Aspden v. Nixon
Annotate this Case
45 U.S. 467 (1846)
U.S. Supreme Court
Aspden v. Nixon, 45 U.S. 4 How. 467 467 (1846)
Aspden v. Nixon
45 U.S. (4 How.) 467
Where a person domiciled in England died leaving property both in England and Pennsylvania, and the executor took out letters testamentary in both countries in a suit in England against the executor by the administrator of a deceased claimant, the parties were restricted to the limits of the country to which their letters extended.
The executor could not rightfully transmit the Pennsylvania assets to be distributed by a foreign jurisdiction.
So the administrator of the deceased claimant, acting under letters granted in England, only represented the intestate to the extent of these English letters, and could not be known as a representative in Pennsylvania.
Two suits, therefore, one in England between the executor and the administrator of a deceased claimant, acting under English letters, and the other in Pennsylvania between the executor and another administrator of the claimant, acting under Pennsylvania letters, are suits between different parties. And neither the decree nor proceedings in the English suit are competent evidence in the American suit. The property in controversy is different in the two suits.
A judgment or decree set up as a bar by plea or relied on as evidence by way of estoppel, to be conclusive, must have been made
1. By a court of competent jurisdiction upon the same subject matter.
2. Between the same parties.
3. For the same purpose.
On either ground, the evidence in the English suit is incompetent to prove anything with regard to the Pennsylvania assets.
Although, in cases peculiarly circumstanced, one jurisdiction administering assets may, as matter of comity, transmit them to a foreign jurisdiction, yet they cannot be sent to England where a suit is pending in this country for the American assets. A decree of the High Court of Chancery in England purporting to distribute assets so situated would be treated as void for want of jurisdiction.
The circuit court of the United States sitting in Pennsylvania is bound by the same rules which govern the local tribunals of that state, and would require a devisee to give security to refund in case a debt should afterwards be proved against the testator. Other provisions of the laws of that state would also embarrass a court in exercising the comity referred to.
Under the influence of similar laws, the courts of the several states have been so much restrained as to render the exercise of comity among each other little more than a barren theory. More could not be required between the courts of this country and England.
There having been no evidence introduced in the English suit to establish the heirship of the claimant, the decision of the court there dismissing the bill is not conclusive as to the title. What effect those proceedings ought to have in this country this Court will not now decide. It only decides that the evidence in support of the title is not barred in the circuit court of Pennsylvania.
The judgment of a foreign court upon a question of title cannot preclude a claimant from introducing evidence in a second suit in another country for other property. Such a proposition is not recognized either by the jurisprudence of the United States or of Great Britain; nor is the opinion of this Court in conflict with the established comity of nations.
The circumstances of the case are set forth in the following statement, which the reporter finds prefixed to the opinion of the Court and which supersedes the necessity of any statement of his own.
In 1791, Matthias Aspden, a subject of the King of Great
Britain and domiciled there, being in the State of Pennsylvania, where he had formerly resided, made his will, whereby he devised his property to his heir at law with the exception of some trifling specific bequests. He died in England, in 1824 (which country continued to be his place of domicile), leaving much property there and also much in Pennsylvania. The only surviving executor named in Matthias Aspden's will was Henry Nixon, of Philadelphia, who proved the will and took out letters testamentary in the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County in November, 1824, and he did the same in the proper court in England, in 1825.
The testator left no children, and different persons claimed to be the true devisee, within the description of "heir at law."
In 1828, Samuel Packer filed his bill against the executor Nixon in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that he, Packer, was the devisee and praying the estate might be distributed to him.
Under this bill, numerous complainants came in by petition representing themselves to be the next of kin and the true devisees in Pennsylvania and claiming parts of the estate, and in December, 1831, John Aspden, of the County of Lancashire, England, was admitted to come in as co-complainant, he claiming to be the rightful heir at law and devisee of Matthias Aspden.
In favor of this latter claimant, a decree was made in 1833 and the bill ordered to be dismissed as to all other claimants. A portion of the latter appealed to this Court.
In 1834, Janet Jones, Thomas Poole, and Mary, his wife, moved to file a supplemental bill and bill of review in the circuit court; the said Janet, and Mary claiming to be heirs at law of John Aspden, of London, who was the heir of Matthias Aspden, at the time of Matthias' death, as they alleged. This motion was overruled as coming too late. Thus stood the proceeding in the supreme court on the appeal taken in 1833.
At the January term, 1835, when the cause came on for argument upon the merits, a question was presented by the counsel for the appellants whether the bill, taken by itself or in connection with the answer, contained sufficient matter upon which the court could proceed and finally dispose of the cause. It was submitted that the bill contains no averment of the actual domicile of the testator at the time he made his will or at any intermediate period before or at his death. The court directed this question to be argued before the argument should proceed on the merits.
The court, in its decision of this preliminary question, said that an averment of the testator's domicile is indispensable in the bill and that the case ought to be remanded to the circuit court for the purpose of having suitable amendments made in this particular. And the court, on the question of the motion to permit the
petitioners for a review to be heard before the Supreme Court, made the following remarks:
"It appears from the motions which have been made to this Court as well as from certain proceedings in the court below which have been laid before us in support thereof that there are certain claimants of this bequest, asserting themselves to be heirs at law, whose claims have not been adjudicated upon in the court below on account of their having been presented at too late a period. As the cause is to go back again for further proceedings, and must be again opened there for new allegations and proofs, these claimants will have a full opportunity of presenting and proving their claims in the cause, and we are of opinion that they ought to be let into the cause for this purpose. In drawing up the decree remanding the cause, leave will be given to them accordingly. The decree of the circuit court is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, in conformity to this opinion."
34 U. S. 9 Pet. 505.
On the mandate's going down in June, 1835, John Aspden of Lancashire filed his amended bill stating the domicile &c., and John A. Brown, administrator of John Aspden of London, together with Janet Jones and Mary Pool (then widows), the daughters of John of London, were let in to file their petition claiming the estate of Matthias Aspden on the ground that John of London was the heir.
To this petition, Nixon pleaded that John of London, in 1825, had filed his bill against him, Nixon, as executor &c., in the High Court of Chancery in England for an account and distribution of the estate, which bill had been answered and the answer replied to. That John of London died in 1828, intestate, his domicile being in England at the time, and that Thomas Poole, in right of his wife Mary, and Janet Jones, administered on said John's estate in England; that they, as such administrator and administratrix, proceeded to revive the suit in chancery against the defendant, Nixon, which was brought to a hearing in the High Court of Chancery in 1830 and was heard, and the bill dismissed.
And that afterwards another bill was brought by said Thomas Poole and Janet Jones, as administrator and administratrix of John Aspden, against said Nixon, as executor of Matthias Aspden, for the same precise subject matter, in the Court of Exchequer in England, to which the decree in the High Court of Chancery was pleaded in bar, and which plea in bar was sustained, and the latter suit dismissed by the Court of Exchequer, and on these proceedings the defendant Nixon relied as a bar to any further proceedings on the part of the personal representatives of John Aspden of London. The court permitted the latter to reply to the plea of Nixon. The replication alleges that the bill in the High Court of Chancery in England was dismissed "for want of prosecution" because the claimants were too poor to prosecute the same or to
procure their evidence of title, and that the bill in the Exchequer was dismissed as stated in the plea.
A commission was awarded by order of the court, and evidence taken in England to establish the facts alleged by the replication. From this it appears that the bills were filed and the proceedings had which are set forth by Nixon's plea, and also that the representatives of John Aspden of London failed to produce any evidence of their title by reason of their poverty. And on the "effect" of this evidence to support the plea in bar the judges were divided in opinion.
Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.