A California policeman determined that there was probable cause
to search petitioner Horton's home for the proceeds of a robbery
and the robbers' weapons. His search warrant affidavit referred to
police reports that described both the weapons and the proceeds,
but the warrant issued by the Magistrate only authorized a search
for the proceeds. Upon executing the warrant, the officer did not
find the stolen property, but did find the weapons in plain view
and seized them. The trial court refused to suppress the seized
evidence, and Horton was convicted of armed robbery. The California
Court of Appeal affirmed. Since the officer had testified that,
while he was searching Horton's home for the stolen property, he
was also interested in finding other evidence connecting Horton to
the robbery, the seized evidence was not discovered
"inadvertently." However, in rejecting Horton's argument that
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443, therefore required suppression of that evidence,
the Court of Appeal relied on a State Supreme Court decision
holding that
Coolidge's discussion of the inadvertence
limitation on the "plain view" doctrine was not binding because it
was contained in a four-Justice plurality opinion.
Held: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view, even though the
discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent. Although
inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate plain view
seizures, it is not a necessary condition. Pp.
496 U. S.
133-142.
(a)
Coolidge is a binding precedent. However, the
second of the
Coolidge plurality's two limitations on the
plain view doctrine -- that the discovery of evidence in plain view
must be inadvertent,
id. at
403 U. S. 469
-- was not essential to the Court's rejection of the State's plain
view argument in that case. Rather, the first limitation -- that
plain view alone is never enough to justify a warrantless seizure,
id. at
403 U. S. 468
-- adequately supports the Court's holding that gunpowder found in
vacuum sweepings from one of the automobiles seized in plain view
on the defendant's driveway in the course of his arrest could not
be introduced against him because the warrantless seizures violated
the Fourth Amendment. In order for a warrantless seizure of an
object in plain view to be valid, two conditions must be satisfied
in addition to the essential predicate that the officer did not
violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from
which
Page 496 U. S. 129
the object could be plainly viewed. First, the object's
incriminating character must be "immediately apparent,"
id. at 466. Although the cars in
Coolidge were
obviously in plain view, their probative value remained uncertain
until after their interiors were swept and examined
microscopically. Second, the officer must have a lawful right of
access to the object itself. Justice Harlan, who concurred in the
Coolidge judgment but did not join the plurality's plain
view discussion, may well have rested his vote on the fact that the
cars' seizure was accomplished by means of a warrantless trespass
on the defendant's property. Pp.
496 U. S.
133-137.
(b) There are two flaws in the
Coolidge plurality's
conclusion that the inadvertence requirement was necessary to avoid
a violation of the Fourth Amendment's mandate that a valid warrant
"
particularly describ[e] . . . [the] . . . things to be
seized,'" id. at 403 U. S.
469-471. First, even-handed law enforcement is best
achieved by applying objective standards of conduct, rather than
standards that depend upon the officer's subjective state of mind.
The fact that an officer is interested in an item and fully expects
to find it should not invalidate its seizure if the search is
confined in area and duration by a warrant's terms or by a valid
exception to the warrant requirement. Second, the suggestion that
the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent the police
from conducting general searches, or from converting specific
warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive, because that
interest is already served by the requirements that an
unparticularized warrant not be issued and that a warrantless
search be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation. Here, the search's scope was not enlarged by the
warrant's omission of reference to the weapons; indeed, no search
for the weapons could have taken place if the named items had been
found or surrendered at the outset. The prohibition against general
searches and warrants is based on privacy concerns, which are not
implicated when an officer with a lawful right of access to an item
in plain view seizes it without a warrant. Pp. 496 U. S.
137-142.
Affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and
KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in
which MARSHALL, J., joined,
post, p.
496 U. S.
142
Page 496 U. S. 130
Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we revisit an issue that was considered, but not
conclusively resolved, in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443
(1971): Whether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in
plain view is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if the discovery
of the evidence was not inadvertent. We conclude that even though
inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate "plain view"
seizures, it is not a necessary condition.
I
Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of Erwin Wallaker,
the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club. When Wallaker returned to
his home after the Club's annual show, he entered his garage and
was accosted by two masked men, one armed with a machine gun and
the other with an electrical shocking device, sometimes referred to
as a "stun gun." The two men shocked Wallaker, bound and handcuffed
him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During the encounter,
sufficient conversation took place to enable Wallaker subsequently
to identify petitioner's distinctive voice. His identification was
partially corroborated by a witness who saw the robbers leaving the
scene, and by evidence that petitioner had attended the coin
show.
Sergeant LaRault, an experienced police officer, investigated
the crime and determined that there was probable cause to search
petitioner's home for the proceeds of the robbery
Page 496 U. S. 131
and for the weapons used by the robbers. His affidavit for a
search warrant referred to police reports that described the
weapons as well as the proceeds, but the warrant issued by the
Magistrate only authorized a search for the proceeds, including
three specifically described rings.
