A law of the State of Alabama, passed in 1854, requiring the
owners of steamboats navigating the waters of the state, before
such boat shall leave the port of Mobile, to file a statement in
writing, in the office of the Probate Judge of Mobile County
setting forth first, the name of the vessel; second, the naive of
the owner or owners; third, his or their place or places of
residence; fourth, the interest each has in the vessel -- is in
conflict with the Act of Congress passed on the 17th of February,
1793, so far as the state law is brought to bear upon a vessel
which had taken out a license, and was duly enrolled under the act
of Congress for carrying on the coasting trade and plied between
New Orleans and the Cities of Montgomery and Wetumpka, in
Alabama.
The state law in such a case is therefore unconstitutional and
void.
An act of Congress, passed in pursuance of a clear authority
under the Constitution, is the supreme law of the land, and any law
of a state in conflict with it is inoperative and void.
The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
Page 63 U. S. 238
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of
Alabama.
The suit was brought by the plaintiffs below, commissioners of
pilotage of the harbor of Mobile, against the steamboat
Bagaby, of which Sinnot, the defendant, was master, to
recover certain penalties for a violation of the law of the State
of Alabama, passed February 15, 1854, entitled "An act to provide
for the registration of the names of steamboat owners."
The 1st section of the act provides that it shall be the duty of
the owners of steamboats navigating the waters of the state, before
such boat shall leave the port of Mobile, to file in the office of
the probate judge a statement in writing, setting forth the name of
the steamboat and of the owner or owners, his or their place or
places of residence, and their interest therein, which statement
shall be signed and sworn to by the owners, or their agent or
attorney, and which statement shall be recorded by the said judge
of probate; and also, in case of a sale of said boat, it is made
the duty of the vendee to file a statement of the change of
ownership, his place of residence, and the interest transferred,
which statement shall be signed by the vendor and vendee, his or
their agent or attorney, and recorded in the office of the
aforesaid judge.
The 2d section provides that if any person or persons, being
owner or owners of any steamboat, shall run, or permit the same to
be run or navigated, on any of the waters of the state,
Page 63 U. S. 239
without having first filed the statement as provided by the act,
he or they shall forfeit the sum of $500, to be recovered in the
name of the commissioners of pilotage of the Bay of Mobile, either
by a suit against the owners or by attachment against the boat, the
one half to the use of the commissioners, and the other half to the
person or persons who shall first inform said commissioners.
The steamboat
Bagaby in question was seized and
detained under this act until discharged, on a bond being given to
pay and satisfy any judgment that might be rendered in the suit. A
judgment was subsequently rendered against the vessel in the City
Court of Mobile for the penalty of $500, with costs, which, on an
appeal to the supreme court was affirmed.
The material facts in the case are that the steamboat was
engaged in navigation and commerce between the City of New Orleans,
in the State of Louisiana, and the Cities of Montgomery and
Wetumpka, in the State of Alabama, and that she touched at the City
of Mobile only in the course of her navigation and trade between
the ports and places above mentioned; that she was an American
vessel, built at Pittsburgh, in the State of Pennsylvania, and was
duly enrolled and licensed in pursuance of the laws of the United
States, and had been regularly cleared at the port of New Orleans
for the ports of Montgomery and Wetumpka, whither she was destined
at the time of the seizure and detention under the act in
question.
The plaintiffs in error, the master, and stipulators in the
court below, insist that the judgment rendered against them is
erroneous, upon the ground that the statute of the Legislature of
the State of Alabama is unconstitutional and void, it being in
conflict with that clause in the Constitution which confers upon
Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states," and the acts of Congress passed in
pursuance thereof. The act of Congress relied on is that of the
17th February, 1793, providing for the enrollment and license of
vessels engaged in the coasting trade. The force and effect of this
act was examined in the case of
Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 210,
22 U. S. 214, and
it was there held that vessels enrolled and licensed in pursuance
of it had conferred
Page 63 U. S. 240
upon them as full and complete authority to carry on this trade
as was in the power of Congress to confer.
The Chief Justice says, speaking of the 1st section:
"This section seems to the court to contain a positive enactment
that the vessels it describes shall be entitled to the privileges
of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade. These
privileges cannot be separated from the trade, and cannot be
enjoyed unless the trade may be prosecuted."
Again, the Court said, to construe these words otherwise than as
entitling the ships or vessels described to carry on the coasting
trade would be, we think, to disregard the apparent intent of the
act. And again, speaking of the license provided for in the 4th
section, the word "license" means permission or authority, and a
license to do any particular thing is a permission or authority to
do that thing, and, if granted by a person having power to grant
it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports
to authorize. It certainly transfers to him all the right which the
grantor can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the
license.
The license is general in its terms, according to the form given
in the act of Congress:
"License is hereby granted for the said steamboat naming her to
be employed in carrying on the coasting trade for one year from the
date hereof, and no longer."
In the case already referred to, it was denied in the argument
that these words authorized a voyage from New Jersey to New York.
The Court observed, in answer to this objection:
"It is true that no ports are specified; but it is equally true
that the words used are perfectly intelligible, and do confer such
authority as unquestionably as if the ports had been mentioned. The
coasting trade is a term well understood. The law has defined it,
and all know its meaning perfectly. The act describes with great
minuteness the various operations of vessels engaged in it, and it
cannot, we think, be doubted that a voyage from New Jersey to New
York is one of those operations."
On looking into the act of Congress regulating the coasting
trade, it will be found that many conditions are to be complied
Page 63 U. S. 241
with by the owners of vessels, before the granting of the
enrollment or license.
