Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983)
U.S. Supreme CourtVerlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983)
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria
Argued January 11, 1983
Decided May 23, 1983
461 U.S. 480
A contract between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and petitioner Dutch corporation for the purchase of cement by Nigeria provided that Nigeria was to establish a confirmed letter of credit for the purchase price. Subsequently, petitioner sued respondent bank, an instrumentality of Nigeria, in Federal District Court, alleging that certain actions by respondent constituted an anticipatory breach of the letter of credit. Petitioner alleged jurisdiction under the provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), granting federal district courts jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy of
"any nonjury civil action against a foreign state . . . as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement."
The District Court, while holding that the Act permitted actions by foreign plaintiffs, dismissed the action on the ground that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity specified in the Act applied. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the ground that the Act exceeded the scope of Art. III of the Constitution, which provides, in part, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to "all Cases . . . arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their Authority," and to "Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." The court held that neither the Diversity Clause nor the "Arising Under" Clause of Art. III is broad enough to support jurisdiction over actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns.
1. For the most part, the Act codifies, as a matter of federal law, the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity under which immunity is confined to suits involving the foreign sovereign's public acts, and does not extend to cases arising out of its strictly commercial acts. If one of the specified exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, a federal district court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a), but if the claim does not fall within one of the exceptions, the court lacks such jurisdiction. Pp. 461 U. S. 486-489.
2. On it face, § 1330(a) allows a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign sovereign in federal court provided the substantive requirements of the Act are satisfied. The Act contains no indication of any limitation based on the plaintiff's citizenship. And, when considered as a whole, the legislative history reveals an intent not to limit jurisdiction under the Act to actions brought by American citizens. Pp. 461 U. S. 489-491.
3. Congress did not exceed the scope of Art. III by granting federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over certain civil actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns where the rule of decision may be provided by state law. While the Diversity Clause of Art. III is not broad enough to support such subject matter jurisdiction, the "Arising Under" Clause is an appropriate basis for the statutory grant of jurisdiction. In enacting the Act, Congress expressly exercised its power to regulate foreign commerce, along with other specified Art. I powers. The Act does not merely concern access to the federal courts, but rather governs the types of actions for which foreign sovereigns may be held liable in a federal court and codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law. Thus, a suit against a foreign state under the Act necessarily involves application of a comprehensive body of substantive federal law, and hence "arises under" federal law within the meaning of Art. III. Pp. 461 U. S. 491-497.
4. Since the Court of Appeal, in affirming the District Court, did not find it necessary to address the statutory question of whether the present action fell within any specified exception to foreign sovereign immunity, the court on remand must consider whether jurisdiction exists under the Act itself. Pp. 461 U. S. 497-498.
647 F.2d 320, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.