Prior to his trial on federal criminal charges, respondent moved
to suppress certain incriminating statements he had made to police
officers and federal agents. Over objections, the District Court
referred the motion to a Magistrate for an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to a provision of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1), which authorizes a district court to refer such a motion
to a magistrate and thereafter to determine and decide such motion
based on the record developed before the magistrate, including the
magistrate's proposed findings of fact and recommendations. Section
636(b)(1) also provides that the judge shall make a "
de
novo determination" of those portions of the magistrate's
report, findings, or recommendations to which objection is made,
and that the judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the magistrate's findings or recommendations; alternatively
the judge may receive further evidence or recommit the matter to
the magistrate with instructions. Based on his view of the
credibility of the testimony at the hearing on respondent's motion,
the Magistrate found that respondent had knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily made the inculpatory statements and recommended
that the motion to suppress be denied. Over respondent's objections
to the Magistrate's report, the District Court accepted the
recommendation and denied the motion to suppress, stating that it
had considered the transcript of the Magistrate's hearing, the
parties' proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
supporting memoranda, the Magistrate's recommendation, and oral
argument of counsel. Respondent was then tried and convicted, but
the Court of Appeals reversed, holding,
inter alia, that
respondent had been deprived of due process by the District Court's
failure personally to hear the controverted testimony on the motion
to suppress.
Held:
1. Under the statute -- which calls for "
de novo
determination," not a
de novo hearing -- the District
Court was not required to rehear the testimony on which the
Magistrate based his findings and recommendations in order to make
an independent evaluation of credibility. The legislative history
discloses that Congress purposefully used the word
Page 447 U. S. 668
determination rather than hearing, believing that Art. III was
satisfied if the ultimate adjudicatory determination was reserved
to the Art. III officer, and that Congress intended to permit
whatever reliance the judge, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, chose to place on the magistrate's proposed findings
and recommendations. Pp.
447 U. S.
673-676.
2. The statute strikes the proper balance between the demands of
due process under the Fifth Amendment and the constraints of Art.
III. Pp.
447 U. S.
677-684.
(a) The nature of the issues presented and the interests
implicated in a motion to suppress evidence do not require, as a
matter of due process, that the district judge must actually hear
the challenged testimony. While the resolution of a suppression
motion may determine the outcome of the case, the interests
underlying a voluntariness hearing do not coincide with the
criminal law objective of determining guilt or innocence, but are
of a lesser magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself. The
due process rights claimed here are adequately protected by the
statute, under which the district judge alone acts as the ultimate
decisionmaker, with the broad discretion to accept, reject, or
modify the magistrate's proposed findings, or to hear the witnesses
live to resolve conflicting credibility claims. The statutory
scheme also includes sufficient procedures to alert the district
court whether to exercise its discretion to conduct a hearing and
view the witnesses itself. Pp.
447 U. S.
677-681.
(b) Although the statute permits the district court to give the
magistrate's proposed findings of fact and recommendations such
weight as their merit commands and the sound discretion of the
judge warrants, that delegation does not violate Art. III so long
as the ultimate decision is made by the district court. Congress
has not sought to delegate the task of rendering a final decision
on a suppression motion to a non-Art. III officer, but instead has
made clear that the district court has plenary discretion whether
to authorize a magistrate to hold an evidentiary hearing and that
the magistrate acts subsidiary to, and only in aid of, the court,
the entire process thereafter taking place under the court's total
control and jurisdiction. Pp.
447 U. S.
681-683.
592 F.2d 976, reversed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
447 U. S. 684.
POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part,
post, p.
447 U. S. 686.
STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
447 U. S. 687.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined,
post, p.
447 U. S.
694.
Page 447 U. S. 669
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 824, to resolve the
constitutionality of a provision of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), which permits a district court to refer to a
magistrate a motion to suppress evidence and authorizes the
district court to determine and decide such motion based on the
record developed before a magistrate, including the magistrate's
proposed findings of fact and recommendations.
I
Respondent Raddatz was indicted on March 31, 1977, in the
Northern District of Illinois for unlawfully receiving a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h). Prior to trial, respondent moved
to suppress certain incriminating statements he had made to police
officers and to agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms. Over his objections, the District Court referred the
motion to a Magistrate for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
The evidence received at the suppression hearing disclosed that,
on August 8, 1976, two police officers responded to a report of a
crime in progress. When they arrived at the scene, they observed
respondent standing next to one Jimmy Baston, who was lying on the
street, bleeding from the head.
Page 447 U. S. 670
Respondent was placed under arrest for illegal use of a weapon,
and was given
Miranda warnings. The arresting officers
testified that respondent explained at the time of his arrest and
after the warning that he had been fighting with Baston over a
family dispute and had brought the gun with him in case any of
Baston's friends tried to interfere.
In due course, state charges were filed against respondent. One
month later, on November 19, 1976, Agents Russell and McCulloch of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms interviewed respondent
at his home. According to their testimony at the suppression
hearing, the agents had been informed by state officials that a
state firearms charge was pending against respondent. The agents
questioned respondent about the gun found in his possession at the
time he was arrested because it had at one time been owned by an
out-of-state man who had been slain in an unsolved homicide. At
this interview, respondent gave a different version of the events,
stating that he had seized the gun from Baston during their August
8 fight, and that he did not know where Baston had obtained a gun.
The agents asked respondent to help them locate Baston, and told
him they would inform the United States Attorney of his cooperation
if he were subsequently prosecuted.
Respondent's testimony before the Magistrate concerning the
November 19 interview varied from that of the federal agents.
According to his testimony, he was informed that he would shortly
be indicted for violations of federal firearms laws, but that, if
he agreed to cooperate, "somebody would talk to the prosecutor, and
it would be dismissed." He also testified that he was told that, if
he did not agree to help, he could find himself "going to the
Federal penitentiary for a long time."
On January 12, 1977, respondent telephoned the agents and
requested a meeting. At this interview, he retracted his November
19 version and stated that he had not taken the gun from Baston,
but had obtained it from his half-brother.
Page 447 U. S. 671
He testified at the suppression hearing that he made the
incriminating statements at the January 12 meeting only after first
obtaining confirmation from the agents of their November 19 promise
that the indictment would be dismissed if he cooperated. The agents
testified that no such promise was ever made to respondent, either
on November 19 or on January 12. They testified that, at the
January 12 meeting, respondent agreed to act as an informant, and
that they gave him $10 at that time to assist him in gathering
information.
A final meeting occurred on January 14, 1977. Respondent
returned to the local offices of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms, accompanied by his wife and children. He was informed
by Agent McCulloch that his case had been referred to the United
States Attorney for prosecution. The agents again discussed with
him the possibility of his becoming an informant, and repeated
their promise that any cooperation would be brought to the
attention of the United States Attorney. Agent McCulloch gave
respondent $50 to pay expenses of acquiring information.
II
The focus of respondent's legal argument at the suppression
hearing was that, under
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S.
1,
378 U. S. 7
(1964), and
Bram v. United States, 168 U.
S. 532,
168 U. S.
542-543 (1897), his confession was not freely and
voluntarily given. He contended that he had been induced to utter
the incriminating statements through a promise of immunity, and
sought to demonstrate a course of conduct on the part of the agents
supportive of such a promise.
In his report and findings, the Magistrate recommended that the
motion to suppress the statements made on August 8, November 19,
and January 12 be denied. He made findings that respondent had
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made inculpatory
statements on all three occasions. Moreover, the Magistrate
specifically stated:
"I find the testimony of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Agent
more credible . . . ;
Page 447 U. S. 672
I find that Federal agents never advised [respondent] that
charges against him would be dismissed, if he cooperated."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a. The evidence before the Magistrate
showed that respondent had altered his version of events on several
occasions.
Respondent filed objections to the Magistrate's report. In
rendering its decision, the District Court stated that it
considered the transcript of the hearing before the Magistrate on
the motion to suppress, the parties' proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and supporting memoranda, and that it read the
recommendation of the Magistrate and heard oral argument of
counsel. Finding "that the three statements given by the defendant
and sought to be suppressed were made voluntarily," the District
Court accepted the recommendation of the Magistrate and denied the
motion to suppress.
By agreement of the parties, the court tried respondent on the
basis of the transcript of the suppression hearing, and
stipulations that the firearm had been manufactured in Florida and
that respondent had been convicted of eight felonies. He was found
guilty and sentenced to six months' imprisonment to be followed by
four and one-half years on probation.
The Court of Appeals reversed. 592 F.2d 976. It first rejected
the statutory arguments, holding that the District Court had the
power to refer to a magistrate the motion to suppress, and did not
abuse its discretion under the statute in deciding the issue
without hearing live testimony of disputed questions of fact.
Turning to the constitutional issues, the court held that the
referral provisions of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B), did not violate Art. III of the Constitution because
the statute required the District Court to make a
de novo
determination of any disputed portion of the Magistrate's proposed
findings and recommendations. However, the Court of Appeals held
that respondent had been deprived of due process by the failure of
the District Court personally to hear the controverted testimony.
Where
Page 447 U. S. 673
credibility is crucial to the outcome, "the district court
cannot constitutionally exercise its discretion to refuse to hold a
hearing on contested issues of fact in a criminal case." 592 F.2d
at 986. The District Court was directed to hold a new hearing.
III
We first address respondent's contention that, under the
statute, the District Court was required to rehear the testimony on
which the Magistrate based his findings and recommendations in
order to make an independent evaluation of credibility. The
relevant statutory provisions authorizing a district court to refer
matters to a magistrate and establishing the mode of review of the
magistrate's actions are in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In §
636(b)(1)(A), Congress provided that a district court judge could
designate a magistrate to "hear and determine" any pretrial matter
pending before the court, except certain "dispositive" motions.
