1. Section 4 of a statute of Florida (Laws of 1943, c. 21968)
provides that no person shall be licensed as a "business agent" of
a labor union who has not been a citizen of the United States for
more than 10 years, who has been convicted of a felony, or who is
not a person of good moral character. Section 6 requires every
labor union operating in the State to file an annual report
disclosing its name, the location of its principal offices, and the
names and addresses of its officers, and to pay an annual fee of
$1.00 therefor. Violation of the statute by any person or labor
organization is made a misdemeanor punishable by fine and
imprisonment. A state court enjoined the petitioner labor union
from further functioning and operating, and enjoined its business
agent from further acting in that capacity until they shall have
complied with the statute.
Held: that §§ 4 and 6 of the Florida statute, as so
applied, are invalid as in conflict with the National Labor
Relations Act. P.
325 U. S.
541.
2. As here applied, § 4 of the Florida statute circumscribes the
"full freedom" of choice of collective bargaining agents which is
secured to employees by the National Labor Relations Act. P.
325 U. S.
541.
3. The requirement of reports and the exaction of a $1.00 annual
fee in § 6 does not, in and of itself, conflict with the National
Labor Relations Act; it is the sanction here imposed -- injunction
against the labor union functioning as such -- which is
inconsistent with the federally protected process of collective
bargaining. P.
325 U. S.
543.
155 Fla. 254, 19 So. 2d 857, reversed.
Certiorari, 324 U.S. 832, to review the affirmance of a decree
granting injunctions against a labor union and its business agent
until they shall have complied with the requirements of a state
statute the validity of which they challenged.
Page 325 U. S. 539
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The only question we find it necessary to decide in this case is
whether a Florida statute [
Footnote
1] regulating labor union activities has been applied to these
petitioners in a manner which brings it into irreconcilable
conflict with the collective bargaining regulations of the National
Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449. That Federal Act, we decided in
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.
S. 740, did not wholly foreclose state power to regulate
labor union activities. Certain conduct, such as mass picketing,
threats, violence, and related actions, we held were not governed
by the Wagner Act, and, hence, Wisconsin was free to regulate them.
We carefully pointed out, however, that, had the state order under
consideration, "affected the status of the employees, or . . .
caused a forfeiture of collective bargaining rights, a distinctly
different question would arise." That question, which we so
distinctly reserved in the
Wisconsin case, has now arisen
in this case.
The Attorney General of Florida filed a bill for injunction
against the petitioner union and its business agent, Hill, in a
state court. He sought to restrain both of them
Page 325 U. S. 540
from functioning as such until they had complied with the
Florida statute. The basis for the relief sought against Hill was
that he had, for a pecuniary reward, acted as a business agent in
violation of § 4; the basis for the relief sought against the union
was that it had operated without obtaining a state license, as
required by § 6. § 4, which was invoked against Hill, provides that
no on shall be licensed as a "business agent" of a labor union who
has not been a citizen of the United States for more than 10 years,
who has been convicted of a felony, or who is not a person of good
moral character. Application for a license as a "business agent"
must be accompanied by a $1.00 fee and a statement signed by
officers of the union setting forth the agent's authority. The
statute then provides that the application be held for 30 days to
permit the filing of objections to the issuance of a license. A
Board composed of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the
Superintendent of Education then passes on the application, and, if
it finds the applicant measures up to the standards of the act, as
it sees them, it authorizes the license to be issued, to "expire on
December 31 of the year for which issued, unless sooner
surrendered, suspended, or revoked." Section 2(2) defines "business
agent" as "any person . . . who shall, for a pecuniary or financial
consideration, act or attempt to act" for a union "in soliciting or
receiving from any employer any right or privilege for employees .
. . " or "in the issuance of membership, or authorization cards,
work permits, or any other evidence of rights granted or claimed
in, or by, a labor organization. . . ." Section 6, which the
Attorney General invoked against the union, requires every labor
union "operating" in the state to file a written report with the
Secretary of State, disclosing its name, the location of its
offices, and the names and addresses of its officers. Section 14
makes it a misdemeanor for "any person or labor organization" to
violate the statute.
