Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829)
U.S. Supreme CourtWillson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 2 Pet. 245 245 (1829)
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Company
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245
This Court has frequently decided that, to sustain its jurisdiction in appeals and writs of error, it is not necessary to state in terms upon the record that the Constitution or a law of the United States was drawn in question. It is sufficient to bring the case within the provisions of the 25th section of the Judicial Act if the record shows that the Constitution or a law of the United States must have been misconstrued or the decision could not have been made, or that the constitutionality of a State law was questioned, and the decision was in favour of the party claiming under such law.
The act of the Assembly of the State of Delaware by which the construction of the dam erected by the plaintiffs was authorised shows plainly that this is one of those many creeks passing through a deep level marsh adjoining the Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance. The value of the property on its banks must be enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do not come in collision with the powers of the General Government, are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the States. But the measure authorised by this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it. But this abridgement, unless it comes in conflict with the Constitution or a law of the United States, is an affair between the Government of Delaware and its citizens, of which this Court can take no cognizance.
If Congress had passed any act in execution of the power to regulate commerce the object of which was to control State legislation over these small navigable creeks into which the tide ebbs and flows, and which abound throughout the lower country of the middle and southern States, we should feel not much difficulty in saying that a State law coming in conflict with such act would be void. But Congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the law to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, a power which has not been exceeded as to affect this question.
This was a writ of error to the high court of errors and appeals of the state of Delaware.
The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company were incorporated by an act of the General Assembly of Delaware passed in February, 1822, and the owners and possessors of the marsh, cripple, [Footnote 1] and low grounds in Appoquinimink hundred, in New Castle county, and State of Delaware, lying on both sides of Black Bird Creek, below Mathews' landing, and extending to the river Delaware, were authorised and empowered to
make and construct a good and sufficient dam across said creek at such place as the managers or a majority of them shall find to be most suitable for the purpose, and also to bank the said marsh, cripple, and low ground, &c.
After the passing of this act, the company proceeded to erect and place in the creek a dam by which the navigation of the creek was obstructed, also embanking the creek and carrying into execution all the purposes of their incorporation.
The defendants being the owners, &c. of a sloop called the Sally, of 95 9-95ths, tons, regularly licensed and enrolled according to the navigation laws of the United States, broke and injured the dam so erected by the company, and thereupon an action of trespass vi et armis was instituted against them in the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware in which damages were claimed amounting to $20,000. To the declaration filed in the Supreme Court, the defendants filed three pleas, the first only of which being noticed by the Court in their decision; the second and third are omitted.
This plea was in the following terms:
1. That the place where the supposed trespass is alleged to have been committed was, and still is, part and parcel of said Black Bird Creek, a public and common navigable creek, in the nature of a highway, in which the tides have always flowed and reflowed; in which there was, and of right ought to have been, a certain common and public way, in the nature of a highway, for all the citizens of the State of Delaware and of the United States, with sloops or other vessels to navigate, sail, pass and repass, into, over, through, in, and upon the same, at all times of the year, at their own free will and pleasure.
Therefore the said defendants, being citizens of the State of Delaware and of the United States, with the said sloop, sailed in and upon the said creek, in which, &c. as they lawfully might for the cause aforesaid; and because the said gum piles, &c. bank and dam, in the said declaration mentioned, &c. had been wrongfully erected, and were there wrongfully continued standing, and being in and across said navigable creek, and obstructing the same, so that, without pulling up,
cutting, breaking, and destroying the said gum piles, &c., bank and dam respectively, the said defendants could not pass and repass with the said sloop into, through, over, and along the said navigable creek. And that the defendants, in order to remove the said obstructions, pulled up, cut, broke, &c., as in the said declaration mentioned, doing no unnecessary damage to the said Black Bird Creek Marsh Company, which is the same supposed trespass, &c.
The plaintiffs, in the Supreme Court of the State, demurred generally to all the pleas, and the Court sustained the demurrers and gave judgment in their favour. This judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, and the record remanded for the purpose of having the damages assessed by a jury. Final judgment having been entered on the verdict of the jury, it was again carried to the Court of Appeals, where it was affirmed, and was now brought before this Court by the defendants in that Court for its review.