Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welf. Rights. Org.Annotate this Case
426 U.S. 26 (1976)
U.S. Supreme Court
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welf. Rights. Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
Argued December 10, 1975
Decided June 1, 1976
426 U.S. 26
Respondents in No. 74-1124 (hereinafter respondents), several low income individuals and organizations representing such individuals, brought this class action in District Court on behalf of all persons unable to afford hospital services, against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. They claimed that Revenue Ruling 69-545, which announced an Internal Revenue Service policy of extending favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code) to hospitals that did not serve indigents to the extent of the hospitals' financial ability, "encouraged" hospitals to deny services to indigents, and was invalid because it was an erroneous interpretation of the Code and because it had been issued in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The complaint described instances in which the individual respondents had been refused treatment, because of their indigency, at hospitals enjoying favorable tax treatment under the policy announced in the challenged Revenue Ruling and alleged to be receiving substantial contributions as a result of that treatment. The District Court overruled the motion to dismiss of petitioners in No. 74-1124 (hereinafter petitioners), which included a challenge to respondents' standing, and, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held Revenue Ruling 69-545 void as contrary to the Code. The Court of Appeals also found standing in respondents, but upheld Revenue Ruling 69-545.
Held: The District Court should have granted petitioners' motion to dismiss because respondents failed to establish their standing to bring this suit. Pp. 426 U. S. 37-46.
(a) When a plaintiff's standing is challenged the relevant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff
has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, and unless such a showing is made, a federal court cannot exercise its power consistent with the "case or controversy" limitation of Art. III of the Constitution. Pp. 426 U. S. 37-39.
(b) The respondent organizations, which alleged no injury to themselves qua organizations, cannot establish standing simply on the basis that they are dedicated to promoting access of the poor to health services. An organization's abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by an adjudication does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art. III. Sierra Club v. Morton,405 U. S. 727. Pp. 426 U. S. 39-40.
(c) Allegations that the individual respondents and members of respondent organizations were denied hospital services because of indigency do not establish a case or controversy in this suit, which is not brought against any hospital, but against Treasury officials. The Art. III "case or controversy" limitation requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of a defendant, and not solely to some third party. Pp. 426 U. S. 40-42.
(d) Though petitioners alleged that the adoption of Revenue Ruling 69-545 "encouraged" hospitals to deny services to indigents, it is purely speculative (1) whether the alleged denials of service are ascribable to petitioners' "encouragement" or resulted from the hospitals' decisions apart from tax considerations, and (2) whether the exercise of the District Court's remedial powers would make such services available to respondents. Respondents' allegation that the hospitals that denied them service receive substantial contributions, without more, does not establish that those hospitals are dependent upon such contributions. It thus appears that respondents relied
"on little more than the remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that their situation might have been better had [petitioners] acted otherwise, and might improve were the [District Court] to afford relief."
Warth v. Seldin,422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 507. Consequently, respondents failed to carry their burden of showing that their injury is the consequence of petitioners' action or that prospective relief will remove the harm. Warth v. Seldin, supra; Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,410 U. S. 614, followed. Pp. 426 U. S. 42-46.
165 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 506 F.2d 1278, vacated and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 426 U. S. 46. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 426 U. S. 46. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.