Docket entries in the courts of the District of Columbia, as in
Maryland, stand in the place of, and perhaps are, the record, and
receive all the consideration that is yielded to the formal record
in other states.
The record of a former suit between the parties, in which the
declaration consisted of a special count, and the common money
counts, and where there was a general verdict on the entire
declaration, cannot be given in evidence as an estoppel in a second
suit founded on the special count, for the verdict may have been
rendered on the common counts.
This rule is not varied by the circumstance that after the
verdict was rendered the court directed judgment to be entered for
the plaintiffs on the first count in the declaration, being the
special count.
The authorities upon the doctrine of estoppel examined.
Page 65 U. S. 334
These two cases related to the same subject matter, and were
argued together. The first case was an action brought by Sickles
and Cook for their share of the earnings of the steam packet
company by the use of their cut-off from March 13, 1846, to October
19, 1846; the second for the same earnings from October 13, 1846,
up to December 26, 1855.
The case was before this Court at a preceding term,
viz., December term, 1850, and is reported in
51 U. S. 10 How.
419. The suit there was for earnings from 20th August, 1844, to
March, 1846.
When the mandate went down, a new trial was had, the judgment of
the court below having been reversed by this Court, which took
place at October term, 1855. The plaintiffs below, Sickles and
Cook, had in the meantime amended their pleadings according to the
evidence as given on the first trial by making the declaration
consist of a special count and the common money counts. The record
entries were as follows, relative to this trial in 1855:
Narr. Non assumpsit and issue.
November 22. July sworn; verdict for plaintiffs; damages
$1,695.79, with interest from March 16, 1846; verdict rendered 7th
December.
December 14. Judgment for plaintiffs on the first count in the
declaration.
December 14, 1855. Appeal bond, writ of error, citation
&c.
The writ of error thus sued out was not prosecuted, and the case
was docketed and dismissed, under the rule, with costs, on December
19, 1856. Of course this was done at the instance of the counsel
for Sickles and Cook.
On the 26th of December, 1855, the suits now in question were
brought by Sickles and Cook. The declaration consisted of two
special counts and the common money counts, which were afterward
abandoned, and the case went to trial on the two special counts. It
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs for $16,388.25.
Page 65 U. S. 335
On the trial of each of the two last-mentioned cases in the
court below, the plaintiffs contended that by the verdict and
judgment rendered in the case tried in 1855, between said
plaintiffs and defendant, the existence of the contract as set
forth in the two first counts of their declarations in said causes,
which was identical with that set forth in the declaration in said
first-mentioned cause, and the rate of saving ascertained by said
experiments, were judicially settled between said plaintiffs and
defendant; and that in all subsequent suits between the same
parties on said contract, the said defendant was estopped to deny
the same, or the rate of saving fixed by the experiment provided
for by said contract, and the court below so ruled. The defendant
excepted to the ruling of the court and presented objections in
various forms by different exceptions.
The reader will perceive that the principal question brought
before this Court by the bills of exception was that relating to
the doctrine of estoppel, when taken in connection with the order
or the circuit court passed on the 14th December, 1855, ordering
judgment to be entered on the first count of the declaration.
Page 65 U. S. 340
MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendants in error, as plaintiffs, sued the plaintiffs in
error, in assumpsit in the circuit court, upon a special parol
contract, purporting to have been made in 1844, to the effect that
they having a patent for Sickles' cut-off, for saving fuel in the
working of steam engines, and the defendants being the owners of a
certain steamboat, it was agreed between them that the said
patentees should attach to the engine of the defendants one of
their machines and that the defendants should pay for the use
thereof three-fourths of the saving of fuel produced thereby, the
payments to be made from time to time, when demanded. That to
ascertain the saving of fuel, an experiment should be made in the
manner described in the declaration, and that the result should be
taken as the rate of saving during the continuance of the contract,
which was to be as long as the patent and the steamboat should
last. The plaintiffs aver that the experiment had been made, and
the rate of saving had been duly ascertained, and that the machine
had been used in connection with the engine on the said boat until
the commencement of the suit.
In the first count of the declaration, the plaintiffs further
stated that they brought, in March, 1846, a suit on this contract
in the circuit court for the sum then due, and had obtained a
verdict and judgment therefor in the circuit court in 1856, and had
thus established conclusively the contract between the parties.
These last allegations are not contained in the second count. The
defendants pleaded the general issue.
