Appellee Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
California (CLVT) was established by an agreement between
construction industry employer associations and a labor union to
provide a mechanism for administering the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement granting construction workers a
yearly paid vacation. The trust qualifies as a "welfare benefit
plan" within the meaning of § 3 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and hence is subject to regulation
under ERISA. Appellant California Franchise Tax Board filed a
complaint in California state court against CLVT and its trustees,
alleging two causes of action: (1) that CLVT had failed to comply
with certain tax levies issued under a California statute, thereby
becoming liable for damages for such failure, and (2) that, in view
of the defendants' contention that ERISA preempted state law and
that the trustees lacked power to honor the levies, a judgment be
issued declaring the parties' respective rights. CLVT removed the
case to Federal District Court, which, after denying appellant's
motion for remand to the state court, held that ERISA did not
preempt the State's power to levy on the funds held in trust by
CLVT. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: The case is not within the removal jurisdiction
conferred by 28 U.S.C.§ 1441. Pp.
465 U. S.
7-28.
Page 463 U. S. 2
(a) Where there is no diversity of citizenship between the
parties, as in this case, the propriety of removal turns on whether
the case falls within the original "federal question" jurisdiction
of United States district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed.,
Supp. V). Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, a defendant may
not remove such a case to federal court unless the plaintiff's
complaint establishes that the case "arises under" federal law
within the meaning of § 1331, and it may not be removed on the
basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption,
even if the defense is anticipated in the complaint and both
parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue.
Pp.
463 U. S.
7-12.
(b) For appellant's first cause of action, a straightforward
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes original
federal court jurisdiction, and thus the cause of action was not
removable. California law establishes a set of conditions, without
reference to federal law, under which a tax levy may be enforced;
federal law becomes relevant only by way of a defense to an
obligation created entirely by state law, and then only if
appellant has made out a valid claim for relief under state law.
Pp.
463 U. S.
13-14.
(c) Nor is appellant's second cause of action removable to
federal court. Under the federal jurisdictional statutes, federal
courts do not have original jurisdiction, nor do they acquire
jurisdiction on removal, when a federal question is presented by a
complaint for a state declaratory judgment, and where, if the
plaintiff had sought a federal declaratory judgment, federal
jurisdiction would be barred by
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667,
under which federal jurisdiction is lacking if, but for the
availability of the federal declaratory judgment procedure, a
federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state-created
action. The situation presented by a State's suit for a declaration
of the validity of state law is sufficiently removed from the
spirit of necessity and careful limitation of federal district
court jurisdiction that informed this Court's statutory
interpretation in
Skelly Oil and
Gully v. First
National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, to
convince the Court that, until Congress informs it otherwise, such
a suit is not within the district courts' original jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the same suit brought originally in state court is not
removable. Pp.
463 U. S.
14-22.
(d) A suit by state tax authorities under a statute like the
California tax levy statute involved here does not "arise" under
ERISA. The State's right to enforce its tax levies is not of
central concern to the federal statute.
Avco Corp. v.
Machinists, 390 U. S. 557,
distinguished. Even though ERISA may preclude enforcement of the
State's levy in the circumstances of this case, an action to
enforce the levy is not itself preempted by ERISA. On the face of a
well-pleaded complaint there are
Page 463 U. S. 3
many reasons completely unrelated to ERISA's provisions and
purposes why the State may or may not be entitled to the relief it
seeks. Moreover, ERISA does not provide an alternative cause of
action in the State's favor to enforce its rights. Nor does
appellant's second cause of action arise under ERISA. ERISA
enumerates the parties entitled to seek a declaratory judgment
under § 502 of that Act; it does not provide anyone other than
participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries of an ERISA-covered
plan with an express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on
the issues of this case. A suit for similar relief by some other
party does not "arise under" that provision. Pp.
463 U. S.
22-27.
679 F.2d 1307, vacated and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question in dispute between the parties is whether
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88
Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
et seq. (1976 ed.
and Supp. V), permits state tax authorities
Page 463 U. S. 4
to collect unpaid state income taxes by levying on funds held in
trust for the taxpayers under an ERISA-covered vacation benefit
plan. The issue is an important one, which affects thousands of
federally regulated trusts and all nonfederal tax collection
systems, and it must eventually receive a definitive, uniform
resolution. Nevertheless, for reasons involving perhaps more
history than logic, we hold that the lower federal courts had no
jurisdiction to decide the question in the case before us, and we
vacate the judgment and remand the case with instructions to remand
it to the state court from which it was removed.
I
None of the relevant facts is in dispute. Appellee Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California (CLVT) [
Footnote 1] is a trust established by
an agreement between four associations of employers active in the
construction industry in southern California and the Southern
California District Council of Laborers, an arm of the District
Council and affiliated locals of the Laborers' International Union
of North America. The purpose of the agreement and trust was to
establish a mechanism for administering the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement that grants construction workers a
yearly paid vacation. [
Footnote
2] The trust agreement expressly proscribes any assignment,
pledge, or encumbrance of
Page 463 U. S. 5
funds held in trust by CLVT. [
Footnote 3] The Plan that CLVT administers is
unquestionably an "employee welfare benefit plan" within the
meaning of § 3 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), and CLVT and its
individual trustees are thereby subject to extensive regulation
under Titles I and III of ERISA.
Appellant Franchise Tax Board is a California agency charged
with enforcement of that State's personal income tax law.
California law authorizes appellant to require any person in
possession of "credits or other personal property or other things
of value, belonging to a taxpayer"
"to withhold . . . the amount of any tax, interest, or penalties
due from the taxpayer . . . and to transmit the amount withheld to
the Franchise Tax Board."
Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 18817 (West Supp.1983). Any
person who, upon notice by the Franchise Tax Board, fails to comply
with its request to withhold and to transmit funds becomes
personally liable for the amounts identified in the notice. §
18818.
