1. The Act of Congress of June 10, 1922, c. 216, 42 Stat. 634,
which, by amendment of Judicial Code, §§ 24, 256, undertakes to
permit application of the workmen's compensation laws of the
several states to injuries within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, excepting the masters and crews of vessels, is
unconstitutional for the reasons explained in
Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205.
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.
S. 149, and other cases reviewed. P.
264 U. S.
222.
2. So
held (a) in a case in which it was sought to
compel an employer of stevedores to contribute to an accident fund,
as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act of Washington; (b) in
a case involving the power of a commission of California to award
compensation for the death of a workman killed while engaged at
maritime work, under maritime contract, upon a vessel moored at
dock and discharging her cargo.
Id.
3. The proviso in the above act of Congress "that the
jurisdiction of the district courts shall not extend to causes
arising out of injuries
Page 264 U. S. 220
to or death of persons other than the master or members of the
crew, for which compensation is provided by the workmen's
compensation law of any state," etc., was intended to supplement
the provision allowing rights and remedies under state compensation
laws, and, that being ineffectual, the proviso is also. P.
264 U. S.
223.
122 Wash. 572 and 220 P. 669 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington affirming
a judgment of a superior court of the state which dismissed, on
demurrer, a complaint brought by the state to recover the sum of
$211.45, from W. C. Dawson & Company, as a contribution to the
accident fund created by Laws of Washington, 1911, c. 74, the
amount claimed being computed on the wages paid by defendant to
stevedores working on board ship.
Error also to a judgment of the Supreme Court of California,
rendered on review of an award made by the Industrial Accident
Commission of the state to the dependents of an employee of the
James Rolph Company who died as a result of injuries sustained
while working as a stevedore upon a vessel afloat on the navigable
waters of San Francisco Bay. The judgment annulled the award as in
excess of the Commission's jurisdiction.
Page 264 U. S. 221
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These causes turn upon the same point, were heard together, and
it will be convenient to decide them by one opinion.
The immediate question presented by No. 366 is whether one
engaged in the business of stevedoring, whose employees work only
on board ships in the navigable waters of Puget Sound, can be
compelled to contribute to the accident fund provided for by the
Workmen's Compensation Act of Washington. Laws 1911, p. 345. The
state maintains that the objections to such requirement pointed out
in
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.
S. 149, were removed by the Act of June 10, 1922, c.
216, 42 Stats. 634.
* Its supreme
court ruled otherwise. 122 Wash. 572, 582.
Page 264 U. S. 222
In No. 684, the Supreme Court of California approved the
conclusion of the Supreme Court of Washington and declared the Act
of June 10, 1922, went beyond the power of Congress. It accordingly
held the Industrial Accident Commission had no jurisdiction to
award compensation for the death of a workman killed while actually
engaged at maritime work, under maritime contract, upon a vessel
moored at her dock in San Francisco Bay and discharging her cargo.
220 P. 669.
The judgments below must be affirmed; the doctrine of
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, to which we adhere,
permits no other conclusion. There, we construed the Act of October
6, 1917, c. 97, 40 Stat. 3952 which undertook
Page 264 U. S. 223
to amend the provision of §§ 24 and 256, Judicial Code, which
saves to suitors in all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction "the right of a common law remedy where the common law
is competent to give it" by adding the words "
and to claimants
the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any
state." After declaring the true meaning and purpose of the
act, we held it beyond the power of Congress.
Except as to the master and members of the crew, the Act of 1922
must be read as undertaking to permit application of the workmen's
compensation laws of the several states to injuries within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction substantially as provided by
the Act of 1917. The exception of master and crew is wholly
insufficient to meet the objections to such enactments heretofore
often pointed out. Manifestly, the proviso which denies
jurisdiction to district courts of the United States over causes
arising out of the injuries specified was intended to supplement
the provision covering rights and remedies under state compensation
laws. As that provision is ineffective, so is the proviso. To hold
otherwise would bring about an unfortunate condition wholly outside
the legislative intent.