Page 325 U. S. 541
Motions by Hill and the union to dismiss the bill on the ground
that the state statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
conflicted with the Wagner Act were denied. Answers were then filed
admitting violations of §§ 4 and 6. The court held the licensing
and reporting provisions valid. Hill was enjoined from further
acting as the union's business agent until he obtained a state
license. The union was enjoined from further functioning and
operating until it made the report and paid the fee to the
Secretary of State. The State Supreme Court affirmed. 19 So. 2d
857.
It is apparent that the Florida statute has been so construed
and applied that the union and its selected representative are
prohibited from functioning as collective bargaining agents, or in
any other capacity, except upon conditions fixed by Florida. The
declared purpose of the Wagner Act, as shown in its first section,
is to encourage collective bargaining, and to protect the "full
freedom" of workers in the selection of bargaining representatives
of their own choice. To this end, Congress made it illegal for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
selecting their representatives. Congress attached no conditions
whatsoever to their freedom of choice in this respect. Their own
best judgment, not that of someone else, was to be their guide.
"Full freedom" to choose an agent means freedom to pass upon that
agent's qualifications.
Section 4 of the Florida act circumscribes the "full freedom" of
choice which Congress said employees should possess. It does this
by requiring a "business agent" to prove to the satisfaction of a
Florida Board that he measures up to standards set by the Florida
as one who, among other things, performs the exact function of a
collective bargaining representative. To the extent that § 4 limits
a union's choice of such an "agent" or bargaining representative,
it substitutes Florida's judgment for the workers' judgment.
Page 325 U. S. 542
Thus, the "full freedom" of employees in collective bargaining
which Congress envisioned as essential to protect the free flow of
commerce among the states would be, by the Florida statute, shrunk
to a greatly limited freedom. No elaboration seems required to
demonstrate that Section 4, as applied here, "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52,
312 U. S. 67;
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.
S. 148;
Napier v. Atlantic, Coast Line R. Co.,
272 U. S. 605. It
is not amiss, however, to call attention to the fact that operation
of this very section has already interfered with the collective
bargaining process. An employer before the Labor Board defended its
refusal to bargain with a duly selected representative of workers
on the ground that the representative had not secured a Florida
license as a business agent.
In the Matter of Eppinger &
Russell Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1259. The Board properly rejected the
employer's contention, holding that Congress did not intend to
subject the "full freedom" of employees to the eroding process of
"varied and perhaps conflicting provisions of state enactments."
Cf. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.
S. 111.
Since the Labor Board has held that an employer must bargain
with a properly selected union agent despite his failure to secure
a Florida license, it is argued that the state law does not
interfere with the collective bargaining process. But here, this
agent has been enjoined, and, if the Florida law is valid, he could
be found guilty of a contempt for doing that which the act of
Congress permits him to do. Furthermore, he could, under § 14 of
the state law, be convicted of a misdemeanor and subjected to fine
and imprisonment. The collective bargaining which Congress has
authorized contemplates two parties free to bargain, and cannot
thus be frustrated by state legislation. We hold that § 4 of the
Florida Act is repugnant to the National Labor Relations Act.
Page 325 U. S. 543
Section 6, as here applied, stands no better. The requirement as
to the filing of information and the payment of a $1.00 annual fee
does not, in and of itself, conflict with the Federal Act. But, for
failure to comply, this union has been enjoined from functioning as
a labor union. It could not, without violating the injunction and
also subjecting itself to the possibility of criminal punishment,
even attempt to bargain to settle a controversy or a strike. It is
the sanction here imposed, and not the duty to report, which brings
about a situation inconsistent with the federally protected process
of collective bargaining.
Cf. Western Union Co. v.
Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530,
125 U. S.
553-554;
Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley
Drainage District, 233 U. S. 75,
233 U. S. 78;
St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.
S. 350,
235 U. S. 368.
This is true because, if the union or its representatives acted as
bargaining agents without making the required reports, presumably
they would be liable both to punishment for contempt of court and
to conviction under the misdemeanor section of the act. Such an
obstacle to collective bargaining cannot be created consistently
with the Federal Act.
Nor can it be argued that our decision in
Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U. S. 516,
forecloses such result. In that case, we did not have, as here, to
deal with such a direct impediment to the free exercise of the
federally established right to collective bargaining.
Our holding is that the National Labor Relations Act and §§ 4
and 6 of the Florida Act, as here applied, cannot "move freely
within the orbit of their respective purposes without infringing
upon one another."
Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen,
322 U. S. 202,
322 U. S. 207.
[
Footnote 2] Accordingly, the
case
Page 325 U. S. 544
is reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
House Bill No. 142, Laws of Florida 1943, Chap. 21968, p.
565.
[
Footnote 2]
The National Labor Relations Act applies only to activities
which affect interstate commerce.
Labor Board v. Jones &
Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 29-30.
The original bill for an injunction prayed that this union might be
restrained from functioning as a union in connection with employees
of the St. Johns River Shipbuilding Co. of Jacksonville, Florida,
which company has been held by the Labor Board to be engaged in
interstate commerce and subject to the Federal Act.
Matter of
St. Johns River Shipbuilding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 12; 52 N.L.R.B.
958; 55 N.L.R.B. 1451; 59 N.L.R.B. No. 83; 60 N.L.R.B. No. 55. The
case was submitted on the pleadings, which assume that interstate
commerce questions were involved. The Supreme Court of Florida so
treated the case in holding that there was no constitutionally
prohibited conflict between the Florida and Federal Acts.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE.
I concur in so much of the opinion as finds conflict between the
licensing provisions of the Florida statute and the National Labor
Relations Act. I do so only on the ground that the command of § 7
of the National Labor Relations Act that "employees shall have the
right . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing" conflicts with the licensing provisions of the
Florida Act purporting to fix the qualifications of business agents
of labor organizations.
This, of course, does not mean that labor unions or their
officers are immune in other respects from the exercise of the
state's police power to punish fraud, violence, or other forms of
misconduct, either because of the commerce clause or the National
Labor Relations Act. It is familiar ground that the commerce clause
does not itself preclude a state from regulating those matters
which, not being themselves interstate commerce, nevertheless
affect the commerce,
California v. Thompson, 313 U.
S. 109,
313 U. S.
113-114,
313 U. S. 116,
and cases cited;
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.
S. 341,
317 U. S. 360,
and cases cited, and that the state's authority is curtailed only
as Congress may by law prescribe in the exercise of the commerce
power.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.
S. 100,
312 U. S. 119,
and cases cited. I can find nothing in
Page 325 U. S. 545
the National Labor Relations Act or its legislative history to
suggest a Congressional purpose to withdraw the punishment of fraud
or violence, or the violation of any state law otherwise valid,
from the state's power merely because the state might subject the
business agent of a labor union who violates its law to
imprisonment, which would prevent his functioning as a bargaining
agent for employees under the National Labor Relations Act.
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.
S. 740,
315 U. S. 748.
See S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.Rep. No.
1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
For the same reasons, the National Labor Relations Act does not
preclude a state from requiring a labor union, or its officers and
agents, as such, to procure licenses or make reports or perform
other duties which do not materially obstruct the exercise of
rights conferred by the National Labor Relations Act or other
federal legislation.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516,
323 U. S. 542.
But it is quite another matter to say that a state may fix
standards or qualifications for labor unions and their officers and
agents which would preclude any of them from being chosen, and from
functioning as bargaining agents under § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act. The right conferred on employees to bargain
collectively through a representative of their own choosing is the
foundation of the National Labor Relations Act. Without that right,
or if it were restricted by state action, the Act as drawn would
have little scope for operation. The fact that the National Labor
Relations Act imposes sanctions on the employer alone does not mean
that it did not, by § 7, confer the right on employees, as against
others as well as the employer, to make an uninhibited choice of
their bargaining agents.
Cf. United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U. S. 219.
Section 7 confers the right of choice generally on employees, and
not merely as against the employer.
Page 325 U. S. 546
I dissent from so much of the opinion as holds that § 6 of the
Florida statute, as applied, is invalid because it conflicts with
the National Labor Relations Act. The requirement of filing by a
labor organization of the information prescribed by § 6,
accompanied by a filing fee of $1.00, is, as the opinion of the
Court recognizes, not incompatible with the National Labor
Relations Act, since it in no substantial way hinders or interferes
with the performance of the union's functions under that Act.
Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U. S. 542;
cf. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. R. Comm'n, 297 U.
S. 471,
297 U. S. 478;
see Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.
S. 133;
Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 285 U. S. 119;
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
292 U. S. 290;
Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.
S. 300,
302 U. S.
306.
Notwithstanding the conflict between the commerce clause or the
federal statute and the local regulation which was found in
Western Union Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.
S. 530,
125 U. S. 554,
and
St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.
