A resident of the District of Columbia was employed by a
District of Columbia employer, had previously worked in the
District for six years, and was subject to assignment to work
there, but had been working for over three years at Quantico,
Virginia, and commuting daily between there and his home in the
District, where his wife also resided. An agreement between the
employer and the employee's union bound the employer to furnish
"transportation . . . for all work outside the District of
Columbia." A fixed sum per day was agreed upon as transportation
expense to Quantico and was added to the employee's pay.
Transportation actually was provided daily by cooperation of
employees in a car pool, in which the employer acquiesced but over
which he exercised no control. The employee was injured fatally in
Virginia while driving his car home from work.
1. A claim by the widow for compensation for the death of the
employee was within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner
under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act. Pp.
330 U. S.
2. As here applied, the District of Columbia Act satisfies any
constitutional requirements of due process or full faith and
credit. P. 330 U. S.
3. Upon the particular facts of this case, the Deputy
Commissioner's finding that the death of the employee "arose out of
and in the course of employment" was supported by evidence and not
inconsistent with the law; it was therefore conclusive, and the
compensation award must be sustained. Pp. 330 U. S.
(a) The Deputy Commissioner's conclusion in this case that the
employer had agreed to furnish transportation to and from work, and
had paid the expense of transportation in lieu of actually
supplying the transportation itself, and that the case therefore
was within a recognized exception to the general rule that injuries
received by an employee while traveling between home and work
Page 330 U. S. 470
not "arise out of and in the course of employment," was not
erroneous as a matter of law. Pp. 330 U. S.
(b) In determining whether an injury suffered by an employee
while traveling between home and work is one "arising out of and in
the course of employment," the existence or absence of control by
the employer over the acts and movements of the employee during the
transportation is a factor to be considered, but is not decisive.
Pp. 330 U. S.
81 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 154 F.2d 529, reversed.
An employer and its insurance carrier brought suit to set aside
an order of the Deputy Commissioner awarding compensation to a
claimant under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act.
The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals
reversed. 81 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 154 F.2d 529. This Court granted
certiorari. 329 U.S. 698. Reversed,
p. 330 U. S. 485
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees'
Compensation Commission, issued an order under the District of
Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act [Footnote 1
] awarding compensation to the widow of one
Clarence H. Ticer. It was specifically found that the injury which
led to Ticer's death "arose out of and in the course of the
employment." The propriety and effect
Page 330 U. S. 471
of that finding are the main focal points of our inquiry in this
Section 1 of the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act
provides in part that
"The provisions of the Act entitled 'Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act' . . . shall apply in respect to the
injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any
employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place
where the injury or death occurs."
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
] § 2(2), in turn,
defines the term "injury" to include "accidental injury or death
arising out of and in the course of employment. . . ." A finding
that the injury or death was one "arising out of and in the course
of employment" is therefore essential to an award of compensation
under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act.
In support of his order in this case, the Deputy Commissioner
made various findings of fact. These may be summarized as
Ticer and his wife were residents of the District of Columbia.
He had been regularly employed since about 1934 [Footnote 3
] as an electrician by E. C. Ernst,
Inc., a contractor engaged in electrical construction work in the
District of Columbia and surrounding areas. In November, 1940,
Ticer was transferred by his employer from a project in the
District of Columbia to a project at the Quantico Marine Base at
Quantico, Virginia. His work at the Marine Base continued for over
three years, until the time of his injury in December, 1943.
There was in effect at all times an agreement between the
electrical workers' union and the employer. Section 15(b) of this
agreement provided that
Page 330 U. S. 472
and any necessary expense such as board and lodging shall be
furnished [by the employer] for all work outside the District of
The sum of $2 a day was fixed by the parties to this agreement
as transportation expense, and represented the approximate cost of
travel from the District of Columbia to the Quantico Marine Base
and return. This sum was paid to Ticer and others in addition to
the regular hourly rate of pay. And it was paid in lieu of the
employer's furnishing transportation.
Because the job site at the Marine Base was several miles away
from the Quantico bus or train terminal, it was necessary for Ticer
and his coworkers to drive their own automobiles to and from work.