Counsel insist that later conclusions of this Court have
modified the doctrine of
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U. S. 205, and
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. They rely especially
upon
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.
S. 233,
Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde,
257 U. S. 469, and
Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U.
S. 263.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen involved a claim under
the New York Compensation Act for death resulting from injuries
sustained while the deceased was on board and engaged in unloading
the vessel. We held (pp.
244 U. S.
216-217):
"It would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with
exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed,
modified, or affected by state legislation. That
Page 264 U. S. 224
this may be done to some extent cannot be denied. . . . Equally
well established is the rule that state statutes may not contravene
an applicable Act of Congress of affect the general maritime law
beyond certain limits. . . . And plainly, we think, no such
legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose
expressed by an Act of Congress or works material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes
with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations. This limitation, at the
least, is essential to the effective operation of the fundamental
purposes for which such law was incorporated into our national laws
by the Constitution itself. . . . The work of a stevedore in which
the deceased was engaging is maritime in its nature; his employment
was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were
likewise maritime, and the rights and liabilities of the parties in
connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiralty
jurisdiction.
Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek,
234 U. S.
52,
234 U. S. 59-60. If New York
can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such obligations
as those imposed by her compensation statute, other states may do
likewise. The necessary consequence would be destruction of the
very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the
Constitution was designed to establish, and freedom of navigation
between the states and with foreign countries would be seriously
hampered and impeded. A far more serious injury would result to
commerce than could have been inflicted by the Washington statute
authorizing a materialman's lien condemned in
The
Roanoke [
189 U.S.
185]. The legislature exceeded its authority in attempting to
extend the statute under consideration to conditions like those
here disclosed."
In
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (pp.
253 U. S.
163-166), where claim was made under the New York act on
account of the death of a bargeman who fell into the Hudson River
and drowned, this was said:
Page 264 U. S. 225
"We conclude that [by the Act of October 6, 1917,] Congress
undertook to permit application of workmen's compensation laws of
the several states to injuries within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, and to save such statutes from the objections pointed
out by
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. It sought to
authorize and sanction action by the states in prescribing and
enforcing, as to all parties concerned, rights, obligations,
liabilities, and remedies designed to provide compensation for
injuries suffered by employees engaged in maritime work."
"And, so construed, we think the enactment is beyond the power
of Congress. Its power to legislate concerning rights and
liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction and remedies for their
enforcement arises from the Constitution, as above indicated. The
definite object of the grant was to commit direct control to the
federal government, to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary
burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation, and
to establish, so far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules
applicable throughout every part of the Union."
"Considering the fundamental purpose in view and the definite
end for which such rules were accepted, we must conclude that, in
their characteristic features and essential international and
interstate relations, the latter may not be repealed, amended, or
changed except by legislation which embodies both the will and
deliberate judgment of Congress. The subject was entrusted to it to
be dealt with according to its discretion, not for delegation to
others. To say that, because Congress could have enacted a
compensation act applicable to maritime injuries, it could
authorize the states to do so as they might desire is false
reasoning. Moreover, such an authorization would inevitably destroy
the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution not only
contemplated but actually established; it would defeat the very
purpose of the grant.
See Sudden & Christenson v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 188 P. 803. "
Page 264 U. S. 226
"Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the states --
by nature this is nondelegable. . . ."
"Here, we are concerned with a wholly different constitutional
provision -- one which, for the purpose of securing harmony and
uniformity, prescribes a set of rules, empowers Congress to
legislate to that end, and prohibits material interference by the
states. Obviously, if every state may freely declare the rights and
liabilities incident to maritime employment, there will at once
arise the confusion and uncertainty which framers of the
Constitution both foresaw and undertook to prevent."
In
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, a proceeding begun in
admiralty to recover damages for death of a stevedore, fatally
injured while working in the hold of a vessel then anchored and
discharging her cargo, we held (p.