S. 350,
235 U. S. 368,
I can find no logical or persuasive legal ground or practical
reason for saying that Congress, by the enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act, intended to preclude the state from exercising
to the utmost extent its sovereign power to enforce the lawful
demands of § 6 of the Florida Act. There is no more occasion for
implying such a Congressional purpose where the union is prevented
from functioning, by punishment or injunction, for a violation of a
valid state law than for saying that Congress, by the National
Labor Relations Act, intended to forbid the states to arrest and
imprison a labor leader for the violation of any other valid state
law because that would prevent his or the union's functioning under
the National Labor Relations Act. The question is wholly one of
state power. Here, the state power is not restricted by the
commerce clause standing alone, nor, so far as I can see, by any
Congressional intention expressed
Page 325 U. S. 547
in the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
Union
Brokerage Company v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202,
322 U. S.
206.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
The Court is striking down a State law not because such a
statute, in and of itself, is beyond the power of a State to enact.
The Florida statute is nullified because, so Florida is told,
Congress has barred Florida from this lawmaking although Congress
has neither expressly nor by fair inference forbidden Florida to
deal with the matter with which Florida has dealt and Congress has
not. Concretely, Congress, by protecting employees in their right
to choose representatives for collective bargaining free from the
coercion or influence of employers, did not impliedly wipe out the
right of States under their police power to require qualifications
appropriate for union officials having fiduciary duties.
It was settled early in our constitutional history that the mere
fact that Congress has power to regulate commerce among the several
States does not exclude State legislation in the exercise of the
police power, even though it may affect such commerce, where the
subject matter does not demand a nationwide rule.
Willson v.
Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245;
Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 12 How. 299,
53 U. S. 319.
The States, in short, may speak on matters even in the general
domain of commerce so long as Congress is silent. But, when
Congress has spoken, although not as fully as the Constitution
authorizes -- that is, when a federal enactment falls short of the
Congressional power to legislate touching commerce -- the States
may still speak where Congress is still silent. The real question
is: has Congress spoken so as to silence the States? The same
regard for the harmonious balance of our federal system, whereby
the States may protect local interests despite the dormant Commerce
Clause, allows State legislation for the protection of local
interests so
Page 325 U. S. 548
long as Congress has not supplanted local regulation either by a
regulation of its own or by an unmistakable indication that there
is to be no regulation at all. The relation of such enactments of
local concern to federal enactments which fall short of the full
reach of the Constitution raises a problem of judicial judgment
similar to that presented where a State law encounters no federal
statute. The problem is one of judicial accommodation between
respect for the supplanting authority of Congress and the reserved
police power of the States. Long ago, this policy of accommodation
was formulated by this Court:
"We agree that, in the application of this principle of
supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the State law is
but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict
should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be
reconciled or consistently stand together."
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227,
63 U. S.
243.
But conflicts between State laws regulating aspects of business
enterprise and federal enactments relating to such aspects were few
and far between in the first hundred years of our history. Apart
from taxes and tariffs, the regulation of fisheries, and measures
dealing with the coastwise trade, there was little intervention by
federal legislation in the affairs of men until, in 1887, the
Interstate Commerce Act initiated the tide of federal regulation.
Since then, this Court has often had to deal with the claim that a
federal statute, though only partially regulating a particular
phase of commerce, superseded State legislation in the exercise of
the police power bearing upon that phase.
In a great variety of cases, the Court has applied the
accommodation formulated in
Sinnot v. Davenport, supra,
and either reasserted or reinforced that policy. The emphasis has
been on recognizing that both the State law and the federal statute
must be allowed to prevail if they may prevail together -- that is,
if they do not, as a
Page 325 U. S. 549
matter of language or practical enforcement, collide, or if
Congress has not manifested an unambiguous purpose that there be no
regulation, either State or federal, as to matters for which it has
not prescribed. This judicial principle is established by an
impressive body of opinions. A few samples must suffice:
1.
"May not these statutory provisions stand without obstructing or
embarrassing the execution of the act of congress? This question
must, of course, be determined with reference to the settled rule
that a statute enacted in execution of a reserved power of the
state is not to be regarded as inconsistent with an act of congress
passed in the execution of a clear power under the constitution
unless the repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that
the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together."
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.
S. 613,
169 U. S.
623.
2.