Review by the district court of the magistrate's determination of
these nondispositive motions is on a "clearly erroneous or contrary
to law" standard.
Certain "dispositive" motions, including a "motion . . . to
suppress evidence in a criminal case," are covered by §
636(b)(1)(B). As to these "dispositive" motions, the district judge
may
"designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition,
by a judge of the court of [the] motion."
However, the magistrate has no authority to make a final and
binding disposition. Within 10 days after the magistrate files his
proposed findings and recommendations, any party may file
objections. The statute then provides:
"A judge of the court shall make a
de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A
judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
Page 447 U. S. 674
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit
the matter to the magistrate with instructions."
§ 636(b)(1) (emphasis added).
It should be clear that, on these dispositive motions, the
statute calls for a
de novo determination, not a
de
novo hearing. We find nothing in the legislative history of
the statute to support the contention that the judge is required to
rehear the contested testimony in order to carry out the statutory
command to make the required "determination." [
Footnote 1] Congress enacted the present version
of § 636(b) as part of the 1976 amendments to the Federal
Magistrates Act in response to this Court's decision in
Wingo
v. Wedding, 418 U. S. 461
(1974).
Wingo held that, as a matter of statutory
construction, the 1968 Magistrates Act did not authorize
magistrates to hold evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus
cases. Congress amended the Act
"in order to clarify and further define the additional duties
which may be assigned to a United States Magistrate in the
discretion of a judge of the district court."
S.Rep. No. 94 625, p. 1 (1976) (hereinafter S.Rep.); H.R.Rep.
No. 94-1609, p. 2 (1976) (hereinafter H.R.Rep.).
The bill, as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, did
not include the language requiring the district court to make a
de novo determination. [
Footnote 2] Rather, it included only the
Page 447 U. S. 675
language permitting the district court to "accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made
by the magistrate." Yet the Senate Report which accompanied the
bill emphasized that the purpose of the bill's language was to vest
"ultimate adjudicatory power over dispositive motions" in the
district court while granting the "widest discretion" on how to
treat the recommendations of the magistrate. S.Rep. at 10.
The House Judiciary Committee added to the Senate bill the
present language of the statute, providing that the judge shall
make a "
de novo determination" of contested portions of
the magistrate's report upon objection by any party. According to
the House Report,
"[t]he amendment states expressly what the Senate implied:
i.e., that the district judge, in making the ultimate
determination of the matter, would have to give fresh consideration
to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a
party."
The Report goes on to state, quite explicitly, what was intended
by "
de novo determination":
"The use of the words '
de novo determination'
is
not intended to require the judge to actually conduct a new
hearing on contested issues. Normally, the judge, on
application, will consider the record which has been developed
before the magistrate and make his own determination on the basis
of that record, without being bound to adopt the findings and
conclusions of the magistrate. In some specific instances, however,
it may be necessary for the judge to modify or reject the findings
of the magistrate, to take additional evidence, recall witnesses,
or recommit the matter to the magistrate for further
proceedings."
H.R.Rep. at 3.
Page 447 U. S. 676
Further evidence that Congress did not intend to require the
district court to rehear the witnesses is provided in the House
Committee Report's express adoption of the Ninth Circuit's
procedures for district court review of a magistrate's credibility
recommendations as announced in
Campbell v. United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, 501
F.2d 196,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974). There, in
language quoted in the Committee Report, the court had stated:
"'If [the district court] finds there is a problem as to the
credibility of a witness or witnesses or for other good reasons,
it may, in the exercise of its discretion, call and hear
the testimony of a witness or witnesses in an adversary proceeding.
It is not required to hear any witness and not required to hold a
de novo hearing of the case.'"
H.R.Rep. at 3-4 (emphasis added), quoting 501 F.2d at 206.
[
Footnote 3]
Congressional intent, therefore, is unmistakable. Congress
focused on the potential for Art. III constraints in permitting a
magistrate to make decisions on dispositive motions.
See
S.Rep. at 6; H.R.Rep. at 8. The legislative history discloses that
Congress purposefully used the word
determination, rather
than
hearing, believing that Art. III was satisfied if the
ultimate adjudicatory determination was reserved to the district
court judge. And, in providing for a "
de novo
determination," rather than
de novo hearing, Congress
intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a
magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.
See Mathews
v. Weber, 423 U. S. 261,
423 U. S. 275
(1976).
Page 447 U. S. 677
IV
Having rejected respondent's statutory argument, we turn to his
constitutional challenge. He contends that the review procedures
established by § 636(b)(1) permitting the district court judge to
make a
de novo determination of contested credibility
assessments without personally hearing the live testimony, violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Art. III of the
United States Constitution.
A
The guarantees of due process call for a "hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case."
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306,
339 U. S. 313
(1950). The issue before us, therefore, is whether the nature of
the issues presented and the interests implicated in a motion to
suppress evidence require that the district court judge must
actually hear the challenged testimony. The core of respondent's
challenge to the statute is that "[t]he one who decides must hear."
Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468,
298 U. S. 481
(1936). Here, he contends, only the magistrate "hears," but the
district court is permitted to "decide" by reviewing the record
compiled before the magistrate and making a final
determination.
In
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.
S. 319,
424 U. S. 335
(1976), we emphasized that three factors should be considered in
determining whether the flexible concepts of due process have been
satisfied: (a) the private interests implicated; (b) the risk of an
erroneous determination by reason of the process accorded and the
probable value of added procedural safeguards; and (c) the public
interest and administrative burdens, including costs that the
additional procedures would involve. In providing the fullest
measure of due process protection, the Court of Appeals stressed
that, in this particular case, the success or failure of the motion
to suppress would, as a practical matter, determine the outcome of
the prosecution.
Of course, the resolution of a suppression motion can and
Page 447 U. S. 678
often does determine the outcome of the case; this may be true
of various pretrial motions. We have repeatedly pointed out,
however, that the interests underlying a voluntariness hearing do
not coincide with the criminal law objective of determining guilt
or innocence. [
Footnote 4]
See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.
S. 433,
428 U. S.
453-454 (1976);
United States v. Peltier,
422 U. S. 531,
422 U. S.
535-536,
422 U. S.
538-539 (1975);
Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U. S. 534,
365 U. S.
540-544 (1961). In
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.
S. 477 (1972), we considered whether the prosecution was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession was
voluntary. In holding that a preponderance of the evidence was
sufficient, we stated that "the purpose that a voluntariness
hearing is designed to serve has nothing whatever to do with
improving the reliability of jury verdicts."
Id. at
404 U. S. 486.
Accord, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.
S. 368,
378 U. S.
384-385 (1964), holding that the "reliability of a
confession has nothing to do with its voluntariness." A defendant
who has not prevailed at the suppression hearing remains free to
present evidence and argue to -- and may persuade -- the jury that
the confession was not reliable, and therefore should be
disregarded. [
Footnote 5]
See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a). [
Footnote 6]
Page 447 U. S. 679
This Court on other occasions has noted that the interests at
stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser magnitude than those
in the criminal trial itself. At suppression hearing, the court may
rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would
not be admissible at trial.
United States v. Matlock,
415 U. S. 164,
415 U. S.
172-174 (1974);
Brinegar v. United States,
338 U. S. 160,
338 U. S.
172-174 (1949); Fed.Rules Evid. 104(a), 1101(d)(1).
Furthermore, although the Due Process Clause has been held to
require the Government to disclose the identity of an informant at
trial, provided the identity is shown to be relevant and helpful to
the defense,
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S.
53,
353 U. S. 60-61
(1957), it has never been held to require the disclosure of an
informant's identity at a suppression hearing.
McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U. S. 300
(1967). We conclude that the process due at a suppression hearing
may be less demanding and elaborate than the protections accorded
the defendant at the trial itself.
To be sure, courts must always be sensitive to the problems of
making credibility determinations on the cold record. More than 100
years ago, Lord Coleridge stated the view of the Privy Council that
a retrial should not be conducted by reading the notes of the
witnesses' prior testimony:
"The most careful note must often fail to convey the evidence
fully in some of its most important elements. . . . It cannot give
the look or manner of the witness: his hesitation, his doubts, his
variations of language, his confidence or precipitancy, his
calmness or consideration; . . . the dead body of the evidence,
without its spirit; which is supplied, when given openly and
orally, by the ear and eye of those who receive it."
Queen v. Bertrand, 4 Moo. P. C. N. S. 460, 481, 16
Eng.Rep. 391, 399 (1867). This admonition was made with reference
to an appellate court's review of a
nisi prius judge in a
trial on the merits;
Page 447 U. S. 680
here we are dealing with a situation more comparable to a
special master's findings or actions of an administrative tribunal
on findings of a hearing officer.
The Court of Appeals rejected an analogy to administrative
agency cases because of its view that the interest inherent in a
suppression motion was often the equivalent, as a practical matter,
of the trial itself. Our view of the due process demands of a
motion to suppress evidence makes those agency cases relevant,
although, to be sure, we do not suggest that the interests inherent
in administrative adjudications are always equivalent to those
implicated in a constitutional challenge to the admissibility of
evidence in a criminal case. Generally, the ultimate factfinder in
administrative proceedings is a commission or board, and such trier
has not heard the witnesses testify.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §
557 (general rule under the Administrative Procedure Act); 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (National Labor Relations Board); 33 U.S.C. §
921(b)(3) (Benefits Review Board); 17 CFR § 207.17(g)(2) (1979)
(Securities and Exchange Commission). While the commission or board
-- or an administrator -- may defer to the findings of a hearing
officer, that is not compelled.
See, e.g., Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474
(1951);
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.
S. 333,
304 U. S.
350-351 (1938);
Morgan v. United States,
298 U. S. 468
(1936);
Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129,
132 (CA2) (Friendly, J.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839
(1967).
