The following propositions in regard to lien for supplies
furnished to vessels may be considered as settled:
(1) That, by the maritime law as administered in England and in
this country, a lien is given for necessaries furnished a foreign
vessel upon the credit of such vessel, and that in this particular
the several states of the Union are treated as foreign to each
other.
(2) That no such lien is given for necessaries furnished in the
home port of the vessel, or in the port in which the vessel is
owned, registered, enrolled or licensed, and the remedy in such
case, though enforceable in the admiralty, is
in personam
only.
(3) That it is competent for the states to create liens for
necessaries furnished to domestic vessels, and that such liens will
be enforced by the courts of admiralty under their general
jurisdiction on the subject of necessaries.
Where, however, Congress has dealt with a subject within its
exclusive
power, or where such exclusive power is given to the federal
courts, as
in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it is not
competent for
Page 189 U. S. 186
the states to invade the domain of such jurisdiction and enact
laws which in any way trench upon the power of the federal
courts.
The statutes of the State of Washington, sections 6963, 5964, 2
Ballinger's Code, giving an absolute lien upon foreign vessels for
work done or material furnished at the request of a contractor or
subcontractor, and making no provision for the protection of the
owner in case the contractor has been paid the full amount of his
bill before notice of the claim of the subcontractor is received,
insofar as it attempts to control the administration of the
maritime law by creating and superadding conditions for the benefit
of a particular class of creditors, and thereby depriving the
owners of vessels of defenses to which they would otherwise have
been entitled, is an unlawful interference with the exclusive
jurisdiction of all admiralty and maritime cases which is vested by
the Constitution in the federal courts, and to that extent such
statute is unconstitutional and void.
This was a libel
in rem for materials, and also for
work and labor, alleged to have been furnished by the libellants
King and Winge in the repair of the steamship
Roanoke, to
certain contractors with the owners, who had full charge of the
alteration and repair of the steamship. An intervening libel was
also filed by one Fraser for labor and material furnished under the
same conditions.
The cases resulted in decrees for the libellants, from which the
North American Transportation and Trading Company, owner of the
steamship, appealed directly to this Court, and the following facts
were found:
"The North American Transportation and Trading Company appeared
as claimant and owner, and the vessel was released upon its
stipulation."
"It admitted all the allegations of the libel except that the
work was done on the credit of the ship, which it denied except
that it admitted that libellants had acted under the belief that
they had a lien by virtue of law. It then alleged its incorporation
and existence under the laws of the State of Illinois, the
residence there at all times of its president and general manager,
its maintaining only agencies at Seattle and at other places in
Alaska and Canada, and its enjoying a high credit. The
Roanoke it alleged to be an ocean-going vessel, registered
at Chicago, Illinois, under the navigation laws of the United
States, with the name of 'Chicago' painted on her stern. She was
alleged
Page 189 U. S. 187
to have been purchased by claimant in 1898 on the Atlantic
coast, and, upon the Pacific coast since that time, employed
between Seattle and the mouth of the Yukon in the summer, and
between San Francisco and southern ports in the winter. It was
further alleged that the claimant had never given any order for the
material and labor described in the libel, and that these were
furnished on the order of the contractor, who, before the filing of
the libel and without any knowledge by claimant of these unpaid
claims, had been paid by this claimant for these materials and
labor in full. It was alleged in conclusion that the lien claimed
by libellants was claimed under sections 5953 and 5954 of
Ballinger's Code and Statutes of Washington, that such a lien was
in this instance void, being in violation of the eighth section of
the first article of the Constitution of the United States,
conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the
several states, was an illegal burden upon interstate commerce, and
in violation also of the fourteenth article of the Constitution of
the United States, as depriving claimant of its property without
due process of law and without its equal protection, and was in
violation of the second section of the third article of the
Constitution conferring on the courts of the United States
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
"To the intervening libel of Fraser, the same answer was
made."
"To each of these answers, respectively, the libellants and
intervening libellant excepted as insufficient, and the whole of
each, to constitute any answer or defense to the libel."