In June, 1980, the Franchise Tax Board filed a complaint in
state court against CLVT and its trustees. Under the heading "First
Cause of Action," appellant alleged that CLVT had failed to comply
with three levies issued under § 18817, [
Footnote 4] concluding
Page 463 U. S. 6
with the allegation that it had been "damaged in a sum . . . not
to exceed $380.56 plus interest from June 1, 1980." App. 3-8. Under
the heading "Second Cause of Action," appellant incorporated its
previous allegations and added:
"There was at the time of the levies alleged above and continues
to be an actual controversy between the parties concerning their
respective legal rights and duties. The Board [appellant] contends
that defendants [CLVT] are obligated and required by law to pay
over to the Board all amounts held . . . in favor of the Board's
delinquent taxpayers. On the other hand, defendants contend that
section 514 of ERISA preempts state law and that the trustees lack
the power to honor the levies made upon them by the State of
California. "
Page 463 U. S. 7
"[D]efendants will continue to refuse to honor the Board's
levies in this regard. Accordingly, a declaration by this court of
the parties' respective rights is required to fully and finally
resolve this controversy."
Id. at 8-9. In a prayer for relief, appellant requested
damages for defendants' failure to honor the levies and a
declaration that defendants are "legally obligated to honor all
future levies by the Board."
Id. at 9. [
Footnote 5]
CLVT removed the case to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California, and the court denied the
Franchise Tax Board's motion for remand to the state court. On the
merits, the District Court ruled that ERISA did not preempt the
State's power to levy on funds held in trust by CLVT. CLVT
appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. 679 F.2d 1307 (CA9
1982). On petition for rehearing, the Franchise Tax Board renewed
its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the
complaint in this case. The petition for rehearing was denied, and
an appeal was taken to this Court. We postponed consideration of
our jurisdiction pending argument on the merits. 459 U.S. 1085
(1982). We now hold that this case was not within the removal
jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and therefore we do not
reach the merits of the preemption question. [
Footnote 6]
II
The jurisdictional structure at issue in this case has remained
basically unchanged for the past century. With exceptions not
relevant here,
"any civil action brought in a
Page 463 U. S. 8
State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending."
Ibid. If it appears before final judgment that a case
was not properly removed, because it was not within the original
jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the district
court must remand it to the state court from which it was removed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). For this case -- as for many
cases where there is no diversity of citizenship between the
parties -- the propriety of removal turns on whether the case falls
within the original "federal question" jurisdiction of the United
States district courts: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976
ed., Supp. V). [
Footnote 7]
Since the first version of § 1331 was enacted, Act of Mar. 3, 1875,
ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, the statutory phrase "arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" has resisted
all attempts to frame a single, precise definition for determining
which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original
jurisdiction of the district courts. Especially when considered in
light of § 1441's removal jurisdiction, the phrase "arising under"
masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and
state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial
system. [
Footnote 8]
The most familiar definition of the statutory "arising under"
limitation is Justice Holmes' statement, "A suit arises
Page 463 U. S. 9
under the law that creates the cause of action."
American
Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.
S. 257,
241 U. S. 260
(1916). However, it is well settled that Justice Holmes' test is
more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come
within the district courts' original jurisdiction than it is for
describing which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction. We
have often held that a case "arose under" federal law where the
vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some
construction of federal law,
see, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180
(1921);
Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.
S. 486 (1917), and even the most ardent proponent of the
Holmes test has admitted that it has been rejected as an
exclusionary principle,
see Flournoy v. Wiener,
321 U. S. 253,
321 U. S.
270-272 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See
also T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (CA2 1964)
(Friendly, J.). Leading commentators have suggested that for
purposes of § 1331 an action "arises under" federal law
"if in order for the plaintiff to secure the relief sought he
will be obliged to establish both the correctness and the
applicability to his case of a proposition of federal law."
P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 889 (2d
ed.1973) (hereinafter Hart & Wechsler);
cf. T. B. Harms
Co., supra, at 827 ("a case may
arise under' a law of the
United States if the complaint discloses a need for determining the
meaning or application of such a law").
One powerful doctrine has emerged, however -- the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule -- which, as a practical matter, severely limits
the number of cases in which state law "creates the cause of
action" that may be initiated in or removed to
Page 463 U. S. 10
federal district court, thereby avoiding more or less
automatically a number of potentially serious federal-state
conflicts.
"[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law
or treaty of the United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional
statute, . . . must be determined from what necessarily appears in
the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or
declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of
avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may
interpose."
Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74,
234 U. S. 75-76
(1914). Thus, a federal court does not have original jurisdiction
over a case in which the complaint presents a state law cause of
action, but also asserts that federal law deprives the defendant of
a defense he may raise,
Taylor v. Anderson, supra; Louisville
& Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.
S. 14 (1908), or that a federal defense the defendant
may raise is not sufficient to defeat the claim,
Tennessee v.
Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454
(1894).
"Although such allegations show that very likely, in the course
of the litigation, a question under the Constitution would arise,
they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff's original
cause of action, arises under the Constitution."
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, supra, at
211 U. S. 152.
For better or worse, under the present statutory scheme as it has
existed since 1887, a defendant may not remove a case to federal
court unless the
plaintiff's complaint establishes that
the case "arises under" federal law. [
Footnote 9]
"[A] right or immunity created by the
Page 463 U. S. 11
Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element,
and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action."
Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.
S. 109,
299 U. S. 112
(1936).
For many cases in which federal law becomes relevant only
insofar as it sets bounds for the operation of state authority, the
well-pleaded complaint rule makes sense as a quick rule of thumb.
