Petitioner, who previously on two separate occasions had been
convicted in Texas state courts and sentenced to prison for
felonies (fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of
goods or services, and passing a forged check in the amount of
$28.36), was convicted of a third felony, obtaining $120.75 by
false pretenses, and received a mandatory life sentence pursuant to
Texas' recidivist statute. After the Texas appellate courts had
rejected his direct appeal as well as his subsequent collateral
attacks on his imprisonment, petitioner sought a writ of habeas
corpus in Federal District Court, claiming that his life sentence
was so disproportionate to the crimes he had committed as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected this claim,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, attaching particular importance
to the probability that petitioner would be eligible for parole
within 12 years of his initial confinement.
Held: The mandatory life sentence imposed upon
petitioner does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp.
445 U. S.
268-285.
(a) Texas' interest here is not simply that of making criminal
the unlawful acquisition of another person's property, but is, in
addition, the interest, expressed in all recidivist statutes, in
dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal
acts have shown that they are incapable of conforming to the norms
of society as established by its criminal law. The Texas recidivist
statute thus is nothing more than a societal decision that, when a
person, such as petitioner, commits yet another felony, he should
be subjected to the serious penalty of life imprisonment, subject
only to the State's judgment as to whether to grant him parole. Pp.
445 U. S.
276-278.
(b) While petitioner's inability to enforce any "right" to
parole precludes treating his life sentence as equivalent to a 12
years' sentence, nevertheless, because parole is an established
variation on imprisonment, a proper assessment of Texas' treatment
of petitioner could not ignore the possibility that he will not
actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life. Pp.
445 U. S.
280-281.
Page 445 U. S. 264
(c) Texas is entitled to make its own judgment as to the line
dividing felony theft from petty larceny, subject only to those
strictures of the Eighth Amendment that can be informed by
objective factors. Moreover, given petitioner's record, Texas was
not require to treat him in the same manner as it might treat him
were this his first "petty property offense." Pp.
445 U. S.
284-285.
587 F.2d 651, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.
STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
445 U. S. 285.
POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL,
and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
445 U. S.
285.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner William James Rummel is presently serving a life
sentence imposed by the State of Texas in 1973 under its
"recidivist statute," formerly Art. 63 of its Penal Code, which
provided that
"[w]hoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony
less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for
life in the penitentiary. [
Footnote
1]"
On January
Page 445 U. S. 265
19, 1976, Rummel sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing
that life imprisonment was "grossly disproportionate" to the three
felonies that formed the predicate for his sentence, and that
therefore the sentence violated the ban on cruel and unusual
punishments of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District
Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rejected Rummel's claim, finding no unconstitutional
disproportionality. We granted certiorari, 441 U.S. 960, and now
affirm.
I
In 1964, the State of Texas charged Rummel with fraudulent use
of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services.
[
Footnote 2] Because the amount
in question was greater than $50, the charged offense was a felony
punishable by a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 10 years in the
Texas Department of Corrections. [
Footnote 3] Rummel eventually pleaded guilty to the charge
and was sentenced to three years' confinement in a state
penitentiary.
In 1969, the State of Texas charged Rummel with passing a forged
check in the amount of $28.36, a crime punishable by imprisonment
in a penitentiary for not less than two nor more
Page 445 U. S. 266
than five years. [
Footnote
4] Rummel pleaded guilty to this offense, and was sentenced to
four years' imprisonment.
In 1973, Rummel was charged with obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses. [
Footnote 5] Because
the amount obtained was greater than $50, the charged offense was
designated "felony theft," which, by itself, was punishable by
confinement in a penitentiary for not less than 2 nor more than 10
years. [
Footnote 6] The
prosecution chose, however, to proceed against Rummel under Texas'
recidivist statute, and cited in the indictment his 1964 and 1969
convictions as requiring imposition of a life sentence if Rummel
were convicted of the charged offense. A jury convicted Rummel of
felony theft, and also found as true the allegation that he had
been convicted of two prior felonies. As a result, on April 26,
1973, the trial court imposed upon Rummel the life sentence
mandated by Art. 63.
Page 445 U. S. 267
The Texas appellate courts rejected Rummel's direct appeal, as
well as his subsequent collateral attacks on his imprisonment.
[
Footnote 7] Rummel then filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas. In that petition,
he claimed,
inter alia, that his life sentence was so
disproportionate to the crimes he had committed as to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court rejected this
claim, first noting that this Court had already rejected a
constitutional attack upon Art. 63,
see Spencer v. Texas,
385 U. S. 554
(1967), and then crediting an argument by respondent that Rummel's
sentence could not be viewed as life imprisonment because he would
be eligible for parole in approximately 12 years.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. 568 F.2d 1193
(CA5 1978). The majority relied upon this Court's decision in
Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349
(1910), and a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit,
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974), in holding that
Rummel's life sentence was "so grossly disproportionate" to his
offenses as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 568 F.2d at
1200. The dissenting judge argued that
"[n]o neutral principle of adjudication permits a federal court
to hold that in a given situation individual crimes are too trivial
in relation to the punishment imposed."
Id. at 1201-1202.
Page 445 U. S. 268
Rummel's case was reheard by the Court of Appeals sitting en
banc. That court vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the
District Court's denial of habeas corpus relief on Rummel's Eighth
Amendment claim. 587 F.2d 651 (CA5 1978). Of particular importance
to the majority of the Court of Appeals en banc was the probability
that Rummel would be eligible for parole within 12 years of his
initial confinement. Six members of the Court of Appeals dissented,
arguing that Rummel had no enforceable right to parole and that
Weems and
Hart compelled a finding that Rummel's
life sentence was unconstitutional.
II
Initially, we believe it important to set forth two propositions
that Rummel does not contest. First, Rummel does not challenge the
constitutionality of Texas' recidivist statute as a general
proposition. In
Spencer v. Texas, supra, this Court upheld
the very statute employed here, noting in the course of its opinion
that similar statutes had been sustained against contentions that
they violated
"constitutional strictures dealing with double jeopardy,
ex
post facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process,
equal protection, and privileges and immunities."
385 U.S. at
385 U. S. 560.
Here, Rummel attacks only the result of applying this concededly
valid statute to the facts of his case.
Second, Rummel does not challenge Texas' authority to punish
each of his offenses as felonies, that is, by imprisoning him in a
state penitentiary. [
Footnote
8]
Cf. Robinson v California, 370 U.
S. 660 (1962) (statute making it a crime to be addicted
to the use of narcotics violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.
S. 651,
Page 445 U. S. 269
667 (1977) (Eighth Amendment "imposes substantive limits on what
can be made criminal and punished as such . . ."). Under Texas law,
Rummel concededly cold have received sentences totaling 25 years in
prison for what he refers to as his "petty property offenses."
Indeed, when Rummel obtained $120.75 by false pretenses, he
committed a crime punishable as a felony in at least 35 States and
the District of Columbia. [
Footnote
9] Similarly, a large number of States authorized
Page 445 U. S. 270
significant terms of imprisonment for each of Rummel's other
offenses at the times he committed them. [
Footnote 10] Rummel's challenge thus focuses only on
the State's authority to impose a
Page 445 U. S. 271
sentence of. life imprisonment, as opposed to a substantial term
of years, for his third felony.
This Court has on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the crime.
See, e.g., Weems v.
Page 445 U. S. 272
United States, 217 U.S. at 367; Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. at
430 U. S. 667
(dictum);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S.
86,
356 U. S. 100
(1958) (plurality opinion). In recent years, this proposition has
appeared most frequently in opinions dealing with the death
penalty.
See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.
S. 584,
433 U. S. 592
(1977) (plurality opinion);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.
S. 153,
428 U. S. 173
(1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.);
Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238,
408 U. S. 458
(1972) (POWELL, J., dissenting). Rummel cites these latter opinions
dealing with capital punishment as compelling the conclusion that
his sentence is disproportionate to his offenses. But as MR.
JUSTICE STEWART noted in
Furman:
"The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment not in degree, but in kind. It is unique in its total
irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of
the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is
unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is
embodied in our concept of humanity."
Id. at
408 U. S. 306.
This theme, the unique nature of the death penalty for purposes of
Eighth Amendment analysis, has been repeated time and time again in
our opinions.
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, supra at
408 U. S. 287,
408 U. S. 289
(BRENNAN, J., concurring);
Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at
428 U. S. 187
(opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.);
Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U. S. 20,
428 U. S. 305
(1976);
Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
433 U. S. 598
(plurality opinion). Because a sentence of death differs in kind
from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long, our
decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
to capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding the
constitutionality of the punishment meted out to Rummel.
Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges
to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare. In
Weems v. United States, supra, a case
coming to this Court from the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Page 445 U. S. 273
Islands, petitioner successfully attacked the imposition of a
punishment known as "
cadena temporal" for the crime of
falsifying a public record. Although the Court in
Weems
invalidated the sentence after weighing "the mischief and the
remedy," 217 U.S. at
217 U. S. 379,
its finding of disproportionality cannot be wrenched from the
extreme facts of that case. As for the "mischief," Weems was
convicted of falsifying a public document, a crime apparently
complete upon the knowing entry of a single item of false
information in a public record, "though there be no one injured,
though there be no fraud or purpose of it, no gain or desire of
it."
Id. at
217 U. S. 365.
The mandatory "remedy" for this offense was cadena temporal, a
punishment described graphically by the Court:
"Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for
twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the
offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from friend or
relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of
property, no participation even in the family council. These parts
of his penalty endure for the term of imprisonment. From other
parts there is no intermission. His prison bars and chains are
removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a
perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept under the
shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of the
criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicile without
giving notice to the 'authority immediately in charge of his
surveillance,' and without permission in writing."