"It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede, or
by its legislation suspend, the exercise of the police powers of
the states, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect
that result is clearly manifested. . . ."
"The principle is universal that legislation, whether by
Congress or by a state, must be taken to be valid unless the
contrary is made clearly to appear, and, as the contrary does not
so appear, the statute of Colorado is to be taken as a
constitutional exercise of the power of the state."
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137,
187 U. S. 148,
187 U. S. 153.
3.
"Is, then, a denial to the state of the exercise of its power
for the purposes in question necessarily implied in the Federal
statute? For, when the question is whether a Federal act overrides
a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must, of course, be
considered, and that when needs must be implied is of no less force
than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot
otherwise be accomplished -- if its operation within its chosen
field else must be frustrated, and its provisions be refused
their
Page 325 U. S. 550
natural effect -- the state law must yield to the regulation of
Congress within the sphere of its delegated power. . . ."
"But the intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its
police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation
is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit
to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In
other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of
Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of
the state. This principle has had abundant illustration."
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501,
225 U. S.
533.
4.
"These case recognize the established rule that a state law
enacted under any of the reserved powers -- especially if under the
police power -- is not to be set aside as inconsistent with an act
of Congress unless there is actual repugnancy, or unless Congress
has at least manifested a purpose to exercise its paramount
authority over the subject. The rule rests upon fundamental grounds
that should not be disregarded."
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U.
S. 412,
234 U. S.
418-419.
5.
"In construing federal statutes enacted under the power
conferred by the commerce clause of the Constitution, the rule is
that it should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or
suspend the exercise of the reserved powers of a state, even where
that may be done, unless, and except so far as its purpose to do so
is clearly manifested."
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
245 U. S. 493,
245 U. S. 510.
6.
"The principle thus applicable has been frequently stated. It is
that the Congress may circumscribe its regulation and occupy a
limited field, and that the intention to supersede the exercise by
the state of its authority as to matters not covered by the federal
legislation is not to be implied unless the Act of Congress fairly
interpreted is in conflict with the law of the State."
Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
283 U. S. 380,
283 U. S.
392-393.
Page 325 U. S. 551
7.
"Unless limited by the exercise of federal authority under the
commerce clause, the state has power to make and enforce the order.
The purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state action
against the ravages of the disease is not lightly to be inferred.
The intention so to do must definitely and clearly appear."
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346,
289 U. S.
350.
8.
"The power conferred upon the Congress is such that, when
exerted, it excludes and supersedes state legislation in respect of
the same matter. But Congress may so circumscribe its regulation as
to leave a part of the subject open to state action.
Atlantic
Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280,
234 U. S.
290.
Cf. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line,
272 U. S.
605. The purpose exclusively to regulate need not be
specifically declared.
New York Cent. R. Co. v. Winfield,
244 U. S.
147. But ordinarily such intention will not be implied
unless, when fairly interpreted, the federal measure is plainly
inconsistent with state regulation of the same matter."
Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley R. Co., 292 U. S.
57,
292 U. S.
60.
9.
"The case calls for the application of the well established
principle that Congress may circumscribe its regulation and occupy
a limited field, and that the intent to supersede the exercise by
the state of its police power as to matters not covered by the
federal legislation is not to be implied unless the latter fairly
interpreted is in actual conflict with the state law."
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441,
301 U. S.
454.
10. "
"States are thus enabled to deal with local exigencies, and to
exert in the absence of conflict with federal legislation an
essential protective power. And, when Congress does exercise its
paramount authority, it is obvious that Congress may determine how
far its regulation shall go. There is no constitutional rule which
compels Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may
circumscribe its regulation and occupy only a limited field.
Page 325 U. S. 552
When it does so, state regulation outside that limited field and
otherwise admissible is not forbidden or displaced. The principle
is thoroughly established that the exercise by the state of its
police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal
action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so
'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or
consistently stand together.'"
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1,
302 U. S. 10.
These rules of respect for the allowable area of State law have
not been ceremonial phrases dishonored in observance. Deviations
from this policy have been very rare, considering the fact that we
are dealing not with a mathematical formula, but with the
application of a constitutional doctrine by judicial judgment. The
deviations have been so rare all these decades, despite the changes
in the Court, because of fidelity to the purposes of this vital
aspect of our federalism.
