of claims, must, unless specified as nonexclusive, be
exhausted before direct legal redress is sought.
Moore v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, and
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal,
345 U. S. 653,
distinguished. Pp.
379 U. S.
652-659.
275 Ala. 685,
158
So. 2d 492, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Maddox brought suit in an Alabama state court against
his employer, the Republic Steel Corporation, for severance pay
amounting to $694.08, allegedly owed him under the terms of the
collective bargaining
Page 379 U. S. 651
agreement existing between Republic and Maddox' union. Maddox
had been laid off in December, 1953. The collective bargaining
agreement called for severance pay if the lay-off was the result of
a decision to close the mine, at which Maddox worked,
"permanently." [
Footnote 1] The
agreement also contained a three-step grievance procedure to be
followed by binding arbitration, [
Footnote 2] but Maddox made no effort to utilize this mode
of redress. Instead, in August, 1956, he sued for breach of the
contract. At all times material to his claim, Republic was engaged
in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management
Relations Act, [
Footnote 3] and
Republic's industrial relations with Maddox and his union were
subject to the provisions of that Act.
The case was tried on stipulated facts without a jury. Judgment
was awarded in favor of Maddox, and the appellate courts of Alabama
affirmed on the theory that state law applies to suits for
severance pay since, with the employment relationship necessarily
ended, no further danger of industrial strife exists warranting the
application of federal labor law. [
Footnote 4]
Moore v. Illinois
Central
Page 379 U. S. 652
R. Co., 312 U. S. 630
(1941), and
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v.
Koppal, 345 U. S. 653
(1953), cases decided under the Railway Labor Act, [
Footnote 5] were cited to support the
proposition. Furthermore, it was held that, under Alabama law,
Maddox was not required to exhaust the contract grievance
procedures. We granted Republic's petition for certiorari, 377 U.S.
904, to determine whether the rationale of
Moore v. Illinois
Central R. Co. carries over to a suit for severance pay on a
contract subject to § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
[
Footnote 6] We conclude that
the state judgment must be reversed.
I
As a general rule, in cases to which federal law applies,
federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to
assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract
grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode
of redress. [
Footnote 7] If the
union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the
individual's claim, differences may arise as to the forms of
redress then available.
See Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U. S. 335;
Labor Board v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172. [
Footnote 8] But
Page 379 U. S. 653
unless the contract provides otherwise, [
Footnote 9] there can be no doubt that the employee
must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf.
Congress has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a
preferred method for settling disputes and stabilizing the "common
law" of the plant. LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d); § 201(c), 29
U.S.C. § 171(c) (1958 ed.). Union interest in prosecuting employees
grievances is clear. Such activity complements the union's status
as exclusive bargaining representative by permitting it to
participate actively in the continuing administration of the
contract. In addition, conscientious handling of grievance claims
will enhance the union's prestige with employees. Employer
interests, for their part, are served by limiting the choice of
remedies available to aggrieved employees. And it cannot be said in
the normal situation that contract grievance procedures are
inadequate to protect the interests of an aggrieved employee until
the employee has attempted to implement the procedures and found
them so.
A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to
completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a
lawsuit has little to commend it. In addition to cutting across the
interests already mentioned, it would deprive employer and union of
the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly
settlement of employee grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot
be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a method of
settlement. A rule creating such a situation "would inevitably
exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and
administration of collective agreements."
Teamsters Local v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95,
369 U. S.
103.
Page 379 U. S. 654
II
Once it is established that the federal rule discussed above
applies to grievances in general, it should next be inquired
whether the specific type of grievance here in question -- one
relating to severance pay -- is so different in kind as to justify
an exception.
Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., and
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, supra,
are put forward for the proposition that it is.