Id. at
217 U. S. 366.
Although Rummel argues that the length of Weems' imprisonment was,
by itself, a basis for the Court's decision, the Court's opinion
does not support such a simple conclusion. The opinion consistently
referred jointly to the length of imprisonment and its
"accessories" or "accompaniments."
See id. at
217 U. S. 366,
217 U. S. 372,
217 U. S. 377,
217 U. S. 380.
Indeed, the Court expressly rejected an argument made on behalf of
the United States that
"the provision
Page 445 U. S. 274
for imprisonment in the Philippine Code is separable from the
accessory punishment, and that the latter may be declared illegal,
leaving the former to have application."
According to the Court, "[t]he Philippine Code unites the
penalties of
cadena temporal, principal and accessory, and
it is not in our power to separate them. . . .
Id. at
217 U. S. 382.
Thus, we do not believe that
Weems can be applied without
regard to its peculiar facts: the triviality of the charged
offense, the impressive length of the minimum term of imprisonment,
and the extraordinary nature of the "accessories" included within
the punishment of
cadena temporal.
Given the unique nature of the punishments considered in
Weems and in the death penalty cases, one could argue
without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that,
for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that
is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state
penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely
a matter of legislative prerogative. [
Footnote 11] Only six years after
Weems, for
example, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court in brushing
aside a proportionality challenge to concurrent sentences of five
years' imprisonment and cumulative fines of $1,000 on each of seven
counts of mail fraud.
See Badders v. United States,
240 U. S. 391
(1916). According to the Court, there was simply "no ground for
declaring the punishment unconstitutional."
Id. at
240 U. S.
394.
Such reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment is implicit in our more recent decisions as well. As
was noted by MR. JUSTICE WHITE, writing for the plurality in
Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
433 U. S. 592,
our Court's
"Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should
be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.
"
Page 445 U. S. 275
Since
Coker involved the imposition of capital
punishment for the rape of an adult female, this Court could draw a
"bright line" between the punishment of death and the various other
permutations and commutations of punishments short of that ultimate
sanction. For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE STEWART in
Furman, see supra at
445 U. S. 272,
this line was considerably clearer than would be any constitutional
distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term
of years.
Similarly, in
Weems, the Court could differentiate in
an objective fashion between the highly unusual
cadena
temporal and more traditional forms of imprisonment imposed
under the Anglo-Saxon system. But a more extensive intrusion into
the basic line-drawing process that is preeminently the province of
the legislature when it makes an act criminal would be difficult to
square with the view expressed in
Coker that the Court's
Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be
merely the subjective views of individual Justices.
In an attempt to provide us with objective criteria against
which we might measure the proportionality of his life sentence,
Rummel points to certain characteristics of his offenses that
allegedly render them "petty." He cites, for example, the absence
of violence in his crimes. But the presence or absence of violence
does not always affect the strength of society's interest in
deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal.
A high official in a large corporation can commit undeniably
serious crimes in the area of antitrust, bribery, or clean air or
water standards without coming close to engaging in any "violent"
or short-term "life-threatening" behavior. Additionally, Rummel
cites the "small" amount of money taken in each of his crimes. But
to recognize that the State of Texas could have imprisoned Rummel
for life if he had stolen $5,000, $50,000, or $500,000, rather than
the $120.75 that a jury convicted him of stealing, is virtually to
concede that the lines to be drawn are indeed "subjective," and
therefore properly within the province of
Page 445 U. S. 276
legislatures, not courts. Moreover, if Rummel had attempted to
defraud his victim of $50,000, but had failed, no money whatsoever
would have changed hands; yet Rummel would be no less blameworthy,
only less skillful, than if he had succeeded.
In this case, however, we need not decide whether Texas could
impose a life sentence upon Rummel merely for obtaining $120.75 by
false pretenses. Had Rummel only committed that crime, under the
law enacted by the Texas Legislature he could have been imprisoned
for no more than 10 years. In fact, at the time that he obtained
the $120.75 by false pretenses, he already had committed and had
been imprisoned for two other felonies, crimes that Texas and other
States felt were serious enough to warrant significant terms of
imprisonment even in the absence of prior offenses. Thus, the
interest of the State of Texas here is not simply that of making
criminal the unlawful acquisition of another person's property; it
is in addition the interest, expressed in all recidivist statutes,
in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal
acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the
norms of society as established by its criminal law. By conceding
the validity of recidivist statutes generally, Rummel himself
concedes that the State of Texas, or any other State, has a valid
interest in so dealing with that class of persons.
Nearly 70 years ago, and only 2 years after
Weems, this
Court rejected an Eighth Amendment claim that seems factually
indistinguishable from that advanced by Rummel in the present case.
In
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.
S. 616 (1912), this Court considered the case of an
apparently incorrigible horse thief who was sentenced to life
imprisonment under West Virginia's recidivist statute. In 1898,
Graham had been convicted of stealing "one bay mare" valued at $50;
in 1901, he had been convicted of "feloniously and burglariously"
entering a stable in order to steal "one brown horse, named Harry,
of the value of $100"; finally, in 1907, he was convicted of
stealing "one red roan horse" valued at $75 and
Page 445 U. S. 277
various tack and accessories valued at $85. [
Footnote 12] Upon conviction of this last
crime, Graham received the life sentence mandated by West
Virginia's recidivist statute. This Court did not tarry long on
Graham's Eighth Amendment claim, [
Footnote 13] noting only that it could not be maintained
"that cruel and unusual punishment [had] been inflicted."
Id. at
224 U. S. 631.
[
Footnote 14]
Undaunted by earlier cases like
Graham and
Badders, Rummel attempts to ground his proportionality
attack on an alleged "nationwide" trend away from mandatory life
sentences and toward "lighter, discretionary sentences." Brief for
Petitioner 43-44. According to Rummel, "[n]o jurisdiction in the
United States or the Free World punishes habitual offenders as
harshly as Texas."
Id. at 39. In support of this
proposition, Rummel offers detailed charts and tables documenting
the history of recidivist statutes in the United States since
1776.
Page 445 U. S. 278
Before evaluating this evidence, we believe it important to
examine the exact operation of Art 63 as interpreted by the Texas
courts. In order to qualify for a mandatory life sentence under
that statute, Rummel had to satisfy a number of requirements.
First, he had to be convicted of a felony and actually sentenced to
prison. [
Footnote 15]
Second, at some time subsequent to his first conviction, Rummel had
to be convicted of another felony and again sentenced to
imprisonment. [
Footnote 16]
Finally, after having been sent to prison a second time, Rummel had
to be convicted of a third felony. Thus, under Art. 63, a
three-time felon receives a mandatory life sentence, with
possibility of parole, only if commission and conviction of each
succeeding felony followed conviction for the preceding one, and
only if each prior conviction was followed by actual imprisonment.
Given this necessary sequence, a recidivist must twice demonstrate
that conviction and actual imprisonment do not deter him from
returning to crime once he is released. One in Rummel's position
has been both graphically informed of the consequences of
lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.
Article 63 thus is nothing more than a societal decision that, when
such a person commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to
the admittedly serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject
only to the State's judgment as to whether to grant him parole.
[
Footnote 17]
Page 445 U. S. 279
In comparing this recidivist program with those presently
employed in other States, Rummel creates a complex hierarchy of
statutes and places Texas' recidivist scheme alone on the top rung.
This isolation is not entirely convincing. Both West Virginia and
Washington, for example, impose mandatory life sentences upon the
commission of a third felony. [
Footnote 18] Rummel would distinguish those States from
Texas because the Supreme Court of Washington and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which includes West
Virginia, have indicated a willingness to review the
proportionality of such sentences under the Eighth Amendment.
See State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d
932, 937, n. 4,
558 P.2d
236, 240, n. 4 (1976) (dictum);
Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136 (CA4 1973). But this Court must ultimately decide the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. If we disagree with the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Washington and the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit on this point, Washington and West Virginia are, for
practical purposes, indistinguishable from Texas. If we agree with
those courts, then of course sentences imposed in Texas, as well as
in Washington and West Virginia, are subject to a review for
proportionality under the Eighth Amendment. But in either case, the
legislative judgment as to punishment in Washington and West
Virginia has been the same as that in Texas.
Rummel's charts and tables do appear to indicate that he might
have received more lenient treatment in almost any State other than
Texas, West Virginia, or Washington. The distinctions, however, are
subtle, rather than gross. A number of States impose a mandatory
life sentence upon conviction of four felonies, rather than three.
[
Footnote 19] Other States
require one
Page 445 U. S. 280
or more of the felonies to be "violent" to support a life
sentence. [
Footnote 20]
Still other States leave the imposition of a life sentence after
three felonies within the discretion of a judge or jury. [
Footnote 21] It is one thing for a
court to compare those States that impose capital punishment for a
specific offense with those States that do not.
See Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. at
433 U. S.
595-596. It is quite another thing for a court to
attempt to evaluate the position of any particular recidivist
scheme within Rummel's complex matrix. [
Footnote 22]
Nor do Rummel's extensive charts even begin to reflect the
complexity of the comparison he asks this Court to make. Texas, we
are told, has a relatively liberal policy of granting "good time"
credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a
prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in
as little as 12 years.
See Brief for Respondent 16-17. We
agree with Rummel that his inability to enforce any "right" to
parole precludes us from treating his life sentence as if it were
equivalent to a sentence of 12 years. Nevertheless, because parole
is "an established variation on imprisonment of convicted
criminals,"
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.
S. 471,
408 U. S. 477
(1972), a proper assessment of Texas'
Page 445 U. S. 281
treatment of Rummel could hardly ignore the possibility that he
will not actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life. If
nothing else, the possibility of parole, however slim, serves to
distinguish Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like Mississippi's, which provides for a sentence of life
without parole upon conviction of three felonies including at least
one violent felony.