A survey of the scores of cases in which the claim has been made
that State action cannot survive some contradictory command of
Congress leaves no doubt that State action has not been set aside
on mere generalities about Congress' having "occupied the field,"
or on the basis of loose talk, instead of demonstrations, about
"conflict" between State and federal action. We are in the domain
of government and practical affairs, and this Court has not stifled
state action, unless what the State has required, in the light of
what Congress has ordered, would truly entail contradictory duties
or make actual, not argumentative, inroads on what Congress has
commanded or forbidden.
Since the bulk of federal regulatory legislation has, until
recently, been concerned with the great interstate utilities, the
cases dealing with the relation of State to federal legislation in
this field shed most light on the question before us. Moreover,
these present situations least favorable to tolerance for State
legislation. The
Page 325 U. S. 553
need for national control, with corresponding restriction of
local regulation, is presumably most powerfully asserted where
interstate transportation and communication are involved.
The range and particularity of federal legislation regulating
railroads, expressed in a long series of enactments, have given
rise to most of the cases in which State action has been found in
conflict with federal action. Once Congress established a uniform
federal rule concerning liability for freight loss or damage in
place of the variegated rules of the several States, State policy
"differently conceived" had to yield.
Charleston & W.C. R.
Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.
S. 597,
237 U. S. 604.
The comprehensive control over railroad rates, progressively
exercised by Congress, necessarily displaced much prior State law.
And so, the permissive power of States to deal with aspects of
transportation in the absence of federal law ceased when State
action ran counter to the specific requirements of the Hepburn Act,
34 Stat. 5 4.
Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.
S. 424;
Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Hardwick
Farmers' Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426.
State regulation of the hours of railroad employees could not
survive a Congressional policy as to hours of service.
Northern
Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370.
Explicitness by Congress relating to the equipping of freight cars
with safety appliances superseded a State law dealing differently
with such safety requirements.
Southern R. Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 236 U. S. 439.
When Congress saw fit to define in the Federal Employees Liability
Act a carrier's responsibility for the death or injury of its
employees, a State could not assert a different basis of
responsibility.
New York Cent. R. Co. v. Winfield,
244 U. S. 147.
Uniform standards set by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the
equipment of locomotives preclude different requirements for such
equipment by the States.
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line,
272 U. S. 605. But
merely because regulatory power is
Page 325 U. S. 554
possessed by a federal agency does not displace State regulation
if no federal standards are set.
See Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79;
Eichholz v. Public Service Comm'n, 306 U.
S. 268. That, even in this technical field, a State is
not denied the exercise of its police power beyond what is
practically required by the actual use of federal power is
illustrated by the limited application given to
Pennsylvania R.
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.
S. 566, in
Terminal Assn. v. Trainmen,
318 U. S. 1.
These are illustrations of a closely knit body of regulations,
full of technical implications, protected against incursions from
local discriminations as to the very subject matter for which
Congress deemed a national rule essential. There was, in short,
concreteness of conflict between what a State prescribed and what
Congress prescribed; the collision was demonstrable, not
argumentative.
Even where the enforcement of a State statute carries
international implications, and thus deals with sensitive concerns
peculiarly within the direction of federal authority, this Court
only recently was slow to strike down an exercise of the State
police power. When, in
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52, the United States strongly urged upon us that a
Pennsylvania system of alien registration, established in 1939, had
been superseded by the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, we
did not displace the State law cavalierly, on the basis of loose
inference and dogmatic assertion, but examined with painstaking
care the particular requirements of Pennsylvania in order to
ascertain whether, in their practical operation, they ran counter
to the scheme as conceived by Congress and impinged upon its
administration. A detailed examination of the long course of
federal legislation affecting aliens, of which the Act of 1940 was
the latest in a series, led the Court to conclude that Congress
Page 325 U. S. 555
had "provided a standard for alien registration in a single
integrated and all-embracing system . . . through one uniform
national registration system" to which Pennsylvania had to
subordinate its local policy.
312 U. S. 312 U.S.
52,
312 U. S. 74.
Even this conclusion evoked a weighty dissent, and one cannot read
the Court's opinion without an awareness that the case presented a
close question. Shortly after this decision, we unanimously made it
clear that
Hines v. Davidowitz was not intended to relax
the requirement of practical and effective conflict between a State
law and a federal enactment before a State police measure can be
nullified, and that the international bearing of the circumstances
made persuasive the finding of conflict in that case. What was said
about
Hines v. Davidowitz in
Allen-Bradley Local v.