"The exceptions were sustained, the claimant elected to stand on
its answer, and a decree was entered against it and its stipulators
for the whole sum claimed in the libels. "
Page 189 U. S. 192
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is appealed directly from the district court to this
Court under that clause of section 5 of the Court of Appeals Act
which permits such appeal "in any case in which the Constitution of
law of a state is claimed to be in contravention of the
Constitution of the United States." No additional significance is
given to the appeal by certain questions certified by the district
court, as the power to certify is only given in cases appealed upon
questions of jurisdiction. But, as the case is properly before us
upon direct appeal from the district court, we proceed to dispose
of the question of the constitutionality of the law of Washington,
under which these proceedings were taken.
Page 189 U. S. 193
By that law, 2 Ballinger's Codes and Statutes, secs. 5953 and
5954 --
"5953. All steamers, vessels, and boats, their tackle, apparel,
and furniture, are liable --"
"
* * * *"
"3. For work done or material furnished in this state, for their
construction, repair, or equipment at the request of their
respective owners, masters, agents, consignees, contractors,
subcontractors, or other person or persons having charge in whole
or in part of their construction, alteration, repair, or equipment,
and every contractor, subcontractor, builder, or person having
charge, either in whole or in part, of the construction,
alteration, repair, or equipment of any vessel, shall be held to be
the agent of the owner, for the purposes of this chapter;"
"
* * * *"
"Demands for these several causes constitute liens upon all
steamers, vessels, and boats, and their tackle, apparel, and
furniture, and have priority in their order herein enumerated, and
have preference over all other demands; but such liens only
continue in force for the period of three years from the time the
cause of action accrued."
"5954. Such liens may be enforced in all cases of maritime
contracts or service by a suit in admiralty,
in rem, and
the law regulating proceedings in admiralty shall govern in all
such suits, and in all cases of contracts or service not maritime
by a civil action in any district court of this territory."
In this connection, the following propositions may be considered
as settled:
1. That, by the maritime law, as administered in England and in
this country, a lien is given for necessaries furnished a foreign
vessel upon the credit of such vessel,
The
General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438;
The
Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129; Gen. Admiralty Rule 12, and
that, in this particular, the several states of this Union are
treated as foreign to each other.
The
General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438;
The
Kalorama, 10 Wall. 204,
77 U. S.
212.
2. That no such lien is given for necessaries furnished in the
home port of the vessel or in the port in which the vessel is
owned, registered, enrolled, or licensed, and the remedy in
such
Page 189 U. S. 194
case, though enforceable in the admiralty, is
in
personam only.
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558;
The Edith,
94 U. S. 518. This
is a distinct departure from the Continental system, which makes no
account of the domicil of the vessel, and is a relic of the
prohibitions of Westminster Hall against the Court of Admiralty, to
the principle of which this Court has steadily adhered.
3. That it is competent for the states to create liens for
necessaries furnished to domestic vessels, and that such liens will
be enforced by the courts of admiralty under their general
jurisdiction over the subject of necessaries.
The
General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438;
Peyroux v.
Howard, 7 Pet. 324;
The St.
Lawrence, 1 Black 522;
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558;
The
Belfast, 7 Wall. 624;
The J. E. Rumbell,
148 U. S. 1,
148 U. S. 12. The
right to extend these liens to foreign vessels in any case is open
to grave doubt.
The Chusan, 2 Story 455;
The
Lyndhurst, 48 F. 839.
The question involved in this case, however, is whether the
states may create such liens as against foreign vessels (vessels
owned in other states or countries), and under such circumstances
as would not authorize a lien under the general maritime law. The
question is one of very considerable importance, as it involves the
power of each state, which a vessel may visit in the course of a
long voyage, to impose liens under wholly different circumstances
and upon wholly different conditions. In the case under
consideration, the vessel was owned by an Illinois corporation
enjoying a high credit and maintaining agencies at Seattle and at
other places in Alaska and Canada. The
Roanoke was an
ocean-going vessel, registered at Chicago under the navigation laws
of the United States, with the name "Chicago" painted on her stern,
although she was engaged in trade upon the Pacific coast between
Seattle and the mouth of the Yukon in summer, and between San
Francisco and southern ports in winter. Neither the owner nor
master nor other officers of the vessel had given an order for the
material and labor set forth in the libel, which were furnished
upon the order of a contractor, who, before the filing
Page 189 U. S. 195
of the libel and without any knowledge by the owner of these
unpaid claims,
had been paid in full for these claims.