We conclude that the due process rights claimed here are
adequately protected by § 636(b)(1). While the district court judge
alone acts as the ultimate decisionmaker, the statute grants the
judge the broad discretion to accept, reject, or modify the
magistrate's proposed findings. That broad discretion includes
hearing the witnesses live to resolve conflicting credibility
claims. Finally, we conclude that the statutory scheme includes
sufficient procedures to alert the
Page 447 U. S. 681
district court whether to exercise its discretion to conduct a
hearing and view the witnesses itself. [
Footnote 7]
B
In passing the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act,
Congress was alert to Art. III values concerning the vesting of
decisionmaking power in magistrates. [
Footnote 8] Accordingly, Congress made clear that the
district court has plenary discretion whether to authorize a
magistrate to hold an evidentiary hearing, and that the magistrate
acts subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court.
Thereafter, the entire process takes place under the district
court's total control and jurisdiction.
We need not decide whether, as suggested by the Government,
Congress could constitutionally have delegated the task of
rendering a final decision on a suppression motion to a non-Art.
III officer.
See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.
S. 389 (1973). Congress has not sought to make any such
delegation. Rather, Congress has provided that the magistrate's
Page 447 U. S. 682
proposed findings and recommendations shall be subjected to a
de novo determination "by the judge who . . . then
exercise[s] the ultimate authority to issue an appropriate order."
S.Rep. at 3. Moreover, "[t]he authority -- and the responsibility
-- to make an informed, final determination . . . remains with the
judge."
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. at
423 U. S. 271.
On his Art. III claim,
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.
22 (1932), and its progeny offer little comfort to
respondent. [
Footnote 9] There,
the Court stated that,
"[i]n cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the
judicial power of the United States necessarily extends to the
independent determination of all questions, both of fact and law,
necessary to the performance of that supreme function."
Id. at
285 U. S. 60.
See also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.
S. 276 (1922). [
Footnote 10] While stating that
"the enforcement of constitutional rights requires that the
Federal court should determine such an issue upon its own record
and the facts elicited before it,"
285 U.S. at
285 U. S. 64,
the Court pointedly noted a "distinction of controlling importance"
between records formed before administrative agencies and those
compiled by officers of the court such as masters in chancery or
commissioners in admiralty where the proceeding is "constantly
subject to the court's control." We view the statutory scheme here
as rendering a magistrate's recommendations
Page 447 U. S. 683
more analogous to a master or a commissioner than to an
administrative agency for Art. III purposes. [
Footnote 11]
Moreover, four years later, in
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U. S. 38
(1936), Mr. Chief Justice Hughes substantially cut back on the
Court's
Crowell holding, which he had authored, and on
which respondent relies. The question there was whether
administrative rate regulations were unconstitutionally
confiscatory. While reaffirming his statement that administrative
agencies cannot finally determine "constitutional facts," Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes noted:
"But this judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does
not require or justify disregard of the weight which may properly
attach to findings [by an administrative body] upon hearing and
evidence. On the contrary, the judicial duty is performed in the
light of the proceedings already had, and may be greatly
facilitated by the assembling and analysis of the facts in the
course of the legislative determination."
298 U.S. at
298 U. S. 53.
See also Estep v. United States, 327 U.
S. 114,
327 U. S.
122-123 (1946). Thus, although the statute permits the
district court to give to the magistrate's proposed findings of
fact and recommendations "such weight as [their] merit commands and
the sound discretion of the judge warrants,"
Mathews v. Weber,
supra at
423 U. S. 275,
that delegation does not violate Art. III so long as the ultimate
decision is made by the district court.
We conclude that the statute strikes the proper balance
Page 447 U. S. 684
between the demands of due process and the constraints of Art.
III. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Before the Court of Appeals, respondent apparently conceded that
the statute permits the procedures employed here. His statutory
arguments in the Court of Appeals were that the reference was
invalid because not made pursuant to required enabling rules, and
that the Court of Appeals should exercise its supervisory powers to
prohibit the procedure employed. That court rejected both
arguments, and he has pursued neither before this Court.
[
Footnote 2]
As originally introduced in the Senate, the bill provided that,
upon request by a party to a proceeding before a magistrate, the
district "court shall
hear de novo those portions of the
report or specific proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law
to which objection is made." S. 1283, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
(emphasis added). As reported out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, however, this language, including the word "hear," was
deleted.
[
Footnote 3]
We conclude that to construe § 636(b)(1) to require the district
court to conduct a second hearing whenever either party objected to
the magistrate's credibility findings would largely frustrate the
plain objective of Congress to alleviate the increasing congestion
of litigation in the district courts. We cannot "impute to Congress
a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with
the other."
Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation,
332 U. S. 480,
332 U. S. 489
(1947).
[
Footnote 4]
Under the Fifth Amendment, a criminal defendant may not be
compelled to testify against himself. In that sense, the exclusion
of involuntary confessions derives from the Amendment itself.
United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433,
428 U. S. 443
(1976).
[
Footnote 5]
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477
(1972), also rejected the argument that, because of the high value
society places on the constitutional right to be free from
compulsory self-incrimination, due process requires proof of
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court found no
indication that federal rights would suffer from determining
admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.
[
Footnote 6]
Nothing in the Magistrates Act or other statute precludes
renewal at trial of a motion to suppress evidence, even though such
motion was denied before trial. A district court's authority to
consider anew a suppression motion previously denied is within its
sound judicial discretion.
See generally Gouled v. United
States, 255 U. S. 298,
255 U. S. 312
(1921);
Rouse v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 359
F.2d 1014 (1966).
[
Footnote 7]
Neither the statute nor its legislative history reveals any
specific consideration of the situation where a district judge,
after reviewing the record in the process of making a
de
novo "determination," has doubts concerning the credibility
findings of the magistrate. The issue is not before us, but we
assume it is unlikely that a district judge would
reject a
magistrate's proposed findings on credibility when those findings
are dispositive and substitute the judge's own appraisal; to do so
without seeing and hearing the witness or witnesses whose
credibility is in question could well give rise to serious
questions which we do not reach.
[
Footnote 8]
The Committee Reports noted several instances prior to the 1976
amendments where Congress had vested in officers of the court,
other than the judge, the power to exercise discretion in
performing an adjudicatory function, "subject always to ultimate
review by a judge of the court," citing 11 U.S.C. § 67(c)
(reference to bankruptcy referee) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (power of
clerk of court to tax costs). By analogy, Congress reasoned that
permitting the exercise of an adjudicatory function by a
magistrate, subject to ultimate review by the district court, would
also pass constitutional muster. S.Rep. at 6; H.R.Rep. at 8.
[
Footnote 9]
In
Crowell, in reviewing the constitutionality of the
delegation of factfinding to administrative officers to consider
claims under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, the Court was concerned that Congress could not reach beyond
the constitutional limits which are inherent in the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. It stated that, unless the injuries to which
the Act relates occurred upon the navigable waters of the United
States, they would fall outside that jurisdiction. 285 U.S. at
285 U. S.
55.
[
Footnote 10]
The
Crowell Court rejected a wholesale attack on any
delegation of factfinding to the administrative tribunal. It noted
that
"there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of
fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges."
Id. at
285 U. S.
51-52.
[
Footnote 11]
In exercising our original jurisdiction under Art. III, we
appoint special masters who may be either Art. III judges or
members of the Bar; the role of the master is, for these purposes,
analogous to that of a magistrate. The master is generally charged
to "take such evidence as may be . . . necessary,"
Nebraska v.
Iowa, 379 U.S. 996 (1965), and to "find the facts specially
and state separately his conclusions of law thereon."
Mississippi v. Louisiana, 346 U.S. 862 (1953). In original
cases, as under the Federal Magistrates Act, the master's
recommendations are advisory only, yet this Court regularly acts on
the basis of the master's report and exceptions thereto.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
While I join the Court's opinion, my analysis of the due process
issue differs somewhat from that set forth therein, and I write
separately to articulate it. The Court seems to focus on the
diminished importance of pretrial suppression motions and the
acceptability in some agency proceedings of decisionmaking without
personal observation of witnesses. For me, these considerations are
of less importance than the practical concern for accurate results
that is the focus of the Due Process Clause. In testing the
challenged procedure against that criterion, I would distinguish
between instances where the district court rejects the
credibility-based determination of a magistrate and instances, such
as this one, where the court adopts a magistrate's proposed result.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In the latter context, the judge accurately can be described as
a "backup" jurist whose review serves to enhance reliability and
benefit the defendant. Respondent was afforded procedures by which
a neutral decisionmaker, after seeing and hearing the witnesses,
rendered a decision. [
Footnote 2/2]
After that decisionmaker found against him, respondent received a
second
Page 447 U. S. 685
turn, albeit. on a cold record, before another neutral
decisionmaker. In asking us to invalidate the magistrate program,
respondent in effect requests removal of the second level of
procedural protections afforded him and others like him. [
Footnote 2/3] In my view, such a result
would tend to undermine, rather than augment, accurate
decisionmaking. It therefore is not a result I could embrace under
the Due Process Clause.
Although MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL ably argues that this
characterization of the magistrate procedure clashes with Art III,
I am not persuaded. As the Court observes, the handling of
suppression motions invariably remains completely in the control of
the federal district court. The judge may initially decline to
refer any matter to a magistrate. When a matter is referred, the
judge may freely reject the magistrate's recommendation. He may
rehear the evidence in whole or in part. He may call for additional
findings, or otherwise "recommit the matter to the magistrate with
instructions."
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Moreover, the
magistrate himself is subject to the Art III judge's control.