Pursuant to the warrant, LaRault searched petitioner's
residence, but he did not find the stolen property. During the
course of the search, however, he discovered the weapons in plain
view and seized them. Specifically, he seized an Uzi machine gun, a
.38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose
Coin Club advertising brochure, and a few items of clothing
identified by the victim. [
Footnote
1] LaRault testified that, while he was searching for the
rings, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting
petitioner to the robbery. Thus, the seized evidence was not
discovered "inadvertently."
The trial court refused to suppress the evidence found in
petitioner's home and, after a jury trial, petitioner was found
guilty and sentenced to prison. The California Court of Appeal
affirmed. App. 43. It rejected petitioner's argument that our
decision in
Coolidge required suppression of the seized
evidence that had not been listed in the warrant because its
discovery was not inadvertent. App. 52-53. The court relied on the
California Supreme Court's decision in
North v. Superior
Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301,
104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 502 P.2d 1305 (1972). In that case, the court
noted that the discussion of the inadvertence limitation on the
"plain view" doctrine in Justice Stewart's opinion in
Coolidge had been joined by only three other Members of
this Court, and therefore was not binding on it. [
Footnote 2] The California Supreme Court
denied petitioner's request for review. App. 78.
Page 496 U. S. 132
Because the California courts' interpretation of the "plain
view" doctrine conflicts with the view of other courts, [
Footnote 3] and because the unresolved
issue is important, we granted certiorari, 493 U.S. 889 (1989).
Page 496 U. S. 133
II
The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."
The right to security in person and property protected by the
Fourth Amendment may be invaded in quite different ways by searches
and seizures. A search compromises the individual interest in
privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or
her person or property.
United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U. S. 109,
466 U. S. 113
(1984). The "plain view" doctrine is often considered an exception
to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable, [
Footnote 4] but
this characterization overlooks the important difference between
searches and seizures. [
Footnote
5] If an article is already in plain view, neither its
observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy.
Arizona v.
Hicks,
Page 496 U. S. 134
480 U. S. 321
(1987);
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.
S. 765,
463 U. S. 771
(1983). A seizure of the article, however, would obviously invade
the owner's possessory interest.
Maryland v. Macon,
472 U. S. 463,
472 U. S. 469
(1985);
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at
466 U. S. 113.
If "plain view" justifies an exception from an otherwise applicable
warrant requirement, therefore, it must be an exception that is
addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures, rather
than by searches.
The criteria that generally guide "plain view" seizures were set
forth in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971). The Court held that the seizure of two
automobiles parked in plain view on the defendant's driveway in the
course of arresting the defendant violated the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, particles of gun powder that had been subsequently
found in vacuum sweepings from one of the cars could not be
introduced in evidence against the defendant. The State endeavored
to justify the seizure of the automobiles, and their subsequent
search at the police station, on four different grounds, including
the "plain view" doctrine. [
Footnote 6] The scope of that doctrine as it had developed
in earlier cases was fairly summarized in these three paragraphs
from Justice Stewart's opinion:
"It is well established that, under certain circumstances, the
police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. But it
is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases,
any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least
at the moment of seizure. The problem with the 'plain view'
doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain
view
Page 496 U. S. 135
has legal significance, rather than being simply the normal
concomitant of any search, legal or illegal."
"An example of the applicability of the 'plain view' doctrine is
the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given
area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come
across some other article of incriminating character.
Cf.
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S.
344;
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S.
452;
Steele v. United States, 267 U. S.
498;
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S.
557,
394 U. S. 571 (STEWART, J.,
concurring in result). Where the initial intrusion that brings the
police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a
warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Thus the police may
inadvertently come across evidence while in 'hot pursuit' of a
fleeing suspect.
Warden v. Hayden, supra; cf. Hester v. United
States, 265 U. S. 57. And an object that
comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is
appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized
without a warrant.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 762-763 . Finally,
the 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where a police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Harris v.
United States, 390 U. S. 234;
Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U. S. 731;
Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. at
374 U. S.
43.
Cf. Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S.
206."
"What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion
in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification -- whether it be a warrant for
another object,
Page 496 U. S. 136
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused -- and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges."
Id. at
403 U. S.
465-466 (footnote omitted). Justice Stewart then
described the two limitations on the doctrine that he found
implicit in its rationale: First, "that plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence,"
id. at 468; and second, "that the discovery of evidence in
plain view must be inadvertent."
Id. at
403 U. S.
469.
Justice Stewart's analysis of the "plain view" doctrine did not
command a majority, and a plurality of the Court has since made
clear that the discussion is "not a binding precedent."
Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. at
460 U. S. 737 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). Justice
Harlan, who concurred in the Court's judgment and in its response
to the dissenting opinions, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
473-484, did not join the plurality's discussion of the
"plain view" doctrine.
