1. In an action to recover penalties from a bridge company for
failure to build foot and carriage ways upon its railway bridge as
required by an act amending its charter, it is premature to inquire
whether a distinct and independent provision, reducing the tolls
chargeable for vehicles and pedestrians below the limits fixed in
the charter, impairs the obligation of the charter contract, since
the invalidity of the toll reductions would not affect the
requirement to build the additions. P.
254 U. S.
130.
2. Under acts of New York and Canada consolidating a New York
with a like Canadian corporation, the new company constructed a
bridge over the Niagara River for railroad uses only. The original
charters provided for constructing foot and carriage ways also,
that of New York in permissive, but that of Canada in mandatory
language, and the acts of consolidation bound the new company to
all the duties of each of its constituents.
Held: that the
new company had no charter contract immunity from being required to
add the foot and carriage ways in New York under power reserved by
the state to amend the charter, and that such requirement was not
inconsistent with the contract clause of the Constitution, nor, in
the absence of anything to show that the additions would not yield
a reasonable return, could it be held to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id.
3. The Act of June 30, 1870, c. 176, 16 Stat. 173, in
recognizing as a lawful structure any bridge constructed across the
Niagara River in pursuance of New York Laws, 1857, c. 753, and
amendments (Laws 1869, c. 550), subject to the supervision of the
Secretary of War and his approval of the plans, recognized that the
existence of the bridge company and its right to build on New York
land came from New York, and the facts that the bridge when built,
as a railroad bridge
Page 254 U. S. 127
only, was devoted wholly to international commerce and that
Congress by the Act of June 23, 1874, c. 475, 18 Stat. 275,
declared it a lawful structure and an established post route for
mail of the United States, did not supplant the authority of the
state to require the company to equip the bridge with way for foot
passengers and vehicles, as contemplated by its charter. P.
254 U. S.
131.
4. The Act of 1874,
supra, by declaring the bridge
lawful as built, did not repeal the authority given by the Act of
1870,
supra, to build subject to the approval of the
Secretary of War, and the fact that this bridge was twice rebuilt
without foot and carriage ways with the Secretary's consent, but
under plan approved by him and providing for such additions in
future, supports, rather than negatives, the view that the power of
the state to require them was contemplated throughout, and that
Congress did not seek to divest it.
Id.
5. The mere fact that a bridge is international, crossing an
international stream, does not, of itself, divest the state of
power over its part of the structure, in the silence of Congress.
P.
254 U.S. 133.
6. The Act of March 3, 1899, 9, C. 425, 30 Stat. 1151, in
requiring the assent of Congress to the erection of bridges over
navigable waters not wholly within a state, does not make Congress
the source of the right to build, but assumes that the right comes
from the state.
Id.
7. The conveyance of a part of the land under the bridge to the
United States for a public purpose not connected with the
administration of the government did not affect the authority of
New York over the residue within the state, and, taken in
connection with the acts of the government before and after the
grant, does not invalidate, even in part, the New York act
requiring the additional construction. P.
254 U. S.
134.
223 N.Y. 137 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 254 U. S. 128
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought by the State of New York to recover
penalties from the Bridge Company for failure to place upon its
bridge a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians between
Squaw Island in Niagara River and the mainland of New York State,
as required by c. 666 of the Laws of 1915 of the State of New York.
The defendant set up that the act was contrary to the Constitution
of the United States in specified respects, but the plaintiff got
judgment in the Supreme Court, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 223 N.Y. 137.
The Bridge Company originally was incorporated by a special
charter from the State of New York. Laws of 1857, c. 753. As the
bridge was to cross the Niagara River from Buffalo to Canada, a
similar corporation was created under the laws of Canada, 20 Vict.
c. 227, and subsequently the two corporations were consolidated,
pursuant to Laws of New York, 1869, c. 550, and a Canadian Act, 32
and 33 Vict. c. 65, subject to all the duties of each of the
consolidated companies. By the Act of Congress of June 30, 1870, c.
176, 16 Stat. 173, any bridge constructed across the Niagara River
in pursuance of the New York Act of 1857 and any acts of the New
York legislature then in force amending the same was authorized as
a lawful structure subject to the supervision of the Secretary of
War and his approval of the plans. By the New York Act of 1857,
"Said bridge may be constructed as well for the passage of persons
on foot and in carriages and otherwise as for the passage of
railroad trains," § 15. And "whenever said bridge shall be complete
for the passage of ordinary teams and carriages," the company may
erect toll gates and charge tolls not exceeding certain rates for
foot passengers, carriages, &c. The original Canadian act had
words similar to those just quoted from
Page 254 U. S. 129
§ 15, except that it said "shall be constructed" instead of "may
be," a fact to which we shall advert again.