Describing the case before the Court in
Gully, [
Footnote 10] Justice Cardozo
wrote:
"Petitioner will have to prove that the state law has been
obeyed before the question will be reached whether anything in its
provisions or in administrative conduct under it is inconsistent
with the federal rule. If what was done by the taxing officers in
levying the tax in suit did not amount in substance under the law
of Mississippi to an assessment of the shareholders, but in
substance as
Page 463 U. S. 12
well as in form was an assessment of the bank alone, the
conclusion will be inescapable that there was neither tax nor debt,
apart from any barriers Congress may have built. On the other hand,
a finding upon evidence that the Mississippi law has been obeyed
may compose the controversy altogether, leaving no room for a
contention that the federal law has been infringed. The most that
one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in the
background, just as farther in the background there lurks a
question of constitutional law, the question of state power in our
federal form of government. A dispute so doubtful and conjectural,
so far removed from plain necessity, is unavailing to extinguish
the jurisdiction of the states."
Id. at
299 U. S.
117.
The rule, however, may produce awkward results, especially in
cases in which neither the obligation created by state law nor the
defendant's factual failure to comply are in dispute, and both
parties admit that the only question for decision is raised by a
federal preemption defense. Nevertheless, it has been correctly
understood to apply in such situations. [
Footnote 11] As we said in
Gully:
"By unimpeachable authority, a suit brought upon a state statute
does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the
United States because prohibited thereby."
Id. at
299 U. S. 116.
[
Footnote 12]
Page 463 U. S. 13
III
Simply to state these principles is not to apply them to the
case at hand. Appellant's complaint sets forth two "causes of
action," one of which expressly refers to ERISA; if either comes
within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, removal was
proper as to the whole case.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
Although appellant's complaint does not specifically assert any
particular statutory entitlement for the relief it seeks, the
language of the complaint suggests (and the parties do not dispute)
that appellant's "first cause of action" states a claim under
Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 18818 (West Supp.1983),
see
supra at
463 U. S. 5-6, and
its "second cause of action" states a claim under California's
Declaratory Judgment Act, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Ann. § 1060 (West
1980). As an initial proposition, then, the "law that creates the
cause of action" is state law, and original federal jurisdiction is
unavailable unless it appears that some substantial, disputed
question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the
well-pleaded state claims, or that one or the other claim is
"really" one of federal law.
A
Even though state law creates appellant's causes of action, its
case might still "arise under" the laws of the United States if a
well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under
state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal
law in dispute between the parties. For appellant's first cause of
action -- to enforce its levy, under § 18818 -- a straightforward
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes original
federal court jurisdiction. California law establishes a set of
conditions, without reference to federal law, under which a tax
levy may be enforced; federal law becomes relevant only by way of a
defense to an obligation created entirely by state law, and then
only if appellant has made out a valid claim for relief under state
law.
See supra at
463 U. S. 11-12. The well-pleaded complaint rule was
framed to deal with precisely such a situation. As we discuss
Page 463 U. S. 14
above, since 1887, it has been settled law that a case may not
be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense,
including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is
anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties
admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the
case.
Appellant's declaratory judgment action poses a more difficult
problem. Whereas the question of federal preemption is relevant to
appellant's first cause of action only as a potential defense, it
is a necessary element of the declaratory judgment claim. Under
Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Ann. § 1060 (West 1980), a party with an interest
in property may bring an action for a declaration of another
party's legal rights and duties with respect to that property upon
showing that there is an "actual controversy relating to the legal
rights and duties" of the parties. The only questions in dispute
between the parties in this case concern the rights and duties of
CLVT and its trustees under ERISA. Not only does appellant's
request for a declaratory judgment under California law clearly
encompass questions governed by ERISA, but appellant's complaint
identifies no other questions as a subject of controversy between
the parties. Such questions must be raised in a well-pleaded
complaint for a declaratory judgment. [
Footnote 13] Therefore, it is clear on the face of its
well-pleaded complaint that appellant may not obtain the relief it
seeks in its second cause of action ("[t]hat the court declare
defendants legally obligated to honor all future levies by the
Board upon [CLVT]," App. 9) without a construction of ERISA and/or
an adjudication of its preemptive effect and constitutionality --
all questions of federal law.
Page 463 U. S. 15
Appellant argues that original federal court jurisdiction over
such a complaint is foreclosed by our decision in
Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.
S. 667 (1950). As we shall see, however,
Skelly
Oil is not directly controlling.
In
Skelly Oil, Skelly Oil and Phillips had a contract,
for the sale of natural gas, that entitled the seller -- Skelly Oil
-- to terminate the contract at any time after December 1, 1946, if
the Federal Power Commission had not yet issued a certificate of
convenience and necessity to a third party, a pipeline company to
whom Phillips intended to resell the gas purchased from Skelly Oil.
Their dispute began when the Federal Power Commission informed the
pipeline company on November 30 that it would issue a conditional
certificate, but did not make its order public until December 2. By
this time, Skelly Oil had notified Phillips of its decision to
terminate their contract. Phillips brought an action in United
States District Court under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a declaration that the contract was still
in effect. 339 U.S. at
339 U. S.
669-671.
There was no diversity between the parties, and we held that
Phillips' claim was not within the federal question jurisdiction
conferred by § 1331. We reasoned:
"'[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural
only.'
Aetna Life In. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S.
227,
300 U. S. 240. Congress
enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts, but
did not extend their jurisdiction. When concerned as we are with
the power of the inferior federal courts to entertain litigation
within the restricted area to which the Constitution and Acts of
Congress confine them, 'jurisdiction' means the kinds of issues
which give right of entrance to federal courts. Jurisdiction in
this sense was not altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Prior
to that Act, a federal court would entertain a suit on a contract
only if the plaintiff asked for an immediately enforceable
remedy
Page 463 U. S. 16
like money damages or an injunction, but such relief could only
be given if the requisites of jurisdiction, in the sense of a
federal right or diversity, provided foundation for resort to the
federal courts. The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be
given by way of recognizing the plaintiff's right even though no
immediate enforcement of it was asked. But the requirements of
jurisdiction -- the limited subject matters which alone Congress
had authorized the District Courts to adjudicate -- were not
impliedly repealed or modified."
339 U.S. at
339 U. S.
671-672. We then observed that, under the well-pleaded
complaint rule, an action by Phillips to enforce its contract would
not present a federal question.