The employees formed a car pool. Each morning, they started from
their respective homes in their own automobiles and drove to a
designated meeting place at Roaches Run, Virginia. From that point,
they would proceed in one car to the job site at the Marine Base.
This procedure was repeated in reverse in the evening. The workers
alternated in the use of the cars between Roaches Run and the job
site. Nonmembers of the car pool each paid the car owner $1 for the
The employer was aware of the means of transportation being
used, and acquiesced therein. On December 13, 1943, Ticer was
driving his car on a direct route from his place of employment to
his home, following the close of the day's work. Four coworkers
were riding with him, two of them being nonmembers of the car pool.
As the car approached Fort Belvoir, Virginia, a large stone, which
came from under the rear wheel of a passing truck, crashed through
the windshield of the car. It struck Ticer's head, crushing his
skull. Death resulted four days later.
Ticer's widow presented a claim for compensation. At the hearing
before the Deputy Commissioner, the employer and the insurance
carrier contended that the Virginia Compensation Commission had
sole jurisdiction over
Page 330 U. S. 473
the claim, and that Ticer's injury did not arise out of or in
the course of his employment. The Deputy Commissioner ruled against
these contentions. After making the foregoing findings, he entered
an order awarding death benefits and funeral expenses to the
The employer and the insurance carrier then brought this action
in the District Court to set aside the order of the Deputy
Commissioner. They renewed their jurisdictional objection and
alleged a lack of substantial evidence to support the finding that
Ticer's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Deputy
Commissioner's findings were supported by evidence in the record,
and that the compensation order was in all respects in accordance
with law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed, one justice dissenting. 154 F.2d 529. Without
passing upon the jurisdictional issue, the court held that Ticer's
injury had not arisen out of and in the course of his employment.
It felt that Ticer had become entirely free of his employer's
control at the close of the day's work at the Marine Base, and that
he had thereafter assumed his own risk in subjecting himself to the
hazards of the highway. We granted certiorari on a petition
alleging a conflict with the decision of this Court in Voehl v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U. S. 162
As noted, the Court of Appeals deemed it unnecessary to dispose
of the question whether the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction
over the instant claim. But, in reviewing an administrative order,
it is ordinarily preferable, where the issue is raised and where
the record permits an adjudication, for a federal court first to
satisfy itself that the administrative agency or officer had
jurisdiction over the matter in dispute. At the same time, however,
it is needless to remand this case to the Court of Appeals for a
determination of the jurisdictional
Page 330 U. S. 474
issue. That issue was considered and determined by the Deputy
Commissioner, who was, in turn, sustained by the District Court.
The facts pertinent to that issue are not seriously disputed, and
the matter has been fully briefed and argued before us. A remand
under such circumstances is not warranted. We accordingly turn to a
consideration of the jurisdictional issue.
We are aided here, of course, by the provision of § 20 of the
Longshoremen's Act that, in proceedings under that Act,
jurisdiction is to be "presumed, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary" -- a provision which applies with equal
force to proceedings under the District of Columbia Act. And the
Deputy Commissioner's findings as to jurisdiction are entitled to
great weight, and will be rejected only where there is apparent
error. Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries,
317 U. S. 249
317 U. S.
-257. His conclusion that jurisdiction exists in this
case is supported both by the statutory provisions and by the
evidence in the record.
The jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner to consider the
claim in this case rests upon the statement in the District of
Columbia Act that it
"shall apply in respect to the injury or death of an employee of
an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia,
irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs, except
that, in applying such provisions, the term 'employer' shall be
held to mean every person carrying on any employment in the
District of Columbia, and the term 'employee' shall be held to mean
every employee of any such person."
