After the Supreme Court of South Carolina had construed the
mortgage contract in accord with the claim of the plaintiffs, and
gave judgment accordingly, in an application for a rehearing, it
was set up for the first time that this was in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.
Held, that this came
too late.
The assertion that, although no federal question was raised
below, and although the mind of the state court was not directed to
the fact that a right protected by the Constitution of the United
States was relied on, nevertheless it is the duty of this Court to
look into the record, and determine whether the existence of such a
claim was not necessarily involved was unsound, as shown by
authority.
This action was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas of
Darlington County, South Carolina, by Welling and Bonnoitt to
recover of the Eastern Building & Loan Association of Syracuse,
New York, the penalty provided by the statutes of South Carolina
for wrongfully failing to enter in the proper office satisfaction
of a mortgage which had been executed by Welling and Bonnoitt to
the association.
The controversy presented by the issue joined was whether the
mortgage in question secured merely the payment of seventy-eight
promissory notes, each maturing monthly, and aggregating $6,065.10,
or whether, in addition, such mortgage secured the payment of the
dues and assessments upon certain shares of stock in said
association which had been subscribed for by Welling and Bonnoitt.
The trial court ruled that the mortgage secured only payment of the
notes. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff upon the
verdict of a jury was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina. 56 S.C. 280. Thereupon a writ of error was
allowed.
Page 181 U. S. 48
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal questions asserted to be presented by the record are
in substance the following:
1. That the Supreme Court of South Carolina, by its decision,
refused full faith and credit to public acts of the State of New
York;
2. That by such decision the obligation of a contract was
impaired; and,
3. That the decision deprived the plaintiff in error of its
property without due process of law.
While in various forms, in the trial court, the association in
effect claimed that the law of its incorporation formed a part and
parcel of the mortgage contract, and that the decisions of the
courts of New York respecting the powers and contracts of
associations thus incorporated should be given effect, nowhere does
it appear that it was claimed that to refuse to concur in the view
stated would operate to deny the protection of the Constitution of
the United States. The trial court disposed of the case solely upon
what it regarded as the plain import of the terms of the contract,
irrespective of the laws of New York and the decisions of the New
York courts, yet in the numerous exceptions predicated on the
rulings of that court there was not contained, either directly or
indirectly, any contention that rights of the association protected
by the Constitution of the United States had been invaded. It was
not until after the Supreme Court of South Carolina construed the
mortgage contract in accord with the claim of the plaintiffs, and
that court had hence affirmed the judgment of the trial court and
remitted the cause to that court, that, in an application for a
rehearing, numerous grounds were set forth in which were contained
assertions that the adverse decision of the supreme court of the
state was in conflict with several clauses of the Constitution of
the United States. But this came too late.
Bobb v.
Jamison, 155 U. S. 416;
Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.
S. 540, and cases cited.
Page 181 U. S. 49
The assertion that, although no federal question was raised
below, and although the mind of the state court was not directed to
the fact that a right protected by the Constitution of the United
States was relied upon, nevertheless that it is our duty to look
into the record and determine whether the existence of such a claim
was not necessarily involved is demonstrated to be unsound by a
conclusive line of authority.
Spies v. Illinois,
123 U. S. 131,
123 U. S. 181;
French v. Hopkins, 124 U. S. 524;
Chappell v. Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132;
Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U. S. 52;
Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462;
Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U.
S. 648;
Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Street
Railway Co., 172 U. S.
488.
The error involved in the argument arises from failing to
observe that the particular character of federal right which is
here asserted is embraced within those which the statute requires
to be "specially set up or claimed." The confusion of thought
involved in the proposition relied upon is very clearly pointed out
in the authorities to which we have referred, and especially in the
latest case cited,
Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Street
Railway Co., supra.
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.