Id. at
339 U. S. 672.
Skelly Oil has come to stand for the proposition that,
"if, but for the availability of the declaratory judgment
procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a
state created action, jurisdiction is lacking."
10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2767, pp. 744-745 (2d ed.1983).
Cf. Public Service
Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.
S. 237,
344 U. S. 248
(1952) (dictum). [
Footnote
14]
Page 463 U. S. 17
1. As an initial matter, we must decide whether the doctrine of
Skelly Oil limits original federal court jurisdiction
under § 1331 -- and by extension removal jurisdiction under § 1441
-- when a question of federal law appears on the face of a
well-pleaded complaint for a state law declaratory judgment.
Apparently, it is a question of first impression. [
Footnote 15] As the passage quoted above
makes clear,
Skelly Oil relied significantly on the
precise contours of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, as well
as of § 1331.
Cf. 339 U.S. at
339 U. S. 674
(stressing the need to respect "the limited procedural purpose of
the Declaratory Judgment Act"). The Court's emphasis that the
Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to affect only the remedies
available in a federal district court, not the court's
jurisdiction, was critical to the Court's reasoning. Our
interpretation of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act in
Skelly Oil does not apply of its own force to state
declaratory judgment statutes, many of which antedate the federal
statute,
see Developments in the Law -- Declaratory
Judgments -- 1941-1949, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 787, 790-791 (1949).
[
Footnote 16]
Cf.
288 U. S. C. &
St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288
Page 463 U. S. 18
U.S. 249,
288 U. S.
264-265 (1933) (Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over federal questions in a state declaratory judgment). Yet while
Skelly Oil itself is limited to the federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, fidelity to its spirit leads us to extend it to state
declaratory judgment actions as well. If federal district courts
could take jurisdiction, either originally or by removal, of state
declaratory judgment claims raising questions of federal law,
without regard to the doctrine of
Skelly Oil, the federal
Declaratory Judgment Act -- with the limitations
Skelly
Oil read into it -- would become a dead letter. For any case
in which a state declaratory judgment action was available,
litigants could get into federal court for a declaratory judgment,
despite our interpretation of § 2201, simply by pleading an
adequate state claim for a declaration of federal law. Having
interpreted the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 to include certain
limitations on the jurisdiction of federal district courts to
entertain declaratory judgment suits, we should be extremely
hesitant to interpret the Judiciary Act of 1875 and its 1887
amendments in a way that renders the limitations in the later
statute nugatory. Therefore, we hold that, under the jurisdictional
statutes as they now stand, [
Footnote 17]
Page 463 U. S. 19
federal courts do not have original jurisdiction, nor do they
acquire jurisdiction on removal, when a federal question is
presented by a complaint for a state declaratory judgment, but
Skelly Oil would bar jurisdiction if the plaintiff had
sought a federal declaratory judgment.
2. The question, then, is whether a federal district court could
take jurisdiction of appellant's declaratory judgment claim had it
been brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. [
Footnote 18] The application of
Skelly Oil to
such a suit is somewhat unclear. Federal courts have regularly
taken original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits in
which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive
action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a
federal question. [
Footnote
19] Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA specifically grants trustees of
ERISA-covered plans like CLVT a cause of action for
Page 463 U. S. 20
injunctive relief when their rights and duties under ERISA are
at issue, and that action is exclusively governed by federal law.
[
Footnote 20] If CLVT could
have sought an injunction under ERISA against application to it of
state regulations that require acts inconsistent with ERISA,
[
Footnote 21] does a
declaratory judgment suit by the State "arise under" federal
law?
We think not. We have always interpreted what
Skelly
Oil called "the current of jurisdictional legislation since
the Act of March 3, 1875," 339 U.S. at 673, with an eye to
practicality and necessity.
"What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation
of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law
in its treatment of problems of causation . . . a selective process
which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the
other ones
Page 463 U. S. 21
aside."
"
Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. at
299 U. S. 117-118. There are
good reasons why the federal courts should not entertain suits by
the States to declare the validity of their regulations despite
possibly conflicting federal law. States are not significantly
prejudiced by an inability to come to federal court for a
declaratory judgment in advance of a possible injunctive suit by a
person subject to federal regulation. They have a variety of means
by which they can enforce their own laws in their own courts, and
they do not suffer if the preemption questions such enforcement may
raise are tested there. [
Footnote 22] The express grant of federal jurisdiction in
ERISA is limited to suits brought by certain parties,
see
infra at
463 U. S. 25, as to whom
Congress presumably determined that a right to enter federal court
was necessary to further the statute's purposes. [
Footnote 23] It did not go so far as to
provide that any suit
against such parties must also be
brought in federal court when they themselves did not choose to
sue. The situation presented by a State's suit for a declaration of
the validity of state law is sufficiently removed from the spirit
of necessity and careful limitation of district court
jurisdiction
Page 463 U. S. 22
that informed our statutory interpretation in
Skelly
Oil and
Gully to convince us that, until Congress
informs us otherwise, such a suit is not within the original
jurisdiction of the United States district courts. Accordingly, the
same suit brought originally in state court is not removable
either. [
Footnote 24]"
B
CLVT also argues that appellant's "causes of action" are, in
substance, federal claims. Although we have often repeated that
"the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will
rely upon,"
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.,
228 U. S. 22,
228 U. S. 25
(1913), it is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded
complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting
to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint,
see Avco
Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 75, Int'l Assn. of Machinists, 376
F.2d 337, 339-340 (CA6 1967),
aff'd, 390 U.S.
390 U. S. 557
(1968).
CLVT's best argument stems from our decision in
Avco Corp.
v. Aero Lodge No. 75. In that case, the petitioner filed suit
in state court alleging simply that it had a valid contract with
the respondent, a union, under which the respondent had agreed to
submit all grievances to binding arbitration and not to cause or
sanction any "work stoppages, strikes, or slowdowns." The
petitioner further alleged that the respondent and its officials
had violated the agreement by
Page 463 U. S. 23
participating in and sanctioning work stoppages, and it sought
temporary and permanent injunctions against further breaches. App.