Magistrates are appointed by district judges, § 631(a), and subject
to removal by them, § 631 (h). In addition, district judges retain
plenary authority over when, what, and how many pretrial matters
are assigned to magistrates, and "[e]ach district court shall
establish rules pursuant to which the magistrates shall discharge
their duties." § 636(b)(4). Thus, the only conceivable danger of a
"threat" to the "independence" of the magistrate comes from within,
rather than without, the judicial department.
It is also significant that the Magistrates Act imposes
significant requirements to ensure competency and impartiality, §§
631(b), (c), and (i), 632, 637 (1976 ed. and
Page 447 U. S. 686
Supp. II), including a rule generally barring reduction of
salaries of full-time magistrates, § 634(b). Even assuming that,
despite these protections, a controversial matter might be
delegated to a magistrate who is susceptible to outside pressures,
the district judge -- insulated by life tenure and irreducible
salary -- is waiting in the wings, fully able to correct errors.
Under these circumstances, I simply do not perceive the threat to
the judicial power or the independence of judicial decisionmaking
that underlies Art. III. We do not face a procedure under which
"Congress [has] delegate[d] to a non-Art III judge the authority to
male final determinations on issues of fact."
Post at
447 U. S. 703
(dissenting opinion). Rather, we confront a procedure under which
Congress has vested in Art. III judges the discretionary power to
delegate certain functions to competent and impartial assistants,
while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control
over the assistants' activities.
[
Footnote 2/1]
This is not to say that a district court's rejection of a
magistrate's recommendation in favor of a defendant will inevitably
violate the Due Process Clause.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The magistrate, of course, makes only a recommendation, rather
than a formal decision. But, at least in this context, I see no
reason to believe that the process of "recommending" is more
susceptible to error than "finally deciding." And even if we were
to speculate that some additional risk of error inheres in
"recommending," I would conclude that it is more than offset by the
double check provided by the district judge and the congressional
determination that this procedure permits independent judicial
evaluation of suppression motions while conserving scarce judicial
resources.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Certainly respondent does not have a due process right to have
an Art. III judge resolve all factual issues surrounding his
suppression motion. If he did, virtually every decision on a
suppression motion in a state court would violate the Due Process
Clause.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I agree with the Court's interpretation of the Federal
Magistrates Act in Part III of its opinion. The terms and
legislative record of § 636(b)(1) plainly indicate that Congress
intended to vest broad discretion in the district courts to decide
whether or not to rehear witnesses already heard by a magistrate in
a suppression proceeding.
The Court recognizes that "serious questions" would be raised if
a district judge rejected a magistrate's proposed findings on
credibility.
See ante at
447 U. S. 681,
n. 7. But the Court finds no error in this case, where the District
Court accepted the Magistrate's judgment on credibility. I would
reach a different conclusion. Under the standards set out in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319,
424 U. S. 335
(1976), due process requires a district court to rehear crucial
witnesses when, as in this case, a suppression hearing turns
only on credibility. As MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL points out in
his dissenting opinion,
Page 447 U. S. 687
the private interests at stake in a suppression hearing often
are substantial. Moreover, the risk of erroneous deprivation of
rights is real when a decider of fact has not heard and observed
the crucial witnesses. The value of hearing and seeing those
witnesses testify is undeniable. Finally, the government interest
in limiting rehearing is not sufficient to outweigh these
considerations.
In sum, I agree with MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's statement that,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a hearing
requirement should be imposed
"only in situations in which the case turns on issues of
credibility that cannot be resolved on the basis of a record. . . .
If the district judge offered a statement of reasons presenting his
independent view of the facts and explaining in some reasoned
manner why it was not necessary for him to hear the witnesses in
order to adopt that view, it would be an exceptionally rare case in
which an abuse of discretion should be found."
Post at
447 U. S.
701-702.
*
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this
ground.
* The classic situation requiring a hearing
de novo is
when the record of a suppression proceeding contains little beyond
a "swearing contest." In many cases, however, the entire record
will contain additional evidence -- direct or circumstantial --
that fully supports the magistrate's recommendation. In those
cases, the district court may decide, within its sound discretion,
not to hear witnesses.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
A federal indictment was returned charging the respondent, who
had previously been convicted of a felony, with unlawfully
receiving a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1). Before
the trial, the respondent filed in the District Court a motion to
suppress various incriminating statements he had made to agents of
the Federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Page 447 U. S. 688
Tobacco, and Firearms. [
Footnote
3/1] Pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Act (Act), 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1), [
Footnote 3/2] the
District Judge referred this motion to a Magistrate, who held an
evidentiary hearing and then recommended that the respondent's
motion be denied. Without taking further evidence, the District
Judge accepted the Magistrate's recommendation and denied
Page 447 U. S. 689
the motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the respondent was constitutionally entitled to a hearing by
the judge before his suppression motion could be denied. Today this
Court reverses that judgment. I dissent, because I believe that the
statute itself required a hearing before the judge in this
case.
The statute provides that a district judge, in ruling on a
motion to suppress,
"shall make a
de novo determination of those portions
of the [magistrate's] report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made."
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (emphasis added). It is my view that the
judge could not make the statutorily required "
de novo
determination" of the critically contested factual issues in this
case without personally observing the demeanor of the
witnesses.
At the hearing before the Magistrate, the respondent testified
that he had made the incriminating statements to the federal agents
only because they promised that he would not be prosecuted if he
cooperated, and offered to employ him as an informer. The agents
gave a different version of the relevant events. They expressly
testified that at no time was the respondent ever told that he
would not be prosecuted. Instead, according to the agents, he was
simply told that any assistance he might provide would be mentioned
to the United States Attorney. Their story also undermined the
respondent's testimony that he had been offered employment as an
informer before he made the incriminating statements.
If the respondent's testimony was true, his motion to suppress
evidence of his incriminating statements should have been granted.
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1,
378 U. S. 7;
Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532,
168 U. S.
542-543. The Magistrate, however, did not believe him,
expressly finding that "the testimony of the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms agent[s is] more credible" and that the "Federal agents
never advised Raddatz that charges against him would be dismissed,
if he cooperated." In concluding for this reason that the motion
should be denied,
Page 447 U. S. 690
the Magistrate properly exercised the authority granted him by
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) "to submit . . . proposed findings of fact
and recommendations for the disposition" of the suppression motion.
But the Act also empowered the respondent to object to these
findings. He did so, and the responsibility then devolved on the
District Judge to "make a
de novo determination" of the
contested issues of fact.
The phrase "
de novo determination" has an accepted
meaning in the law. It means an independent determination of a
controversy that accords no deference to any prior resolution of
the same controversy. Thus, in
Renegotiation Board v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1,
415 U. S. 23, the
Court had occasion to define "
de novo proceeding" as a
review that was
"unfettered by any prejudice from the [prior] agency proceeding
and free from any claim that the [agency's] determination is
supported by substantial evidence. [
Footnote 3/3]"
And in
United States v. First City National Bank,
386 U. S. 361,
386 U. S. 368,
this Court observed that "review
de novo" means "that the
court should make an independent determination of the issues" and
should "not . . . give any special weight to the [prior]
determination of" the administrative agency. [
Footnote 3/4]
Page 447 U. S. 691
Here, the District Judge was faced with a transcript that
contained two irreconcilable accounts of the critical facts.
Neither version was intrinsically incredible or, for that matter,
less plausible on its face than the other. Moreover, there was in
the record no evidence inherently more trustworthy than that
supported by human recollection. In these circumstances, the
District Judge could not make the statutorily mandated "
de
novo determination" without being exposed to the one kind of
evidence that no written record can ever reveal -- the demeanor of
the witnesses. [
Footnote 3/5] In
declining to conduct a hearing in this case, the District Judge
thus necessarily gave the Magistrate's prior assessment of
credibility the kind of "special weight" that the "
de novo
determination" standard does not permit.
Contrary to the Court's assertion, nothing in the legislative
history of the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act
compels a different conclusion. Congress, to be sure, explicitly
rejected a version of the ultimately enacted bill that would have
required a district judge always to "hear
de novo" those
aspects of the case whose proposed resolution by the magistrate
dissatisfied one or more of the parties.
Compare S.Rep.
No. 9625, p. 2 (1976) (hereinafter S.Rep.) (bill as reported by
Senate Committee on the Judiciary),
with S. 1283, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (bill as originally introduced by Senator
Burdick). Moreover, as the Court points out, the Report of the
House Judiciary Committee says that "[t]he use of the words
de novo determination' is not intended to require the
judge to actually conduct a new hearing on contested issues."
H.R.Rep. No. 91609, p. 3 (1976) (hereinafter H.R.Rep.).
Page 447 U. S. 692
Other passages in the legislative history, however, make clear
that these indications of legislative intent comport with the plain
language of the statute. As the Senate and House Reports emphasize,
"the ultimate adjudicatory power over" suppression and other
dispositive motions is to be "exercised by [a district] judge . . .
after receiving assistance from and the recommendation of the
magistrate." S.Rep. at 10; H.R.Rep. at 11. Thus, according to the
House Report, a district judge, "in making the ultimate
determination of the matter, would have to give
fresh
consideration to those issues to which specific objection has
been made by a party."
Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied). The
Report describes this responsibility as follows:
"
Normally, the judge . . . will consider the record
which has been developed before the magistrate and make his own
determination on the basis of that record. . . . In some specific
instances, however, it may be necessary for the judge . . .
to
take additional evidence, recall witnesses. . . ."
Ibid. (emphasis supplied) .
See also 122
Cong.Rec. 35182 (1976) (Rep. Railsback). It is thus evident that
Congress anticipated that occasions would arise when a district
judge could not make the requisite "
de novo determination"
without hearing the evidence himself. [
Footnote 3/6] Congress' prime objective in 1976 was to
overrule this Court's decision in
Wingo v. Wedding,
418 U. S. 461,
which had interpreted the then existing Federal Magistrates Act
as
Page 447 U. S. 693
barring a magistrate from holding an evidentiary hearing on a
petition for habeas corpus.