257 U. S.
242):
"As the logical result of prior decisions, we think it follows
that, where death upon such waters results from a maritime tort
committed on navigable waters within a state whose statutes give a
right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty
courts will entertain a libel
in personam for the damages
sustained by those to whom such right is given. The subject is
maritime and local in character, and the specified modification of
or supplement to the rule applied in admiralty courts, when
following the common law, will not work material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor interfere
with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations."
Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde was a proceeding in
admiralty to recover damages from the shipbuilder for injuries
which the carpenter received while working on an unfinished vessel
moored in the Willamette river at Portland, Oregon.
"The contract for constructing the
Ahala was
nonmaritime, and although the incompleted structure upon which the
accident occurred was lying in
Page 264 U. S. 227
navigable waters, neither Rohde's general employment nor his
activities at the time had any direct relation to navigation or
commerce."
We held the matter was only of local concern, and that to permit
the rights and liabilities of the parties to be determined by the
local law would not interfere with characteristic features of the
general maritime rules. We also pointed out the conclusion was in
entire accord with prior cases.
Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co. related to a
claim based upon death which resulted from injuries received by the
long shoreman while on the dock -- a matter never within the
admiralty jurisdiction.
"Insana was injured upon the dock, an extension of the land,
Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S.
Co., 208 U. S. 316, and certainly,
prior to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employer's liability
for damages would have depended upon the common law and the state
statutes. Consequently, when the Compensation Act superseded other
state laws touching the liability in question, it did not come into
conflict with any superior maritime law. And this is true whether
awards under the act are made as upon implied agreements or
otherwise. The stevedore's contract of employment did not
contemplate any dominant federal rule concerning the master's
liability for personal injuries received on land."
None of the later causes departs from the doctrine of
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen and
Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, and we think the provisions of the Act of 1922
cannot be reconciled therewith.
Without doubt, Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the
maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will
and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment of a
general Employers' Liability Law or general provisions for
compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the
several states. The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
looks to
Page 264 U. S. 228
uniformity; otherwise, wide discretion is left to Congress.
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. Exercising another power
-- to regulate commerce -- Congress has prescribed the liability of
interstate carriers by railroad for damages to employees, Act April
22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, and thereby abrogated conflicting
local rules.
New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield,
244 U. S. 147.
This cause presents a situation where there was no attempt to
prescribe general rules. On the contrary, the manifest purpose was
to permit any state to alter the maritime law, and thereby
introduce conflicting requirements. To prevent this result, the
Constitution adopted the law of the sea as the measure of maritime
rights and obligations. The confusion and difficulty if vessels
were compelled to comply with the local statutes at every port are
not difficult to see. Of course, some within the states may prefer
local rules, but the Union was formed with the very definite design
of freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions incident
to such control. The subject is national. Local interests must
yield to the common welfare. The Constitution is supreme.
Affirmed.
*
"That clause section of § 24 of the Judicial Code as hereby
amended to read as follows:"
" Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common
law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and to
claimants for compensation for injuries to or death of persons
other than the master or members of the crew of a vessel their
rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any
state, district, territory, or possession of the United States,
which rights and remedies when conferred by such law shall be
exclusive; of all seizures on land or waters not within admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction; of all prizes brought into the United
States, and of all proceedings for the condemnation of property
taken as prize:
Provided, that the jurisdiction of the
district courts shall not extend to causes arising out of injuries
to or death of persons other than the master of members of the
crew, for which compensation is provided by the workmen's
compensation law of any state, district, territory, or possession
of the United States."
"Sec. 2. That clause 3 of section 256 of the Judicial Code is
hereby amended to read as follows:"
" Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common
law remedy where the common law is competent to give it and to
claimants for compensation for injuries to or death of persons
other than the master or members of the crew of a vessel, their
rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation Law of any
state, district, territory, or possession of the United
States."
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES.