O.T. 1967, No. 445, pp. 2-9. It was clear that, had petitioner
invoked it, there would have been a federal cause of action under §
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §
185,
see Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.
S. 448 (1957), and that, even in state court, any action
to enforce an agreement within the scope of § 301 would be
controlled by federal law,
see Teamsters v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U. S. 95,
369 U. S.
103-104 (1962). It was also clear, however, under the
law in effect at the time, that independent limits on federal
jurisdiction made it impossible for a federal court to grant the
injunctive relief petitioner sought.
See Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195
(1962) (later overruled in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, 398 U. S. 235
(1970)).
The Court of Appeals held, 376 F.2d at 340, and we affirmed, 390
U.S. at
390 U. S. 560,
that the petitioner's action "arose under" § 301, and thus could be
removed to federal court, although the petitioner had undoubtedly
pleaded an adequate claim for relief under the state law of
contracts and had sought a remedy available
only under
state law. The necessary ground of decision was that the preemptive
force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state
cause of action "for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization." [
Footnote
25] Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law,
notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of
action in the absence of § 301.
Avco
Page 463 U. S. 24
stands for the proposition that, if a federal cause of action
completely preempts a state cause of action any complaint that
comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily
"arises under" federal law.
CLVT argues by analogy that ERISA, like § 301, was meant to
create a body of federal common law, and that
"any state court action which would require the interpretation
or application of ERISA to a plan document 'arises under' the laws
of the United States."
Brief for Appellees 20-21. ERISA contains provisions creating a
series of express causes of action in favor of participants,
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries of ERISA-covered plans, as well as
the Secretary of Labor. § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). [
Footnote 26] It may be that, as with
§ 301 as interpreted in
Avco, any state action coming
within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA would be removable to federal
district court, even if an otherwise adequate state cause of action
were pleaded without reference to federal law. [
Footnote 27] It does not follow, however,
that either of appellant's
Page 463 U. S. 25
claims in this case comes within the scope of one of ERISA's
causes of action.
The phrasing of § 502(a) is instructive. Section 502(a)
specifies which persons -- participants, beneficiaries,
fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor -- may bring actions for
particular kinds of relief. It neither creates nor expressly denies
any cause of action in favor of state governments, to enforce tax
levies or for any other purpose. It does not purport to reach every
question relating to plans covered by ERISA. [
Footnote 28] Furthermore, § 514(b)(2)(A) of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), makes clear that Congress did not
intend to preempt entirely every state cause of action relating to
such plans. With important, but express, limitations, it states
that
"nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities."
Against this background, it is clear that a suit by state tax
authorities under a statute like § 18818 does not "arise under"
ERISA. Unlike the contract rights at issue in
Avco, the
State's right to enforce its tax levies is not of central
concern
Page 463 U. S. 26
to the federal statute. For that reason, as in
Gully, see
supra at
463 U. S. 11-12,
on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are many reasons
completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of ERISA why
the State may or may not be entitled to the relief it seeks.
[
Footnote 29] Furthermore,
ERISA does not provide an alternative cause of action in favor of
the State to enforce its rights, while § 301 expressly supplied the
plaintiff in
Avco with a federal cause of action to
replace its preempted state contract claim. Therefore, even though
the Court of Appeals may well be correct that ERISA precludes
enforcement of the State's levy in the circumstances of this case,
an action to enforce the levy is not itself preempted by ERISA.
Once again, appellant's declaratory judgment cause of action
presents a somewhat more difficult issue. The question on which a
declaration is sought -- that of the CLVT trustees' "power to honor
the levies made upon them by the State of California,"
see
supra at
463 U. S. 6 -- is
undoubtedly a matter of concern under ERISA. It involves the
meaning and enforceability of provisions in CLVT's trust agreement
forbidding the trustees to assign or otherwise to alienate funds
held in trust,
see supra at
463 U. S. 4-5, and
n. 3, and thus comes within the class of questions for which
Congress intended that federal courts create federal common law.
[
Footnote 30] Under §
502(a)(3)(B) of
Page 463 U. S. 27
ERISA, a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of a plan
covered by ERISA may bring a declaratory judgment action in federal
court to determine whether the plan's trustees may comply with a
state levy on funds held in trust. [
Footnote 31] Nevertheless, CLVT's argument that
appellant's second cause of action arises under ERISA fails for the
second reason given above. ERISA carefully enumerates the parties
entitled to seek relief under § 502; it does not provide anyone
other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an
express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the issues in
this case. A suit for similar relief by some other party does not
"arise under" that provision. [
Footnote 32]
IV
Our concern in this case is consistent application of a system
of statutes conferring original federal court jurisdiction, as they
have been interpreted by this Court over many years. Under our
interpretations, Congress has given the lower federal courts
jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court,
only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes
either that federal law creates
Page 463 U. S. 28
the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal law. We hold that a suit by state tax authorities both to
enforce its levies against funds held in trust pursuant to an
ERISA-covered employee benefit plan and to declare the validity of
the levies notwithstanding ERISA is neither a creature of ERISA
itself nor a suit of which the federal courts will take
jurisdiction because it turns on a question of federal law.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand so that this case may be remanded to the Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Along with CLVT itself, CLVT's individual trustees are also
appellees. At various points throughout this opinion, the trust and
its trustees are referred to collectively as "CLVT."
[
Footnote 2]
As part of the hourly compensation due bargaining unit members,
employers pay a certain amount to CLVT, which places the money in
an account for each employee. Once a year, CLVT distributes the
money in each account to the employee for whom it is kept, provided
the employee complies with CLVT's application procedures. Any funds
held for employees who fail to make a timely application are used
to defray CLVT's administrative expenses.
See generally
Trust Agreement, Art. IX, App. 45-51 ("The Plan"). This system was
set up in large part because union members typically work for
several employers during the course of a year.