See id. at
403 U. S.
464-473. The decision nonetheless is a binding
precedent. Before discussing the second limitation, which is
implicated in this case, it is therefore necessary to explain why
the first adequately supports the Court's judgment.
It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid
warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did
not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from
which the evidence could be plainly viewed. There are, moreover,
two additional conditions that must be satisfied to justify the
warrantless seizure. First, not only must the item be in plain
view, its incriminating character must also be "immediately
apparent."
Id. at
403 U. S. 466;
see also Arizona v.
Page 496 U. S. 137
Hicks, 480 U.S. at
480 U. S.
326-327. Thus, in
Coolidge, the cars were
obviously in plain view, but their probative value remained
uncertain until after the interiors were swept and examined
microscopically. Second, not only must the officer be lawfully
located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but
he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object
itself. [
Footnote 7] As the
Solicitor General has suggested, Justice Harlan's vote in
Coolidge may have rested on the fact that the seizure of
the cars was accomplished by means of a warrantless trespass on the
defendant's property. [
Footnote
8] In all events, we are satisfied that the absence of
inadvertence was not essential to the Court's rejection of the
State's "plain view" argument in
Coolidge.
III
Justice Stewart concluded that the inadvertence requirement was
necessary to avoid a violation of the express constitutional
requirement that a valid warrant must particularly describe the
things to be seized. He explained:
"The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement, as
just stated, is that a plain-view seizure will not turn an
initially valid (and therefore limited) search into
Page 496 U. S. 138
a 'general' one, while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant
to cover an inadvertent discovery is great. But where the discovery
is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of
the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether
different. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no
inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally
cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as
'per se unreasonable' in the absence of 'exigent
circumstances.'"
"If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails
to mention a particular object, though the police know its location
and intend to seize it, then there is a violation of the express
constitutional requirement of 'Warrants . . . particularly
describing . . . [the] things to be seized.'"
403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
469-471.
We find two flaws in this reasoning. First, even-handed law
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective
standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the
subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact that an officer
is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it
in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the
search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant
or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. If the officer has
knowledge approaching certainty that the item will be found, we see
no reason why he or she would deliberately omit a particular
description of the item to be seized from the application for a
search warrant. [
Footnote 9]
Specification of the additional item could only permit the
officer
Page 496 U. S. 139
to expand the scope of the search. On the other hand, if he or
she has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a
suspicion concerning the second, whether or not it amounts to
probable cause, we fail to see why that suspicion should immunize
the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search
for the first. The hypothetical case put by Justice WHITE in his
dissenting opinion in
Coolidge is instructive:
"Let us suppose officers secure a warrant to search a house for
a rifle. While staying well within the range of a rifle search,
they discover two photographs of the murder victim, both in plain
sight in the bedroom. Assume also that the discovery of the one
photograph was inadvertent, but finding the other was anticipated.
The Court would permit the seizure of only one of the photographs.
But in terms of the 'minor' peril to Fourth Amendment values, there
is surely no difference between these two photographs: the
interference with possession is the same in each case and the
officers' appraisal of the photograph they expected to see is no
less reliable than their judgment about the other. And in both
situations, the actual inconvenience and danger to evidence remain
identical if the officers must depart and secure a warrant."
Id. at
403 U. S.
516.
Second, the suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is
necessary to prevent the police from conducting general searches,
or from converting specific warrants into general warrants, is not
persuasive, because that interest is already served by the
requirements that no warrant issue unless it "particularly
describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized,"
see Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S.
79,
480 U. S. 84
(1987);
Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.
S. 498,
267 U. S. 503
(1925), [
Footnote 10] and
that a warrantless search be circumscribed
Page 496 U. S. 140
by the exigencies which justify its initiation.
See, e.g.,
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325,
494 U. S.
332-334 (1990);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385,
437 U. S. 393
(1978). Scrupulous adherence to these requirements serves the
interests in limiting the area and duration of the search that the
inadvertence requirement inadequately protects. Once those commands
have been satisfied and the officer has a lawful right of access,
however, no additional Fourth Amendment interest is furthered by
requiring that the discovery of evidence be inadvertent. If the
scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a
validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception
from the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is
unconstitutional without more. Thus, in the case of a search
incident to a lawful arrest,
"[i]f the police stray outside the scope of an authorized
Chimel search, they are already in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and evidence so seized will be excluded; adding a second
reason for excluding evidence hardly seems worth the candle."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 517.
Similarly, the object of a warrantless search of an automobile also
defines its scope:
"The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not
defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is
secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower
may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an
upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe
Page 496 U. S. 141
that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not
justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to
believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains
contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire
cab."
United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798,
456 U. S. 824
(1982).
In this case, the scope of the search was not enlarged in the
slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the
warrant. Indeed, if the three rings and other items named in the
warrant had been found at the outset -- or if petitioner had them
in his possession and had responded to the warrant by producing
them immediately -- no search for weapons could have taken place.