See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp.
1979).
Another variable complicating the calculus is the role of
prosecutorial discretion in any recidivist scheme. It is a matter
of common knowledge that prosecutors often exercise their
discretion in invoking recidivist statutes or in plea bargaining so
as to screen out truly "petty" offenders who fall within the
literal terms of such statutes.
See Oyler v. Boles,
368 U. S. 448,
368 U. S. 456
(1962) (upholding West Virginia's recidivist scheme over contention
that it placed unconstitutional discretion in hands of prosecutor).
Indeed, in the present case, the State of Texas has asked this
Court, in the event that we find Rummel's sentence
unconstitutionally disproportionate, to remand the case to the
sentencing court so that the State might introduce Rummel's entire
criminal record. If, on a remand, the sentencing court were to
discover that Rummel had been convicted of one or more felonies in
addition to those pleaded in the original indictment, one
reasonably might wonder whether that court could then sentence
Rummel to life imprisonment even though his recidivist status based
on only three felonies had been held to be a "cruel and unusual"
punishment.
We offer these additional considerations not as inherent flaws
in Rummel's suggested interjurisdictional analysis, but as
illustrations of the complexities confronting any court that would
attempt such a comparison. Even were we to assume that the statute
employed against Rummel was the most stringent found in the 50
States, that severity hardly would render Rummel's punishment
"grossly disproportionate" to his offenses or to the punishment he
would have received in the other States. As Mr. Justice Holmes
noted in his dissenting
Page 445 U. S. 282
opinion in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45,
198 U. S. 76
(1905), our Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally
differing views. . . ." Until quite recently, Arizona punished as a
felony the theft of any "neat or horned animal," regardless of its
value; [
Footnote 23]
California considers the theft of "avocados, olives, citrus or
deciduous fruits, nuts and artichokes" particularly reprehensible.
[
Footnote 24] In one State,
theft of $100 will earn the offender a fine or a short term in
Jail; [
Footnote 25] in
another State, it could earn him a sentence of 10 years'
imprisonment. [
Footnote 26]
Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to
traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the
distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any
other State. [
Footnote
27]
Page 445 U. S. 283
Perhaps, as asserted in
Weems, "time works changes"
upon the Eighth Amendment, bringing into existence "new conditions
and purposes." 217 U.S. at
217 U. S. 373. We all of course, would like to think
that we are "moving down the road toward human decency."
Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at
408 U. S. 410
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Within the confines of this judicial
proceeding, however, we have no way of knowing in which direction
that road lies. Penologists themselves have been unable to agree
whether sentences should be light or heavy, [
Footnote 28] discretionary or determinate.
[
Footnote 29] This
uncertainty
Page 445 U. S. 284
reinforces our conviction that any "nationwide trend" toward
lighter, discretionary sentences must find its source and its
sustaining force in the legislatures, not in the federal
courts.
III
The most casual review of the various criminal justice systems
now in force in the 50 States of the Union shows that the line
dividing felony theft from petty larceny, a line usually based on
the value of the property taken, varies markedly from one State to
another. We believe that Texas is entitled to make its own judgment
as to where such lines lie, subject only to those strictures of the
Eighth Amendment that can be informed by objective factors.
See
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at
433 U. S. 592.
Moreover, given Rummel's record, Texas was not required to treat
him in the same manner as it might treat him were this his first
"petty property offense." Having twice imprisoned him for felonies,
Texas was entitled to place upon Rummel the onus of one who is
simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms
prescribed by the criminal law of the State.
The purpose of a recidivist statute such as that involved here
is not to simplify the task of prosecutors, judges, or juries. Its
primary goals are to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in
the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious
enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person from
the rest of society for an extended period of time. This
segregation and its duration are based not merely on that person's
most recent offense, but also on the propensities he has
demonstrated over a period of time during which he has been
convicted of and sentenced for other crimes.
Page 445 U. S. 285
Like the line dividing felony theft from petty larceny, the
point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the
necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist
will be isolated from society are matters largely within the
discretion of the punishing jurisdiction.
We therefore hold that the mandatory life sentence imposed upon
this petitioner does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
With minor revisions, this article has since been recodified as
Texas Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (1974).
[
Footnote 2]
In 1964 Texas Penal Code Ann., Art. 1555b, provided:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to present a
credit card or alleged credit card, with the intent to defraud, to
obtain or attempt to obtain any item of value or service of any
type; or to present such credit card or alleged credit card, with
the intent to defraud, to pay for items of value or services
rendered."
App. to Tex.Penal Code Ann., p. 712 (1974) .
[
Footnote 3]
In 1964, Texas Penal Code Ann., Art. 1555b(4)(d), provided:
"For a violation of this Act, in the event the amount of the
credit obtained or the value of the items or services is Fifty
Dollars ($50) or more, punishment shall be confinement in the
penitentiary for not less than two (2) nor more than ten (10)
years."
App. to Tex.Penal Code Ann., p. 713 (1974) .
[
Footnote 4]
In 1969 Texas Penal Code Ann., Art. 996, provided:
"If any person shall knowingly pass as true, or attempt to pass
as true, any such forged instrument in writing as is mentioned and
defined in the preceding articles of this chapter, he shall be
confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five
years."
App. to Tex.Penal Code Ann., p. 597 (1974).
[
Footnote 5]
In 1973, Texas Penal Code Ann., Art. 1410, provided:
"'Theft' is the fraudulent taking of corporeal personal property
belonging to another from his possession, or from the possession of
some person holding the same for him, without his consent, with
intent to deprive the owner of the value of the same, and to
appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person taking."
App. to Tex.Penal Code Ann., p. 688 (1974).
In 1973, Texas Penal Code Ann., Art. 1413, provided:
"The taking must be wrongful, so that, if the property came into
the possession of the person accused of theft by lawful means, the
subsequent appropriation of it is not theft, but if the taking,
though originally lawful, was obtained by false pretext, or with
any intent to deprive the owner of the value thereof, and
appropriate the property to the use and benefit of the person
taking, and the same is so appropriated, the offense of theft is
complete."
App. to Tex.Penal Code Ann., p. 689 (1974).
[
Footnote 6]
In 1973, Texas Penal Code § 1421 provided:
"Theft of property of the value of fifty dollars or over shall
be punished by confinement in the penitentiary not less than two
nor more than ten years."
App. to Tex.Penal Code Ann., p. 690 (1974).
[
Footnote 7]
Preliminarily, the respondent argues that Rummel's claim is
barred by
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S.
72 (1977), because he did not object at the punishment
stage of his trial to the imposition of a mandatory life sentence.
Respondent raised this claim for the first time in his petition to
the Court of Appeals for rehearing en banc, which was filed shortly
after
Wainwright was decided. The Court of Appeals
rejected this argument because it did not believe that Texas'
contemporaneous objection requirement extended to a challenge like
that raised by Rummel.
See 587 F.2d 651, 653-654 (CA5
1978). Deferring to the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Texas
law, we decline to hold that
Wainwright bars Rummel from
presenting his claim.
[
Footnote 8]
Texas, like most States, defines felonies as offenses that "may
-- not must -- be punishable by death or by confinement in the
penitentiary. . . ." Tex.Penal Code Ann., Art. 47 (Vernon 1925),
recodified without substantive change at Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 1.07
(14) (1974).
See also W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook
on Criminal Law 26 (1972).
[
Footnote 9]
See Ala.Code §§ 13-3-50, 13-3-90 (1975) (1 to 10
years); Alaska Stat.Ann. § 11.20.360 (1970) (1 to 5 years);
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 13-661(A)(3), 13-663(A)(1), 13-671 (1956 and
Supp. 1957-1978) (1 to 10 years); Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 41-1901, 41-3907
(1964) (1 to 21 years); Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 18-1-l01, 18-1-105 (1973)
(fine or up to 10 years); Del.Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 841, 843, 4205
(1974) (fine or up to 7 years); D.C.Code § 22-1301 (1973) (1 to 3
years); Fla.Stat. § 811.021 (1965) (fine or up to 5 years); Ga.Code
Ann. §§ 26-1803, 26-1812 (1977) (fine or up to 10 years); Ind.Code
Ann. §§ 10-3030(b), 10-3039(3) (Supp. 1975) (fine or up to 10
years); Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 21-3701, 21-4501 (1974) (1 to 3 years);
Ky.Rev.Stat. §§ 514.040, 532.080 (1975) (1 to 5 years);
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:67 (West 1974) (up to 2 years);
Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 17, § 1601 (1965) (fine or up to 7 years);
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 140 (1957) (fine or up to 10 years);
Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 266, § 30 (West 1970) (fine or up to 5
years); Mich.Comp.Laws § 750.218 (1968) (fine or up to 10 years);
Minn.Stat. § 609.52 (Supp. 1978) (fine or up to 5 years); Miss.Code
Ann. § 97-19-39 (1972) (fine or up to 3 years); Mont.Rev.Code Ann.