There is no question here but that Ticer was employed by a
District of Columbia employer; the latter had its place of business
in the District, and engaged in construction work in the District,
as well as in surrounding areas. But the contention is made that,
despite the broad sweep of the statutory language, the
Page 330 U. S. 475
Act applies only where the employee, during the whole of his
employment, spent more time working within the District than be
spent working outside the District. Using that criterion, it is
said that the Act is inapplicable to this case, since Ticer was
employed on a construction job in Virginia continuously for over
three years prior to the accident, and did nothing within the
District for his employer during that period. The implication is
that only the Virginia workmen's compensation law is
But the record indicates that both Ticer and his wife were
residents of the District. He had been hired in the District by his
employer in 1934, and had worked on various projects in and around
the District from that time until 1940, when he was assigned to the
Quantico Marine Base project. While at the Marine Base, he was
under orders from the District, and was subject to being
transferred at anytime to a project in the District. His pay was
either carried to him from the District or was given to him
directly in the District. And he commuted daily between his home in
the District and the Marine Base project.
We hold that the jurisdictional objection is without merit in
light of these facts. Nothing in the history, the purpose or the
language of the Act warrants any limitation which would preclude
its application to this case. The Act, in so many words, applies to
every employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the
District of Columbia, "irrespective of the place where the injury
or death occurs." Those words leave no possible room for reading in
an implied exception excluding those employees, like Ticer, who
have substantial business and personal connections in the District
and who are injured outside the District. Whether this language
covers employees who are more remotely related to the District
Page 330 U. S. 476
is a matter which we need not now discuss, and any arguments
based upon such hypothetical situations are without weight in this
Nor does any statutory policy suggest itself to justify the
proposed exception. A prime purpose of the Act is to provide
residents of the District of Columbia with a practical and
expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and to place on
District of Columbia employers a limited and determinate liability.
See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.
, 286 U. S. 159
The District is relatively quite small in area; many employers
carrying on business in the District assign some employees to do
work outside the geographical boundaries, especially in nearby
Virginia and Maryland areas. When such employees reside in the
District and are injured while performing those outside
assignments, they come within the intent and design of the statute
to the same extent as those whose work and injuries occur solely
within the District. In other words, the District's legitimate
interest in providing adequate workmen's compensation measures for
its residents does not turn on the fortuitous circumstance of the
place of their work or injury. Nor does it vary with the amount or
percentage of work performed within the District. Rather, it
depends upon some substantial connection between the District and
the particular employee employer relationship, a connection which
is present in this case. Such has been the essence of prior
holdings of the Court of Appeals. B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
78 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 139 F.2d 362; Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Cardillo,
78 U.S.App.D.C. 392, 141 F.2d 362;
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo,
78 U.S.App.D.C. 394, 141
F.2d 364. And, as so applied, the statute fully satisfies any
constitutional questions of due process or full faith and credit.
Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
294 U. S. 532
Cf. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, supra.
Page 330 U. S. 477
Hence, we conclude that the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction
under the District of Columbia Act to entertain a claim by the
widow of an employee who had been a resident of the District, who
had been employed by a District employer, and who had been subject
to work assignments in the District. We accordingly turn to a
consideration of the propriety and effect of the Deputy
Commissioner's finding that Ticer's injury arose out of and in the
course of his employment.
Our approach to that problem grows out of the provisions of the
Longshoremen's Act, as made applicable by the District of Columbia
Act. Section 19(a) of the Longshoremen's Act provides for the
filing of a "claim for compensation," and specifies that "the
deputy commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and
determine all questions in respect of such claim." Thus, questions
as to whether an injury arose out of and in the course of
employment necessarily fall within the scope of the Deputy
Commissioner's authority. Section 21(b) then provides that
compensation orders may be suspended or set aside through
injunction proceedings instituted in the federal district courts
"if not in accordance with law."
In determining whether a particular injury arose out of and in
the course of employment, the Deputy Commissioner must necessarily
draw an inference from what he has found to be the basic facts. The
propriety of that inference, of course, is vital to the validity of
the order subsequently entered. But the scope of judicial review of
that inference is sharply limited by the foregoing statutory
provisions. If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the
law, the Deputy Commissioner's inference that an injury did or did
not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive. No
reviewing court can then set aside that inference because the
opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor can the
Page 330 U. S. 478
inference be substituted by the court because of a belief that
the one chosen by the Deputy Commissioner is factually
questionable. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra,
288 U. S. 166
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U. S. 280
296 U. S. 287
South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.
, 309 U. S.