In
Moore, the Court ruled that a trainman was not
required by the Railway Labor Act to exhaust the administrative
remedies granted him by the Act before bringing suit for wrongful
discharge. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, for the Court, based the decision on
the use of permissive language in the Act -- disputes "may be
referred . . . to the . . . Adjustment Board. . . ." [
Footnote 10] MR. JUSTICE BLACK wrote
again in
Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.,
339 U. S. 239
(1950), a declaratory judgment suit brought in a state court by a
railroad company against two unions to resolve a representation
dispute. The Court held that jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board
to resolve such disputes was exclusive.
Moore was
distinguished thus:
"Moore was discharged by the railroad. He could have challenged
the validity of his discharge before the Board, seeking
reinstatement and back pay. Instead, he chose to accept the
railroad's action in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to
be an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for breach of
contract. As we there held, the Railway Labor Act does not bar
courts from adjudicating such cases. A common law or statutory
action for wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which
Page 379 U. S. 655
the Board has power to provide, and does not involve questions
of future relations between the railroad and its other
employees."
339 U. S. 339 U.S.
239, at
339 U. S. 244.
This distinction was confirmed in
Transcontinental &
Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, supra:
"Such [a wrongfully discharged] employee may proceed either in
accordance with the administrative procedures prescribed in his
employment contract or he may resort to his action at law for
alleged unlawful discharge if the state courts recognize such a
claim. Where the applicable law permits his recovery of damages
without showing his prior exhaustion of his administrative
remedies, he may so recover, as he did in the
Moore
litigation,
supra, under Mississippi law. [
Footnote 11]"
345 U. S. 345 U.S.
653, at
345 U. S.
661.
Federal jurisdiction in both
Moore and
Koppal
was based on diversity; federal law was not thought to apply merely
by reason of the fact that the collective bargaining agreements
were subject to the Railway Labor Act. Since that time, the Court
has made it clear that substantive federal law applies to suits on
collective bargaining agreements covered by § 204 of the Railway
Labor Act,
International Assn. of Machinists v. Central
Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682, and
by § 301(a) of the LMRA,
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U. S. 448.
Thus, a major underpinning for the continued validity of the
Moore case in the field of the Railway Labor Act, and more
importantly in the present context, for the extension of its
rationale to suits under § 301(a) of the LMRA, has been
removed.
Page 379 U. S. 656
We hold that any such extension is incompatible with the
precepts of
Lincoln Mills, and cannot be accepted.
Grievances depending on severance claims are not critically unlike
other types of grievances. Although it is true that the employee
asserting the claim will necessarily have accepted his discharge as
final, it does not follow that the resolution of his claim can have
no effect on future relations between the employer and other
employees. Severance pay and other contract terms governing
discharge are of obvious concern to all employees, and a potential
cause of dispute so long as any employee maintains a continuing
employment relationship. Only in the situation in which no
employees represented by the union remain employed, as would be the
case with a final and permanent plant shutdown, is there no
possibility of a work stoppage resulting from a severance pay
claim. But even in that narrow situation, if applicable law did not
require resort to contract procedures, the inability of the union
and employer at the contract negotiation stage to agree upon
arbitration as the exclusive method of handling permanent shutdown
severance claims in all situations could have an inhibiting effect
on reaching an agreement. If applicable law permitted a court suit
for severance pay in any circumstances without prior recourse to
available contract remedies, an employer seeking to limit the modes
of redress that could be used against him could do so only by
eliminating contract grievance procedures for severance pay claims.
The union would hardly favor the elimination, for it is in the
union's interest to afford comprehensive protection to those it
represents, to participate in interpretations of the contract, and
to have an arbitrator, rather than a court, decide such questions
as whether the company has determined to "close permanently."
[
Footnote 12]
Page 379 U. S. 657
There are, then, positive reasons why the general federal rule
should govern grievances based on severance claims as it does
others. Furthermore, no positive reasons appear why the general
federal rule should not apply. "Comprehensiveness is inherent in
the process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate
of
Lincoln Mills," and "the subject matter of § 301(a)
is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.'" Teamsters
Local v. Lucas Flour Co., at 369 U. S. 103.