The plaintiffs produced upon the trial, as the only testimony of
the contract, the proceedings of the suit mentioned in the
declaration, and insisted that these proceedings operated as an
estoppel upon the defendants. These proceedings consisted of a
writ, a declaration, containing two counts upon the contract, and
the common counts, and the plea of the general issue; also a docket
entry of a general verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on the entire
declaration, and a docket entry of judgment, subsequently rendered
on the first count -- a count similar to the counts in the
declaration in the present suit. The defendants objected to these
docket entries as evidence
Page 65 U. S. 341
of a verdict and judgment, but insisted they were simply
memoranda or minutes from which a record of a verdict and judgment
were to be made. It appears that in the courts of this District, as
in Maryland, the docket stands in the place of, or perhaps, is the
record, and receives here all the consideration that is yielded to
the formal record in other states. These memorials of their
proceedings must be intelligible to the court that preserves them,
as their only evidence, and we cannot, therefore, refuse to them
faith and credit.
Bateler v. State, 8 G. and J. 381;
Ruggles v. Alexander, 2 Rawle 232. Besides this testimony
of the contract, the plaintiffs proved the quantity of the fuel
that had been used in the running of the boat, and relied upon the
rate as settled to determine their demand, and insisted that the
defendants were estopped to prove there was no such contract or to
disprove anyone of the averments in the first count of the
declaration in the former suit, or to show that no saving of the
wood had been effected, or to show that the so-called experiment
was not made pursuant to the contract or was fraudulently made and
was not a true and genuine exponent of the capacity of the said
cut-off, or to prove that the said verdict was in fact rendered
upon all the testimony and allegations that were submitted to the
jury, and was in point of fact rendered, as by the docket entry it
purports to have been, upon the issues generally, and not upon the
first count specially.
The circuit court adopted these conclusions of the plaintiffs
and excluded the testimony offered by the defendants to prove those
facts.
The authority of the
res judicata, with the limitations
under which it is admitted, is derived by us from the Roman law and
the Canonists. Whether a judgment is to have authority as such in
another proceeding, depends,
an idem corpus sit; quantitas
eadem, idem jus; et an eadem causa petendi et eadem conditio
personarum; quae nisi omnia concurrent alia res est -- or, as
stated by another jurist,
exceptionem rei judicatae, obstare
quotiens eadem qaestio inter easdem personas revocatur. The
essential conditions under which the exception of the
res
judicata becomes applicable are the identity of the thing
demanded, the identity of
Page 65 U. S. 342
the cause of the demand, and of the parties in the character in
which they are litigants. This Court described the rule in
Apsden v.
Nixon, 4 How. 467, in such cases to be that a
judgment or decree set up as a bar by plea, or relied on as
evidence by way of estoppel, must have been made by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the same subject matter, between the
same parties for the same purpose. The thing demanded in the
present suit is a sum of money, being a part of the consideration
or price for the use of a valuable machine for which the plaintiffs
had a patent, and is the complement of a whole, of which the sum
demanded in the first count of the declaration in the former suit
is the other part. The special counts in the declaration of each
suit are similar, being framed upon this contract, and a decision
in the one suit on those counts in favor of the plaintiffs
necessarily included and virtually determined its sufficiency to
sustain the title of the plaintiffs on it. It was therefore
admissible as testimony. This conclusion is supported by adjudged
cases and the authority of writers on the law of evidence.
Gardener v. Buckbe, 3 Cow. 120;
Dutton v.
Woodman, 9 Cushing 256; Bonnier des Preuves, sec. 766; 8
Dalloz, Jur.Generale, 256, 257, 258. Buller, in his work on Nisi
Prius, says:
"If a verdict be had on the same point, and between the same
parties, it may be given in evidence, though the trial were not had
for the same lands, for the verdict in such a case is very
persuading evidence, because what twelve men have already thought
of the fact may be supposed fit to direct the determination of the
jury. . . . It is not necessary that the verdict should be in
relation to the same land, for the verdict is only set up to prove
the point in question, and every matter is evidence that amounts to
a proof of the point in question."
B.N.P. 232. The plaintiffs in error contend that, conceding the
record to be admissible as evidence, to render the verdict and
judgment in the first suit an estoppel it must be shown by the
record that the very point which it is sought to estop the party
from contesting was distinctly presented by an issue, and expressly
found by the jury, and that no estoppel by verdict and judgment can
arise in an action on the case or an
Page 65 U. S. 343
action of assumpsit tried upon the general issue, because in no
such action can any precise point be made and presented for trial
by a jury, and the cases of
Outram v. Morewood, 3 East.
346, Vooght v. Winch, 2 B. & Ald. 662, are cited in support of
this proposition. And the conclusion would seem to be proper for
the attainment of the end for which authority was allowed to the
res judicata as testimony. Experience has disclosed that
for the security of rights, and the preservation of the repose of
society, a limit must be imposed upon the faculties for litigation.
For this purpose, the presumption has been adopted that the thing
adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction, under definite
conditions, shall be received in evidence as irrefragable
truth.