[
Footnote 3]
Article IX, � 9.08, provides in part:
"[N]o payments due the Fund and no monies in vacation accounts
established pursuant to the Plan shall be subject in any manner to
anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, encumbrance
or charge by any employee or any other persons and any such
anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge,
encumbrance or charge shall be void and ineffective. The money
credited to a vacation account shall be subject to withdrawal and
distribution only at the times, in the manner and for the purposes
specified in this Agreement."
Id. at 49.
Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976 ed. and
Supp. V), requires plan trustees to discharge their duties "solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries," "for the
exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits . . . and . . .
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan," and "in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan"
insofar as they are consistent with ERISA. §§ 1104(a)(1)(A),
(D).
[
Footnote 4]
At several points in 1977 and 1978, appellant issued notices to
CLVT requesting it to withhold and to transmit approximately $380
in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties due from three
individuals. CLVT did not dispute that the individuals in question
were beneficiaries of its trust or that it was then holding
vacation benefit funds for them. In each case, however, it
acknowledged receipt of appellant's notice and informed appellant
that it had requested an opinion letter from the Administrator for
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs of the United States
Department of Labor as to whether it was permitted under ERISA to
honor appellant's levy. CLVT also informed appellant that it would
withhold the funds from the individual workers until it received an
opinion from the Department of Labor, but that it would not
transmit the funds to the Franchise Tax Board.
Appellant took no immediate action to enforce its levy, and in
January, 1980, CLVT finally received the opinion letter it had
requested. The opinion letter concluded:
"[I]t is the position of the Department of Labor that the
process of any state judicial or administrative agency seeking to
levy for unpaid taxes or unpaid unemployment insurance
contributions upon benefits due a participant or beneficiary under
the Plan is preempted under ERISA section 514 [29 U.S.C. §
1144]."
App. 71. Accordingly, on January 7, 1980, counsel for CLVT
furnished appellant a copy of the opinion letter, informed
appellant that CLVT lacked the power to honor appellant's levies,
and stated their intention to recommend that CLVT should disburse
the funds it had withheld to the employees in question.
[
Footnote 5]
The complaint does not identify statutory authority for the
relief requested; indeed, the only statute mentioned on the face of
the complaint is ERISA.
See infra at
463 U. S. 13.
[
Footnote 6]
At least for purposes of determining whether the courts below
had jurisdiction over this case, we have appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).
[
Footnote 7]
ERISA may also be an "Act of Congress regulating commerce"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 ed., Supp. V), but we
have not distinguished between the "arising under" standards of §
1337 and § 1331.
See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667
(1950).
[
Footnote 8]
The statute's "arising under" language tracks similar language
in Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, which has been construed as
permitting Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to any case of
which federal law potentially "forms an ingredient,"
See Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738,
22 U. S. 823
(1824), and its limited legislative history suggests that the 44th
Congress may have meant to "confer the whole power which the
Constitution conferred," 2 Cong.Rec. 4986 (1874) (remarks of Sen.
Carpenter). Nevertheless, we have only recently reaffirmed what has
long been recognized -- that "Art. III
arising under'
jurisdiction is broader than federal question jurisdiction under §
1331." Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U. S. 480,
461 U. S. 495
(1983).
[
Footnote 9]
The well-pleaded complaint rule applies to the original
jurisdiction of the district courts as well as to their removal
jurisdiction.
See Phillips Petroleum Co . v. Texaco Inc.,
415 U. S. 125,
415 U. S. 127
(1974) (per curiam) (case brought originally in federal court);
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court,
366 U. S. 656,
366 U. S. 663
(1961) (attack on jurisdiction of state court).
It is possible to conceive of a rational jurisdictional system
in which the answer as well as the complaint would be consulted
before a determination was made whether the case "arose under"
federal law, or in which original and removal jurisdiction were not
coextensive. Indeed, until the 1887 amendments to the 1875 Act, Act
of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as amended by Act of Aug.
13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433, the well-pleaded complaint rule
was not applied in full force to cases removed from state court;
the defendant's petition for removal could furnish the necessary
guarantee that the case necessarily presented a substantial
question of federal law.
See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi,
102 U. S. 135,
102 U. S. 140
(1880);
Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes,
96 U. S. 199,
96 U. S.
203-204 (1878). Commentators have repeatedly proposed
that some mechanism be established to permit removal of cases in
which a federal defense may be dispositive.
See, e.g.,
American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts § 1312, pp. 188-194 (1969) (ALI
Study); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the
Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp.Prob. 216, 233-234 (1948). But
those proposals have not been adopted.
[
Footnote 10]
Gully was a suit by Mississippi tax authorities,
claiming that the First National Bank had failed to make good on a
contract with its predecessor corporation whereby, according to the
State, the bank had promised to pay the predecessor's tax
liabilities. 299 U.S. at
299 U. S.
111-112. It had been removed to federal court, and the
motion for remand had been defeated, on the ground that the State's
"power to lay a tax upon the shares of national banks has its
origin and measure in the provisions of a federal statute," and
that, "by necessary implication, a plaintiff counts upon the
statute in suing for the tax."
Id. at
299 U. S.
112.
[
Footnote 11]
E.g., Trent Realty Associates v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Assn., 657 F.2d 29, 34-35 (CA3 1981);
First National
Bank of Aberdeen v. Aberdeen National Bank, 627 F.2d 843,
850-852 (CA8 1980);
Washington v. American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 660 (CA9 1972);
cf. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v.
Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 422-423 (CA1 1979).
[
Footnote 12]
Note, however, that a claim of federal preemption does not
always arise as a defense to a coercive action.
See n.
20 infra. And, of
course, the absence of original jurisdiction does not mean that
there is no federal forum in which a preemption defense may be
heard. If the state courts reject a claim of federal preemption,
that decision may ultimately be reviewed on appeal by this Court.
See, e.g., Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141
(1982) (deciding preemption question at issue in
Trent Realty,
supra).