Maddox' suit in the present case is simply on the contract, and the
remedy sought, award of $694.08, did not differ from any that the
grievance procedure had power to provide. Federal law
governs
"[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter. . . . [
Footnote 13]"
Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958 ed.),
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra. The suit by
Maddox clearly falls within the terms of the statute and within the
principles of
Lincoln Mills, and because we see no reason
for creating an exception, we conclude that the general federal
rule applies. [
Footnote
14]
III
The federal rule would not, of course, preclude Maddox' court
suit if the parties to the collective bargaining agreement
expressly agreed that arbitration was not the exclusive
Page 379 U. S. 658
remedy. [
Footnote 15] The
section of this contract governing grievances provides,
inter
alia:
"It is the purpose of this Section to provide procedure for
prompt, equitable adjustment of claimed grievances. It is
understood and agreed that, unless otherwise specifically specified
elsewhere in this Agreement, grievances to be considered hereunder
must be filed within thirty days after the date on which the fact
or events upon which such alleged grievance is based shall have
existed or occurred."
"
* * * *"
"Any Employee who has a complaint may discuss the alleged
complaint with his Foreman in an attempt to settle it. Any
complaint not so settled shall constitute a grievance within the
meaning of this Section, 'Adjustment of Grievances'."
"Grievances shall be handled in the following manner:"
"STEP 1. Between the aggrieved Employee, his Grievance
Committeeman or Assistant Grievance Committeeman and the
Foreman."
The procedure calls for two more grievance committee steps
capped with binding arbitration of matters not satisfactorily
settled by the initial steps.
The language stating that an employee "may discuss" a complaint
with his foreman is susceptible to various interpretations; the
most likely is that an employee may, if he chooses, speak to his
foreman himself without bringing in his grievance committeeman and
formally embarking on Step 1. Use of the permissive "may" does not
of itself reveal a clear understanding between the contracting
Page 379 U. S. 659
parties that individual employees, unlike either the union or
the employer, are free to avoid the contract procedure and its time
limitations in favor of a judicial suit. Any doubts must be
resolved against such an interpretation.
See United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U. S. 574;
Belk v. Allied Aviation Service Co., 315 F.2d 513,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 847.
Finally, Maddox suggests that it was not possible for him to
make use of the grievance procedure, the first step of which called
for a discussion within 30 days of his discharge with his foreman,
because a mine that has permanently closed has no foreman --
indeed, no employees of any kind. This casuistic reading of the
contract cannot be accepted. The foreman did not vanish; and it is
unlikely that the union grievance procedure broke down within 30
days of Maddox' discharge. In any event, the case is before us on
stipulated facts; in neither the facts nor the pleadings is there
any suggestion that Maddox could not have availed himself of the
grievance procedure instead of waiting nearly three years and
bringing a court suit.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The section of the contract dealing with severance allowance
provided in relevant part:
"When, in the sole judgment of the Company, it decides to close
permanently a plant or discontinue permanently a department of a
mine or plant, or substantial portion thereof and terminate the
employment of individuals, an Employee whose employment is
terminated either directly as a result thereof because he was not
entitled to other employment with the Company under the provisions
of Section 9 of this Agreement -- Seniority and Subsection C of
this Section 14, shall be entitled to a severance allowance in
accordance with and subject to the provisions hereinafter set forth
in this Section 14."
[
Footnote 2]
See infra, p.
379 U. S.
658.
[
Footnote 3]
61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141
et
seq. (1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 4]
275 Ala. 685,
158 So. 2d
492.
[
Footnote 5]
48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. (1958
ed.).
[
Footnote 6]
See infra, p.
379 U. S.
657.
[
Footnote 7]
Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.
S. 195,
371 U. S. 196,
n. 1 (by implication);
Belk v. Allied Aviation Service
Co., 315 F.2d 513,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 847;
see Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv.L.Rev.
601, 647-648 (1956). The proviso of § 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958 ed.), is not
contra; Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 313 F.2d 179.