-258; Parker v. Motor Boat Sales,
314 U. S. 244
314 U. S. 246
Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries, supra,
317 U. S.
It matters not that the basic facts from which the Deputy
Commissioner draws this inference are undisputed, rather than
controverted. See Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.
, 326 U. S. 293
It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of
diverse inferences. The Deputy Commissioner alone is charged with
the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most
reasonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be
disturbed by a reviewing court. Del Vecchio v. Bowers,
supra, 296 U. S. 287
Moreover, the fact that the inference of the type here made by the
Deputy Commissioner involves an application of a broad statutory
term or phrase to a specific set of facts gives rise to no greater
scope of judicial review. Labor Board v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U. S. 111
322 U. S. 131
Commissioner v. Scottish American Inv. Co., 323 U.
, 323 U. S. 124
Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Aragan,
329 U. S. 143
329 U. S. 153
Even if such an inference be considered more legal than factual in
nature, the reviewing court's function is exhausted when it becomes
evident that the Deputy Commissioner's choice has substantial roots
in the evidence, and is not forbidden by the law. Such is the
result of the statutory provision permitting the suspension or
setting aside of compensation orders only "if not in accordance
Our attention must therefore be cast upon the inference drawn by
the Deputy Commissioner in this case that Ticer's injury and death
did arise out of and in the course
Page 330 U. S. 479
of his employment. If there is factual and legal support for
that conclusion, our task is at an end.
A reasonable legal basis for the Deputy Commissioner's action in
this respect is clear. The statutory phrase "arising out of and in
the course of employment," which appears in most workmen's
compensation laws, is deceptively simple and litigiously prolific.
] As applied to
injuries received by employees while traveling between their homes
and their regular places of work, however, this phrase has
generally been construed to preclude compensation. Voehl v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 288 U. S. 169
Such injuries are said not to arise out of and in the course of
employment; rather, they arise out of the ordinary hazards of the
journey -- hazards which are faced by all travelers and which are
unrelated to the employer's business. But certain exceptions to
this general rule have come to be recognized. These exceptions
relate to situations where the hazards of the journey may fairly be
regarded as the hazards of the service. They are thus dependent
upon the nature and circumstances of the particular employment, and
necessitate a careful evaluation of the employment terms.
Page 330 U. S. 480
Under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act, at
least four exceptions have been recognized by the Court of Appeals:
(1) where the employment requires the employee to travel on the
highways; (2) where the employer contracts to and does furnish
transportation to and from work; (3) where the employee is subject
to emergency calls, as in the case of firemen; (4) where the
employee uses the highway to do something incidental to his
employment, with the knowledge and approval of the employer.
Ward v. Cardillo,
77 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 135 F.2d 260, 262.
See also Lake v. City of Bridgeport,
102 Conn. 337, 128 A.
782. In performing his function of deciding whether an injury,
incurred while traveling, arose out of and in the course of
employment, the Deputy Commissioner must determine the
applicability of these exceptions to the general rule. Here, he
decided that the second exception was applicable -- that Ticer's
employer had contracted to furnish transportation to and from work
and had paid the expense of transportation in lieu of actually
supplying the transportation itself. We cannot say that he was
wrong as a matter of law.
There are no rigid legal principles to guide the Deputy
Commissioner in determining whether the employer contracted to and
did furnish transportation to and from work. "No exact formula can
be laid down which will automatically solve every case." Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418
263 U. S. 424
Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 288 U. S. 169
Each employment relationship must be perused to discover whether
the employer, by express agreement or by a course of dealing,
contracted to and did furnish this type of transportation. For that
reason, it was error for the Court of Appeals in this case to
emphasize that the employer must have control over the acts and
movements of the employee during the transportation before it can
be said that an injury arose out of and in the course of
employment. The presence or
Page 330 U. S. 481
absence of control is certainly a factor to be considered. But
it is not decisive. An employer may in fact furnish transportation
for his employees without actually controlling them during the
course of the journey or at the time and place where the injury
occurs. Ward v. Cardillo, supra.
And, in situations where
the journey is in other respects incidental to the employment, the
absence of control by the employer has not been held to preclude a
finding that an injury arose out of and in the course of
employment. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra; Voehl
v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra.