Again, Justice WHITE's dissenting opinion in
Coolidge is
instructive:
"Police with a warrant for a rifle may search only places where
rifles might be, and must terminate the search once the rifle is
found; the inadvertence rule will in no way reduce the number of
places into which they may lawfully look."
403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
517.
As we have already suggested, by hypothesis the seizure of an
object in plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy.
[
Footnote 11] If the
interest in privacy has been invaded, the violation must have
occurred before the object came into plain view, and there is no
need for an inadvertence limitation on seizures to condemn it. The
prohibition against general searches and general warrants serves
primarily as a protection against unjustified intrusions on
privacy. But reliance
Page 496 U. S. 142
on privacy concerns that support that prohibition is misplaced
when the inquiry concerns the scope of an exception that merely
authorizes an officer with a lawful right of access to an item to
seize it without a warrant.
In this case, the items seized from petitioner's home were
discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant.
When they were discovered, it was immediately apparent to the
officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. He had
probable cause not only to obtain a warrant to search for the
stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns
had been used in the crime he was investigating. The search was
authorized by the warrant, the seizure was authorized by the "plain
view" doctrine. The judgment is affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Although the officer viewed other handguns and rifles, he did
not seize them because there was no probable cause to believe they
were associated with criminal activity. App. 30;
see Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U. S. 321,
480 U. S. 327
(1987).
[
Footnote 2]
"In
Coolidge, the police arrested a murder suspect in
his house and thereupon seized his automobile and searched it later
at the police station, finding physical evidence that the victim
had been inside the vehicle. The record disclosed that the police
had known for some time of the probable role of the car in the
crime, and there were no 'exigent circumstances' to justify a
warrantless search. Accordingly, the plurality opinion of Justice
Stewart concluded that the seizure could not be justified on the
theory that the vehicle was itself the 'instrumentality' of the
crime and was discovered 'in plain view' of the officers. Justice
Stewart was of the opinion that the 'plain view' doctrine is
applicable only to the inadvertent discovery of incriminating
evidence."
"If the plurality opinion in
Coolidge were entitled to
binding effect as precedent, we would have difficulty
distinguishing its holding from the instant case, for the discovery
of petitioner's car was no more 'inadvertent' than in
Coolidge. However, that portion of Justice Stewart's
plurality opinion which proposed the adoption of new restrictions
to the 'plain view' rule was signed by only four members of the
court (Stewart, J., Douglas, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.).
Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Harlan declined to
join in that portion of the opinion, and the four remaining
justices expressly disagreed with Justice Stewart on this
point."
North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d
301, 307-308, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308
(1972) (citations omitted).
[
Footnote 3]
See, e.g., Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930 (CA10
1987);
United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency,
780 F.2d 213 (CA2 1986);
United States v. Roberts, 644
F.2d 683 (CA8),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821, 101 S. Ct. 79,
66 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1980);
United States v. Antill, 615 F.2d
648 (CA5 1980);
Terry v. State, 271 Ark. 715, 610 S.W.2d
272 (App.1981);
State v. Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 561
P.2d 701 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319,
409
N.E.2d 719 (1980);
State v. Sanders, 431 So. 2d 1034
(Fla.App.1983);
State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87,
652 P.2d 673
(1982);
Clark v. State, 498 N.E.2d
918 (Ind.1986);
State v. Eiseman, 461 A.2d
369, 380 (R.I.1983);
State v. McColgan, 631
S.W.2d 151 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1981);
Tucker v.
State, 620
P.2d 1314 (Okla.Crim.App.1980);
State v. Dingle, 279
S.C. 278,
306 S.E.2d
223 (1983).
See also the cases cited in the appendices
to Justice BRENNAN's dissenting opinion,
post at
496 U. S.
149-153. At least two other state courts have agreed
with the California Supreme Court.
See State v. Pontier,
95 Idaho 707, 712, 518 P.2d 969, 974 (1974);
State v.
Romero, 660 P.2d 715
(Utah 1983).
[
Footnote 4]
"We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in
Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U. S. 385,
437 U. S.
390:"
"The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.'"
"
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347,
389 U. S. 357 (footnotes
omitted)."
United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798,
456 U. S.
824-825 (1982).
[
Footnote 5]
"It is important to distinguish 'plain view,' as used in
Coolidge to justify seizure of an object, from an
officer's mere observation of an item left in plain view. Whereas
the latter generally involves no Fourth Amendment search,
see
infra at 740;
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347 (1967), the former generally does implicate the
Amendment's limitations upon seizures of personal property."
Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730,
460 U. S. 738,
n. 4 (1983) (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.)
[
Footnote 6]
The State primarily contended that the seizures were authorized
by a warrant issued by the Attorney General, but the Court held the
warrant invalid because it had not been issued by "a neutral and
detached magistrate." 403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
449-453. In addition, the State relied on three
exceptions from the warrant requirement: (1) search incident to
arrest; (2) the automobile exception; and (3) the "plain view"
doctrine.
id. at
403 U. S.
453-473.