Board, 315 U. S. 740,
315 U. S. 749,
is precisely relevant here:
"In the
Hines case, a federal system of alien
registration was held to supersede a state system of registration.
But there, we were dealing with a problem which had an impact on
the general field of foreign relations. The delicacy of the issues
which were posed alone raised grave questions as to the propriety
of allowing a state system of regulation to function alongside of a
federal system. In that field, any 'concurrent state power that may
exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits.' p.
312 U. S.
68. Therefore, we were more ready to conclude that a
federal act in a field that touched international relations
superseded state regulation than we were in those cases where a
State was exercising its historic powers over such traditionally
local matters as public safety and order, and the use of streets
and highways.
Maurer v. Hamilton,
[
309 U.S.
598],
supra, and cases cited. Here, we are dealing
with the latter type of problem. We will not lightly infer that
Congress, by the mere passage of a federal Act, has impaired the
traditional sovereignty of the several States in that regard. "
Page 325 U. S. 556
In truth, when a State statute is assailed because of alleged
conflict with a federal law, the same considerations of
forbearance, the same regard for the lawmaking power of States,
should guide the judicial judgment as when this Court is asked to
declare a statute unconstitutional outright. The problem of
conflict arises only when the States have power concurrent with
Congress to legislate; to find conflict is merely a form of denying
the power of legislation to the States. Except in rare instances,
as already indicated, this Court has been extremely cautious in
upsetting State regulation unless it has found that the regulation
devised by Congress and that by which the State dealt with some
local concern cannot, in a practical world, coexist. Only then has
the Court been justified in holding that Congress has manifested
its will to displace the constitutional authority of the State. To
strike down a State law when that which a State requires does not
truly hinder or obstruct federal regulation is unwarrantably to
deprive the States of their constitutional power.
These are the principles which have been recognized and applied
by the vast body of the decisions of this Court, and they are the
principles that should determine the fate of the Florida
legislation now here for judgment.
By legislation known as House Bill No. 142, Florida, in 1943,
undertook to regulate labor unions and their officers. Laws of
Florida, 1943, Ch. 21968, p. 565. That Act prohibits any person
from acting as a "business agent" for any "labor organization"
without having obtained a license. § 9(6). In order to obtain such
a license, for a fee of one dollar, a person must file with the
Secretary of State an application, under oath, accompanied by a
statement showing the applicant's authority to act as business
agent, vouched for by the president and secretary of the labor
organization. To permit the filing of objections to granting the
license, the application must be held on file for thirty days.
Thereafter, the application, with all relevant
Page 325 U. S. 557
documents, goes to a Board composed of the Governor, the
Secretary of State, and the Superintendent of Education. On finding
the applicant qualified, the Board must authorize the Secretary of
State to issue a license for the calendar year. A license may not
be issued to any person who has not been a citizen and resident of
the United States for at least ten years, or who has been convicted
of a felony, or who is not of good moral character. § 4. Another
provision of the Act requires every "labor organization operating
in the Florida" to file an annual report with the Secretary of
State giving the name of the organization, the location of its
office, the names and addresses of the president, secretary,
treasurer, and business agent. A filing fee of one dollar is
required. § 6. A penal provision provides for fines not exceeding
$500, or six months' imprisonment, or both, for violation of the
Act by any person or labor organization. § 14.
The Attorney General of Florida sought and obtained from a
Florida Circuit Court an injunction forbidding the petitioner,
United Association of Journeymen Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local
No. 234, from functioning as a labor union until it had complied
with the requirements of § 6, and forbidding petitioner Hill from
acting as business agent for the Association until he had procured
the license required by § 4. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
the injunction. 19 So. 2d 857. This Court reverses the Florida
decision by concluding that the National Labor Relations Act,
familiarly known as the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq., debarred Florida from dealing with the matters
with which her legislation dealt.
The Court reaches this conclusion rather summarily, as though
the conflict between the Wagner Act and the Bradford Act is too
obvious for argument. Considering the fact that this case involves
what so often has
Page 325 U. S. 558
characterized as the most delicate function of this Court --
that of invalidating legislation -- the issue cannot be disposed of
so easily.