[
Footnote 13]
To obtain declaratory relief in California, a party must plead
"facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to
the legal rights and duties of the parties."
Wellenkamp v. Bank
of America, 21 Cal. 3d
943, 947, 582 P.2d 970, 972 (1978).
[
Footnote 14]
In
Wycoff Co., a company that transported films between
various points within the State of Utah sought a declaratory
judgment that a state regulatory commission had no power to forbid
it to transport over routes authorized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. However, "[i]t offered no evidence whatever of any
past, pending or threatened action by the Utah Commission." 344
U.S. at
344 U. S. 240.
We held that there was no jurisdiction, essentially because the
dispute had "not matured to a point where we can see what, if any,
concrete controversy will develop."
Id. at
344 U. S. 245.
We also added:
"Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks
in essence to assert a defense to an impending or threatened state
court action, it is the character of the threatened action, and not
of the defense, which will determine whether there is federal
question jurisdiction in the District Court. If the cause of
action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does
not itself involve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a
federal court may entertain an action for a declaratory judgment
establishing a defense to that claim. This is dubious, even though
the declaratory complaint sets forth a claim of federal right, if
that right is in reality in the nature of a defense to a threatened
cause of action. Federal courts will not seize litigations from
state courts merely because one, normally a defendant, goes to
federal court to begin his federal law defense before the state
court begins the case under state law."
Id. at
344 U. S.
248.
[
Footnote 15]
The existence of this question was noted by the leading
proponent of declaratory judgments during the interim between this
Court's first indication that state declaratory judgment actions
did not fall outside Art. III's "case or controversy" limitation
and passage of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, but the issue
did not come before us.
See E. Borchard, Declaratory
Judgments 298-300 (1934).
[
Footnote 16]
California's Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted 13 years
before the federal Act.
See ch. 463, § 1, 1921 Cal.Stats.
689. California may Well regard its statute as having a more
substantive purpose than the federal Act as interpreted in
Skelly Oil. According to the leading commentator on
California procedure: "Declaratory relief is not a special
proceeding. It is an action, classified as equitable by reason of
the type of relief offered. . . ." 3 B. Witkin, California
Procedure § 705(c), p. 2329 (2d ed.1971).
See also Adams v.
Cook, 15 Cal. 2d
352, 362, 101 P.2d 484, 489 (1940);
cf. Mefford v.
Tulare, 102 Cal. App.
2d 919, 922, 228 P.2d 847, 849 (1951) (declaratory judgment is
intended "to liquidate uncertainties and controversies").
But
cf. Western Title Guaranty Co. v. Sacramento & San Joaquin
Drainage Dist., 235 Cal. App.
2d 815, 822, 45 Cal. Rptr. 578, 582 (1965) (citing federal
cases).
[
Footnote 17]
It is not beyond the power of Congress to confer a right to a
declaratory judgment in a case or controversy arising under federal
law -- within the meaning of the Constitution or of § 1331 --
without regard to
Skelly Oil's particular application of
the well-pleaded complaint rule. The 1969 ALI report strongly
criticized the
Skelly Oil doctrine:
"If no other changes were to be made in federal question
jurisdiction, it is arguable that such language, and the historical
test it seems to embody, should be repudiated."
ALI Study § 1311, at 170-171. Nevertheless, Congress has
declined to make such a change. At this point, any adjustment in
the system that has evolved under the
Skelly Oil rule must
come from Congress.
[
Footnote 18]
It may seem odd that, for purposes of determining whether
removal was proper, we analyze a claim brought under state law, in
state court, by a party who has continuously objected to district
court jurisdiction over its case, as if that party had been trying
to get original federal court jurisdiction all along. That irony,
however, is a more or less constant feature of the removal statute,
under which a case is removable if a federal district court could
have taken jurisdiction had the same complaint been filed.
See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the
Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 234 (1948).
[
Footnote 19]
For instance, federal courts have consistently adjudicated suits
by alleged patent infringers to declare a patent invalid, on the
theory that an infringement suit by the declaratory judgment
defendant would raise a federal question over which the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
See E. Edelmann & Co.
v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (CA7 1937); Hart &
Wechsler 896-897. Taking jurisdiction over this type of suit is
consistent with the dictum in
Public Service Comm'n of Utah v.
Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237,
344 U. S. 248
(1952),
see n 14,
supra, in which we stated only that a declaratory judgment
plaintiff could not get original federal jurisdiction if the
anticipated lawsuit by the declaratory judgment defendant would
not "arise under" federal law. It is also consistent with
the nature of the declaratory remedy itself, which was designed to
permit adjudication of either party's claims of right.
See
E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 15-18, 23-25 (1934).
[
Footnote 20]
Section 502(a)(3) provides:
"[A civil action may be brought] by a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter. . .
."
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
See also n 26,
infra (federal jurisdiction over
suits under § 502 is exclusive, and they are governed entirely by
federal common law).
Even if ERISA did not expressly provide jurisdiction, CLVT might
have been able to obtain federal jurisdiction under the doctrine
applied in some cases that a person subject to a scheme of federal
regulation may sue in federal court to enjoin application to him of
conflicting state regulations, and a declaratory judgment action by
the same person does not necessarily run afoul of the
Skelly
Oil doctrine.
See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Assn. v.
MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498,
406 U. S.
506-508 (1972);
Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530
F.2d 1295, 1303-1306 (CA9 1975),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519
(1977);
First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v.
Greenwald, 591 F.2d at 423, and n. 8.
[
Footnote 21]
We express no opinion, however, whether a party in CLVT's
position could sue under ERISA to enjoin or to declare invalid a
state tax levy, despite the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.
S. 393 (1982). To do so, it would have to show either
that state law provided no "speedy and efficient remedy" or that
Congress intended § 502 of ERISA to be an exception to the Tax
Injunction Act.