The reasoning of
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U. S. 205, and
cases following it, never has satisfied me, and therefore I should
have been glad to see a limit set to the principle. But I must
leave it to those who think the principle right to say how far it
extends.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (dissenting).
A concern doing a general upholstering business in New York
directs one of its regular employees, resident there, to make
repairs on a vessel lying alongside a New York dock. The ship, then
temporarily out of commission, is owned and enrolled in New York,
and, when used, is employed
Page 264 U. S. 229
only within the state. While on the vessel engaged in making the
repairs, the employee is injured without the fault of anyone and is
disabled for life. A statute of New York provides that, in such a
case, he and his dependents shall receive compensation out of funds
which employers are obliged to provide. To such state legislation
Congress has, in express terms, given its sanction. Under the rule
announced by the Court, the federal Constitution prohibits
recovery. [
Footnote 1] If,
perchance, the accident had occurred while the employee so engaged
was on the dock, the Constitution would permit recovery. [
Footnote 2] Or, if happily he had been
killed and the accident had been due to the employer's negligence,
recovery (which is provided for by another state statute) would
likewise be permitted under the Constitution, even though the
accident had occurred on board the vessel. [
Footnote 3]
The Constitution contains, of course, no provision which, in
terms, deals in any way with the subject of workmen's compensation.
The prohibition found by the court rests solely upon a clause in §
2 of Article III:
Page 264 U. S. 230
"The judicial power [of the United States] shall extend . . . to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." [
Footnote 4]
The conclusion that the state law violates the Constitution and
that the consent of Congress cannot save it is reached solely by a
process of deduction. The chain of reasoning involved is a long
one. The argument is that the grant of judicial power to the United
States confers upon Congress, by implication, legislative power
over the substantive maritime law; that this legislative power in
Congress (while not necessarily exclusive) precludes state
legislation which
"works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international or interstate
relations;"
that there is a rule of the general maritime law by which an
employer is not liable except in case of negligence for an
occupational injury occurring on board a vessel; that the rule
applies whenever the vessel on which the injury occurs is afloat on
navigable water, even if the vessel, made fast to a dock, is out of
commission; that the rule applies to occupations which, like
upholstering, are not in their nature inherently maritime; that the
rule governs the relations not only of the ship and its owners to
their employees, but also the relations of independent contractors
to their employees who customarily work on land; that this rule is
a characteristic feature of the general maritime law; that for a
state to change the rule, even as applied to independent
contractors doing work on craft moored to a dock, temporarily
disabled, and normally employed wholly within the state interferes
with the
Page 264 U. S. 231
proper harmony and uniformity of the general maritime law in its
international and interstate relations, and that hence a statute of
a state which provides that employers within it shall be liable to
employees within it for occupational accidents occurring within it
violates the federal Constitution notwithstanding the state statute
is expressly sanctioned by Congress.
Such is the chain of reasoning. Every link of the chain is
essential to the conclusion stated. If any link fails, the argument
falls. Several of the links are, in my opinion, unfounded
assumption which crumbles at the touch of reason. How can a law of
New York making a New York employer liable to a New York employee
for every occupational injury occurring within the state mar the
proper harmony and uniformity of the assumed general maritime law
in its interstate and international relations when neither a ship
nor a shipowner is the employer affected, even though the accident
occurs on board a vessel on navigable waters? The relation of the
independent contractor to his employee is a matter wholly of state
concern. The employer's obligation to pay and the employee's right
to receive compensation are not dependent upon any act or omission
of the ship or of its owners. To impose upon such employer the
obligation to make compensation in case of an occupational injury
in no way affects the operation of the ship. Nor can it affect the
shipowners in any respect except as every other tax, direct or
indirect, laid by a state or municipality may affect, by increasing
the cost of living and of doing business, everyone who has occasion
to enter it and many who have not. [
Footnote 5] This is true of the application of the
workmen's compensation law whether the service rendered by the
independent contractor is in its nature non-maritime,
Page 264 U. S. 232
like upholstering, or is inherently maritime, like stevedoring.