Between 1870 and 1874, the bridge was built as required by the
charter with one draw across Black Rock Harbor and one across the
main channel of the river. It crossed Squaw Island on a trestle,
afterwards filled in, but was built as a railroad bridge
exclusively, without any provision for footpaths or roadways. By
the Act of Congress of June 23, 1874, c. 475, 18 Stat. 275, it was
declared a lawful structure and an established post route for the
mail of the United States. In the year 1899, a plan for rebuilding
the bridge with wings for roadways and footpaths was approved by
the Secretary of War subject to changes at the expense of the
Company if the Secretary should deem them advisable. The rebuilding
took place in 1899-1901, but omitted the wings, and this
modification was assented to by the Secretary of War.
The Niagara River is navigable at this point. In pursuance of
plans for improvement adopted by the United States, in 1906 it
acquired from the State of New York the land under Black Rock
Harbor, lying on the New York side of Squaw Island, and the
adjacent portions of the Erie Canal, both being within the limits
of the state and crossed by the bridge. Thereafter, the
improvements were carried out.
In 1907, the Secretary of War gave notice to the Company that
the bridge over Black Rock Harbor and Erie Canal obstructed
navigation, and that changes were required. The Company submitted
plans again showing in dotted lines wings for roadways and
footpaths, noting that they were not to be put in at present, but
that provision was made in the design for their future
construction. The plans were approved, and the bridge was built
without the wings, the completion being reported by his resident
representative to the Secretary of War.
By c. 666 of the Laws of New York for 1915, the charter
Page 254 U. S. 130
of the Company was amended so as to require the construction of
a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians upon the draw
across Black Rock Harbor, the Company being allowed to charge tolls
not exceeding specified sums. The Company failed to comply with the
requirement, and the time limit had expired before this suit was
brought to recover penalties imposed by the act. It is found that
the construction was necessary for the public interest and
convenience; that the cost of the changes is insignificant in
comparison with the assets and net earnings of the Company, and
that it does not appear that the investment would not yield a
reasonable return.
The first objections to the new requirement made by the state
are that it impairs the obligation of the contract in the original
charter and takes the Company's property without due process of
law. The argument is based partly upon a reduction of the tolls
from those mentioned in the charter of 1857, made by the Act of
1915. Concerning this, it is enough to say that the objection is
premature. The clause relating to the construction of the roadway
and pathway is distinct from and independent of that which fixes
the maximum rates to be charged. The latter might be invalid and
the former good. If the rates are too low, they can be changed at
any time. The only question now before us is whether the additions
shall be built. As to that, it would be going very far in the way
of limiting the reserved right to amend such charters if it should
be held that the state had not the power to require what originally
was contemplated in permissive words as part of the scheme. But,
however that might be, the New York Act authorizing consolidation
subjected this consolidated corporation to the duties of the
Canadian as well as of the New York charter, and the Canadian Act
made the arrangement for foot passengers and carriages a duty. The
words that we have quoted plainly impose one. The
Page 254 U. S. 131
opinion in
Attorney General v. International Bridge
Co., 6 Ont.App. 537, 543, implies that they do so by speaking
of the abandonment of a portion of the work as probably an abuse of
the Act of Parliament, and the same is clearly stated in
Canada
Southern Ry. Co. v. International Bridge Co., 8 App.Cases,
723, 729.
It is argued that, the Canadian Act governing only the Canadian
side, its adoption by New York carried the obligation no farther.
But it appears to us that it would be quibbling with the rational
understanding of the duty assumed to say that the company could
have supposed that it had a contract or property right to confine
its building of the footpath and carriage-way to the Canada side of
the boundary line.
The New York Legislature, of course, confined its command to the
half of the bridge within its jurisdiction. It may be presumed
that, if that command is obeyed, either Canada or the Company will
see the propriety of carrying the way and path across to the other
shore. At all events, the power of New York to insist upon its
rights is not limited by speculation upon that point. As we agree
with the Court of Appeals that this amendment to the charter was
within the power reserved to the state. the objection under the
contract clause of the Constitution, of course, must fail, and, it
would seem, that under the Fourteenth Amendment also. But, as to
the latter, we may add, as the Court of Appeals added, that there
is nothing to show that the addition to the structure will not
yield a reasonable return, if that be essential in view of the
charter.