[
Footnote 7]
"This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed
above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless
search or seizure absent exigent circumstances. Incontrovertible
testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises
belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible
measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband,
this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that
the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure.
Taylor
v. United States, 286 U. S. 1;
Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10;
McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451;
Jones v.
United States, 357 U. S. 493,
357 U. S.
497-498;
Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S.
610;
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S.
699."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 468.
We have since applied the same rule to the arrest of a person in
his home.
See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S.
91 (1990);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 (1980).
[
Footnote 8]
See Brief for the United States as
Amicus
Curiae 7, n. 4.
[
Footnote 9]
"If the police have probable cause to search for a photograph as
well as a rifle and they proceed to seek a warrant, they could have
no possible motive for deliberately including the rifle but
omitting the photograph. Quite the contrary is true. Only oversight
or careless mistake would explain the omission in the warrant
application if the police were convinced they had probable cause to
search for the photograph."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 517
(WHITE, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 10]
"The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically
prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one 'particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.' The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was
to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to
search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable
cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers
intended to prohibit."
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79,
480 U. S.
84.
[
Footnote 11]
Even if the item is a container, its seizure does not compromise
the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents, because it
may only be opened pursuant to either a search warrant,
see
Smith v. Ohio, 494 U. S. 541
(1990);
United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696,
462 U. S. 701
(1983);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 (1979);
United States v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1 (1977);
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.
S. 249 (1970);
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
727,
96 U. S. 733
(1878), or one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.
S. 367 (1987);
United States v. Ross,
456 U. S. 798
(1982).
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
I remain convinced that Justice Stewart correctly articulated
the plain view doctrine in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443
(1971). The Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement officers to
seize items for which they do not have a warrant when those items
are found in plain view and (1) the officers are lawfully in a
position to observe the items, (2) the discovery of the items is
"inadvertent," and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officers
that the items are evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure. In eschewing the inadvertent discovery
requirement, the majority ignores the Fourth Amendment's express
command that warrants particularly describe not only the
places to be searched but also the
things to be
seized. I respectfully dissent from this rewriting of the Fourth
Amendment.
I
The Fourth Amendment states:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable
Page 496 U. S. 143
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
The Amendment protects two distinct interests. The prohibition
against unreasonable searches and the requirement that a warrant
"particularly describ[e] the place to be searched" protect an
interest in privacy. The prohibition against unreasonable seizures
and the requirement that a warrant "particularly describ[e] . . .
the . . . things to be seized" protect a possessory interest in
property. [
Footnote 2/1]
See
ante at
496 U. S. 133;
Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730,
460 U. S. 747
(1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). The Fourth Amendment,
by its terms, declares the privacy and possessory interests to be
equally important. As this Court recently stated,
"Although the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment
injunction against unreasonable searches is quite different from
that protected by its injunction against unreasonable seizures,
neither the one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily
requires only lesser protection."
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321,
480 U. S. 328
(1987) (citation omitted).
The Amendment protects these equally important interests in
precisely the same manner: by requiring a neutral and detached
magistrate to evaluate, before the search or seizure, the
government's showing of probable cause and its particular
description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized.
Accordingly, just as a warrantless
Page 496 U. S. 144
search is
per se unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances, so too a seizure of personal property is
"
per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant
issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to
be seized."
United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696,
462 U. S. 701
(1983) (footnote omitted) (citing
Marron v. United States,
275 U. S. 192,
275 U. S. 196
(1927)). "Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the
time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights."
United States v. United States District Court,
407 U. S. 297,
407 U. S. 318
(1972). A decision to invade a possessory interest in property is
too important to be left to the discretion of zealous officers
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10,
333 U. S. 14
(1948).
"The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible
and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant."
Marron, supra, at
275 U. S.
196.
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the general rule that
a seizure of personal property must be authorized by a warrant. As
Justice Stewart explained in
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 470,
we accept a warrantless seizure when an officer is lawfully in a
location and inadvertently sees evidence of a crime because of "the
inconvenience of procuring a warrant" to seize this newly
discovered piece of evidence. But "where the discovery is
anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the
evidence and intend to seize it," the argument that procuring a
warrant would be "inconvenient" loses much, if not all, of its
force.
Ibid. Barring an exigency, there is no reason why
the police officers could not have obtained a warrant to seize this
evidence before entering the premises. The rationale behind the
inadvertent discovery requirement is simply that we will not excuse
officers
Page 496 U. S. 145
from the general requirement of a warrant to seize if the
officers know the location of evidence, have probable cause to
seize it, intend to seize it, and yet do not bother to obtain a
warrant particularly describing that evidence. To do so would
violate "the express constitutional requirement of
Warrants . .