[
Footnote 8]
See, e.g., Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 362 (1962); Cox, Rights
Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 601 (1956); Note, Federal
Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 Yale L.J.
1215 (1964).
[
Footnote 9]
See infra, pp.
379 U. S. 657-658.
[
Footnote 10]
45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 11]
Mississippi law, which controlled in
Moore v. Illinois
Central R. Co., did not require exhaustion (
but see
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Bolton, 240 Miss. 195, 126 So. 2d
524 (1961)). Missouri law controlled in
Koppal, and did
require exhaustion. The suing employee therefore lost.
[
Footnote 12]
See n 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 13]
"Between" in the statute refers to "contracts," not "suits."
Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.
S. 195,
371 U. S.
200.
[
Footnote 14]
By refusing to extend
Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co.
to § 301 suits, we do not mean to overrule it within the field of
the Railway Labor Act. Consideration of such action should properly
await a case presented under the Railway Labor Act in which the
various distinctive features of the administrative remedies
provided by that Act can be appraised in context,
e.g.,
the makeup of the Adjustment Board, the scope of review from
monetary awards, and the ability of the Board to give the same
remedies as could be obtained by court suit.
[
Footnote 15]
Of course, a court suit on the collective bargaining agreement
would still be governed by federal law.
Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
This is an ordinary, common, run of the mill lawsuit for breach
of contract brought by respondent Charlie Maddox, an iron miner
employed by petitioner Republic Steel, to recover $694.08 of wages
which he said the company owed him. This amount he said was due by
the terms of a contract made between the company and the union
representing workers at the mine at which Maddox worked, a contract
which provided that if any employee should be discharged because
the company "permanently" closed the mine, he should continue to be
paid the amount of his regular wages for a number of weeks after
the discharge. The mine closed down, Maddox lost his job, but
Page 379 U. S. 660
the company nevertheless refused to continue to pay him the
wages he said it had obligated itself to pay under the contract. To
collect the money, he hired a lawyer and went to court. The trial
court in Alabama awarded him the $694.08 (the stipulated amount
due, if any) and the Supreme Court of the State affirmed. This
Court now reverses. It holds that, because the contract, agreed to
by the union, provided for binding arbitration of all "grievances,"
federal law has deprived Maddox of his right to hire his own lawyer
and to sue in a court of law for the balance of wages due,
[
Footnote 2/1] and has instead left
him with only the remedies set out in the contract: a long,
involved grievance procedure, controlled by the company and the
union, followed by compulsory arbitration, with his claim put in
the hands of union officials and union lawyers whether he wants
them to handle it or not.
In thus deciding on its own, or deciding that Congress somehow
has decided, to expand apparently without limit the kinds of claims
subject to compulsory arbitration, to include even wage claims, and
in thus depriving individual laborers of the right to handle their
wage claims for themselves, today's decision of the Court
interprets federal law in a way that is revolutionary. Yet the
Court disposes of this case as easily as it would reach the
conclusion that 2 plus 2 equal 4. First the Court says that the
contract between the union and the company provides that a laborer
who wants to assert a "contract grievance" is bound to attempt to
use the contract grievance procedure, which requires several stages
of company-union meetings, negotiations, etc., [
Footnote 2/2] to be followed
Page 379 U. S. 661
by submitting the dispute for final decision to an arbitrator
"appointed by mutual agreement" of the union and the company. Next,
the Court labels Maddox' claim
Page 379 U. S. 662
for wages due him a "grievance" -- and, indeed, no one would
deny that Maddox was unhappy about the company's failure to pay him
what it had promised. Finally the Court, citing as its authority §
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, [
Footnote 2/3] lays down for this and future cases
the flat rule that no matter what his contractual claim -- or
"grievance," as the Court prefers to call it -- an individual
laborer, even though no longer an employee, has no choice but to
follow the long, time-consuming, discouraging road to arbitration
set out in the union-company contract, including having the union
represent him whether he wants it to or not and whether or not he
is still in its good graces. And, of course, the Court's logic
leads irresistibly to the conclusion (although it has not yet had
occasion to say so) that if, instead of seeking wages due on
discharge, an employee wants to sue his employer for unpaid wages
while he is still working, he cannot do that either, but must
instead wait until the union processes his claim through the
interminable stages of "grievance procedure" and then turns him
over to the arbitrator, whom he does not want. Employees are thus
denied a judicial hearing, and state courts have their ancient
power to try simple breach of contract cases taken away from them
-- taken away not by Congress, I think, but by this Court. Today's
holding is, in my judgment, completely unprecedented, and is the
brain
Page 379 U. S. 663
child of this Court's recent consistently expressed preference
for arbitration over litigation in all types of cases [
Footnote 2/4] and for accommodating the
wishes of employers and unions in all things over the desires of
individual workers. Since I do not believe that Congress has passed
any law which justifies any inference at all that workers are
barred from bringing and courts from deciding cases like this one,
and since I am not sure that it constitutionally could, it is
impossible for me to concur in this decision.