Indeed, to import all the common law concepts of control and to
erect them as the sole or prime guide for the Deputy Commissioner
in cases of this nature would be to encumber his duties with all
the technicalities and unrealities which have marked the use of
those concepts in other fields. See Labor Board v. Hearst
Publications, supra, 322 U. S.
-121, 322 U. S. 125
Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U.
, 328 U. S.
-725. That we refuse to do.
"The modern development and growth of industry, with the
consequent changes in the relations of employer and employee, have
been so profound in character and degree as to take away, in large
measure, the applicability of the doctrines upon which rest the
common law liability of the master for personal injuries to a
servant, leaving of necessity a field of debatable ground where a
good deal must be conceded in favor of forms of legislation,
calculated to establish new bases of liability more in harmony with
these changed conditions."
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra, 263 U. S.
Nor is there any other formal principle of law which would
invalidate the choice made by the Deputy Commissioner
Page 330 U. S. 482
in this instance. The fact that Ticer was not being paid wages
at the time of the accident is clearly immaterial. Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra.
] And it is without statutory consequence that
the employer here carried out his contract obligation to furnish
actual transportation by paying the travel costs and allowing the
employees like Ticer to make the journey by whatever means they saw
fit. To be sure, there are many holdings to the effect that, where
the employer merely pays the costs of transportation, an injury
occurring during the journey does not arise out of and in the
course of employment; there must be something more than mere
payment of transportation costs. [Footnote 7
] But assuming those holdings to be correct, and
assuming the Deputy Commissioner's findings in this case to be
justified, there is more here than mere payment of transportation
costs. It was found that Ticer's employer paid the costs as a means
of carrying out its contract obligation to furnish the
transportation itself. Where there is that obligation, it becomes
irrelevant in this setting whether the employer
Page 330 U. S. 483
performs the obligation by supplying its own vehicle, hiring the
vehicle of an independent contractor, making arrangements with a
common carrier, reimbursing employees for the use of their own
vehicles, or reimbursing employees for the costs of transportation
by any means they desire to use. In other words, where the employer
has promised to provide transportation to and from work, the
compensability of the injury is in no way dependent upon the method
of travel which is employed. [Footnote 8
] From the statutory standpoint, the employer is
free to carry out its transportation obligation in any way the
parties desire, and the rights of the employees to compensation are
unaffected by the choice made.
Turning to the factual support for the Deputy Commissioner's
inference that Ticer's injury arose out of and in the course of
employment, we find ample sustaining evidence. Ticer's employment
was governed by the terms of a longstanding agreement between Local
Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (of
which Ticer was a member) and the Institute of Electrical
Contractors of the District of Columbia, Inc. (of which the
employer was a member). Rule 15(b) of the agreement provided that
"[t]ransportation and any necessary expense such as board and
lodging shall be furnished for all work outside the District of
The employer carried out in different ways this obligation to
furnish transportation. On certain construction jobs in the past,
it actually furnished a station wagon or a
Page 330 U. S. 484
passenger car of its own to transport the employees. At other
times, however, it paid the employees an allowance to cover the
cost of transportation in lieu of furnishing an automobile. Where
the latter course was followed, the written contract was not
amended or changed in any way, the employer simply communicating
with the union to ascertain the amount necessary to defray the cost
of transportation. The amount agreed upon affected all contractors
in the Institute, and the cost of transportation was determined
before the contractors made their respective bids.
On the Quantico Marine Base project, the sum of $2 per day was
agreed upon as the transportation allowance in lieu of furnishing
an automobile. This amount was fixed after investigation into the
cost of transportation by railroad, and was paid to each employee,
irrespective of his rate of pay, to cover the cost of
transportation to and from the Marine Base. No change was made in
the written contract.
There was also evidence that the distant location of the Marine
Base project, the hours of work, and the inadequacy of public
transportation facilities all combined to make it essential, as a
practical matter, that the employer furnish transportation in some
manner if employees were to be obtained for the job. This was not a
case of employees traveling in the same city between home and work.