. particularly describing . . . [the] things to be seized,'" and
would "fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable
cause can justify a warrantless seizure." Id. at
403 U. S.
471.
Although joined by only three other Members of the Court,
Justice Stewart's discussion of the inadvertent discovery
requirement has become widely accepted.
See Texas v. Brown,
supra, at
460 U. S. 746
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("Whatever my view might have
been when
Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this
late date to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception.
It has been accepted generally for over a decade"). Forty-six
States and the District of Columbia [
Footnote 2/2] and twelve United States Courts of Appeals
[
Footnote 2/3] now require plain
view seizures to be inadvertent. There has been no outcry from law
enforcement officials that the inadvertent discovery requirement
unduly burdens their efforts. Given that the requirement is
inescapably rooted in the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, I
cannot fathom the Court's enthusiasm for discarding this element of
the plain view doctrine.
The Court posits two "flaws" in Justice Stewart's reasoning that
it believes demonstrate the inappropriateness of the inadvertent
discovery requirement. But these flaws are illusory. First, the
majority explains that it can see no reason
Page 496 U. S. 146
why an officer who "has knowledge approaching certainty" that an
item will be found in a particular location "would deliberately
omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the
application for a search warrant."
Ante at
496 U. S. 138.
But to the individual whose possessory interest has been invaded,
it matters not
why the police officer decided to omit a
particular item from his application for a search warrant. When an
officer with probable cause to seize an item fails to mention that
item in his application for a search warrant -- for whatever reason
-- and then seizes the item anyway, his conduct is
per se
unreasonable. Suppression of the evidence so seized will encourage
officers to be more precise and complete in future warrant
applications.
Furthermore, there are a number of instances in which a law
enforcement officer might deliberately choose to omit certain items
from a warrant application even though he has probable cause to
seize them, knows they are on the premises, and intends to seize
them when they are discovered in plain view. For example, the
warrant application process can often be time-consuming, especially
when the police attempt to seize a large number of items. An
officer interested in conducting a search as soon as possible might
decide to save time by listing only one or two hard-to-find items,
such as the stolen rings in this case, confident that he will find
in plain view all of the other evidence he is looking for before he
discovers the listed items. Because rings could be located almost
anywhere inside or outside a house, it is unlikely that a warrant
to search for and seize the rings would restrict the scope of the
search. An officer might rationally find the risk of immediately
discovering the items listed in the warrant -- thereby forcing him
to conclude the search immediately -- outweighed by the time saved
in the application process.
The majority also contends that, once an officer is lawfully in
a house and the scope of his search is adequately circumscribed by
a warrant, "no additional Fourth Amendment
Page 496 U. S. 147
interest is furthered by requiring that the discovery of
evidence be inadvertent."
Ante at
496 U. S. 140.
Put another way, "
the inadvertence rule will in no way reduce
the number of places into which [law enforcement officers] may
lawfully look.'" Ante at 496 U. S. 141
(quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 517
(WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The
majority is correct, but it has asked the wrong question. It is
true that the inadvertent discovery requirement furthers no privacy
interests. The requirement in no way reduces the scope of a search
or the number of places into which officers may look. But it does
protect possessory interests. Cf. Illinois v. Andreas,
463 U. S. 765,
463 U. S. 771
(1983) ("The plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition
that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item
first-hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost;
the owner may retain the incidents of title and possession
but not privacy") (emphasis added). The inadvertent discovery
requirement is essential if we are to take seriously the Fourth
Amendment's protection of possessory interests as well as privacy
interests. See supra, at 496 U. S. 143.
The Court today eliminates a rule designed to further possessory
interests on the ground that it fails to further privacy interests.
I cannot countenance such constitutional legerdemain.
II
Fortunately, this decision should have only a limited impact,
for the Court is not confronted today with what lower courts have
described as a "pretextual" search.
See, e.g., State v.
Lair, 95 Wash. 2d
706, 717-718,
630 P.2d
427, 434 (1981) (en banc) (holding pretextual searches
invalid). For example, if an officer enters a house pursuant to a
warrant to search for evidence of one crime when he is really
interested only in seizing evidence relating to another crime, for
which he does not have a warrant, his search is "pretextual" and
the fruits of that search should be suppressed.
See, e.g.,
State v. Kelsey, 592 S.W.2d
509 (Mo.App.1979) (evidence suppressed because officers, who
had ample opportunity to obtain
Page 496 U. S. 148
warrant relating to murder investigation, entered the premises
instead pursuant to a warrant relating to a drug investigation and
searched only the hiding place of the murder weapon, rather than
conducting a "top to bottom" search for drugs). Similarly, an
officer might use an exception to the generally applicable warrant
requirement, such as "hot pursuit," as a pretext to enter a home to
seize items he knows he will find in plain view. Such conduct would
be a deliberate attempt to circumvent the constitutional
requirement of a warrant "particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized," and cannot be
condoned.