The requirement by the state is a regulation of the business of
upholstering or stevedoring. It is not a regulation of shipping. It
in no respect attempts to modify or deal with admiralty
jurisdiction or procedure or the substantive maritime law. It is
but an exercise of the local police power. [
Footnote 6] To impose upon the independent employer the
obligation to provide compensation for accidents occurring on a
vessel in port, while the vessel is made fast to the dock, in fact
cannot conceivably interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity
of the general maritime law in its international or interstate
relations.
Moreover, it is not a characteristic feature of the general
maritime law that the employer, in case of accident, is liable to
an employee only for negligence. The characteristic feature is the
very contrary. To one of the crew the vessel and her owners are
liable, even in the absence of negligence, for maintenance, care,
and wages at least so long as the voyage is continued. To him they
are liable also, even in the absence of negligence, for indemnity
or damages if the injury results from unseaworthiness of the ship
or from failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances.
[
Footnote 7] The legal rights
in case of accident to persons other than members of the crew were
not determined by the maritime law until recently. The admiralty
court, instead of extending to these persons this characteristic
feature, borrowed the rule of negligence from the common law
courts, making modifications conformable to its views of justice.
[
Footnote 8]
Page 264 U. S. 233
The mere facts that the accident is an incident of a maritime
contract and the service performed thereunder is inherently
maritime do not preclude the application of the workmen's
compensation law. The stevedore can recover under the workmen's
compensation law, if the injury happens to occur on land, although
the contract of the stevedoring concern is confessedly a maritime
one and the stevedore is employed in a maritime service quite as
much while he is on the dock as after he crosses the gangplank and
enters the ship. [
Footnote 9]
Underlying the whole chain of reasoning, by which the conclusion is
reached that the state and federal statutes are unconstitutional
will be found the legally indefensible assumption that the
liability under the workmen's compensation law is governed by the
law of the locality in which the accident happened -- that is, by
the rule that, in tort, the test of admiralty jurisdiction is
presence on navigable waters. There is no more reason why the mere
fact that the injury occurs on navigable waters should make
applicable the maritime law to liabilities arising under the
workmen's compensation law than that it should make the maritime
law applicable in such cases to the liability under a general
accident insurance policy. Tort is, in fact not an element in the
liability created by the workmen's compensation law. [
Footnote 10] On the contrary, the
basis of this legislation is liability without fault. Nor does the
workmen's compensation law create a status between employer and
employee. It provides an incident to the employment which is
often
Page 264 U. S. 234
likened to a contractual obligation even where the workmen's
compensation law is not of the class called optional. It will
hardly be contended that an act occurring beyond the geographical
limits of a state cannot be made the basis for the creation of
rights to be enjoyed or enforced within it. Workmen's compensation
laws which provide for compensation for injuries occurring in
states other than that of the residence of the employer and the
employee are held constitutional. [
Footnote 11] Why should they not be deemed valid where
they provide for accidents occurring within the state, but upon
navigable waters?
A further assumption is that Congress, which has power to make
and to unmake the general maritime law, can have no voice in
determining which of its provisions require adaptation to peculiar
local needs and as to which absolute uniformity is an essential of
the proper harmony of international and interstate maritime
relations. This assumption has no support in reason, and it is
inconsistent (at least in principle) with the powers conferred upon
Congress in other connections. The grant "of the . . . judicial
power . . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is
surely no broader in terms than the grant of power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states." Yet,
as to commerce, Congress may, at least in large measure, determine
whether uniformity of regulation is required or diversity is
permissible. [
Footnote 12]
Likewise, Congress is given exclusive power of legislation over its
forts, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful places and buildings.