§§ 94-2701(1), 94-2704(1), 94-2706 (1947) (1 to 14 years);
Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 205.380, 205.380(1) (1977) (fine or 1 to 10
years); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 637:4(1), 637:11(II)(a), 651:2 (1974)
(fine or up to 7 years); N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-100 (1969) (fine or 4
months to 10 years); N.D.Cent.Code §§ 12.1-23-02, 12.1-2305(2)(a),
12.1-32-01(3) (1976) (fine or up to 5 years); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §
2911.01 (Supp. 1974) (1 to 3 years), committee comment following
Ohio Rev.Stat.Ann. § 2913.02 (1975); Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, §§
1541.1, 1541.2 (Supp. 1979-1980) (fine or 1 to 10 years);
S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. §§ 22-37-1, 22-37-2, 22-37-3 (1969) (up to 10
years); Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-1901, 39-4203, 39-4204 (1975) (3 to 10
years); Tex.Penal Code Ann., Arts. 1410, 1413, 1421 (Vernon 1925)
(2 to 10 years); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203(3), 76-6-405, 76-6-412
(1978), and accompanying Compiler's Note (up to 5 years);
Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 13, § 2002 (1958) (up to 10 years); Va.Code §§
18.2-178, 18.2-95 (1975) (fine or 1 to 20 years); Wash.Rev.Code
Ann. §§ 9.54.010(2), 9.54.090(6) (1974) (up to 15 years); W.Va.Code
§§ 61-3-24, 61-3-13 (1977) (1 to 10 years); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 943.20
(1958) (fine or up to 5 years); Wyo.Stat. § 6-3-106 (1977) (up to
10 years).
[
Footnote 10]
In 1969, Rummel's passing of a forged check would have been
punishable by imprisonment in 49 States and the District of
Columbia, even though the amount in question was only $28.36.
See Ala.Code, Tit. 14, §§ 199, 207 (1958) (1 to 20 years);
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-421 (Supp. 1957-1978) (1 to 14 years);
Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1806 (1964) (2 to 10 years); Cal.Penal Code Ann.
§§ 470, 473 (West 1970) (up to 14 years); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 40-6-1
(1963) (1 to 14 years); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53346 (1968) (up to 5
years); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 861, 4205 (1974) (fine or up to
7 years); D.C.Code § 22-1401 (1973) (1 to 10 years); Fla.Stat. §§
831.01, 831.02 (1965) (fine or up to 10 years); Ga.Code Ann. §
26-1701 (1977) (1 to 10 years); Haw. Rev.Stat. §§ 743-9, 743-11
(1968) (fine or up to 5 years' hard labor); Idaho Code §§ 18-3601,
183604 (1948) (1 to 14 years); Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, § 17-3 (1971)
(fine and/or 1 to 14 years); Ind.Code § 10-2102 (1956) (2 to 14
years plus fine); Iowa Code § 718.2 (1950) (fine or up to 10
years); Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 21-609, 21-631 (1964) (up to 10 years'
hard labor); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 434.130 (1962) (2 to 10 years);
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:72 (West 1974) (fine or up to 10 years' hard
labor); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 17, § 1501 (1965) (up to 10 years);
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 44 (1957) (1 to 10 years); Mass.Gen.Laws
Ann., ch. 267, § 5 (West 1970) (2 to 10 years); Mich.Comp.Laws §
750.253 (1968) (fine or up to 5 years); Minn.Stat. § 609.625(3)
(1964) (fine or up to 10 years); Miss.Code Ann. §§ 2172, 2187
(1942) (2 to 15 years); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 561.011 (1969) (fine or up
to 10 years); Mont. Rev.Code Ann. §§ 94-2001, 942044 (1947) (1 to
14 years); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-601 (1943) (1 to 20 years plus fine);
Nev.Rev.Stat. § 205.090 (1959) (1 to 14 years); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann.
§§ 581:1, 581:2 (1955) (up to 7 years); N.J.Stat.Ann. §§ 2A:109-1,
2A:85-6 (West 1969) (fine or up to 7 years); N.M.Stat.Ann. §§
40A-16-9, 40A-29-3(C) (Supp. 1963) (fine or 2 to 10 years); N.Y.
Penal Law §§ 70.00(2)(d), 170.10, 170.25 (McKinney 1967 and 1975)
(up to 7 years); N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-120 (1969) (4 months to 10
years); N.D.Cent.Code §§ 12-39-23, 12-39-27 (1960) (up to 10
years); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2913.01 (1954) (1 to 20 years);
Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, §§ 1577, 1621(2) (1958) (up to 7 years);
Ore.Rev.Stat. §§ 165.105, 165.115 (Supp. 1967) (up to 10 years);
Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, § 5014 (Purdon 1963) (fine or up to 10
years); R.I.Gen.Laws § 11-17-1 (1956) (fine or up to 10 years);
S.C.Code § 16-13-10 (1976) (1 to 7 years plus fine); S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 22-39-14, 22-39-17 (1967) (fine or up to 5 years);
Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-1704, 39-1721, 39-4203, 39-4204 (1955 and
Supp. 1974) (1 to 5 years); Tex.Penal Code Ann., Art. 996 (Vernon
1925) (2 to 5 years); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-26-1, 7626-4 (1953) (1
to 20 years); Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 13, § 1802 (1958) (fine or up to
10 years); Va.Code § 18.1-96 (1960) (up to 10 years); Wash.Rev.Code
Ann. §§ 9.44.020, 9.44.060 (1956) (up to 20 years); W.Va.Code §
61-4-5 (1966) (up to 10 years); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 943.38 (1958) (fine
or up to 10 years); Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-101 (1977) (up to 14
years).
In 1964, at least five of the States that had specific statutes
covering credit-card fraud authorized terms of imprisonment for a
crime like Rummel's.
See Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 484a(b)(6)
(Deering Supp. 1964), § 18 (Deering 1960) (up to 5 years);
Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 21-533, 21-534, 21-590 (1964) (up to 5 years' hard
labor); 1963 Ore.Laws, ch. 588, § 3(6) (up to 5 years); Tex.Penal
Code Ann., Art. 1555b (Vernon Supp. 1973) (2 to 10 years); Va.Code
§ 18.1-119.1 (Supp. 1964) (up to 10 years). A number of other
States, while lacking specific statutes dealing with credit-card
fraud, apparently authorized an equivalent degree of punishment for
such a crime under their general fraud provisions.
See,
e.g., Ala.Code, Tit. 14, §§ 209, 331 (1958 and Supp. 1973) (1
to 10 years); Mont.Rev.Code Ann. §§ 94-1805, 94-2704(1), 94-2706
(1947) (1 to 14 years); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 580:1 (1955) (fine or
up to 7 years); N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-100 (1953) (fine or up to 10
years); N.D.Cent.Code § 12-384 (1960) (fine or up to 3 years);
Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 391901, 39-4203, 39-4204 (1955 and Supp. 1974) (1
to 5 years); Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 13, § 2002 (1958) (fine or up to 10
years). After 1964, at least two other States adopted specific
statutes dealing with credit-card fraud and authorizing
imprisonment for crimes like Rummel's.
See Idaho Code §§
18-112, 18-3113, 18-3119 (1979) (fine or up to 5 years);
Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 9.26 A. 040 (1972) (up to 20 years) .
[
Footnote 11]
This is not to say that a proportionality principle would not
come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent,
post at
445 U. S. 288,
if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life
imprisonment.
[
Footnote 12]
See Transcript of Record in
Graham v. West
Virginia, O.T. 1911, No. 721, pp. 4, 5, 9.
[
Footnote 13]
While, at the time this Court decided
Graham, the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments had not been held applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment,
see, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U. S. 459,
329 U. S. 462
(1947) (plurality opinion), earlier cases had assumed, without
deciding, that the States could not inflict cruel and unusual
punishments.
See, e.g., Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.
S. 126,
191 U. S.
135-136 (1903);
McDonald v. Massachusetts,
180 U. S. 311,
180 U. S. 313
(1901).
Graham's reference to
Howard, McDonald,
and other cases indicates that it followed a similar course.
See 224 U.S. at
224 U. S.
631.
[
Footnote 14]
Rummel characterizes
Graham as a case where petitioner
argued only that imposition of a life sentence under West
Virginia's recidivist statute was,
per se, a violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
See Brief for Petitioner 18-19, n.
6. We do not share that reading. The brief submitted on Graham's
behalf clearly attacked the alleged disproportionality of his
sentence.
See Brief for Plaintiff in Error in
Graham
v. West Virginia, O.T. 1911, No. 721, pp. 37-38. The brief on
behalf of the State of West Virginia, moreover, expressly assumed
that Graham was arguing that "the sentence in this case is so
disproportionate to the offense as to be cruel and unusual." Brief
for Defendant in Error in
Graham v. West Virginia, supra
at 19.
[
Footnote 15]
Texas courts have interpreted the recidivist statute as
requiring not merely that the defendant be convicted of two prior
felonies, but also that he actually serve time in prison for each
of those offenses.
See Cromeans v. State, 160 Tex.Crim.
135, 138,
268
S.W.2d 133, 135 (1954).
[
Footnote 16]
As the statute has been interpreted, the State must prove that
each succeeding conviction was subsequent to both the commission of
and the conviction for the prior offense.
See Tyra v.
State, 534
S.W.2d 695, 697-698 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976);
Rogers v.
State, 168 Tex. Crim. 306, 308,
325
S.W.2d 697, 698 (1959).
[
Footnote 17]
Thus, it is not true that, as the dissent claims, the Texas
scheme subjects a person to life imprisonment "merely because he is
a three-time felon."
Post at
445 U. S. 299,
n. 18. On the contrary, Art. 63 mandates such a sentence only after
shorter terms of actual imprisonment have proved ineffective.
[
Footnote 18]
See Wash.Rev.Code § 9.92.090 (1976) ; W.Va.Code § 61 18
(1977).
[
Footnote 19]
See, e.g., Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-13-101 (1973 and Supp.
1976); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 207.010 (1977); S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. §§
22-6-1, 22-7-8 (Supp. 1978); Wyo.Stat. § 6-1-110 (1977).
[
Footnote 20]
See, e.g., Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979) .
[
Footnote 21]
See, e.g., D.C.Code § 22-104a (1973); Idaho Code §
19-2514 (1979); Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, § 51 (Supp. 1979-1980).