See S.Rep. at 3, 9; H.R.Rep.
at 5, 11. The 1976 Act thus granted magistrates the power to take
evidence on matters like habeas corpus petitions and motions to
suppress. By enacting such legislation, Congress obviously
anticipated that hearings conducted by magistrates would, in many
instances, obviate the need for district judges to take evidence as
well.
It does not follow, however, that Congress told district judges
that they need not conduct hearings in every case where an
evidentiary hearing has been conducted by a magistrate, regardless
of the circumstances. Instead, Congress expressly limited the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review to pretrial motions that are
termed non-"dispositive" in the Act's legislative history,
see S.Rep. at 7, 9-10; H.R.Rep. at 9, 111, and excluded
habeas corpus petitions, motions to suppress, and other important
motions from that category,
see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Court suggests that a plain reading of the statutory
language would, as a practical matter, frustrate the Act's
objective of alleviating the increasing congestion of litigation in
the district courts. But, as I interpret the statutory language,
district judges need not always hold evidentiary hearings in order
properly to dispose of suppression motions. Although many motions
to suppress turn on issues of credibility, many do not. A
suppression motion predicated, for instance, on the claim that a
search warrant was not supported by an adequate affidavit could
normally be resolved without the taking of any testimony.
More importantly, the "
de novo determination"
requirement of the Federal Magistrates Act applies to a much wider
range of motions and applications than simply pretrial motions to
suppress. [
Footnote 3/7] Some of
these -- such as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
motions for judgment on the pleadings,
Page 447 U. S. 694
and motions for summary judgment -- presume as a legal matter
the lack of any need for an evidentiary hearing, even at the
magistrate's level. Others -- such as motions for injunctive
relief, motions to dismiss or quash an indictment, motions to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, motions to
dismiss an action involuntarily, applications for post-trial relief
made by those convicted of criminal offenses, and petitions by
prisoners challenging conditions of confinement -- could often, as
a practical matter, be granted or denied by a district court on the
strength alone of the transcript of the magistrate's hearing and
his recommendation. Thus, contrary to the Court's suggestion, the
plain reading I would give to the pertinent statutory language
would not equate "
de novo determination" with "
de
novo hearing."
Since I believe that the plain language of the statute required
the District Judge in this case to hear the conflicting factual
testimony of the witnesses, I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 3/1]
The respondent also moved to suppress certain statements the
Government claimed he had made to Chicago police officers shortly
after his arrest. At the suppression hearing, the respondent denied
having ever made such remarks. A Chicago police officer testified
to the contrary, making the issue one for determination at trial by
the trier of fact.
[
Footnote 3/2]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides:
"Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary -- "
"(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine
any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for
injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary
judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by
the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss
or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to
involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may
reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it
has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or
contrary to law."
"(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct
hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge
of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the
disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in
subparagraph (A), of applications for postrial [
sic]
relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of
prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement."
"(C) the magistrate shall file his proposed findings and
recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy
shall forthwith be mailed to all parties."
"Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may
serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and
recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court
shall make a
de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence
or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions."
[
Footnote 3/3]
In
Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., the
Court was construing the following language in the Renegotiation
Act of 1951 as amended:
"Any contractor . . . aggrieved by an order of the Board [of
Renegotiation] determining the amount of excessive profits received
or accrued by such contractor . . . may --"
"
* * * *"
"file a petition with the Court of Claims for a redetermination
thereof. . . . A proceeding before the Court of Claims to finally
determine the amount, if any, of excessive profits shall not be
treated as a proceeding to review the determination of the Board,
but shall be treated as a proceeding
de novo. . . ."
65 Stat. 21, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 1218.
[
Footnote 3/4]
In
United States v. First City National Bank, the Court
was construing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A), which provides that, in
an antitrust action brought under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, the
court "shall review
de novo the issues presented."
[
Footnote 3/5]
In other contexts, the Courts of Appeals have held that critical
issues of credibility can be resolved only by personally hearing
live testimony.
See, e.g., Weahkee v. Perry, 190
U.S.App.D.C. 359, 370, 587 F.2d 1256 1267 (1978) (Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Hackley v. Roudebush, 171
U.S.App.D.C. 376, 427, and n. 202, 520 F.2d 108, 159, and n. 202
(1975) (same);
Piglatello v. Attorney General, 350 F.2d
719, 723724 (CA2 1965) (Immigration and Nationality Act).
[
Footnote 3/6]
Nothing in the passage from the opinion of the Court of Appeals
in
Campbell v. United States District Court, 501 F.2d 196,
206-207 (CA9 1974), that is quoted in the House Report can be read
to mean anything different. In
Campbell, the court said
that a district court "may, in the exercise of its discretion, call
and hear the testimony of a witness or witnesses" when "it finds
there is a problem as to the credibility of a witness or witnesses
or for other good reasons." Nothing said in
Campbell,
however, implied that a district judge's failure to call a witness
or witnesses is invariably permissible.
[
Footnote 3/7]
See 447
U.S. 667fn3/2|>n. 2,
supra.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
I agree with my Brother STEWART that the statutory provision for
"a
de novo determination of . . . specified proposed
findings . . . to which objection is made," 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
should be construed to require the district court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing when there are case-dispositive issues of
credibility that cannot be resolved on the basis of the record
compiled before the magistrate. I write separately to express my
view that, unless the Act is construed in that fashion, its
application in this case is impermissible under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and under Art. III.
In my view, the Due Process Clause requires that a judicial
officer entrusted with finding the facts in a criminal case must
hear the testimony whenever a fair resolution of disputed issues
cannot be made on the basis of a review of the cold
Page 447 U. S. 695
record. Accordingly, if the Act permits the district judge not
to hear the witnesses, but at the same time requires him to make a
de novo determination of the facts, its application
violates the Due Process Clause in any case that turns on issues of
credibility that cannot be resolved on the written record. This
infirmity cannot be avoided by interpreting the Act to allow the
district judge to give final effect to the magistrate's findings on
issues of credibility. Such an interpretation would render the Act
fatally inconsistent with Art. III of the Constitution, which
entitles a criminal defendant in a federal court to an independent
determination of the case-dispositive facts by an Art. III
judge.
I
The Court of Appeals held that the unconsented referral of the
suppression motion to the Magistrate was not an unlawful delegation
of the federal judicial power to a non-Art III judge To reach this
conclusion, it relied on its understanding that the Act required
the District Judge to make a
de novo determination of all
contested issues. At the same time, it concluded that the Due
Process Clause required the District Judge to hear the witnesses
before making a
de novo determination of the facts. The
Court rejects this conclusion in an analysis suggesting that the
individual's interest in vindicating his right against compulsory
self-incrimination is an unimportant one. I disagree.
A
One of the most deeply engrained principles in Anglo-American
jurisprudence requires that an official entrusted with finding
facts must hear the testimony on which his findings will be based.
As I explained in
Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.
S. 204,
438 U. S.
229-233 (1978) (dissenting opinion), [
Footnote 4/1] our constitutional
Page 447 U. S. 696
tradition rejects the notion that factual findings in criminal
cases may be made by an official who acts in isolation and on the
basis of a cold record.
The principle that "[t]he one who decides must hear,"
Morgan
v. United States, 298 U. S. 468,
298 U. S. 481
(1936), is supported by two distinct rationales. First, judicial
factfinding on the basis of a written record carries an intolerably
high risk of error. Any experienced lawyer is aware that findings
of fact frequently rest on impressions of demeanor and other
factors which do not appear on the face of the record. As the Court
stated in
Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.
S. 342,
313 U. S. 352
(1941), "[o]ne of the essential elements of the determination of
the crucial facts is the weighing and appraising of the testimony."
Accordingly, the Court has rejected the proposition
"that an appraisal of the truth of the [witness'] oral testimony
by a master or commissioner is, in the light of the purpose and
object of the proceeding, the equivalent of the judge's own
exercise of the function of the trier of the facts."
See also Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.
S. 461 (1974);
United States v. Oregon Medical
Society, 343 U. S. 326,
343 U. S. 339
(1952);
Dyer v. MacDogall, 201 F.2d 265, 268-269 (CA2
1952).
The principle is not, however, based solely on the
constitutional interest in accurate factfinding. It also derives
from the notion that, as a matter of basic fairness, a person
facing the prospect of grievous loss is entitled to relate his
version of the facts to the official entrusted with judging its
accuracy. The Due Process Clause "promot[es] participation and
dialogue
Page 447 U. S. 697
. . . in the decisionmaking process,"
Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc., 446 U. S. 238,
446 U. S. 242
(1980), by ensuring that individuals adversely affected by
governmental action may confront the ultimate decisionmaker, and
thus play some part in formulating the ultimate decision.
See
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247
(1978);
Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,
435 U. S. 78,
435 U. S. 103,
n. 15 (1978) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). [
Footnote 4/2] In this
respect, the requirement that a finder of facts must hear the
testimony offered by those whose liberty is at stake derives from
deep-seated notions of fairness and human dignity.
See Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.
S. 123,
341 U. S. 170
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A rule that would allow a
criminal defendant to face a jail sentence on the basis of factual
findings made by one who has not heard the evidence is, in my view,
foreign to notions of fair adjudicative procedure embodied in the
Due Process Clause. [
Footnote
4/3]
Page 447 U. S. 698
I do not, of course, mean to suggest that a district judge must
hear the witnesses in every case, or even in all cases in which
issues of credibility are raised. An actual rehearing would be
required only in cases involving case-dispositive issues that are
impossible to resolve on the basis of the written record. But as my
Brother STEWART demonstrates, the District Judge could not make an
independent finding in this case without hearing the witnesses.