Although this Court has never directly decided whether materials
and labor furnished by workmen or subcontractors constitute a lien
upon a vessel -- in other words, whether the contractor can be
regarded as an agent of the vessel in the purchase of such labor
and materials -- there is a general consensus of opinion in the
state courts and in the inferior federal courts that labor and
materials furnished to a contractor do not constitute a lien upon
the vessel unless at least notice be given to the owner of such
claim before the contractor has received the sum stipulated by his
contract.
Smith v. The Steamer Eastern Railroad, 1 Curtis
253;
Southwick v. The Clyde, 6 Blackf. 148;
Hubbell v.
Denison, 20 Wend. 181;
Burst v. Jackson, 10 Barb.
219;
The Whitaker, 1 Sprague, 229, 282;
Harper v. The
New Brig, Gilpin 536;
Ames v. Swett, 33 Me. 479;
Squire v. One Hundred Tons of Iron, 2 Ben. 21;
The
Marguette, Brown's Adm. 364.
The injustice of permitting such claims to be set up is plainly
apparent. The master is the agent of the vessel and its owner in
more than the ordinary sense. During the voyage, he is in fact the
alter ego of his principal. He is entrusted with an uncontrolled
authority to provide for the crew and for the preservation and
repair of the ship. He engages the cargoes, receives the freight,
hires and pays his crew, and is entrusted, perhaps for years, with
the command and disposition of the vessel. With full authority to
bind the vessel, his position is such that it is almost impossible
for him to acquaint himself with the laws of each individual state
he may visit, and he has a right to suppose that the general
maritime law applies to him and his ship wherever she may go,
unhampered by laws which are mainly intended for local application
or for domestic vessels. Local laws such as the one under
consideration ordinarily protect the ship by requiring notice of
the claim to be filed in some public office, limiting the time to a
few weeks or months within which the laborer or subcontractor may
proceed against her, requiring notice to be given of the claim,
before the contractor himself has been paid, and limiting his
recovery
Page 189 U. S. 196
to the amount remaining unpaid at the time such notice is
received. The statute of Washington, however, provides for an
absolute lien upon the ship for work done or material furnished at
the request of the contractor or subcontractor, and makes no
provision for the protection of the owner is case the contractor
has been paid the full amount of his bill before notice of the
claim of the subcontractor is received. The finding in this case is
that the contractor, who had agreed, in consonance with the usual
course of business, to make the repairs upon this vessel, had been
paid in full by the claimant. The injustice of holding the ship
under the circumstances is plainly manifest.
Not only is the statute in question obnoxious to the general
maritime law in declaring every contractor and subcontractor an
agent of the owner, but it establishes a new order of priority in
payment of liens, abolishes the ancient and equitable rule
regarding "stale claims," and permits the assertion of a lien at
any time within three years, regardless of the fact that the vessel
may have been sold to a
bona fide purchaser not only
without notice of the claim, but without the possibility of
informing himself by a resort to the public records. It also gives,
or at least creates the presumption of, a lien, though the
materials be furnished upon the order of the owner in person.
No opinion upon this subject can afford to ignore the admirable
discussion of Mr. Justice Story in the case of
The Chusan,
2 Story 455, in which he refused to apply to a Massachusetts vessel
a law of the State of New York requiring a lien for supplies to be
enforced before the vessel left the state:
"This statute is, as I conceive, perfectly constitutional as
applied to cases of repairs of domestic ships -- that is, of ships
belonging to the ports of that state. . . . But in cases of foreign
ships and supplies furnished to them, the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States is governed by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and is in no sense governed, controlled,
or limited by the local legislation. . . . For myself, I can only
say that, during the whole of my judicial life, I have never up to
the present hour heard a single doubt breathed upon the
subject."