I think one crucial flaw in the Court's logical presentation is
that it treats things as the same which are in fact different.
"Grievance" is a word of many meanings in many contexts, and yet
the Court uses it without any discrimination among them. As used in
the industrial field, "grievance" generally signifies something
that has happened that is unsatisfactory to employers or employees
in connection with their work. Failure to settle serious and
widespread grievances has sometimes brought about industrial
tensions, strikes and violence, often disrupting the peace and
doing irreparable harm to the economy of the Nation. In order to
try to prevent such widespread disastrous results to the public,
arbitration has come to be accepted as a good way to settle such
semi-public controversies, which are more in the nature of power
struggles between giants than ordinary justiciable controversies
involving individual laborers. [
Footnote 2/5] When a contract provided for arbitration
to settle disputes which affected many workers and which could lead
to strikes, this Court
Page 379 U. S. 664
approved it and held that, since both sides -- company and union
-- had agreed to this method of peaceful settlement, federal law
would honor and enforce it.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U. S. 448. But
to hold that the union and company can bind themselves to arbitrate
a dispute of general importance affecting all or many of the
union's members and vitally threatening the public welfare is a far
cry from saying, as the Court does today, that an ordinary laborer
whose employer discharges him and then fails to pay his past-due
wages or wage substitutes must, if the union's contract with the
employer provides for arbitration of grievances, have the doors of
the courts of his country shut in his face to prevent his suing the
employer to get his own wages for breach of contract.
Lincoln
Mills was a case involving a real and active collective
bargaining dispute between union and employer over general working
conditions; but the present case is a controversy not about general
working conditions, but about whether the company will pay one
individual his wages.
For the individual, whether his case is settled by a
professional arbitrator or tried by a jury can make a crucial
difference. Arbitration differs from judicial proceedings in many
ways: arbitration carries no right to a jury trial as guaranteed by
the Seventh Amendment; arbitrators need not be instructed in the
law; they are not bound by rules of evidence; they need not give
reasons for their awards; witnesses need not be sworn; the record
of proceedings need not be complete; and judicial review, it has
been held, is extremely limited. [
Footnote 2/6] To say that, because the union chose a
contract providing for grievance arbitration, an individual
employee freely and willingly chose this
Page 379 U. S. 665
method of settling any contractual claims of his own which might
later arise is surely a transparent and cruel fiction. And even if
the employee could with any truth be regarded as having himself
agreed to such a thing, until recently, this Court refused to
recognize and enforce contracts under which individuals were to be
denied access to courts, and instead left to the comparatively
standardless process of arbitration. An insurance company cannot
enforce a contract made with its insured to arbitrate all disputes
which might arise in the future, this Court said, since such an
agreement would be "an attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction
by excluding the assured from all resort to them for his remedy."
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 7 Wall. 386,
74 U. S. 391.
Cf. 87 U. S. v.