Neither respondent's nor the agents' story carried inherent indicia
of reliability. Both accounts suffered from inconsistencies. In the
end, the issue was solely one of credibility. On the basis of the
cold record, the District Judge had no basis for determining
whether the respondent or the agents were telling the truth. He was
required, therefore, either blindly to accept the Magistrate's
findings as to matters of credibility or to flip a coin. The first
course is forbidden by the statute and by Art. III; [
Footnote 4/4] the second is forbidden by
the requirements of fair adjudicative procedure that the Due
Process Clause reflects.
B
It is true that the principle that "[t]he one who decides must
hear" should not be applied with mechanical rigidity.
Administrators are permitted to base factual findings on a record
compiled before a hearing examiner who does not play a role in
formulating the ultimate findings.
See
Morgan
v.
Page 447 U. S. 699
United States, 298 U. S. 468,
298 U. S. 481
(1936); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 11.02 (1958).
Similar qualifications of the principle have been recognized by
lower courts in certain civil contexts.
See, e.g., Utica Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129 (CA2),
cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967) (National Labor Relations Board
determination of proper unit in a representation election). The
Court errs, however, in suggesting that those exceptions provide
support for the decision announced today. In a number of the cases
in which such exceptions have been permitted, the factual issues to
be resolved did not at all depend on issues of credibility; the
demeanor of the witnesses was entirely irrelevant.
See
examples cited
ante at
447 U. S. 680.
And in other cases, the factfinder was not entrusted, as was the
District Judge here, with making a
de novo determination,
but was instead permitted to give appropriate deference to the
conclusions of the official who conducted the hearing.
See
2 K. Davis,
supra, § 10.04.
I am aware of no case, and the Court cites none, in which a
federal court has upheld a procedure in which a judge is required
to conduct a
de novo determination without hearing the
witnesses when the factual issues have turned on issues of
credibility that cannot be fairly resolved on the basis of the
record. Under such a procedure, the judge's determination is so
inevitably arbitrary, and so plainly a blind guess, that I believe
it to be prohibited by the Due Process Clause under any
circumstances. But even if I were not so persuaded, the answer in
the present context would be clear, for the simple reason that this
case is criminal in nature. It is, of course, in such cases that
the need for scrupulous observance of procedural safeguards is
greatest. Whatever the appropriate limits of the principle that the
factfinder must hear the witnesses where demeanor evidence is
critical, the principle is fully applicable to criminal cases.
As the Court correctly observes,
see ante at
447 U. S. 677,
under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.
S. 319,
424 U. S. 335
(1976), the determination of "what process is due" turns on a
balancing of three
Page 447 U. S. 700
factors:
"[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."
The Court recites this test, but it does not even attempt to
apply it.
Instead, the Court resolves the due process issue solely by
distinguishing a motion to suppress evidence from a criminal trial.
See ante at
447 U. S.
677-681. To state the obvious point that guilt or
innocence is not determined in a suppression hearing, however, is
only the beginning of the inquiry. That fact does not render the
interest of both the defendant and the public in vindicating the
right against compulsory self-incrimination an unimportant one, or
make it analogous to other interests, such as those involved in a
securities transaction, that have been thought to merit
comparatively little due process protection,
see ante at
447 U. S. 680.
Mathews contemplates and requires a thorough inquiry into
the three factors it specifies, rather than the conclusory approach
taken by the Court today.
The private interests at stake here are hardly insignificant.
The suppression hearing was conducted to determine whether the
agents had violated respondent's privilege against self-
incrimination, an interest that the Constitution singles out for
special protection and that our cases recognize as fundamentally
important.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966). Moreover, respondent's liberty was wholly
dependent on whether the trier of fact believed his account of his
confession rather than that of the agents. The subsequent history
of the case confirms this fact. As my Brother POWELL has
explained:
"In our criminal justice system as it has developed, suppression
hearings often are as important as the trial which may follow. The
government's case may turn
Page 447 U. S. 701
upon the confession or other evidence that the defendant seeks
to suppress, and the trial court's ruling on such evidence may
determine the outcome of the case."
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.
S. 368,
443 U. S. 397,
n. 1 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring).
See also id. at
443 U. S. 434
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting in part). Indeed, Congress itself
recognized the importance of suppression motions by providing for a
de novo determination by the district judge.
Second, both the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the
probable value of the additional safeguard were substantial. The
issues presented here could not be resolved
de novo solely
on the basis of the record. As my Brother STEWART suggests, the
case was a classic swearing match: the only issues were ones of
credibility. The risk of error could be minimized only if the
District Judge heard the witnesses himself.
The Court itself confirms that, if the judge does not hear the
witnesses, his decisions on credibility issues can only be a blind
guess, when it intimates that a district judge may not reject a
magistrate's findings without hearing the witnesses.
See
ante at
447 U. S.
680-681. The sole distinction that can be drawn between
accepting the magistrate's findings and rejecting them is that, in
the former case, the district judge is deferring to the magistrate.
But the Court rejects this distinction by asserting, in order to
avoid the Art III objection, that, in either event, it is the
district judge who "[makes] the ultimate decision."
See
ante at
447 U. S.
683.
Finally, the governmental interest -- essentially one of
administrative convenience -- is not, in this context, substantial.
The Court of Appeals' holding would not require the district judge
to hear the witnesses whenever objection is made to the
magistrate's findings. A rehearing requirement would be imposed
only in situations in which the case turns on issues of credibility
that cannot be resolved on the basis of a record. Nor is there much
force to the Government's argument that an occasional rehearing of
the witnesses would impose an
Page 447 U. S. 702
intolerable burden on the district courts. [
Footnote 4/5] Finally, I would afford the district
judge considerable discretion to determine whether a rehearing of
the witnesses was required in order for him to make the requisite
de novo determination. If the district judge offered a
statement of reasons presenting his independent view of the facts
and explaining in some reasoned manner why it was not necessary for
him to hear the witnesses in order to adopt that view, it would be
an exceptionally rare case in which an abuse of discretion should
be found.
In this case, it is plain that a
de novo determination
could not be made without hearing the witnesses. I am therefore
brought to the conclusion that the Due Process Clause required the
District Judge to rehear the witnesses. Indeed, a contrary
conclusion would suggest that, save for the criminal trial itself,
there may be no settings in which the principle that "[t]he one who
decides must hear" will carry force.
In
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.
S. 513,
357 U. S. 520
(1958), we observed that
"the outcome of a lawsuit -- and hence the vindication of legal
rights -- depends more often on how the factfinder appraises the
facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or
interpretation of a line of precedents."
By today's decision, the Court permits the vindication of Fifth
Amendment rights to depend on a form of bureaucratic factfinding
foreign to our
Page 447 U. S. 703
constitutional traditions. I am unwilling to join in that
enterprise.
II
The due process infirmity cannot be remedied by interpreting the
statute to permit the district judge to give final effect to the
magistrate's findings on issues of credibility. Such an
interpretation would render the Act fatally inconsistent with Art.
III of the Constitution. The Court attempts to avoid this
conclusion by suggesting that the district judge retains "control"
of the suppression motion and by indicating that Art. III in any
event does not prohibit a federal court from giving final effect to
a magistrate's findings of fact. I find neither argument
convincing.
A
At the outset, it is important to observe that the Court's
suggestion that "a magistrate's recommendations [are] analogous to
[those of] a master or a commissioner,"
ante at
447 U. S.
682-683, is highly misleading. If the motion to suppress
turns on issues of credibility that cannot be resolved on the basis
of the record, and if the district judge does not hear the
witnesses, the magistrate's report is no mere "recommendation."
Unless the district judge ventures a blind guess, that report is
effectively the final determination of the facts underlying the
suppression motion. For this reason, it is simply incorrect to say
that the "ultimate decision is made by the district court."
Ante at
447 U. S. 683.
This case squarely presents the issue whether, in a criminal case
tried in federal court, Congress may delegate to a non-Art. III
judge the authority to make final determinations on issues of
fact.
Article III vests the "judicial Power of the United States . . .
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." It provides that
judges
"both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation,
Page 447 U. S. 704
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office."
The rationale underlying the tenure and salary protections of
Art. III has often been stated and need not be rehearsed in detail
here. But it is worth remembering that the Framers of the
Constitution believed that those protections were necessary in
order to guarantee that the judicial power of the United States
would be placed in a body of judges insulated from majoritarian
pressures, and thus able to enforce constitutional principles
without fear of reprisal or public rebuke.
See The
Federalist Nos. 78 and 79;
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U. S. 530
(1962) (plurality opinion);
O'Donohue v. United States,
289 U. S. 516,
289 U. S. 530
(1933).
In this case, it is agreed that magistrates are not Art. III
judges. Appointed by the judges of the district court, they serve
8-year terms. They are subject to removal by the judges of the
district court for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or
physical or mental disability." If the Judicial Conference
concludes that "the services performed by his office are no longer
needed," 28 U.S.C. § 631(h), a magistrate's office may be
terminated. None of these factors, of course, suggests that a
magistrate will be unable to perform his assigned tasks fairly and
in accordance with constitutional principles. But there can be no
doubt that one holding the office of magistrate is unprotected by
the safeguards that the Framers regarded as indispensable to
assuring the independence of the federal judiciary.
It is true that a number of our decisions have recognized
Congress' authority to create legislative tribunals unprotected by
the tenure and salary provisions of Art. III.
See Glidden Co.
v. Zdanok, supra, at
370 U. S.
543-552, and cases cited. Those decisions do not,
however, provide any support for the proposition that Congress may,
with respect to suppression hearings in criminal cases, displace
the federal judiciary and entrust the finding of case-dispositive
facts to a non-Art. III tribunal.