But it may permit the
Page 264 U. S. 235
diverse laws of the several states to govern the relations of
men within them. [
Footnote
13] Congress has exclusive power to legislate concerning the
Army and Navy of the United States, to declare war, to determine to
what extent citizens shall aid in its prosecution, and how
effective aid can best be secured. But state legislation directly
affecting these subjects has been sustained. [
Footnote 14] In respect to bankruptcy, duties,
imposts, excises, and naturalization, the Constitution prescribes
uniformity. Still, the provision in the Bankruptcy Law giving
effect to the divergent exemption laws of the several states was
held valid. [
Footnote 15]
Absolute uniformity in things maritime is confessedly not essential
to the proper harmony of the maritime law in its interstate and
international relations. This is illustrated both by the cases
which hold constitutional state regulation of pilotage and liens
created by state laws in aid of maritime contracts and by those
which hold that there are broad fields of maritime activity to
which admiralty jurisdiction does not extend. A notable instance of
the latter is the liability in tort for injuries inflicted by a
ship to a dock, or to maritime workers on the dock engaged in the
inherently maritime operation of stevedoring. [
Footnote 16]
The recent legislation of Congress seeks, in a statesmanlike
manner, to limit the practical scope and effect of our decisions in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205,
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U. S. 149, and
later cases, by making them hereafter applicable only to the
Page 264 U. S. 236
relations of the ship to her master and crew. To hold that
Congress can effect this result by sanctioning the application of
state workmen's compensation laws to accidents to any other class
of employees occurring on the navigable waters of the state would
not, in my judgment, require us to overrule any of these cases. It
would require merely that we should limit the application of the
rule therein announced, and that we should declare our disapproval
of certain expressions used in the opinions. Such limitation of
principles previously announced, and such express disapproval of
dicta, are often necessary. It is an unavoidable incident of the
search by courts of last resort for the true rule. [
Footnote 17] The process of inclusion and
exclusion, so often applied in developing a rule, cannot end with
its first enunciation. The rule as announced must be deemed
tentative. For the many and varying facts to which it will be
applied cannot be foreseen. Modification implies growth. It is the
life of the law.
If the court is of opinion that this Act of Congress is in
necessary conflict with its recent decisions, those cases should be
frankly overruled. The reasons for doing so are persuasive. Our
experience in attempting to apply the rule, and helpful discussion
by friends of the Court, have made it clear that the rule declared
is legally unsound; [
Footnote
18] that it disturbs legal principles
Page 264 U. S. 237
long established, and that, if adhered to, it will make a
serious addition to the classes of cases which this Court is
required to review. [
Footnote
19] Experience and discussion have also made apparent how
unfortunate are the results, economically and socially. It has, in
part, frustrated a promising attempt to alleviate some of the
misery and remove some of the injustice incident to the conduct of
industry and commerce. These far-reaching and unfortunate results
of the rule declared in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
cannot have been foreseen when the decision was rendered. If it is
adhered to, appropriate legislative provision, urgently needed,
cannot be made until another amendment of the Constitution shall
have been adopted. For no federal workmen's compensation law could
satisfy the varying and peculiar economic and social needs incident
to the diversity of conditions in the several states. [
Footnote 20]
Page 264 U. S. 238
The doctrine of
stare decisis should not deter us from
overruling that case and those which follow it. The decisions are
recent ones. They have not been acquiesced in. They have not
created a rule of property around which vested interests have
clustered. They affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On
the other hand, they affect seriously the lives of men, women and
children, and the general welfare.
Stare decisis is
ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal,
inexorable command. The instances in which the court has
disregarded its admonition are many. [
Footnote 21] The existing admiralty jurisdiction rests,
in large part, upon like action of the Court in
The
Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443,
53 U. S. 456.
In that case, the Court overruled
The Thomas
Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428, and
Page 264 U. S. 239
The Steamboat Orleans v.
Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175, and a doctrine declared by
Mr. Justice Story with the concurrence of Chief Justice Marshall,
and approved by Chancellor Kent, was abandoned when found to be
erroneous, although it had been acted on for 26 years.
[
Footnote 1]
Compare Peters v. Veasey, 251 U.