While employer-employee relations on railroads have been the
subject of Congressional legislation for more than half a century,
giving rise to a more and more comprehensive scheme of federal
regulation, as to such relations in industry generally, Congress
abstained from regulation until 1935. Its first essay in this field
was professedly very limited in scope. Not content with setting
forth the central aim of the Wagner Act in the legislative reports,
Congress, in the Act itself, defined its purposes. In view of the
inequality between organized employers and employees devoid of
"full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract," and of
the "denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining," it was
"declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection."
Section 1. To that end § 8, the heart of the Act, enumerated
conduct by employers which the National Labor Relations Board was
established to prevent. § 10. It is an accurate summary of the
Wagner Act to say that it aimed to equalize bargaining power
between industrial employees and their employers by putting federal
law behind the employees' right of association. The whole plan or
scheme of the Wagner Act was to enable employees to bargain on a
fair basis, freed from "restraint or coercion
Page 325 U. S. 559
by their employer" through the protection given by the federal
government.
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp, 301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 33.
All proposals to make of the Wagner Act a more comprehensive
industrial code by dealing with the conduct of employees and their
unions were rejected. The rights Congress created, the obligations
it defined, the machinery it devised for enforcing these rights and
securing obedience to these obligations, all were exclusively
concerned with putting the strength of the Government against this
conduct by employers. All other aspects of industrial relations
were left untouched by the Wagner Act, and purposely so. All
activities or aspects of labor organizations outside of their right
to be free from employer coercion were left wholly unregulated by
that Act. Neither expressly nor by indirection did the Wagner Act
displace whatever police power the States may have to deal with
those aspects of the life of a trade union as to which Congress,
with eyes wide open, refused to legislate. When Congress purposely
dealt only with the employer aspect of industrial relations and
purposely abstained from making any rules touching unions, or the
responsibility of union officials or the responsibility of union
officials to union members and to the public, Congress certainly
did not sponge out the States' police power as to these matters. It
wipes out State power and distorts Congressional intention to
disregard the limited policy explicitly set forth by Congress. That
policy -- curbing of employer interferences with union rights --
was scrupulously observed by Congress in the substantive
provisions, as well as in the enforcement structure, of the Act.
There is not a breath in the Act referring to any aspect of union
activity unrelated to employer interference therewith. By refusing
to legislate beyond that, Congress did not forbid the States from
so legislating.
If Congress tomorrow chose to subject labor organizations and
their officers to regulations similar to those dealt
Page 325 U. S. 560
with in the Florida law, it could hardly be suggested that the
Wagner Act, as it now stands, already covers these subjects.
Specifically, if Congress were to make certain requirements for the
filing of reports by labor organizations that seek to avail
themselves of the rights defined by the Wagner Act, and also were
to devise a system of identification and licensing of authorized
representatives of the unions, one would be hard put to it to find
anything in the Wagner Act to prove that it had already dealt with
these matters. Congress may well believe that there is such a
difference in local circumstances as to make it desirable to leave
treatment of these matters to the different localities. In any
event, since these subjects are outside of the Wagner Act for
purposes of making additions by federal law, they cannot be inside
it to justify nullification of the Florida law. Whether the
interests of union members or of outsiders call for an
indemnification and licensing system for men discharging the
responsibilities of business agents, it is not for us to determine.
The only issue before us is whether Florida is free to deal with
these matters when Congress has not done so. To repeat what was
said in
Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, supra, "We will not
lightly infer that Congress by the mere passage of a federal Act"
-- this very Act -- "has impaired the traditional sovereignty of
the several States" over such police matters as are the concern of
the Florida legislation.
If the Wagner Act has left Florida free to deal with these
matters, Florida may not only legislate, but also provide for
enforcement of its legislation. In other words, if Florida may call
for reports and require business agents to apply for licenses, of
course Florida may provide appropriate sanctions for such
regulations. If a union may properly be required to file a report
and does not do so, and therefore is prohibited from pursuing its
industrial activities until it does file such a report, the State
is not interfering with whatever rights the union may have
Page 325 U. S. 561
under the Wagner Act. It will be time enough to consider such a
claim of conflict, if anything that Florida may exact should, in a
concrete situation, actively interfere with appropriate action by
the National Labor Relations Board. In any event, we do not know
the reach of the Florida Act. For all that appears, the Supreme
Court of Florida may construe the Act's requirements to apply only
to intrastate activities of the union and its business agents.
The judgment should be affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS concurs in this dissent.