The discovery of evidence in pretextual searches is not
"inadvertent," and should be suppressed for that reason. But even
state courts that have rejected the inadvertent discovery
requirement have held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
pretextual searches.
See State v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781,
788, n. 2, 760 P.2d 1197, 1204, n. 2 (1988);
State v.
Kelly, 718 P.2d 385,
389, n. 1 (Utah 1986). The Court's opinion today does not address
pretextual searches, but I have no doubt that such searches violate
the Fourth Amendment. [
Footnote
2/4]
III
The Fourth Amendment demands that an individual's possessory
interest in property be protected from unreasonable governmental
seizures, not just by requiring a showing of probable cause but
also by requiring a neutral and detached
Page 496 U. S. 149
magistrate to authorize the seizure in advance. The Court today
ignores the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment, which
protects possessory interests in the same manner as it protects
privacy interests, in order to eliminate a generally accepted
element of the plain view doctrine that has caused no apparent
difficulties for law enforcement officers. I am confident, however,
that when confronted with more egregious police conduct than that
found in this case,
ante at
496 U. S.
130-131, such as pretextual searches, the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution will be less parsimonious than
it is today. I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
As the majority recognizes, the requirement that warrants
particularly describe the things to be seized also protects privacy
interests by preventing general searches.
Ante at
496 U. S.
139-141. The scope of a search is limited to those
places in which there is probable cause to believe an item
particularly described in the warrant might be found. A police
officer cannot search for a lawnmower in a bedroom, or for an
undocumented alien in a suitcase.
Ante at
496 U. S.
140-141 (citing
United States v. Ross,
456 U. S. 798, 824
(1982)). Similarly, once all of the items particularly described in
a warrant have been found, the search must cease and no further
invasion of privacy is permitted.
Ante at
496 U. S.
141.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See Appendix A,
infra at
496 U. S.
149-152. Only three States -- California, Idaho, and
Utah -- have rejected the inadvertent discovery requirement.
See People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d
1046, 1076,
259 Cal. Rptr.
630, 644,
774 P.2d 659,
673-674 (1989),
cert. pending, No. 89-6223;
State v.
Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 712, 518 P.2d 969, 974 (1974);
State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385,
389, n. 1 (Utah 1986). The status of the inadvertent discovery
requirement in Delaware is unclear.
See, e.g., Wicks v.
State, 552 A.2d
462, 465 (Del.Super.1988).
[
Footnote 2/3]
See Appendix B,
infra at 152-153.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The Court also does not dispute the unconstitutionality of a
search that goes "so far astray of a search for the items mentioned
in the warrant that it [becomes] a general exploratory search for
any evidence of wrongdoing that might be found."
United States
v. Tranquillo, 330 F.
Supp. 871, 876 (MD Fla.1971). Indeed, the Court reiterates that
converting specific warrants into general warrants is
unconstitutional, and emphasizes the need for scrupulous adherence
to the requirements that warrants particularly describe the place
to be searched and the things to be seized and that a warrantless
search "be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation.
Ante at
496 U. S.
139-140.
|
496
U.S. 128app|
APPENDIX A
STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE INADVERTENT DISCOVERY
REQUIREMENT
"AL:
Taylor v. State, 399
So. 2d 881, 892 (Ala.1981)"
"AK:
Deal v. State, 626 P.2d 1073,
1079 (Alaska 1980)"
"AZ:
State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 464,
724 P.2d 545,
550 (1986)"
"AR:
Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 263,
724 S.W.2d
160, 162 (1987)"
"CO:
People v. Cummings, 706 P.2d
766, 771 (Colo.1985)"
"CT:
State v. Hamilton, 214 Conn. 692, 701, 573 A.2d
1197, 1201 (1990)"
"DC:
Gant v. United States, 518
A.2d 103, 107 (DCApp.1986)"
"FL:
Hurt v. State, 388 So. 2d 281, 282-283
(Fla.App.1980),
review denied, 399 So. 2d 1146
(Fla.1981)"
"GA:
Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 383-384,
254 S.E.2d
337, 346,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179,
62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979)"
"HI:
State v. Barnett, 68 Haw. 32, 35,
703 P.2d 680,
683 (1985)"
"IL:
People v. Madison, 121 Ill. 2d
195, 208, 117 Ill.Dec. 213,
520 N.E.2d
374, 380-381,
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 907, 109 S. Ct.
257, 102 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1988)"
"IN:
Clark v. State, 498 N.E.2d
918, 921 (Ind.1986)"
"IA:
State v. Emerson, 375 N.W.2d
256, 259 (Iowa 1985)"
"KS:
State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493, 497,
769 P.2d 666,
669 (1989)"
"KY:
Patrick v. Commonwealth, 535 S.W.2d 88, 89
(Ky.1976)"
"LA:
State v. Stott, 395 So.
