United States v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 190 (1916)
U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 190 (1916)
United States v. Northern Pacific Railway Company
Argued October 27, 1916
Decided December 4, 1916
242 U.S. 190
A railroad company which, being required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to report all instances in which its employees have been kept on duty longer than the period provided by the Hours of Service Act, 34 Stat. 1415, omits from its report as filed certain instances of excessive service, under the honest but mistaken belief that they did not come within that act, is not liable to the penalties prescribed by § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, 556, where it appears that the mistake was not only honest, but was made in a genuinely doubtful case.
Section 20 in its penal features should be applied only to cases coming plainly within its terms. Semble that the only sanction securing the correctness of such reports is the penalty for the perjury committed when the oath under which they are made is violated.
In construing a penal provision, the Court will be slow to attribute to Congress an intention to exact punishment which the government itself has conceded would be greatly disproportionate to the offence.
Statutes should be construed, if possible, so that their requirements shall be apparent in their own terms, rather than dependent upon the discretion of executive officers.
213 F. 162 affirmed.
This is a civil proceeding brought by the United States in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota to recover $500 from the Northern Pacific Railway Company for the claimed failure to file, for five successive days, with the Interstate Commerce Commission, a report of violations of the Hours of Service Act, as required by an order of the Commission issued June 28, 1911. The order was made under authority of § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended June 18th,
1910, 36 Stat. 539, 556, and has the force of statute law. It requires the carrier to report "under oath" within thirty days after the end of each month all instances where employees have been on duty for a longer period than that provided in said act, which in this case was sixteen hours.
The district court rendered judgment for the government, which was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (213 F. 162). The case is here for decision on writ of certiorari.
The judgment of the district court was rendered on the pleadings, the admitted facts of the case being as follows:
Five employees of defendant were called to take charge of a wrecking train at 8:10 o'clock p.m. October 29, 1911, but, before they reported at the place of duty, it was ascertained that such train would not be needed, and when the arrived, they were notified that their services would not then be required, but that they should report for duty at 10:35 o'clock p.m. the same evening. From 8:10 to 10:35, they did not render any service "save that they kept alive the fire in the engine during said period." At 10:35 o'clock, the five men entered upon a freight train run which, because of hot boxes, was delayed so that it did not arrive at destination until 1:15 o'clock p.m. the next day.
If the service of the men were considered as beginning at 8:10 o'clock, the hour for which they were called, they were on duty for 17 hours and 5 minutes, but if the time were reckoned from 10:35 p.m., when the men actually took charge of the freight train, they were on duty less than sixteen hours. It is admitted that the officials of the railway company believed in good faith that the time of the men should be reckoned from 10:35 p.m., and not from 8:10 p.m., and that, for that reason, when next after October 30th, 1911, they filed their report of employees
subject to the act who had been kept on duty for a longer period than sixteen hours, the names of the members of this crew were omitted, although the names of many other employees who had been kept on duty longer than the statutory limit were stated in that report.
It was conceded at the hearing in the circuit court of appeals that the United States had sued the company for the "forfeitures" prescribed for these excessive services under discussion in this case, and had secured a judgment which had been paid, and that thereby it was determined, for the purposes of this suit, that these employees were on duty from 8:10 o'clock P.M., and therefore for more than sixteen hours.
The government's claim in the case is for the omission for five days to file the report, and it prays judgment for "forfeitures" aggregating $500, although, when the complaint was filed, the report claimed to be defective had been on file from November 30th, 1911, to September 14th, 1912, and if the "forfeitures" of $100 per day prescribed by the law for each day of failure to file a proper report were allowed, the amount of recovery by the government would be $28,900, and it is only by grace of the public officials that the claim in the suit was not for this amount instead of for $500.