Page 447 U. S. 705
The rationale of our decisions involving legislative courts has
been far more limited, focusing on Congress' plenary power over
specialized areas of geography or subject matter and on the
manifest need for a more flexible tribunal to perform adjudicatory
functions in those areas.
See generally 370 U.S. at
370 U. S.
543-552. Nor has the Court suggested that it will defer
blindly to a congressional determination that an alternative
tribunal is necessary.
"The touchstone of decision in all these cases has been the need
to exercise the jurisdiction then and there and for a transitory
period. Whether constitutional limitations on the exercise of
judicial power have been held inapplicable has depended on the
particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the
possible alternatives."
Id. at
370 U. S.
547-548. Thus,
"the requirements of Art. III,
which are applicable where
laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are
at stake, must, in proper circumstances, give way to
accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with
respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and
warranting distinctive treatment."
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.
S. 389,
411 U. S.
407-408 (1973) (emphasis added). Congress has never
attempted to displace Art. III courts when laws of nationwide
applicability were involved, and nothing in our prior decisions
suggests that it may constitutionally do so. [
Footnote 4/6]
Page 447 U. S. 706
Our decision in
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U. S. 11
(1955), confirms that there are severe limits on Congress'
authority to displace Art. III courts. In that case, the Government
attempted to try a civilian ex-serviceman in a military tribunal.
The Court agreed that Congress' authority under Art. I, § 8, cl.
14, "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces" permitted it to subject persons in the Armed
Services to trial by court-martial. Nonetheless, it concluded that
the clause should not be construed to encompass civilian
ex-servicemen. Such a construction, the Court held, "necessarily
encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under
Article III of the Constitution."
Id. at
350 U. S. 15.
The Court emphasized that
"[t]he provisions of Article III were designed to give judges
maximum freedom from possible coercion or influence by the
executive or legislative branches of the Government."
Id. at
350 U. S. 16.
Accordingly, Congress' power to circumvent criminal trials in Art.
III tribunals would not "be inferred through the Necessary and
Proper Clause," but would instead call "for limitation to
the
least possible power adequate to the end
Page 447 U. S.
707
proposed,'" id.; at
350 U. S. 22-23 (emphasis omitted), quoting
Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 19 U. S. 231
(1821). The Quarles decision has been applied in other
contexts to limit sharply Congress' power to try civilians in Art.
I courts. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S.
1 (1957) (civilian dependents living with servicemen on
military base may not be tried in Art. I court); O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U. S. 258
(1969) (crimes that are not service-connected may not be tried in
Art. I court). In my view, Quarles and its progeny
foreclose the conclusion that Congress may use its Art. I powers to
create legislative tribunals in order to divest Art. III courts of
their authority to conduct federal criminal proceedings.
B
As the Court observes,
see ante at
447 U. S. 681,
Congress has not in this case attempted to substitute magistrates
for Art. III judges on a wholesale basis. The district court
retains authority over questions of law. Under the Court's
construction, it is also compelled to make a
de novo
determination of the facts, to the extent that that task can be
performed on the basis of an evidentiary record. Reasoning by
analogy from the context of masters and commissioners, the Court
suggests that the retained power of the district court is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Art. III. As I have
explained, however, when a district judge does not hear the
witnesses, it is the magistrate who makes the final determination
of factual questions in any case involving issues of credibility
that cannot be resolved on the basis of the record. The Court's
conclusion must therefore rest on an understanding that the
requirements of Art. III are fully applicable when the issues are
ones of law, but not when the issues are factual in nature.
See
ante at
447 U. S. 683.
I am unable to discern any such distinction in Art. III or in any
other provision of the Constitution.
As the Court rightly observes, the primary case relevant to the
question is
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.
22 (1932). There the Court upheld the constitutionality
of an administrative
Page 447 U. S. 708
scheme by which deputy commissioners adjudicated compensation
claims under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, but, at the same time, ruled that the federal district court
must find
de novo whether a master-servant relationship
existed and whether the injury occurred on the navigable waters of
the United States. Mr Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court,
did rely on the "historic practice" of permitting the courts to be
assisted in factual findings by masters and commissioners,
id. at
285 U. S. 51.
But the Court's opinion in
Crowell provides no authority
for the statutory scheme upheld today.
The Court in
Crowell expressly rejected the proposition
that Congress had authority to displace the federal judiciary by
removing all questions of fact from Art. III courts.
"In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial
power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent
determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to
the performance of that supreme function."
Id. at
285 U. S. 60.
The Court's reasoning on this point bears quotation in full:
"[T]he question is not the ordinary one as to the propriety of
provision for administrative determinations. . . . It is rather a
question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial
power in requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions.
It is the question whether the Congress may substitute for
constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United
States is vested, an administrative agency . . . for the final
determination of the existence of the facts upon which the
enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend. The
recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative
agencies for the investigation and finding of facts within their
proper province, and the support of their authorized action, does
not require the conclusion that there is no limitation of their
use, and that the Congress could completely
Page 447 U. S. 709
oust the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the
authority to make them with finality in its own instrumentalities
or in the Executive' Department. That would be to sap the judicial
power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish
a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system,
wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do
depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect
finality in law."
Id. at
285 U. S.
56-57.
The Court relied on
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.
S. 276 (1922), where it held that persons involved in
deportation proceedings and claiming to be citizens of the United
States are constitutionally entitled to a
de novo judicial
determination of their factual claims.
"[W]hen fundamental rights are in question, this Court has
repeatedly emphasized 'the difference in security of judicial over
administrative action.'"
Crowell v. Benson, supra at
285 U. S. 61,
quoting
Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra at
259 U. S. 285. In
this respect, the Court found that its earlier discussion of the
historical use of masters and commissioners was irrelevant, for
even as to factual issues, "their reports are essentially advisory,
a distinction of controlling importance when questions of a
fundamental character are in issue."
Crowell v. Benson,
supra at
285 U. S.
61.
In his celebrated dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis rejected the
view that the particular factual issues in
Crowell were
ones that must constitutionally be resolved
de novo in an
Art III court. He did agree, however, that there are some issues of
fact which must be found independently in an Art. III court.
"[U]nder certain circumstances," he stated, "the constitutional
requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process."
285 U.S. at
285 U. S. 87. As
he explained in a subsequent opinion:
"A citizen who claims that his liberty is being infringed is
entitled, upon habeas corpus, to the opportunity of
a judicial
determination of the facts. And so highly is this liberty
prized that the opportunity must be accorded to any
Page 447 U. S. 710
resident of the United States who claims to be a citizen."
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U. S. 38,
298 U. S. 77
(1936) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). [
Footnote 4/7]
It may fairly be said that, in certain respects, at least, Mr.
Justice Brandeis' views in
Crowell and
St. Joseph
Stock Yards have become the law. It can no longer be claimed
that a person is entitled under Art. III or the Due Process Clause
to a
de novo judicial determination of the facts in every
case that implicates constitutional rights. Yet neither
Crowell nor
Ng Fung Ho has been overruled, and
the Court has cited both with approval in recent years.
See
Agosto v. INS, 436 U. S. 748 753
(1978);
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U. S. 442,
430 U. S. 450,
n. 7 (1977).
Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S.
88,
426 U. S. 118
(1976) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting);
Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U. S. 49,
413 U. S. 102,
and n. 20 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). [
Footnote 4/8]
Page 447 U. S. 711
There is no basis, then, for a conclusion that there are no
circumstances in which a person is entitled to a determination of
the facts by an Art. III court. In my view, both Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes and Mr. Justice Brandeis were correct on one of the few
propositions on which they were in agreement in
Crowell:
that there remain some cases in which an opportunity for an
independent judicial determination of the facts is constitutionally
required.
The Court's conclusion to the contrary appears premised on its
perception that, under the Act, effective control of suppression
motions remains in the hands of district judges, and the submission
of "recommendations" by magistrates is a relatively mechanical task
for which the special characteristics of an Art. III judge are
unnecessary. But in view of the likely finality of the magistrate's
decision and the importance of factfinding to the process of legal
decision, that view is unsupportable. As I have explained, in cases
like this one the magistrate's decision is effectively unreviewable
if the district judge does not hear the witnesses. The fact that
the judge is permitted to hear the witnesses is an irrelevance in
any case in which he does not do so. Moreover, the Court has
emphasized that the vindication of constitutional rights more
frequently depends on findings of fact than abstract principles of
law.
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at
357 U. S. 520.
And it cannot seriously be suggested that the majoritarian
pressures the Framers sought to avoid by the tenure and salary
protections of Art. III become inapplicable when the relevant
question is one of fact. Indeed, it is precisely in resolving
constitutional issues that are dependent on questions of
credibility as between a government official and one accused of
crime that a detached and independent arbiter may be most
indispensable. A contrary conclusion would mean that the
Page 447 U. S. 712
protections of Art. III, viewed as so fundamental by the Framers
of the Constitution, were intended to apply solely to appellate
judges.
C
Since I reject the suggestion that every issue of fact may be
removed from Art. III courts and submitted instead to federal
magistrates, the question remains whether a suppression hearing is
one of the admittedly few contexts in which independent factfinding
by an Art. III judge is constitutionally required. I believe that
it is.
As noted above, Mr. Justice Brandeis would have restricted the
requirement of independent judicial factfinding to situations in
which personal liberty was at stale, such as habeas corpus and
deportation. I agree that for both criminal cases and deportation,
a citizen is constitutionally entitled to an independent
determination of the case-dispositive facts by an Art. III court.
My conclusion is based on two factors, the nature of the issue and
the individual interest in a determination by an Art. III judge.