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.
S. 262;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 242 U. S. 603.
The only argument that impresses us, and the one that was most
pressed, is that this is an international bridge, and that Congress
has assumed such control of it as to exclude any intermeddling by
the state. It is said that
Page 254 U. S. 132
the bridge as constructed was and is devoted wholly to
international commerce, and that, when Congress authorized it in
that form in 1874, that authority must be regarded as the charter
under which it was maintained. Without repeating the considerations
urged in support of this conclusion, we will state the reasons that
prevail with us. The part of the structure with which we are
concerned is within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of
New York. There was no exercise of the power of eminent domain by
the United States. The state was the source of every title to that
land and, apart from the special purposes to which it might be
destined, of every right to use it. Any structure upon it,
considered merely as a structure, is erected by the authority of
New York. The nature and qualifications of ownership are decided by
the state, and although certain supervening uses consistent with
those qualifications cannot be interfered with by the state, still
the foundation of a right to use the land at all must be laid by
state law. Not only the existence of the company, but its right to
build upon New York land came from New York, as was recognized by
the form of the original Act of Congress of 1870, which speaks of
any bridge built "in pursuance of" the New York statutes. It did
not, as perhaps the New York Consolidation Act did, refer to those
statutes simply as documents and incorporate them; it referred to
them as the source of the Company's power.
From an early date, the state has been recognized as the source
of authority in the absence of action by Congress.
Willson v.
Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245;
Escanaba
Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678. And
this Court has been slow to interpret such action as intended to
exclude the source of rights from all power in the premises. In a
case of navigable waters wholly within a state, over which a right
of way had been conveyed to the United States and which the United
States was spending considerable
Page 254 U. S. 133
sums to improve, it was held that, whether or nor Congress had
power to authorize private persons to build in such waters without
the consent of the state, an act making comprehensive regulations
of work within them did not manifest a purpose to exclude the
previously existing authority of the state over such work.
Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410,
188 U. S. 413,
188 U. S. 428
et seq.
But it is said that a different rule applies to an international
stream, and that Congress has recognized the distinction by the Act
of March 3, 1899, c. 425, § 9, 30 Stat. 1151. It is true that that
statute makes a distinction, but the distinction is that bridges
may be built across navigable waters wholly within the state if
approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War, but,
with regard to waters not wholly within the state, only after the
consent of Congress has been obtained. The Act does not make
Congress the source of the right to build, but assumes that the
right comes from another source -- that is, the state. It merely
subjects the right supposed to have been obtained from there to the
further condition of getting from Congress consent to action upon
the grant.
No doubt, in the case of an international bridge, the action of
a state will be scrutinized in order to avoid any possible ground
for international complaint, but the mere fact that the bridge was
of that nature would not, of itself, take away the power of the
state over its part of the structure if Congress were silent, any
more than the fact that it was a passageway for interstate commerce
or crossed a navigable stream. When Congress has acted, we see no
reason for not leaving the situation as Congress has seemed to
leave it if, on the most critical examination, we discover no
intent to withdraw state control, but, on the contrary, an
assumption that the control is to remain. We have adverted to the
implications of the general law of 1899, and have mentioned the
statutes that deal specifically with
Page 254 U. S. 134
this bridge. The Act of 1874 declaring the existing bridge
lawful was a confirmation which it was natural to seek, but was not
a repeal of the authority given to the Company in 1870 to build
subject to the approval of the Secretary of War. The superstructure
has been rebuilt since 1874, and the Secretary of War twice has
approved plans showing the carriage and footways. It is true that
the Company never has sought to execute that part of the plan, but,
on the facts that we have stated, it appears to us a strange
contention that it has contract or property rights not to be
required to build the bridge, or that Congress, by implication, has
forbidden the state to demand that the plan recognized by everyone
from the beginning should at last be carried out.
The conveyance of a part of the land under the bridge to the
United States for a public purpose not connected with the
administration of the government did not affect the authority of
New York over the residue within the state, and, taken in
connection with the acts of the government before and after the
grant, does not invalidate the statute of 1915 even in part.
See Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410,
188 U. S. 413;
Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.
S. 525;
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.
S. 343,
246 U. S.
346.
Judgment affirmed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, and MR. JUSTICE
McREYNOLDS dissent.