Extended cross-country transportation was necessary. And it was
transportation of a type that an employer might fairly be expected
to furnish. Such evidence illustrates the setting in which the
contract was drawn.
The Court of Appeals felt, however, that the original contract
to furnish transportation was not followed, and that a new oral
contract to pay transportation expenses was substituted in its
place. We need not decide whether that view is justified by the
record. It is enough that there is sufficient evidence to support
the Deputy Commissioner's
Page 330 U. S. 485
view that the payment of transportation costs was merely one way
of carrying out the original contract obligation to furnish the
We therefore hold that, under the particular circumstances of
this case, the Deputy Commissioner was justified in concluding that
Ticer's injury and death arose out of and in the course of his
employment. And since the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction over
this case, the resulting award of compensation should have been
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE BURTON dissent.
Act of May 17, 1928, 45 Stat. 600, D.C.Code, 1940, Title 36,
Chap. 5, § 1.
Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901
There was one exception. For a period of about 6 months in 1938
or 1939, he worked for the United States Government.
"The few and seemingly simple words 'arising out of and in the
course of the employment' have been the fruitful (or fruitless)
source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and
supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the
reader in a maze of confusion. From their number, counsel can, in
most cases, cite what seems to be an authority for resolving in his
favour, on whichever side he may be, the question in dispute."
Lord Wrenbury in Herbert v. Fox & Co.
 1 A.C.
405, 419. See also
Dodd, Administration of Workmen's
Compensation (1936), pp. 680-687; Horovitz, "Modern Trends in
Workmen's Compensation," 21 Ind.L.J. 473, 497-564; Horovitz, Injury
and Death Under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 93-173;
Brown, "Arising out of and in the course of the employment' in
Workmen's Compensation Laws," 7 Wis.L.Rev. 15, 67, 8 Wis.L.Rev.
See also Gagnebin v. Industrial Accident Commission,
140 Cal. App. 80, 34 P.2d 1052; Keely v. Metropolitan Edison
157 Pa.Super. 63, 41 A.2d 420; McKinney v.
48 N.M. 149, 146 P.2d 867; Exelbert v. Klein &
243 App.Div. 839, 278 N.Y.S. 377.
"Nor is it ['in the course of employment'] limited to the time
for which wages are paid. Indeed, the fact that the workman is paid
wages for the time when the accident occurs is of little, if any,
Bohlen, "A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation
Acts." 25 Harv.L.Rev. 328, 401, 402. Turner Day & Woolworth
Handle Co. v. Pennington,
250 Ky. 433, 63 S.W.2d 490.
Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois v. Industrial
370 Ill. 334, 18 N.E.2d 914; Guenesa v. Ralph
v. Rulon, Inc.,
124 Pa.Super. 569, 189 A. 524; Republic
Underwriters v. Terrell,
126 S.W.2d 752; Orsinie v.
96 Conn. 352, 113 A. 924; Kowalek v. New York
Consolidated R. Co.,
229 N.Y. 489, 128 N.E. 888; Tallon v.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co.,
232 N.Y. 410, 134 N.E. 327;
Keller v. Reis & Donovan, Inc.,
195 App.Div. 45, 185
N.Y.S. 741; Levehuk v. Krug Cement Products Co.,
589, 225 N.W. 559. See
annotations in 20 A.L.R. 319, 49
A.L.R. 454, 63 A.L.R. 469, 87 A.L.R. 250, 100 A.L.R. 1053. Cf.
Netherton v. Coles,
1 All E.R. 227.
See In re Donovan,
217 Mass. 76, 104 N.E. 431;
Breland v. Traylor Engineering & Mfg.
Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d
, 126 P.2d 455; Lehigh Nav. Coal Co. v. McGonnell,
120 N.J.L. 428, 199 A. 906; Burchfield v. Department of Labor
165 Wash. 106, 4 P.2d 858; Swanson v.
Latham & Crane,
92 Conn. 87, 101 A. 492; Cary v. State
147 Okl. 162, 296 P. 385; Williams
v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.,
19 So. 2d 586;
Turner Day & Woolworth Handle Co. v. Pennington,
Ky. 433, 63 S.W.2d 490.