S. 121 (a stevedore);
also Danielsen v. Morse Dry
Dock & Repair Co., 235 N.Y. 439,
cert. denied,
262 U.S. 756;
Warren v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co.,
235 N.Y. 445,
cert. denied, 262 U.S. 756;
Morse Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Connelly, 235 N.Y. 602,
cert.
denied, 262 U.S. 756 (all drydock employees). In
Industrial Accident Com. v. Zurich General Accident, etc.,
Co. 218 P. 563,
cert. denied, 263 U.S. 722, the
injury occurred in connection with the operations of a harbor
dredger not engaged in commerce or navigation. In
Alaska
Packing Association v. Industrial Accident Com., 218 P. 561,
cert. denied, 263 U.S. 722, the accident occurred on an
Alaska fishing vessel while laid up for the winter at San
Francisco, alongside the dock.
[
Footnote 2]
State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation,
259 U. S. 263, a
stevedore.
[
Footnote 3]
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski,
261 U. S. 479, a
member of the crew;
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U. S. 233, a
stevedore.
See also Steamboat Co. v.
Chase, 16 Wall. 522;
Sherlock v. Alling,
93 U. S. 99;
The
Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398.
[
Footnote 4]
Article I, § 8, confers upon Congress power
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof."
The conclusion reached by the court emphasizes not the breadth
of the congressional power, but the limitations upon it.
[
Footnote 5]
That the obligation to contribute to the compensation fund may
be deemed a tax,
see Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 U. S. 219,
243 U. S.
237.
[
Footnote 6]
Compare 36 U. S. Miln,
11 Pet. 102;
Hooper v. California, 155 U.
S. 648.
[
Footnote 7]
The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158;
Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.
S. 255.
[
Footnote 8]
See Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S.
52;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U. S. 205,
244 U. S.
221-222.
[
Footnote 9]
In my opinion, the state law, being sanctioned by Congress, is
valid, also, as applied to accidents suffered in port by persons
other than the master or member of the crew even if the persons
injured are employees of the vessel or of the owners and
notwithstanding their occupations are inherently maritime, like
stevedoring.
[
Footnote 10]
See Ernest Angell, "Recovery Under Workmen's
Compensation Acts for Injury Abroad," 31 Hary.L.Rev. 619, 620.
See also 37 Harv.L.Rev. 375.
Compare Pound,
Spirit of the Common Law (1921) 30.
[
Footnote 11]
Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
184 Cal. 26, 35-37, 39, 44, 45;
255 U. S. 255 U.S.
445.
Compare Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216
N.Y. 544;
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106.
See Ernest Angell,
supra, 31 Harv.L.Rev. 619,
628, 636.
[
Footnote 12]
See Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205,
244 U. S.
244-251;
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R.
Co., 242 U. S. 311;
In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545,
140 U. S.
564.
[
Footnote 13]
Compare Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.
S. 525;
Chicago & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.
S. 274;
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.
S. 343.
[
Footnote 14]
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.
Compare 55 U. S.
Illinois, 14 How. 13;
Halter v Nebraska, 205 U. S.
34.
[
Footnote 15]
Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.
S. 181.
See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U. S. 149,
253 U. S.
168.
[
Footnote 16]
See Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205,
244 U. S.
219-220.
[
Footnote 17]
Compare, e.g., Sonneborn Bros. v Cureton, 262 U.
S. 506,
qualifying Texas Co. v. Brown,
258 U. S. 466;
Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.
S. 642;
Askren v. Continental Oil Co.,
252 U. S. 444;
Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.
S. 389,
and Baltimore & Ohio S.W. R. Co. v.
Settle, 260 U. S. 166,
260 U. S. 173,
overruling dicta in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
Texas, 204 U. S. 403.
[
Footnote 18]
See Edgar Tremlett Fell, Recent Problems in Admiralty
Jurisdiction (1922) 1-53; John Gorham Palfrey, "The Common Law
Courts and the Law of the Sea," 36 Harv.L.Rev. 777; also Vol. 31,
p. 488; Vol. 34, p. 82; Vol. 35, p. 743; Vol. 37, p. 478; E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., "The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty
over the Common Law," 21 Col.L.Rev. 647; also Vol. 17, p. 703; Vol.