[
Footnote 22]
Nor do we have another sort of objective evidence found in
Coker. After
Furman, where the Court had declared
unconstitutional the death penalty statutes of all of the States as
then applied, a majority of the States had reenacted the death
penalty for killings, but had not done so for rape. In
Coker, the plurality found this fact of some importance.
See 433 U.S. at
433 U. S.
594-595. Here, if there was a watershed comparable to
Furman, it was
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.
S. 55 (1967), which confirmed, rather than undercut, the
constitutionality of recidivist statutes. There thus has been no
comparable occasion for contemporary expression of legislative or
public opinion on the question of what sort of penalties should be
applied to recidivists, or to those who have committed crimes
against property.
[
Footnote 23]
See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-663(A) (Supp. 1957-1978)
(repealed in 1977)
[
Footnote 24]
See Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 487(1) (West 1970).
[
Footnote 25]
See, e.g., Idaho Code §§ 18-4604, 18-4607 (1979).
[
Footnote 26]
See, e.g., Nev.Rev.Stat. § 205.220 (1973).
[
Footnote 27]
The dissent draws some support for its belief that Rummel's
sentence is unconstitutional by comparing it with punishments
imposed by Texas for crimes other than those committed by Rummel.
Other crimes, of course, implicate other societal interests, making
any such comparison inherently speculative. Embezzlement, dealing
in "hard" drugs, and forgery, to name only three offenses, could be
denominated "property related" offenses, and yet each can be viewed
as an assault on a unique set of societal values as defined by the
political process. The notions embodied in the dissent that, if the
crime involved "violence,"
see post at
445 U. S.
295-296, n. 12, a more severe penalty is warranted under
objective standards simply will not wash, whether it be taken as a
matter of morals, history, or law. Caesar's death at the hands of
Brutus and his fellow conspirators was undoubtedly violent; the
death of Hamlet's father at the hands of his brother, Claudius, by
poison, was not. Yet there are few, if any, States which do not
punish just as severely murder by poison (or attempted murder by
poison) as they do murder or attempted murder by stabbing. The
highly placed executive who embezzles huge sums from a state
savings and loan association, causing many shareholders of limited
means to lose substantial parts of their savings, has committed a
crime very different from a man who takes a smaller amount of money
from the same savings and loan at the point of a gun. Yet rational
people could disagree as to which criminal merits harsher
punishment. By the same token, a State cannot be required to treat
persons who have committed three "minor" offenses less severely
than persons who have committed one or two "more serious" offenses.
If nothing else, the three-time offender's conduct supports
inferences about his ability to conform with social norms that are
quite different from possible inferences about first- or
second-time offenders.
In short, the "seriousness" of an offense or a pattern of
offenses in modern society is not a line, but a plane. Once the
death penalty and other punishments different in kind from fine or
imprisonment have been put to one side, there remains little in the
way of objective standards for judging whether or not a life
sentence imposed under a recidivist statute for several separate
felony convictions not involving "violence" violates the "cruel and
unusual punishment" prohibition of the Eighth Amendment. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter noted for the Court in
Gore v. United
States, 357 U. S. 386,
357 U. S. 393
(1958),
"[w]hatever views may be entertained regarding severity of
punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, .
. . these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy."
[
Footnote 28]
Compare A. Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of
Punishments, Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration
140 (1976); M. Yeager, Do Mandatory Prison Sentences for Handgun
Offenders Curb Violent Crime?, Technical Report for the United
States Conference of Mayors 25-26 (1976);
with E. van den
Haag, Punishing Criminals: Concerning a Very Old and Painful
Question 158-159, 177 (1975).
See generally F. Zimring
& G. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control
234-241, 245-246 (1973).
[
Footnote 29]
Compare R. McKay, It's Time to Rehabilitate the
sentencing Process, An Occasional Paper -- Aspen Institute for
Humanistic Studies 4-5 (1977); Von Hirsch,
supra at
98-104;
with R. Dawson, Sentencing: The Decision as to
Type, Length, and Conditions of Sentence, Report of the American
Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice
in the United States 381, 414 (1969); Yeager,
supra, at
25-26.
See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice, Determinate
Sentencing: Reform or Regression?, Proceedings of the Special
Conference on Determinate Sentencing, June 2-3, 1977.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
I am moved to repeat the substance of what I had to say on
another occasion about the recidivist legislation of Texas:
"If the Constitution gave me a roving commission to impose upon
the criminal courts of Texas my own notions of enlightened policy,
I would not join the Court's opinion. For it is clear to me that
the recidivist procedures adopted in recent years by many other
States . . . are far superior to those utilized [here]. But the
question for decision is not whether we applaud, or even whether we
personally approve, the procedures followed in [this case]. The
question is whether those procedures fall below the minimum level
the [Constitution] will tolerate. Upon that question, I am
constrained to join the opinion and judgment of the Court."
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554,
385 U. S. 569
(concurring opinion).
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
The question in this case is whether petitioner was subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, when he received a mandatory life sentence upon his
conviction for a third property-related
Page 445 U. S. 286
felony. Today, the Court holds that petitioner has not been
punished unconstitutionally. I dissent.
I
The facts are simply stated. In 1964, petitioner was convicted
for the felony of presenting a credit card with intent to defraud
another of approximately $80. In 1969, he was convicted for the
felony of passing a forged check with a face value of $28 36. In
1973, petitioner accepted payment in return for his promise to
repair an air conditioner. The air conditioner was never repaired,
and petitioner was indicted for the felony offense of obtaining
$120.75 under false pretenses. He was also charged with being a
habitual offender. The Texas habitual offender statute provides a
mandatory life sentence for any person convicted of three felonies.
See Tex.Penal Code Ann., Art. 63 (Vernon 1925), as amended
and recodified, Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (1974). Petitioner
was convicted of the third felony and, after the State proved the
existence of the two earlier felony convictions, was sentenced to
mandatory life imprisonment.
After exhausting state remedies, petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Texas. Petitioner contended that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Petitioner did not suggest that the method of punishment
-- life imprisonment -- was constitutionally invalid. Rather, he
argued that the punishment was unconstitutional because it was
disproportionate to the severity of the three felonies. A panel of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit accepted petitioner's
view, 568 F.2d 1193 (1978), but the court en banc vacated that
decision and affirmed the District Court's denial of the writ of
habeas corpus. 587 F.2d 651 (1979).
This Court today affirms the Fifth Circuit's decision. I dissent
because I believe that (i) the penalty for a noncapital offense may
be unconstitutionally disproportionate, (ii) the
Page 445 U. S. 287
possibility of prole should not be considered in assessing the
nature of the punishment, (iii) a mandatory life sentence is
grossly disproportionate as applied to petitioner, and (iv) the
conclusion that this petitioner has suffered a violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights is compatible with principles of judicial
restraint and federalism.
II
A
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments."
That language came from Art. I, § 9, of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, which provided that "excessive bail ought not to be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." The words of the Virginia Declaration were
taken from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
See
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The
Original Meaning, 57 Calif.L.Rev. 839,840 (1969).
Although the legislative history of the Eighth Amendment is not
extensive, we can be certain that the Framers intended to proscribe
inhumane methods of punishment.
See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238,
408 U. S.
319-322 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., concurring); Granucci,
supra, at 839-842. When the Virginia delegates met to
consider the Federal Constitution, for example, Patrick Henry
specifically noted the absence of the provisions contained within
the Virginia Declaration. Henry feared that, without a "cruel and
unusual punishments" clause, Congress "may introduce the practice .
. . of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime." [
Footnote 2/1] Indeed, during debate in the
First Congress on the adoption of the Bill of Rights, one
Congressman objected to adoption of the Eighth Amendment precisely
because "villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their
ears cut off." [
Footnote 2/2]
Page 445 U. S. 288
In two 19th-century cases, the Court considered constitutional
challenges to forms of capital punishment. In
Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U. S. 130,
99 U. S. 135
(1879), the Court held that death by shooting did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court emphasized, however, that
torturous methods of execution, such as burning a live offender,
would violate the Eighth Amendment.
In re Kemmler,
136 U. S. 436
(1890), provided the Court with its second opportunity to review
methods of carrying out a death penalty. That case involved a
constitutional challenge to New York's use of electrocution.
Although the Court did not apply the Eighth Amendment to state
action, it did conclude that electrocution would not deprive the
petitioner of due process of law.
See also Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459,
329 U. S. 464
(1947).
B
The scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause extends
not only to barbarous methods of punishment, but also to
punishments that are grossly disproportionate. Disproportionality
analysis measures the relationship between the nature and number of
offenses committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted
upon the offender. The inquiry focuses on whether a person deserves
such punishment, not simply on whether punishment would serve a
utilitarian goal. A statute that levied a mandatory life sentence
for overtime parking might well deter vehicular lawlessness, but it
would offend our felt sense of justice. The Court concedes today
that the principle of disproportionality plays a role in the review
of sentences imposing the death penalty, but suggests that the
principle may be less applicable when a noncapital sentence is
challenged. Such a limitation finds no support in the history of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The principle of disproportionality is rooted deeply in English
constitutional law. The Magna Carta of 1215 insured that
"[a] free man shall not be [fined] for a trivial offence,
Page 445 U. S. 289
except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a
serious offence he shall be [fined] according to its gravity.
[
Footnote 2/3]"
By 1400, the English common law had embraced the principle, not
always followed in practice, that punishment should not be
excessive either in severity or length. [
Footnote 2/4] One commentator's survey of English law
demonstrates that the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the
English Bill of Rights of 1689
"was, first, an objection to the imposition of punishments which
were unauthorized by statute and outside the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court, and second, a reiteration of the English policy
against disproportionate penalties."
Granucci,
supra at 860.
See Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U. S. 153,
428 U. S. 169
(1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.).
In
Weems v. United States, 217 U.
S. 349 (1910), a public official convicted for
falsifying a public record claimed that he suffered cruel and
unusual punishment when he was sentenced to serve 15 years'
imprisonment in hard labor with chains. [
Footnote 2/5] The sentence also subjected Weems to loss
of civil rights and perpetual surveillance after his release. This
Court agreed that the punishment was cruel and unusual. The Court
was attentive to the methods of the punishment,
id. at
217 U. S.
363-364, but its conclusion did not rest solely upon the
nature of punishment. The Court relied explicitly upon the
Page 445 U. S. 290
relationship between the crime committed and the punishment
imposed:
"Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed
their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending
citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and
believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense."
Id. at
217 U. S.
366-367.
In both capital and noncapital cases this Court has recognized
that the decision in
Weems v. United States "proscribes
punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime."
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651,
430 U. S. 667
(1977);
see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.
S. 678,
437 U. S. 685
(178);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584,
433 U. S. 592
(1977) (opinion of WHITE, J.);
Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at
428 U. S. 171
(opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.);
Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. at
408 U. S. 325
(MARSHALL, J., concurring). [
Footnote
2/6]
In order to resolve the constitutional issue, the
Weems
Court measured the relationship between the punishment and the
offense. The Court noted that Weems had been punished more severely
than persons in the same jurisdiction who committed more serious
crimes, or persons who committed a similar crime in other American
jurisdictions. 217 U.S. at
217 U. S. 381-382. [
Footnote
2/7]
Page 445 U. S. 291
Robinson v. California, 370 U.
S. 660,
370 U. S. 667
(1962), established that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
applies to the States through the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court held that imprisonment for the crime of being
a drug addict was cruel and unusual. The Court based its holding
not upon the method of punishment, but on the nature of the
"crime." Because drug addiction is an illness which may be
contracted involuntarily, the Court said that
"imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a
punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question
cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would
be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a
common cold."
Ibid.
In
Furman v. Georgia, supra, the Court held that the
death penalty may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in some
circumstances. The special relevance of
Furman to this
case lies in the general acceptance by Members of the Court of two
basic principles. First, the Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly
excessive punishment. [
Footnote
2/8] Second, the scope of
Page 445 U. S. 292
the Eighth Amendment is to be measured by "evolving standards of
decency."
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S.
86,
356 U. S. 101
(1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.). [
Footnote 2/9]
In
Coker v. Georgia., supra, this Court held that rape
of an adult woman may not be punished by the death penalty. The
plurality opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE stated that a punishment is
unconstitutionally excessive
"if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment, and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime."
Id. at
433 U. S. 592.
[
Footnote 2/10] The plurality
concluded that the death penalty was a grossly disproportionate
punishment for the crime of rape. The plurality recognized that
"Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should
be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible
extent."
Ibid. To this end, the plurality examined the nature of
the crime and attitudes of state legislatures and sentencing juries
toward use of the death penalty in rape cases. In a separate
opinion, I concurred in the plurality's reasoning that death
ordinarily is disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping
an adult woman.
Id. at
433 U. S. 601.
Nothing in the
Coker analysis suggests that principles of
disproportionality are applicable only
Page 445 U. S. 293
to capital cases. Indeed, the questions posed in
Coker
and this case are the same: whether a punishment that can be
imposed for one offense is grossly disproportionate when imposed
for another.
In sum, a few basic principles emerge from the history of the
Eighth Amendment. Both barbarous forms of punishment and grossly
excessive punishments are cruel and unusual. A sentence may be
excessive if it serves no acceptable social purpose, or is grossly
disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime. The principle of
disproportionality has been acknowledged to apply to both capital
and noncapital sentences.
III
Under Texas law, petitioner has been sentenced to a mandatory
life sentence. Even so, the Court of Appeals rejected the
petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim primarily because it concluded
that the petitioner probably would not serve a life sentence. 587
F.2d at 659 (en banc). In view of goodtime credits available under
the Texas system, the court concluded that Rummel might serve no
more than 10 years.
Ibid. Thus, the Court of Appeals
equated petitioner's sentence to 10 years of imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.
Id. at 660.
It is true that imposition in Texas of a mandatory life sentence
does not necessarily mean that petitioner will spend the rest of
his life behind prison walls. If petitioner attains sufficient
good-time credits, he may be eligible for parole within 10 or 12
years after he begins serving his life sentence. But petitioner
will have no right to early release; he will merely be eligible for
parole. And parole is simply an act of executive grace.
Last Term, in
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,
442 U. S. 1 (1979),
we held that a criminal conviction extinguishes whatever liberty
interest a prisoner has in securing freedom before the end of his
lawful sentence. The Court stated unequivocally that a convicted
person has "no constitutional or
Page 445 U. S. 294
inherent right . . . to be conditionally released before the
expiration of a valid sentence."
Id. at
442 U. S. 7. Of
course, a State may create legitimate expectations that are
entitled to procedural protection under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but Texas has not chosen to create a
cognizable interest in parole. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has held that a Texas prisoner has no constitutionally
enforceable interest in being freed before the expiration of his
sentence.
See Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1018
(1978);
Craft v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, 550
F.2d 1054, 1056 (1977).
A holding that the possibility of parole discounts a prisoner's
sentence for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment would be cruelly
ironic. The combined effect of our holdings under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment would
allow a State to defend an Eighth Amendment claim by contending
that parole is probable even though the prisoner cannot enforce
that expectation. Such an approach is inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment. The Court has never before failed to examine a
prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim because of the speculation that
he might be pardoned before the sentence was carried out.
Recent events in Texas demonstrate that parole remains a matter
of executive grace. In June, 1979, the Governor of Texas refused to
grant parole to 79 of the state prisoners whom the parole board
recommended for release. [
Footnote
2/11] The State's chief executive acted well within his rights
in declining to follow the board, but his actions emphasize the
speculative nature of the Court of Appeals' reasoning. As this case
comes to us, petitioner has been deprived by operation of state law
of his right to freedom from imprisonment for the rest of his life.
We should judge the case accordingly.
Page 445 U. S. 295
IV
The Eighth Amendment commands this Court to enforce the
constitutional limitation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. In discharging this responsibility, we should minimize the
risk of constitutionalizing the personal predilictions of federal
judges by relying upon certain objective factors. Among these are
(i) the nature of the offense,
see Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. at
433 U. S. 598;
id. at
433 U. S. 603
(POWELL, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part); (ii) the sentence imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions,
see id. at
433 U. S.
593-594;
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
428 U. S.
179-180;
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at
217 U. S. 380;
cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at
356 U. S.
102-103; and (iii) the sentence imposed upon other
criminals in the same jurisdiction,
Weems v. United States,
supra at
217 U. S.
380-381.
A
Each of the crimes that underlies the petitioner's conviction as
a habitual offender involves the use of fraud to obtain small sums
of money ranging from $28.36 to $120.75. In total, the three crimes
involved slightly less than $230. None of the crimes involved
injury to one's person, threat of injury to one's person, violence,
the threat of violence, or the use of a weapon. Nor does the
commission of any such crimes ordinarily involve a threat of
violent action against another person or his property. It is
difficult to imagine felonies that pose less danger to the peace
and good order of a civilized society than the three crimes
committed by the petitioner. Indeed, the state legislature's
recodification of its criminal law supports this conclusion. Since
the petitioner was convicted as a habitual offender, the State has
reclassified his third offense, theft by false pretext, as a
misdemeanor. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(d)(3) (Supp. 1980).
[
Footnote 2/12]
Page 445 U. S. 296
B
Apparently, only 12 States have ever enacted habitual offender
statutes imposing mandatory life sentence for the commission of two
or three nonviolent felonies and only 3, Texas, Washington, and
West Virginia, have retained such a statute. [
Footnote 2/13] Thus, three-fourths of the States
that experimented
Page 445 U. S. 297
with the Texas scheme appear to have decided that the imposition
of a mandatory life sentence upon some persons who have committed
three felonies represents excess punishment. Kentucky, for example,
replaced the mandatory life sentence with a more flexible
scheme
"because of a judgment that, under some circumstances, life
imprisonment for an habitual criminal is not justified. An example
would be an offender who has committed three Class D felonies, none
involving injury to person."
Commentary following Criminal Law of Kentucky Annotated, Penal
Code § 532.080, p. 790 (1978). The State of Kansas abolished its
statute mandating a life sentence for the commission of three
felonies after a state legislative commission concluded that
"[t]he legislative policy as expressed in the habitual criminal
law bears no particular resemblance to the enforcement policy of
prosecutors and judges."
Kansas Legislative Council, The Operation of the Kansas Habitual
Criminal Law, Pub. No. 47, p. 4 (1936). In the eight years
following enactment of the Kansas statute, only 96 of the 733
defendants who committed their third felony were sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Id. at 32-33. This statistic strongly
supports the belief that prosecutors and judges thought the
habitual offender statute too severe. [
Footnote 2/14] In Washington,
Page 445 U. S. 298
which retains the Texas rule, the State Supreme Court has
suggested that application of its statute to persons like the
petitioner might constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
See
State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d
932, 937, n. 4,
558 P.2d
236, 240, n. 4 (1976).