1. The vessel must possess the same qualifications, and the same
requisites must be complied with, as are made necessary to the
registering of ships or vessels engaged in the foreign trade by the
act of December 31, 1792. These conditions are many and important,
as will be seen by a reference to the act.
2. A bond must be given by the husband, or managing owner, and
the master, with sureties to the satisfaction of the collector,
conditioned that such vessel shall not be employed in any trade by
which the United States shall be defrauded of its revenues; and
also the master must make oath that he is a citizen of the United
States; that the license shall not be used for any other vessel or
any other employment than that for which it is granted, or in any
trade or business in fraud of the public revenues, as a condition
to the granting of the license. These are the guards and
restraints, and the only guards and restraints, which Congress has
seen fit to annex to the privileges of ships and vessels engaged in
the coasting trade, and upon a compliance with which, as we have
seen, as full and complete authority is conferred by the license to
carry on the trade as Congress is capable of conferring.
Now the act of the Legislature of the State of Alabama imposes
another and an additional condition to the privilege of carrying on
this trade within her waters -- namely, the filing of a statement
in writing, in the office of the Probate Judge of Mobile County,
setting forth 1. the name of the vessel; 2. the name of the owner
or owners; 3. his or their place or places of residence; and 4. the
interest each has in the vessel. Which statement must be sworn to
by the party, or his agent or attorney. And the like statement,
mutatis mutandis, is required to be made each time a
change of owners of the vessel takes place. Unless this condition
of navigation and trade within the waters of Alabama is complied
with, the vessel is forbidden to leave the port of Mobile, under
the penalty of $500 for each offense.
If the interpretation of the court as to the force and effect of
the privileges afforded to the vessel by the enrollment and license
in the case of
Gibbons v. Ogden, are to be maintained,
Page 63 U. S. 242
it can require no argument to show a direct conflict between
this act of the state and the act of Congress regulating this
trade. Certainly, if this state law can be upheld, the full
enjoyment of the right to carry on the coasting trade, as
heretofore adjudged by this Court, under the enrollment and
license, is denied to the vessel in question.
If anything further could be necessary, we might refer to the
enrollment prescribed by the act of Congress, by which it is made
the duty of the owner to furnish, under oath, to the collectors,
all the information required by this state law, and which is
incorporated in the body of the enrollment. Congress, therefore,
has legislated on the very subject which the state act has
undertaken to regulate, and has limited its regulation in the
matter to a registry at the home port.
It has been argued, however, that this act of the state is but
the exercise of a police power, which power has not been
surrendered to the general government, but reserved to the states,
and hence, even if the law should be found in conflict with the act
of Congress, it must still be regarded as a valid law, and as
excepted out of and from the commercial power.
This position is not a new one; it has often been presented to
this Court, and in every instance the same answer given to it. It
was strongly pressed in the New York case of
Gibbons v.
Ogden. The Court, in answer to it, observed:
"It has been contended, that if a law passed by a state, in the
exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes in conflict with a
law passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, they
affect the subject and each other, like equal opposing forces."
But, the Court said the framers of the Constitution foresaw this
state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy
not only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The
nullity of any act inconsistent with the Constitution is produced
by the declaration that the Constitution is the supreme law. The
appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers
the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the
state legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but, though
enacted in the execution of acknowledged state powers, interfere
with or are contrary
Page 63 U. S. 243
to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution,
or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In
every such case, the act of Congress or treaty is supreme, and the
law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, must yield to it. The same doctrine was asserted in
the case of
Brown v. State of
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 448-449, and in numerous other
cases.
46 U. S. 5 How.
573-574,
46 U. S. 579,
46 U. S. 581;
27 U. S. 2 Pet.
251-252;
17 U. S. 4
Wheat. 405-406,
17 U. S.
436
We agree that in the application of this principle of supremacy
of an act of Congress in a case where the state law is but the
exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be
direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled
or consistently stand together, and also that the act of Congress
should have been passed in the exercise of a clear power under the
Constitution, such as that in question.
The whole commercial marine of the country is placed by the
Constitution under the regulation of Congress, and all laws passed
by that body in the regulation of navigation and trade, whether
foreign or coastwise, is therefore but the exercise of an
undisputed power. When, therefore, an act of the legislature of a
state prescribes a regulation of the subject repugnant to and
inconsistent with the regulation of Congress, the state law must
give way, and this without regard to the source of power whence the
state legislature derived its enactment.
This paramount authority of the act of Congress is not only
conferred by the Constitution itself, but is the logical result of
the power over the subject conferred upon that body by the states.
They surrendered this power to the general government, and to the
extent of the fair exercise of it by Congress, the act must be
supreme.
The power of Congress, however, over the subject does not extend
further than the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states. Beyond these limits, the states have not
surrendered their power over the subject, and may exercise it
independently of any control or interference of the general
government, and there has been much
Page 63 U. S. 244
controversy, and probably will continue to be, both by the bench
and the bar, in fixing the true boundary line between the power of
Congress under the commercial grant and the power reserved to the
states. But in all these discussions, or nearly all of them, it has
been admitted, that if the act of Congress fell clearly within the
power conferred upon that body by the Constitution, there was an
end of the controversy. The law of Congress was supreme.
These questions have arisen under the quarantine and health laws
of the states -- laws imposing a tax upon imports and passengers,
admitted to have been passed under the police power of the states,
and which had not been surrendered to the general government. The
laws of the states have been upheld by the court, except in cases
where they were in conflict, or were adjudged by the court to be in
conflict, with the act of Congress.
Upon the whole, after the maturest consideration the Court has
been able to give to the case, we are constrained to hold that the
act of the legislature of the state is in conflict with the
Constitution and law of the United States, and therefore void.
The judgment of the court below is reversed.