Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner
387 U.S. 136 (1967)

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U.S. Supreme Court

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner

No. 39

Argued January 16, 1967

Decided May 22, 1967

387 U.S. 136

Syllabus

The Commissioner of Food and Drugs, exercising authority delegated to him by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, issued regulations requiring that labels and advertisements for prescription drugs which bear proprietary names for the drugs or the ingredients carry the corresponding "established name" (designated by the Secretary) every time the proprietary or trade name is used. These regulations were designed to implement the 1962 amendment to § 502(e)(1)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Petitioners, drug manufacturers and a manufacturers' association, challenged the regulations on the ground that the Commissioner exceeded his authority under the statute. The District Court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought, finding that the scope of the statute was not as broad as that of the regulations. The Court of Appeals reversed without reaching the merits, holding that pre-enforcement review of the regulations was unauthorized and beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court, and that no "actual case or controversy" existed.

Held:

1. Preenforcement review of these regulations is not prohibited by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Pp. 387 U. S. 139-148.

(a) The courts should restrict access to judicial review only upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of a contrary legislative intent. Rusk v. Cort,369 U. S. 367, 369 U. S. 379-380. Pp. 387 U. S. 139-141.

(b) The statutory scheme in the food and drug area does not exclude pre-enforcement judicial review. Pp. 387 U. S. 141-144.

(c) The special review provisions of § 701(f) of the Act, applying to regulations embodying technical factual determinations, were simply intended to assure adequate judicial review of such agency decisions, and manifest no congressional purpose to eliminate review of other kinds of agency action. P. 387 U. S. 144.

Page 387 U. S. 137

(d) The saving clause of § 701(f)(6), which states that the "remedies provided for in this subsection shall be in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies provided by law," does not foreclose pre-enforcement judicial review, and should be read in harmony with the policy favoring judicial review expressed in the Administrative Procedure Act and court decisions. Pp. 387 U. S. 144-146.

(e) Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,339 U. S. 594, which did not concern the promulgation of a self-operative industry-wide regulation, distinguished. Pp. 387 U. S. 146-148.

2. This case presents a controversy "ripe" for judicial resolution. Pp. 387 U. S. 148-156.

(a) The issue of statutory construction is purely legal, and the regulations are "final agency action" within § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,316 U. S. 407, and similar cases followed. Pp. 387 U. S. 149-152.

(b) The impact of the regulations upon petitioners is sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review at this stage. Pp. 387 U. S. 152-154.

(c) Here, the pre-enforcement challenge by nearly all prescription drug manufacturers is not calculated to delay or impede effective enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Pp. 387 U. S. 154-155.

352 F.2d 286, reversed and remanded.

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