To the same effect is
The Lundhurst, 48 F. 839.
Page 189 U. S. 197
While no case involving this precise question seems to have
arisen in this Court, we have several times had occasion to hold
that, where Congress has dealt with a subject within its exclusive
power, or where such exclusive power is given to the federal
courts, as in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it is
not competent for states to invade that domain of legislation, and
enact laws which in any way trench upon the power of the federal
government. cases arising in other branches of the law furnish apt
analogies. The principle is stated in a nutshell by Chief Justice
Marshall in
Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122,
17 U. S.
193:
"But it has never been supposed that this concurrent power of
legislation extended to every possible case in which its exercise
by the states has not been expressly prohibited. The confusion
resulting from such a practice would be endless. . . . That
whenever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the
nature of the power, required that it should be exercised
exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from
the state legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to
act on it."
This was said of a bankrupt law of New York which assumed to
discharge the debtor from all liability for debts previously
contracted, notwithstanding the Constitution had vested the power
in Congress of establishing uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcy. It was held that the states had a right to pass
bankrupt laws until the power had been acted upon by Congress,
though the law of New York discharging the debtor from liability
was held to be void as impairing the obligation of prior contracts
within the meaning of the Constitution.
In
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485,
95 U. S. 498,
it was said that, inasmuch as interstate commerce is regulated very
largely by congressional legislation, it followed that such
legislation must supersede all state legislation upon the same
subject, and, by necessary implication, prohibit it, except in
cases where the legislation of Congress manifests an intention to
leave some particular matter to be regulated by the several states
-- as for instance in the case of pilotage.
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. Upon this principle,
it was held that a law of Louisiana excluding colored passengers
from the cabin set
Page 189 U. S. 198
apart for the use of whites during the passage of steamboats
down the Mississippi was a regulation of interstate commerce, and
therefore unconstitutional. To the same effect is
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227. In the subsequent cases of
Louisville &c. Railway v. Mississippi, 133 U.
S. 587, and
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.
S. 537, state laws requiring separate railway carriages
for the white and colored races were sustained upon the ground that
they applied only between places in the same state.
In the very recent case of
Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.
S. 220, it was held that a state law punishing
presidents of banks receiving deposits of money at a time when the
bank was insolvent, and when such insolvency was known to them, was
unconstitutional as applied to national banks whose operations were
governed exclusively by acts of Congress. Said Mr. Justice
Shiras:
"But we are unable to perceive that Congress intended to leave
the field open for the states to attempt to promote the welfare and
stability of national banks by direct legislation. If they had such
power, it would have to be exercised and limited by their own
discretion, and confusion would necessarily result from control,
possessed and exercised by two independent authorities."
See also Farmers' &c. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S.
29;
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 425.
The following cases are also to the same general effect:
Degant v. Michael, 2 Ind. 396;
State v. Pike, 15
N.H. 83;
Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand.Ch. 583, 644;
Jack v.
Martin, 12 Wend. 311;
Ex Parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429,
450;
People v. Fonda, 62 Mich. 401. Although it is equally
true that, where Congress, having the power, has exercised it but
incidentally, and obviously with no intention of covering the
subject, the states may supplement its legislation by regulations
of their own not inconsistent with it.
Reid v. Colorado,
187 U. S. 137.
Bearing in mind that exclusive jurisdiction of all admiralty and
maritime cases is vested by the Constitution in the federal courts,
which are thereby made judges of the scope of such jurisdiction,
subject, of course, to congressional legislation, the statute of
the State of Washington, insofar as it attempts to
Page 189 U. S. 199
control the administration of the maritime law by creating and
superadding conditions for the benefit of a particular class of
creditors, and thereby depriving the owners of vessels of defenses
to which they would otherwise have been entitled, is an unlawful
interference with that jurisdiction, and to that extent is
unconstitutional and void.
The decree of the district court is therefore reversed, and
the case remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the
libels.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurred in the result.