Morse, 20 Wall. 445. The Court holds today, however, that a
union representing a worker in a mine or factory can by the union's
contract take away from that worker his right to sue, which he
would not be able to contract away himself unless the
Riddlesbarger case is to be overruled.
Compare Moseley
v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.
S. 167,
374 U. S.
172-173 (concurring opinion). And there is nothing in
the legislative history of § 301 which indicates any congressional
purpose to overrule or avoid the
Riddlesbarger rule.
Moreover, there is not one word in § 301 about agreements to
arbitrate. It is true that this Court said in
Lincoln
Mills, "Plainly, the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes
is the
quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike,"
and
"the entire tenor of the history indicates that the agreement to
arbitrate grievance disputes was considered as
quid pro
quo of a no-strike agreement. [
Footnote 2/7]"
In that case, however, the Court expressly recognized that its
decision and reasoning did "not reach" the right of individual
employees to bring suit in court on their individual claims.
[
Footnote 2/8] Forcing Charlie
Page 379 U. S. 666
Maddox, who is out of a job, to submit his claim to arbitration
is not going to promote industrial peace. Charlie Maddox is not
threatening to go out in the street by himself and stage a strike
against the Republic Steel Corporation to get his unpaid wages.
Merely because this Court, in
Lincoln Mills, has expressed
its preference for arbitration when used to avoid industrial
warfare by heading off violent clashes between powerful employers
and powerful unions, [
Footnote 2/9]
it does not follow that § 301 should be expanded to require a
worker to arbitrate his wage claim or to surrender his right to
bring his own suit to enforce that claim in court. Such an
expansion would run counter to this Court's long established policy
of preserving the ancient, treasured right to judicial trials in
independent courts according to due process of law.
The past decisions of this Court which are closest to the case
before us are not
Lincoln Mills and cases like it, which
involved broad conflicts between unions and employers with
reference to contractual terms vital to settlement of genuine
employer-union disputes. The cases really in point are those which
involved agreements governed by the Railway Labor Act, [
Footnote 2/10] and which expressly
refused to hold that a discharged worker must pursue collective
bargaining grievance procedures before suing in a court for
wrongful discharge.
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v.
Koppal, 345 U. S. 653;
Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.
S. 630. While those were wrongful discharge cases and
the suit here is for wages due on a contract after discharge, the
principle of those cases is precisely applicable here, since, as
was pointed out
Page 379 U. S. 667
in
Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.
S. 239, 244, the claim of a person no longer employed
will almost never involve questions substantially affecting future
relations between an employer and the remaining employees. The
Court recognizes the relevance of
Moore and
Koppal and, while declining expressly to overrule them in
this case, has raised the overruling axe so high that its falling
is just about as certain as the changing of the seasons. Yet,
although members of Congress and alert counsel for the national
unions and employers and bound to have been familiar with
Moore at the time the comprehensive labor statute of which
§ 301 is a part was enacted, Congress did not see fit to disown the
Moore rule, and did not express a preference for a
different policy with reference to individual suits on collective
bargaining agreements covered by the LMRA.
The Court's opinion manifests great concern for the interests of
employers and unions, but not, I fear, enough understanding and
appreciation for an individual worker caught in the plight Maddox
is in. The Court refers with seeming approval to the "
common
law' of the plant," and directs attention to the clear interest
that the union has in handling employees' grievances in order to
"enhance the union's prestige with employees." It also refers to
the great interest that an employer has (and I agree) in having a
complicated procedural system which dissatisfied employees are here
compelled to follow, which ends up in binding arbitration and which
relieves the employer of a lawsuit. The Court then expresses its
view that allowing this former employee to sue without going
through the grievance procedure and arbitration, as he would be
permitted to do in this case by the law of his State, [Footnote 2/11] has
Page 379 U. S.