2d 714, 716 (La.1981)"
"ME:
State v. Cloutier, 544
A.2d 1277, 1281, n. 4 (Me.1988)"
"MD:
Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. 232, 251 252, 554 A.2d
356, 365 (1989)"
"MA:
Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 330-331,
409
N.E.2d 719, 727 (1980)"
"MI:
People v. Dugan, 102 Mich.App. 497, 503-505, 302
N.W.2d 209, 211-212 (1980),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927,
102 S. Ct. 1292, 71 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1982)"
"MN:
State v. Buschkopf, 373
N.W.2d 756, 768 (Minn.1985)"
"MS:
Smith v. State, 419 So. 2d
563, 571 (Miss.1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047, 103
S. Ct. 1449, 75 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1983)"
"MO:
State v. Clark, 592 S.W.2d
709, 713 (Mo.1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847, 101 S.
Ct. 132, 66 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1980)"
"MT:
State v. Hembd, 235 Mont. 361, 368-369, 767 P.2d
864, 869 (1989)"
"NE:
State v. Hansen, 221 Neb. 103, 108-109,
375 N.W.2d 605,
609 (1985)"
"NV:
Johnson v. State, 97 Nev. 621, 624,
637 P.2d 1209,
1211 (1981)"
"NH:
State v. Cote, 126 N.H. 514, 525, 526, 493 A.2d
1170, 1177-1178 (1985)"
"NJ:
State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237-238,
463 A.2d
320, 334-335 (1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104
S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984)"
"NM:
State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 779, 606 P.2d 183, 188
(1980)"
"NY:
People v. Jackson, 41 N.Y.2d 146, 150-151, 391
N.Y.S.2d 82, 359 N.E.2d 677, 681 (1976)"
"NC:
State v. White, 322 N.C. 770, 773,
370
S.E.2d 390, 392,
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958, 109 S.
Ct. 399, 102 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1988)"
"ND:
State v. Riedinger, 374
N.W.2d 866, 874 (N.D.1985)"
"OH:
State v. Benner, 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 308, 533
N.E.2d 701, 709-710 (1988),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090,
110 S. Ct. 1834, 108 L. Ed. 2d 962 (1990)"
"OK:
Farmer v. State, 759
P.2d 1031,
1033
(Okla.Cr.App.1988)"
"OR:
State v. Handran, 97 Ore.App. 546, 550-551,
777 P.2d
981, 983,
review denied, 308 Or. 405, 781 P.2d 855
(1989)"
"PA:
Commonwealth v. Davidson, 389 Pa.Super. 166, 174,
566
A.2d 897,
901
(1989)"
"RI:
State v. Robalewski, 418
A.2d 817, 824 (R.I.1980)"
"SC:
State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237,
387 S.E.2d
255, 257 (1990)"
"SD:
State v. Albright, 418
N.W.2d 292, 295 (S.D.1988)"
"TN:
State v. Byerley, 635
S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tenn.1982)"
"TX:
Stoker v. State, 788
S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tex.Crim.App., Sept. 20, 1989) (en banc)"
"VT:
State v. Dorn, 145 Vt. 606, 620-621,
496 A.2d 451,
459-460 (1985)"
"VA:
Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 949,
275 S.E.2d
620, 621-622 (1981)"
"WA:
State v. Bell, 108 Wash. 2d
193, 196,
737 P.2d
254, 257 (1987)"
"WV:
State v. Moore, 165 W.Va. 837, 852-853,
272 S.E.2d
804, 813-814 (1980)"
"WI:
State v. Washington, 134 Wis.2d 108, 119-121,
396 N.W.2d
156, 161 (1986)"
"WY:
Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d
56, 63 (Wyo.1982)"
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS THAT HAVE ADOPTED
THE INADVERTENT DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT
"CA1:
United States v. Caggiano, 899 F.2d 99, 102 (CA1
1990)"
"CA2:
United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 16
(CA2),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953, 110 S. Ct. 364, 107 L.
Ed. 2d 350 (1989)"
"CA3:
United States v. Meyer, 827 F.2d 943, 945 (CA3
1987)"
"CA4:
Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 777, n. 3 (CA4
1987)"
"CA5:
Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 826, n. 30 (CA5
1989),
cert. pending, No. 89-1326"
"CA6:
United States v. Poulos, 895 F.2d 1113, 1121 (CA6
1990)"
"CA7:
United States v. Perry, 815 F.2d 1100, 1105 (CA7
1987)"
"CA8:
United States v. Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110, 1113
(CA8 1989)"
"CA9:
United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1512
(CA9 1989)"
"CA10:
Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930, 935
(CA10 1987)"
"CA11:
United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545,
1551 (CA11 1985)"
"CADC:
In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, for Premises
at 2125 S Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C., 215
U.S.App.D.C. 74, 102, 667 F.2d 117, 145 (1981),
cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 926, 102 S. Ct. 1971, 72 L. Ed. 2d 441
(1982)"