20, p. 685; Frederic Cunningham, "Is Every County Court in the
United States a Court of Admiralty?" 53 Am.L.Rev. 749; "The Tables
Turned -- Lord Coke Demolished," 55 Am.L.Rev. 685; J. Whitla
Stinson, "Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction," 54 Am.L.Rev. 908;
Yale L. Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 255, 924; Vol. 28, pp. 281, 835; Vol.
29, p. 925; Mich.L.Rev. Vol. 15, p. 657; Vol. 16, p. 562; Vol. 18,
p. 793; Calif.L.Rev. Vol. 6, p. 69; Vol. 8, p. 338; Vol. 10, p.
234; Minn.L.Rev. Vol. 2, p. 145; Vol. 4, p. 444; Vol. 6, p. 230;
Southern L.Q. Vol. 2, p. 304; Vol. 3, p. 76; Francis J. MacIntyre,
"Admiralty and the Workmen's Compensation Law," 5 Cornell L.Q. 275;
91 Central L.J. 43; 6 Ill. L.Q. 157; 3 Va.L.Reg. (N.S.) 290-296; 61
Am.L.Reg. (N.S.) 42-45.
[
Footnote 19]
By making the substantive maritime law the rule of decision in
the common law courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction, the rule
of
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen introduces into every
case in a state court involving maritime law, even if it is not
affected by any state statute, a federal question which may be
brought to this Court for review either by writ of error or by
petition for a writ of certiorari.
Compare Dahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282,
257 U. S.
293-303;
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants'
Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285,
259 U. S.
290.
[
Footnote 20]
Compare New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield,
244 U. S. 147,
244 U. S. 169.
See Andrew Furuseth, "Harbor Workers Are Not Seamen: An
Essential Distinction in Compensation Legislation," 11 Am.Labor
Leg.Rev. 139; T. V. O'Connor, "The Plight of the Longshoremen,"
id., p. 144; J. R. Coughlin, "Accident Protection for Ship
Repairmen,"
id., p. 146; J. P. Chamberlain, "The Conflict
of Jurisdiction in Compensation for Maritime Workers,"
id., p. 133; L. W. Hatch, "The "Maritime" Twilight Zone
from the Standpoint of Compensation Administration,"
id.,
148; J. B. Andrews, "Legislative Program of Accident Compensation
for "Maritime" Workers,"
ibid., p. 152.
See also
id., Vol. 10, pp. 117, 241; Vol. 12, pp. 53, 69, 103, 104.
[
Footnote 21]
See Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U.
S. 653,
260 U. S. 659,
overruling Ex parte Wisner, 203 U.
S. 449;
Terral v. Burke Construction Co.,
257 U. S. 529,
257 U. S. 533,
overruling Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co.,
94 U. S. 535 and
Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt,
202 U. S. 246;
Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S.
8,
246 U. S. 25, and
Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.
S. 502,
243 U. S. 518,
overruling Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S.
1;
United States v. Nice, 241 U.
S. 591,
241 U. S. 601,
overruling Matter of Heff, 197 U.
S. 488;
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 158 U. S. 601,
overruling 3 U. S. United
States, 3 Dall. 171;
Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U.
S. 367,
153 U. S. 379,
overruling Giles v. Little, 104 U.
S. 291;
Brenham v. German American Bank,
144 U. S. 173,
144 U. S. 187,
overruling 70 U. S.
Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, and
Mitchell
v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270;
Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U. S. 100,
135 U. S. 118,
overruling 46 U. S. New
Hampshire, 5 How. 504;
Morgan v. United States,
113 U. S. 476,
113 U. S. 496,
overruling 74 U. S.
White, 7 Wall. 700;
Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 457,
79 U. S. 553,
overuling 75 U. S.
Griswold, 8 Wall. 603.