668
"little to commend it," and "would deprive employer and
union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method
for orderly settlement of employee grievances." I emphasize the
words "employer" and "union" to point out that here, as elsewhere
in the opinion, theirs seem to be the chief interests on which the
Court's attention is focused. The procedure they (employer and
union) want must be "made exclusive," or else they might not like
it. [Footnote 2/12] Individual
workers are to take some comfort, I suppose, in the Court's
statement that
"it cannot be said, in the normal situation, that contract
grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an
aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted to implement
the procedures and found them so."
I think it can be said, however, and I say it. I think an
employee is just as capable of trying to enforce payment of his
wages or wage substitutes under a collective bargaining agreement
as his union, and he certainly is more interested in this effort
than any union would likely be. This is particularly true where the
employee has lost his job and is most likely outside the union door
looking in, instead of on hand to push for his claim. Examples
certainly have not been wanting from which the Court might learn
that often employees, for one reason or another, have felt
themselves compelled to sue the union as a prerequisite to
obtaining any help from the union at all.
See, e.g., Humphrey
v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335;
Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 350 U.S. 892;
Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.
S. 768;
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210;
Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.
S. 192. But, says the Court, the employee attempting to
recover wages owed him must, unless the collective bargaining
Page 379 U. S. 669
contract of the company and the union provides otherwise,
"afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf." The Court
then implies that, if the union "refuses to press or only
perfunctorily presses the individual's claim," there may be some
form of redress available to the worker, but we are left in the
dark as to what form that redress might take. It may be that the
worker would be allowed to sue after he had presented his claim to
the union and after he had suffered the inevitable discouragement
and delay which necessarily accompanies the union's refusal to
press his claim. But I cannot agree that this is the sort of remedy
a worker should have to invoke to bring a simple lawsuit.
I am wholly unable to read § 301 as laying any such restrictive
burdens on an employee. And I think the difference between my
Brethren and me in this case is not simply one concerning this
Court's function in interpreting or formulating laws. There is
also, apparently, a vast difference between their philosophy and
mine concerning litigation and the role of courts in our country.
At least since Magna Carta, people have desired to have a system of
courts with set rules of procedure of their own and with certain
institutional assurances of fair and unbiased resolution of
controversies. It was in Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights,
and other such charters of liberty that there originally was
expressed in the English-speaking world a deep desire of people to
be able to settle differences according to standard, well known
procedures in courts presided over by independent judges with
jurors taken from the public. Because of these deep-seated desires,
the right to sue and be sued in courts according to the "law of the
land," known later as "due process of law," became recognized. That
right was written into the Bill of Rights of our Constitution and
in the constitutions of the States.
See Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U. S. 227,
309 U. S.
235-238. Even if it be true, which I do not concede,
Page 379 U. S. 670
that Congress could force a man in this country to have his
ordinary lawsuit adjudicated not under due process of law,
i.e., without the constitutional safeguards of a court
trial, I do not think that this Court should ever feel free to
infer or imply that Congress has taken such a step until the words
of the statute are written so clearly that no one who reads them
can doubt.
Cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U. S. 11;
United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303;
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304;
Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1,
354 U. S. 5-10
(opinion announcing judgment);
Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U. S. 442,
347 U. S. 456
(dissenting opinion);
Stein v. New York, 346 U.
S. 156,
346 U. S. 197
(dissenting opinion);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U. S. 206,
345 U. S. 216
(dissenting opinion);
Galloway v. United States,
319 U. S. 372,
319 U. S. 396
(dissenting opinion). Maddox has a justiciable controversy. He has
not agreed since the controversy arose, or even, for that matter,
before it arose, to arbitrate it, and so he should not have the
doors of the courts shut in his face. Nor do I believe that he or
any other member of the union should be treated as an incompetent
unable to pursue his own simple breach of contract losses. I cannot
and do not believe any law Congress has passed provides that, when
a man becomes a member of a labor union in this country, he thereby
has somehow surrendered his own freedom and liberty to conduct his
own lawsuit for wages. Of course, this is not the worst kind of
servitude to which a man could be subjected, but it is certainly
contrary to the spirit of freedom in this country to infer from the
blue that workers lose their rights to appeal to the courts for
redress when they believe they are mistreated.