[
Footnote 4/9] Resolution of the
issues involved in criminal cases and deportation proceedings does
not require specialization or expertise in an area in which a
federal judge is untrained. Moreover, the Framers adopted Art. III
precisely in order to protect individual interests of the sort
involved here. [
Footnote 4/10] In
my view, the independence provided by
Page 447 U. S. 713
Art. III is hardly dispensable in finding facts underlying a
motion to suppress evidence on Fifth Amendment grounds. Nor, for
these purposes, is it possible to distinguish between suppression
motions and the trial itself; as experience shows, the primary
issues in a criminal case often deal with whether evidence should
be excluded because illegally obtained. I am therefore brought to
the conclusion that the Constitution entitled respondent to an
independent judicial determination of the facts on which his motion
to suppress was based. [
Footnote
4/11]
III
The Court's holding today is undoubtedly influenced by its
sympathy with Congress' perception that the assistance of federal
magistrates was a necessary measure to ensure that the already
severe pressures on the federal district courts do not become
overwhelming. I too sympathize with that concern. And I applaud the
conspicuous and conscientious legislative effort to conform to the
dictates of the Constitution by ensuring maximum control of
suppression motions by the federal district courts. I agree with my
Brother STEWART that § 636(b)(1)
Page 447 U. S. 714
should be construed to avoid the constitutional objections and
to require the district court to call witnesses when a fair
resolution of the facts is not otherwise possible.
The Court's unwillingness to construe the relevant provision in
this fashion may be attributable to an understandable desire to
minimize existing burdens on federal district judges, burdens that
may seem especially unnecessary with respect to the gathering and
evaluation of the facts. But the replacement of Art. III judges
with magistrates, even if the replacement extends only to the
finding of facts, erodes principles that strike near the heart of
the constitutional order. In such contexts, considerations of
administrative cost are least forceful, and the Court must be most
wary lest principles that were meant to endure be sacrificed to
expediency. I would affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
[
Footnote 4/1]
Swisher involved a Maryland procedure whereby a master
first made factual findings with respect to the issue of juvenile
delinquency, and a judge subsequently conducted a
de novo
review of the evidence. The judge's review was confined to the
record, with the exception that he could receive additional
evidence when the parties did not object. The Court held that the
procedure did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, but reserved
the due process issue on the ground that it was not properly
presented. Writing for myself and my Brothers BRENNAN and POWELL, I
expressed the view that the issue was before us, and that the
procedure violated the due process principle that, where demeanor
evidence is critical, the ultimate factfinder in a criminal case
must hear the witnesses on whose testimony his findings will be
based.
[
Footnote 4/2]
Cf. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in
Procedural Due Process, in J. Pennock & J. Chapman, Due
Process: Nomos XVIII, pp. 12171 (1977). I do not, of course, mean
to suggest that all adverse effects fall within the categories of
"life, liberty, [and] property" under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In recent years, the Court has held that those terms
encompass only so-called statutory entitlements and certain kinds
of grievous losses.
See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.
S. 480 (1980);
cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, ante at
447 U. S. 93-94,
and n. 2 (MARSHALL, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 4/3]
The principle that deference must be paid to the findings of the
official who hears the testimony is reflected in a wide variety of
areas of the law. Under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a trial court's factual findings may be reversed only
when "clearly erroneous," a standard that reflects the common
understanding that,
"[f]ace to face with living witnesses, the original trier of the
facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are
excluded. In doubtful cases, the exercise of his power of
observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining
the truth."
United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U.
S. 326,
343 U. S. 339
(1952). For this reason, the successor of a trial judge who has
resigned or died after the conclusion of a trial is ordinarily
barred from resolving factual disputes on the basis of the trial
transcript.
Brennan v. Grisso, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 198
F.2d 532 (1952);
United States v. Nugent, 100 F.2d 215
(CA6 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 648 (1939). And in
United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463 (CA2
1972) (Friendly, J.), the court applied the principle in habeas
corpus proceedings to invalidate a procedure under which a state
appellate court had entered a conviction for a lesser offense when
reversal of the original conviction was required because of
improperly admitted evidence. The court stated:
"Due process forbids that, when an issue of fact is presented, a
man should be sent to prison without the trier of the facts having
seen and heard his accusers and himself, if he desires to testify,
and weighing their credibility in the light of their demeanor on
the stand."
Id. at 469.
[
Footnote 4/4]
See 447 U. S.
infra.
[
Footnote 4/5]
Experience shows that motions to suppress evidence consume a
relatively small proportion of the time of federal district judges.
A recent study indicated that suppression motions involving
confessions were filed in only 4% of all federal criminal cases.
GAO, Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal
Prosecutions, Report by the Comptroller General of the United
States, App. II, p. 8 (Apr.19, 1979). Moreover, a rehearing by the
district judge would be required only in some of those cases, since
the rehearing requirement would be imposed solely in situations (1)
involving case-dispositive issues that (2) could not be resolved on
the basis of the record and (3) that were contested by a party.
Finally, the rehearing requirement would create an additional
burden only where the judge would otherwise choose not to hear the
witnesses. In light of these factors, the incremental expenses that
would be imposed by the ruling of the Court of Appeals would be
relatively small.
[
Footnote 4/6]
The Government contends that, since Congress is constitutionally
entitled not to create federal courts,
see Palmore v.
United States,
411 U. S. 389
(1973); 49 U. S. Sill, 8
How. 441 (185), and may instead entrust the resolution of federal
questions to state courts, it follows that Congress also has the
authority to create federal tribunals that do not carry the
safeguards of Art. III. Such a view would, of course, render the
requirements of Art. III practically meaningless by permitting
Congress to vest the judicial power in whatever tribunal it
chose.
The argument is unpersuasive for two additional reasons. First,
it represents a revival of the now discredited idea that Congress
may attach whatever conditions it wishes to entities or programs
that it is free not to create.
Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. at
445 U. S.
487-494. But there is no logical infirmity in concluding
that, although Congress is free not to create federal courts, if it
chooses to do so, those courts must be as described in Art. III,
subject to limited exceptions.
Second, the argument misconceives the intentions that underlay
the constitutional compromise embodied in Art. III. The Framers
were especially concerned about the possibility of an alliance
between federal judges and the Congress. For this reason, they
ensured that federal judges would be isolated from the legislative
branch of the Federal Government and protected from congressional
reprisal. State courts were perceived as necessarily independent
from the Federal Government and as a relatively reliable buffer
against its excesses. No such assurance would be possible with
respect to federal judges unprotected by the provisions of Art.
III. It follows from those assumptions that, under Art. III,
Congress is generally prohibited from creating specially
accountable federal tribunals but, at the same time is permitted to
entrust issues of federal law to state tribunals.
See
generally Tushnet, Invitation to a Wedding: Some Thoughts on
Article III and a Problem of Statutory Interpretation, 60 Iowa
L.Rev. 937, 944-945 (1975);
cf. R. Berger, Congress v. The
Supreme Court 8, 117-119 (1969).
[
Footnote 4/7]
Federal courts on habeas corpus are not obliged to examine the
facts independently in every case. Under
Townsend v. Sain,
372 U. S. 293
(1963), deference to the state court findings is permitted in the
absence of any allegation of procedural irregularity. As the
holdings of
Ng Fung Ho and
Crowell make clear,
however, this deference is based on the special role played by
state courts in the federal system, and not on any rule allowing
Congress to create non-Art. III tribunals to make findings of fact
that are binding on Art. III courts.
See 447
U.S. 667fn4/6|>n. 6,
supra.
[
Footnote 4/8]
In
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U. S. 38,
298 U. S. 53
(1936), the Court indicated that, in the context of a claim of
unconstitutional confiscation, the requirement of independent
judicial judgment would be satisfied even if the court gives "the
weight which may properly attach to findings [by an administrative
body] upon hearing and evidence." In subsequent cases, the Court
has made clear that the scope of judicial review of confiscation
claims may be limited to the substantial evidence test.
See FPC
v. National Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.
S. 575 (1942);
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U. S. 591
(1944);
Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern R. Co.,
341 U. S. 341,
341 U. S. 348
(1951);
American Trucking Assns. v. United States,
344 U. S. 298
(1953).
See generally 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 29.09 (1958). But the Court errs if it reads
St.
Joseph Stock Yards to establish the far more radical
proposition that all questions of fact may be transferred to and
decided by non-Art. III federal tribunals.
See ante at
447 U. S. 683.
Our continued adherence to
Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U. S. 276
(1922), demonstrates that such a reading would be unwarranted.
[
Footnote 4/9]
See L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action
640-648 (1965). In my view, this standard is far preferable to a
test that would draw a rigid line between issues of law and issues
of fact, and hold that, with the exception of the criminal trial,
the latter need never be resolved independently by an Art. III
court. No such line appears in the Constitution, and it is
contradicted by the rationale that underlies the tenure and salary
protections of Art. III.
[
Footnote 4/10]
Alexander Hamilton justified the tenure and salary protections
of Art. III in this fashion:
"That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
constitution and of individuals which we perceive to be
indispensable in the courts of justice can certainly not be
expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by
whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their
necessary independence. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to
the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their
support. . . . In the general course of human nature,
a power
over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will."
The Federalist No. 78, P. 489, and No. 79, P. 491 (Gideon ed.
1818) (emphasis in original).
[
Footnote 4/11]
Actual rehearing of the witnesses, of course, would be required
only in exceptional cases. In most circumstances, the requirement
of independent judicial factfinding would be satisfied on the basis
of record review. It is only when that task cannot fairly be
performed in the absence of the witnesses that a
de novo
hearing should be required. And as I have indicated,
see
supra at
447 U. S.
701-702, if the district judge offered a statement of
reasons explaining why it was not necessary for him to hear the
witnesses, an abuse of discretion would be found quite rarely.
See 447
U.S. 667fn4/5|>n. 5,
supra; ante at
447 U. S.
693-694 (STEWART, J., dissenting).