[
Footnote 22]
Indeed, as appellant's strategy in this case shows, they may
often be willing to go to great lengths to avoid federal court
resolution of a preemption question. Realistically, there is little
prospect that States will flood the federal courts with declaratory
judgment actions; most questions will arise, as in this case,
because a State has sought a declaration in state court and the
defendant has removed the case to federal court. Accordingly, it is
perhaps appropriate to note that considerations of comity make us
reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts
of that State unless some clear rule demands it.
[
Footnote 23]
Cf. nn.
19 and |
19 and S. 1fn20|>20,
supra. Alleged patent infringers, for example, have a
clear interest in swift resolution of the federal issue of patent
validity -- they are liable for damages if it turns out they are
infringing a patent, and they frequently have a delicate network of
contractual arrangements with third parties that is dependent on
their right to sell or license a product. Parties subject to
conflicting state and federal regulatory schemes also have a clear
interest in sorting out the scope of each government's authority,
especially where they face a threat of liability if the application
of federal law is not quickly made clear.
[
Footnote 24]
CLVT suggests that we treat the motion to dismiss appellant's
complaint it filed in the District Court as a counterclaim for a
declaratory judgment under § 502 of ERISA, which might then provide
an independent jurisdictional basis for reaching the merits of the
preemption issue in this case. Brief for Appellees 9-11;
see
First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v. Greenwald,
supra, at 423;
Wong v. Bacon, 445 F.
Supp. 1177, 1183-1184 (ND Cal.1977). Apparently, CLVT never
filed an answer or a counterclaim in this case, because it
stipulated that the District Court could treat its motion to
dismiss as a cross-motion for summary judgment, and the court
decided the case on that basis.
See App. to
Juris.Statement 17 (District Court's "Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law"). Under the circumstances, we decline to adopt
such a broad construction of CLVT's pleadings.
[
Footnote 25]
To similar effect is
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U. S. 661,
414 U. S. 677
(1974), in which we held that -- unlike all other ejectment suits
in which the plaintiff derives its claim from a federal grant,
e.g., Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S.
74 (1914) -- an ejectment suit based on Indian title is
within the original "federal question" jurisdiction of the district
courts, because Indian title creates a federal possessory right to
tribal lands, "wholly apart from the application of state law
principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of
possession."
Cf. 414 U.S. at
414 U. S.
682-683 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 26]
The statute further states that
"the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the
Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,"
except for actions by a participant or beneficiary to recover
benefits due, to enforce rights under the terms of a plan, or to
clarify rights to future benefits, over which state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction. § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). In
addition, ERISA's legislative history indicates that, in light of
the Act's virtually unique preemption provision,
see §
514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144,
"a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the
courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under
private welfare and pension plans."
120 Cong.Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
[
Footnote 27]
Indeed, precedent involving other statutes granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal courts suggests that, if such an action
were not within the class of cases over which state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the proper course for a
federal district court to take after removal would be to dismiss
the case altogether, without reaching the merits.
See, e.g.,
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co.,
260 U. S. 261,
260 U. S.
287-288 (1922);
Koppers Co. v. Continental Casualty
Co., 337 F.2d 499, 501-502 (CA8 1964) (Blackmun, J.).
[
Footnote 28]
In contrast, § 301(a) of the LMRA applies to all
"[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations."
We have not taken a restrictive view of who may sue under § 301
for violations of such contracts,
see, e.g., Smith v. Evening
News Assn., 371 U. S. 195
(1962);
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.
S. 459 (1960);
cf. Nedd v. United Mine Workers,
556 F.2d 190, 196-198 (CA3 1977), or of what contracts are covered
by § 301,
see Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.,
369 U. S. 17
(1962).
See also Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists Lodge 5,
313 F.2d 179, 181-182 (CA2 1962) (suit by employer for declaratory
judgment as to contract obligations arises under § 301). But even
under § 301, we have never intimated that any action merely
relating to a contract within the coverage of § 301 arises
exclusively under that section. For instance, a state battery suit
growing out of a violent strike would not arise under § 301, simply
because the strike may have been a violation of an employer-union
contract.
Cf. Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.
S. 634,
356 U. S.
640-642 (1958).
[
Footnote 29]
In theory (looking only at the complaint), it may turn out that
the levy was improper under state law, or that, in fact, the
defendant had complied with the levy.
Cf. Gully v. First
National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109,
299 U. S. 117
(1936). Furthermore, a levy on CLVT might be for something like
property taxes on real estate it owned. CLVT's trust agreement
authorizes its trustees to pay such taxes. Art. V, � 5.21(k), App.
29.
[
Footnote 30]
See supra at
463 U. S. 24, n.
26. Of course, in suggesting that the trustees' power to comply
with a state tax levy is -- as a subset of the trustees' general
duties with respect to CLVT -- a matter of concern under ERISA, we
express no opinion as to whether ERISA forbids the trustees to
comply with the levies in this case or otherwise preempts the
State's power to levy on funds held in trust. The same is true of
our holding that ERISA does not preempt the State's causes of
action entirely. Merely to hold that ERISA does not have the same
effect on appellant's suit in this case that § 301 of the LMRA had
on the petitioner's contract suit in
Avco is not to
prejudge the merits of CLVT's preemption claim.
[
Footnote 31]
See n19,
supra. Section 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA has been interpreted
as creating a cause of action for a declaratory judgment.
See
Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 527 (CA3 1979). We repeat,
however, the caveat expressed in
n 21,
supra, as to the effect of the Tax
Injunction Act.
[
Footnote 32]
CLVT also argues that this case is directly controlled by
Avco, on the theory that CLVT's trust agreement is a
contract covered by § 301 of the LMRA itself. Brief for Appellees
19, n.19. We reject this argument essentially for the reasons given
in
n 28,
supra. In
this case, the State does not rely on any contract within the scope
of § 301. The connection between appellant's causes of action to
enforce its levy and for a declaration of rights and duties and a
suit to enforce the trust agreement is too attenuated for us to say
that either "arises under" § 301.