This presumption is a guarantee of the future efficacy and
binding operation of the judgment. It presupposes that all the
constituents of the judgment shall be preserved by the court, which
renders it in an authentic and unmistakable form. It the courts
upon the continent of Europe and in the courts of chancery and
admiralty in the United States and Great Britain, where the
function of adjudication is performed entire by a tribunal composed
of one or more judges, this has been done without much difficulty.
The separate functions of the judge and jury in common law courts
created a necessity for separating issues of law from issues of
fact, and with the increase of commerce and civilization,
transactions have become more complicated and numerous, and law and
fact have become more closely interwoven, so as to render their
separation more embarrassing. The ancient system of pleading, which
was conducive to the end of ascertaining the material issue between
the parties and the preservation in a permanent form of the
evidence of the adjudication, has been condemned as requiring
unnecessary precision and subjecting parties to over-technical
rules, prolixity, and expense. A system of general pleading has
been extensively adopted in this country which rendered the
application of the principle contended for by the plaintiffs
impracticable unless we were prepared to restrict within narrow
bounds the authority of the
res judicata. It was
consequently decided that it was not necessary
Page 65 U. S. 344
as between parties and privies that the record should show that
the question upon which the right of the plaintiff to recover, or
the validity of the defense, depended for it to operate
conclusively, but only that the same matter in controversy might
have been litigated, and that extrinsic evidence would be admitted
to prove that the particular question was material, and was in fact
contested, and that it was referred to the decision of the
jury.
In
Young v.
Black, 7 Cranch 565, this Court admitted in
evidence a record of a former suit between the parties in which
judgment was rendered for the defendant, supported by parol proof
that the cause of action in the two suits was the same. The Court
said:
"The controversy had passed
in rem judicatam, and, the
identity of the causes of action being once established, the law
would not suffer them again to be drawn into question."
The current of American authority runs in the same direction.
Wood v. Jackson, 8 Wend. 9;
Eastman v. Cooper, 15
Pick. 276;
Marsh v. Pico, 4 Rawle 288; Green.Ev., section
531.
In the case before the Court, the verdict was rendered upon two
special counts and the general counts in assumpsit, but the verdict
in the subsequent stage of the proceedings was applied by the court
only to the first count. The record produced by the plaintiffs
showed that the first suit was brought apparently upon the same
contract as the second, and that the existence and validity of that
contract might have been litigated. But the verdict might have been
rendered upon the entire declaration, and without special reference
to the first count. It was competent to the defendants to show the
state of facts that existed at the trial, with a view to ascertain
what was the matter decided upon by the verdict of the jury. It may
have been that there was no contest in reference to the fairness of
the experiment or to its sufficiency to ascertain the premium to be
paid for the use of the machine at the first trial, or it may have
been that the plaintiffs abandoned their special counts and
recovered their verdict upon the general counts. The judgment
rendered in that suit, while it remains in force and for the
purpose of maintaining its validity, is conclusive of all the
Page 65 U. S. 345
facts properly pleaded by the plaintiffs. But when it is
presented as testimony in another suit, the inquiry is competent
whether the same issue has been tried and settled by it.
Merriam v. Whittemore, 5 Gray 316;
Hughes v.
Alexander, 5 Duer 488. The defendants in error contend the
jury, by their verdict, necessarily found the statements of fact in
all the counts of the declaration to be true, and the effect of a
verdict and judgment on the whole declaration and a verdict and
judgment on the first count is precisely the same, in producing an
estoppel, as respects the matters contained in that special count.
But this is not true. If the verdict had been rendered on the
special count in exclusion of the others, the record itself would
have shown that the existence and validity of the contract were in
question. There would have been no ground for the inquiry whether
any other issue was presented to the jury. But where a number of
issues are presented, the finding on any one of which will warrant
the verdict and judgment, it is competent to show that the finding
was upon one, rather than on another, of these different issues.
Henderson v. Kenner, 1 Rich. 474;
Sawyer v.
Woodbury, 7 Gray 499. Nor do we think that the subsequent
application of the verdict to a single count by the court precludes
this inquiry. The authority of the courts to make the application,
and the circumstances under which it is allowable, was considered
by this Court in
Matheson v.
Grant, 2 How. 263. It is done for the purpose of
preventing the consequences of a misjoinder of counts in a
declaration, or of the union of insufficient counts with others, so
as to allow a valid judgment on the verdict. It had no reference to
the use that might be made of the proceedings as testimony in
another proceeding. In Maryland, the power to amend the record in
this form was conferred by the act of 1809. 3 Maxey, laws, 484. The
case is not embraced in the earlier act of 1785 upon this subject.
3 H. and J. 9;
ibid., 91.
It is the opinion of the Court that the circuit court erred in
holding that the plaintiffs in error were estopped by the
proceedings in the former suit for any inquiry in respect to the
matters in issue, and actually tried in that cause, and
Page 65 U. S. 346
its judgment is
Reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings
in conformity with this opinion.