Compare Smith v.
Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195,
371 U. S.
204-205 (dissenting opinion).
I would affirm.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Although the Court calls this "severance pay," it can be seen
that the claim was simply one for wages which were to continue for
a stated period after discharge.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The grievance procedure set out in the contract was as
follows:
"Any Employee who has a complaint may discuss the alleged
complaint with his Foreman in an attempt to settle it. Any
complaint not so settled shall constitute a grievance within the
meaning of this Section, 'Adjustment of Grievances.'"
"Grievances shall be handled in the following manner:"
"STEP 1. Between the aggrieved Employee, his Grievance
Committeeman or Assistant Grievance Committeeman and the
Foreman."
"STEP 2. Between the Employee, his Grievance Committeeman or
Assistant Grievance Committeeman and the Superintendent or his
representative."
"STEP 3. Between the Grievance Committee, a representative of
the International Union, the Superintendent of Industrial
Relations, the Superintendent, and such Company representatives as
he may select. Accurate minutes of this meeting shall be prepared
by the Company not later than five days after the date of the
meeting and shall be signed by representatives of the Union and the
Company."
"Grievances not appealed from the decision rendered in writing
in any of the three steps specified herein, within ten days from
the date of such decision, shall be considered settled on the basis
of the decision last made and shall not be eligible for further
appeal."
"If any grievance is not answered within the time limits
hereinafter specified in this Section, unless an extension of time
has been mutually agreed upon, either party after notifying the
other party by notation on the grievance papers of such intent may
appeal to the next step."
"Grievances presented in the first step hereof shall be reduced
to writing on forms provided by the Company, dated and signed by
the Employee involved and two copies given to the Foreman, the
Foreman will have inserted in the appropriate place on the form his
disposition of the matter and will sign and date same, returning
one copy to the Assistant Grievance Committeeman or Grievance
Committeeman."
"The following time shall be allowed the Company to give an
answer in each of the respective steps before the grievance may be
processed to the next step: Step 1, three days exclusive of Sundays
and Holidays; Step 2, seven days; Step 3, fifteen days."
"STEP 4. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
Agreement, grievances not satisfactorily settled in Step 3 may by
written notice within ten days from the date of the written
decision in Step 3, be appealed to an impartial Arbitrator to be
appointed by mutual agreement of the parties hereto within fifteen
days after either party has requested arbitration. The decision of
the Arbitrator shall be final."
[
Footnote 2/3]
61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958 ed.). Section 301(a) in
its entirety reads as follows:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
[
Footnote 2/4]
See, e.g., Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U. S. 95;
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise, Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U. S. 593;
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U. S. 574;
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.
S. 564.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Compare the distinction in cases under the Railway
Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151
et
seq. (1958 ed.) between "major" and "minor" disputes.
See,
e.g., Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R.
Co., 353 U. S. 30.
[
Footnote 2/6]
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.
S. 198,
350 U. S. 203;
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427,
346 U. S. 436.
But see Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co.,
324 F.2d 903 (C.A.7th Cir.),
affirmed by an equally divided
Court, 379 U. S. 130.
[
Footnote 2/7]
353 U.S. at
353 U. S.
455.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Id. at
353 U. S. 459,
n. 9.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Compare United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593;
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U. S. 574;
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.
S. 564.
[
Footnote 2/10]
44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. (1958
ed.). The Act of April 10, 1936, c. 166, makes the Railway Labor
Act applicable to aviation workers. 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 181
(1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 2/11]
Alabama law does not require exhaustion of grievance procedures
and arbitration in a case like this one.
Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox, 275 Ala. 685,
158 So. 2d
492;
Woodward Iron Co. v. Stringfellow, 271 Ala. 596,
126 So. 2d
96.
[
Footnote 2/12]
The AFL-CIO has filed an
amicus brief supporting the
employer in this case.