More than three-quarters of American jurisdictions have never
adopted a habitual offender statute that would commit the
petitioner to mandatory life imprisonment. The jurisdictions that
currently employ habitual offender statutes either (i) require the
commission of more than three offenses, [
Footnote 2/15] (ii) require the commission of at least
one violent crime, [
Footnote
2/16] (iii) limit a mandatory penalty to less than life,
[
Footnote 2/17] or (iv) grant
discretion to the sentencing authority. [
Footnote 2/18] In none of the
Page 445 U. S. 299
jurisdictions could the petitioner have received a mandatory
life sentence merely upon the showing that he committed three
nonviolent property-related offenses. [
Footnote 2/19]
The federal habitual offender statute also differs materially
from the Texas statute. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3575 provides increased
sentences for "dangerous special offenders" who have been convicted
of a felony. A defendant is a "dangerous special offender" if he
has committed two or more previous felonies, one of them within the
last five years, if the current felony arose from a pattern of
conduct "which constituted a substantial source of his income, and
in which he manifested special skill or expertise," or if the
felony involved a criminal conspiracy in which the defendant played
a supervisory role. § 3575(e). Federal courts may sentence such
persons
"to imprisonment for an appropriate term not to exceed
twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the
maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony.
Page 445 U. S. 300
§ 3575(b). [
Footnote 2/20]
Thus, Congress and an overwhelming number of state legislatures
have not adopted the Texas scheme. These legislative decisions lend
credence to the view that a mandatory life sentence for the
commission of three nonviolent felonies is unconstitutionally
disproportionate. [
Footnote
2/21]"
C
Finally, it is necessary to examine the punishment that Texas
provides for other criminals. First and second offenders who commit
more serious crimes than the petitioner may receive markedly less
severe sentences. The only first-time offender subject to a
mandatory life sentence is a person
Page 445 U. S. 301
convicted of capital murder. Tex.Penal Code §§ 12.31, 19.03
(1974). A person who commits a first-degree felony, including
murder, aggravated kidnaping, or aggravated rape, may be imprisoned
from 5 to 99 years. §§ 19.02, 21.03; 12.32 (1974 and Supp. 1980).
Persons who commit a second-degree felony, including voluntary
manslaughter, rape, or robbery, may be punished with a sentence of
between 2 and 20 years. § 12.33 (1974). A person who commits a
second felony is punished as if he had committed a felony of the
next higher degree. §§ 12.42(a)-(b) (1974). Thus, a person who
rapes twice may receive a 5-year sentence. He also may, but need
not, receive a sentence functionally equivalent to life
imprisonment.
The State argues that these comparisons are not illuminating
because a three-time recidivist may be sentenced more harshly than
a first-time offender. Of course, the State may mandate extra
punishment for a recidivist.
See Oyler v. Boles,
368 U. S. 448
(1962). In Texas, a person convicted twice of the unauthorized use
of a vehicle receives a greater sentence than a person once
convicted for that crime, but he does not receive a sentence as
great as a person who rapes twice.
Compare §§ 12.42(a) and
31.07
with § 12.42(b); § 21.02 (1974 and Supp. 1980). Such
a statutory scheme demonstrates that the state legislature has
attempted to choose a punishment in proportion to the nature and
number of offenses committed.
Texas recognizes when it sentences two-time offenders that the
amount of punishment should vary with the severity of the offenses
committed. But all three-time felons receive the same sentence. In
my view, imposition of the same punishment upon persons who have
committed completely different types of crimes raises serious
doubts about the proportionality of the sentence applied to the
least harmful offender. Of course, the Constitution does not bar
mandatory sentences. I merely note that the operation of the Texas
habitual offender system raises a further question about the extent
to which a
Page 445 U. S. 302
mandatory life sentence, no doubt a suitable sentence for a
person who has committed three violent crimes, also is a
proportionate punishment for a person who has committed the three
crimes involved in this case.
D
Examination of the objective factors traditionally employed by
the Court to assess the proportionality of a sentence demonstrates
that petitioner suffers a cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner
has been sentenced to the penultimate criminal penalty because he
committed three offenses defrauding others of about $230. The
nature of the crimes does not suggest that petitioner ever engaged
in conduct that threatened another's person, involved a trespass,
or endangered in any way the peace of society. A comparison of the
sentence petitioner received with the sentences provided by
habitual offender statutes of other American jurisdictions
demonstrates that only two other States authorize the same
punishment. A comparison of petitioner to other criminals sentenced
in Texas shows that he has been punished for three property-related
offenses with a harsher sentence than that given first-time
offenders or two-time offenders convicted of far more serious
offenses. The Texas system assumes that all three-time offenders
deserve the same punishment whether they commit three murders or
cash three fraudulent checks.
The petitioner has committed criminal acts for which he may be
punished. He has been given a sentence that is not inherently
barbarous. But the relationship between the criminal acts and the
sentence is grossly disproportionate. For having defrauded others
of about $230, the State of Texas has deprived petitioner of his
freedom for the rest of his life. The State has not attempted to
justify the sentence as necessary either to deter other persons or
to isolate a potentially violent individual. Nor has petitioner's
status as a habitual offender been shown to justify a mandatory
life sentence. My view, informed by examination of the "objective
indicia
Page 445 U. S. 303
that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction,"
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
428 U. S. 173,
is that this punishment violates the principle of proportionality
contained within the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
V
The Court today agrees with the State's arguments that a
decision in petitioner's favor would violate principles of
federalism, and, because of difficulty in formulating standards to
guide the decision of the federal courts, would lead to excessive
interference with state sentencing decisions. Neither contention is
convincing.
Each State has sovereign responsibilities to promulgate and
enforce its criminal law. In our federal system, we should never
forget that the Constitution
"recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the
States -- independence in their legislative and independence in
their judicial departments."
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64,
304 U. S. 78-79
(1938), quoting
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh,
149 U. S. 368,
149 U. S. 401
(1893) (Field, J., dissenting). But even as the Constitution
recognizes a sphere of state activity free from federal
interference, it explicitly compels the States to follow certain
constitutional commands. When we apply the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause against the States, we merely enforce an
obligation that the Constitution has created. As MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST has stated,
"[c]ourts are exercising no more than the judicial function
conferred upon them by Art. III of the Constitution when they
assess, in a case before them, whether or not a particular
legislative enactment is within the authority granted by the
Constitution to the enacting body, and whether it runs afoul of
some limitation placed by the Constitution on the authority of that
body."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at
408 U. S. 466
(dissenting opinion).
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
at
217 U. S.
379.
Because the State believes that the federal courts can formulate
no practicable standard to identify grossly disproportionate
Page 445 U. S. 304
sentences, it fears that the courts would intervene into state
criminal justice systems at will. Such a "floodgates" argument can
be easy to make, and difficult to rebut. But in this case, we can
identify and apply objective criteria that reflect constitutional
standards of punishment and minimize the risk of judicial
subjectivity. Moreover, we can rely upon the experience of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in applying
criteria similar to those that I believe should govern this
case.
In 1974, the Fourth Circuit considered the claim of a West
Virginia prisoner who alleged that the imposition of a mandatory
life sentence for three nonviolent crimes violated the Eighth
Amendment. In
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974), the court held that the
mandatory sentence was unconstitutional as applied to the prisoner.
The court noted that none of the offenses involved violence or the
danger of violence, that only a few States would apply such a
sentence, and that West Virginia gave less severe sentences to
first- and second-time offenders who committed more serious
offenses. The holding in
Hart v. Coiner is the holding
that the State contends will undercut the ability of the States to
exercise independent sentencing authority. Yet the Fourth Circuit
subsequently has found only twice that noncapital sentences violate
the Eighth Amendment. In
Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153
(1979) (en banc), the court held that a 40-year sentence for
possession and distribution of less than nine ounces of marihuana
was cruel and unusual. In
Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168
(1976), the court held that a person could not receive a longer
sentence for a lesser included offense (assault) than he could have
received for the greater offense (assault with intent to murder).
[
Footnote 2/22]
Page 445 U. S. 305
More significant are those cases in which the Fourth Circuit
held that the principles of
Hart v. Coiner were
inapplicable. In a case decided the same day as
Hart v.
Coiner, the Court of Appeals held that a 10-year sentence
given for two obscene telephone calls did not violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. The court stated that
"[w]hatever may be our subjective view of the matter, we fail to
discern here objective factors establishing disproportionality in
violation of the eighth amendment."
Wood v. South Carolina, 483 F.2d 149, 150 (1973). In
Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (1975), the court refused
to hold that the West Virginia statute was unconstitutionally
applied to a person who had been convicted of breaking and entering
a gasoline and grocery store, burglary of a residence, and grand
larceny. The court distinguished
Hart v. Coiner on the
ground that Griffin's offenses "clearly involve the potentiality of
violence and danger to life as well as property." 517 F.2d at 757.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit turned aside an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the imposition of a 10- to 20-year sentence for
statutory rape of a 13-year-old female.
Hall v. McKenzie,
537 F.2d 1232, 1235-1236 (1976). The court emphasized that the
sentence was less severe than a mandatory life sentence, that the
petitioner would have received a similar sentence in 17 other
American jurisdictions, and that the crime involved violation of
personal integrity and the potential of physical injury. The Fourth
Circuit also has rejected Eighth Amendment challenges brought by
persons sentenced to 12 years for possession and distribution of
heroin,
United States v. Atkinson, 513 F.2d 38, 42 (1975),
2 years for unlawful possession of a firearm,
United States v.
Wooten, 503 F.2d 65, 67 (1974), 15 years for assault with
intent to commit murder,
Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172
(1972), and 40 years for kidnaping,
United States v.
Martell, 335 F.2d 764 (1964). [
Footnote 2/23]
Page 445 U. S. 306
I do not suggest that each of the decisions in which the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied
Hart v. Coiner
is necessarily correct. But I do believe that the body of Eighth
Amendment law that has developed in that Circuit constitutes
impressive empirical evidence that the federal courts are capable
of applying the Eighth Amendment to disproportionate noncapital
sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to principles of
federalism and state autonomy. [
Footnote 2/24]
VI
I recognize that the difference between the petitioners grossly
disproportionate sentence and other prisoners' constitutionally
valid sentences is not separated by the clear distinction that
separates capital from noncapital punishment. "But the fact that a
line has to be drawn somewhere does not justify its being drawn
anywhere."
Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.
S. 543,
315 U. S. 558
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
Page 445 U. S. 307
Court has, in my view, chosen the easiest line, rather than the
best. [
Footnote 2/25]
It is also true that this Court has not heretofore invalidated a
mandatory life sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Yet our
precedents establish that the duty to review the disproportionality
of sentences extends to noncapital cases.
Supra at
445 U. S.
289-293. The reach of the Eighth Amendment cannot be
restricted only to those claims previously adjudicated under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
particularly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.'"
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at
217 U. S.
373.
We are construing a living Constitution. The sentence imposed
upon the petitioner would be viewed as grossly unjust by virtually
every layman and lawyer. In my view, objective criteria clearly
establish that a mandatory life sentence for defrauding persons of
about $230 crosses any rationally drawn line separating punishment
that lawfully may be imposed from that which is proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment. I would reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
[
Footnote 2/1]
3 J Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 447-448
(187).
[
Footnote 2/2]
1 Annals of Cong. 754 (1789) (Rep. Livermore).
[
Footnote 2/3]
J. Holt, Magna Carta 323 (1965).
[
Footnote 2/4]
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959).
[
Footnote 2/5]
The principle that grossly disproportionate sentences violate
the Eighth Amendment was first enunciated in this Court by Mr.
Justice Field in
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.
S. 323 (1892). In that case, a defendant convicted of
307 offenses for selling alcoholic beverages in Vermont had been
sentenced to more than 54 years in prison. The Court did not reach
the question whether the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment,
because the issue had not been raised properly and because the
Eighth Amendment had yet to be applied against the States.
Id. at
144 U. S.
331-332. But Mr. Justice Field dissented, asserting that
the "cruel and unusual punishment" Clause was directed "against all
punishments which, by their excessive length or severity, are
greatly disproportioned to the offences charged."
Id. at
144 U. S.
339-340.
[
Footnote 2/6]
See also Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses,
Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L.J.
1325, 1377 (1979); Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of
Imprisonment, 79 Colum.L.Rev. 1119 (1979).
[
Footnote 2/7]
The Court notes that
Graham v. West Virginia,
224 U. S. 616,
224 U. S. 631
(1912), rejected an Eighth Amendment claim brought by a person
sentenced under the West Virginia statute to mandatory life
imprisonment for the commission of three felonies. But the
Graham Court's entire discussion of that claim consists of
one sentence: "Nor can it be maintained that cruel and unusual
punishment has been inflicted." The Court then cited six cases in
support of its statement. The first case was
In re
Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436,
136 U. S.
448-449 (1890), in which the Court declined to apply the
Eighth Amendment against state action. The
Graham opinion
also cited
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S.
86,
212 U. S. 111
(1909), in which the Court recognized that no claim was made that
the Eighth Amendment controlled state action, and stated that
"[w]e can only interfere with such legislation and judicial
action of the States enforcing it if the fines imposed are so
grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law."
The Eighth Amendment was not applied as a prohibition on state
action until this Court's decision in
Robinson v.
California, 370 U. S. 660,
370 U. S. 667
(1962). A one-sentence holding in a preincorporation decision is
hardly relevant to the determination of the case before us
today.
Badders v. United States, 240 U.
S. 391 (1916), also adds "little to our knowledge of the
scope of the cruel and unusual language."
Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U. S. 238,
408 U. S. 325
(1972) (MARSHALL, J., concurring). In
Badders, this Court
rejected a claim that concurrent 5-year sentences and a $7,000 fine
for seven counts of mail fraud violated the Eighth Amendment. 240
U.S. at
240 U. S. 394.
Badders merely teaches that the Court did not believe that
a 5-year sentence for the commission of seven crimes was cruel and
unusual.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at
408 U. S. 280
(BRENNAN, J., concurring);
id. at
408 U. S. 312
(WHITE, J., concurring);
id. at
408 U. S.
331-332 (MARSHALL, J., concurring);
id. at
408 U. S.
457-458 (POWELL, J., dissenting, joined by BURGER, C.J.,
and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ.).
[
Footnote 2/9]
Id. at
408 U. S. 266
(BRENNAN, J., concurring);
id. at
408 U. S. 329
(MARSHALL, J., concurring);
id. at
408 U. S. 382
(BURGER, C.J., dissenting, joined by BLACKMUN, POWELL, and
REHNQUIST, JJ.);
id. at
408 U. S. 409
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id. at
408 U. S. 420
(POWELL, J., dissenting, joined by BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN and
REHNQUIST, JJ).
[
Footnote 2/10]
The
Coker standard derived from the joint opinion in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
428 U. S. 173
(1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), which stated
that
"the inquiry into 'excessiveness' has two aspects. First, the
punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain. . . . Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime."
[
Footnote 2/11]
Austin American-Statesman, Sept. 23, 1979, p. A1, col. 4. The
newspaper reported that, in a 6-month period including June, 1979,
the Governor rejected 33% of the parole board recommendations that
prisoners be released.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/12]
The Court suggests that an inquiry into the nature of the
offense at issue in this case inevitably involves identifying
subjective distinctions beyond the province of the judiciary.
Ante at
445 U. S.
275-276. Yet the distinction between forging a check for
$28 and committing a violent crime or one that threatens violence
is surely no more difficult for the judiciary to perceive than the
distinction between the gravity of murder and rape.
See Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584,
433 U. S. 598
(1977);
id. at
433 U. S. 603
(POWELL, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part). I do not suggest that all criminal acts may be separated
into precisely identifiable compartments. A professional seller of
addictive drugs may inflict greater bodily harm upon members of
society than the person who commits a single assault. But the
difficulties of line-drawing that might be presented in other cases
need not obscure our vision here.
[
Footnote 2/13]
The nine States that previously enforced such laws include: (1)
California, 1927 Cal.Stats., ch. 634, § 1, P. 1066, repealed, 1935
Cal.Stats., ch. 602-603, p. 1699; ch. 754, § 1, p. 2121.
See Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 667.5 (West Supp. 1979)
(Habitual offender statute allows no more than three years'
additional sentence for the commission of a previous felony). (2)
Indiana, 1907 Ind. Acts, ch. 82, § 1, p. 109, repealed, 1977
Ind.Acts No. 340, § 121, p. 1594.
See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8
(SUPP. 1979) (30 years' additional sentence upon the conviction of
a third felony). (3) Kansas, 1927 Kan.Sess.Laws, ch.191, § 1, p.
247, repealed, 1939 Kan.Sess.Laws, ch. 178, § 1, p. 299.
See 1978 Kan.Sess.Laws, ch. 120, § 4(2) (up to the treble
maximum penalty may be given upon the commission of the third
felony). (4) Kentucky, 1893 Ky.Acts, ch. 182, Art. I, § 4, p. 757,
repealed, 1974 Ky.Acts, ch. 406, § 280, p. 873.
See
Ky.Rev.Stat. § 532.080 (Supp. 1978) (A persistent felony offender
may receive a discretionary life sentence upon the conviction of a
Class A or B felony). (5) Massachusetts, 1818 Mass.Acts, ch. 176,
§§ 5-6, p. 603, repealed, 1833 Mass.Acts, ch. 85, p. 618.
See Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 279, § 25 (West 1972) (A
person convicted of three specified felonies receives the maximum
penalty provided for the third offense). (6) New York, 1796
N.Y.Laws, ch. 30, p. 669, repealed, 1881 N.Y.Laws, ch. 676, §§
688-690, p. 181.
See N.Y.Penal Code §§ 70.04, 70.06-70.10
(McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1979-1980) (mandatory life imprisonment
upon the conviction for a third violent felony). (7) Ohio, 1885
Ohio Leg.Acts, No. 751, § 2, p. 236, repealed, 1929 Ohio Leg.Acts,
No. 8, §§ 1-2, p. 40.
See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §§ 2929.01,
2929.11, 2929.12 (Supp. 1979) (no mandatory habitual offender
penalties). (8) Oregon, 1921 Ore.Laws, ch. 70, § 1, p. 97,
repealed, 1927 Ore.Laws, ch. 334, §§ 1-3, p. 432.
See
Ore.Rev.Stat. §§ 161.725, 166.230 (1977) (life sentence upon
conviction of fourth armed felony or attempted felony). (9)
Virginia, 1848 Va. Acts, ch.199, § 26, p. 752, repealed, 1916 Va.
Acts, chs. 29-30, pp. 34-35.
See 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 411
(no habitual offender statute).
In addition to Texas, Washington,
see Wash.Rev.Code §
9.92.090 (1976), and West Virginia,
see W.Va.Code § 61
-11-18 (1977), continue to provide mandatory life imprisonment upon
the commission of a third nonviolent felony.
[
Footnote 2/14]
See Note, "The Kansas Habitual Criminal Act," 9
Washburn L.J. 244, 247-250 (1970);
see also State v.
Lee, 87 Wash. 2d
932, 940-942,
558 P.2d
236, 241-242 (1976) (Rosellini, J., dissenting);
State v.
Thomas, 16 Wash. App. 1, 13-15, 553 P.2d 1357, 1365-1366
(1976); Commentary following Criminal Law of Kentucky Annotated,
Penal Code § 532.080, p. 790 (1978).
[
Footnote 2/15]
Four States impose a mandatory life sentence upon the commission
of a fourth felony.
See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-13-101(2)
(1978); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 207.010(2) (1977); S.D. Comp.Laws Ann. §§
22-6-1, 22-7-8 (1979); Wyo.Stat. § 6-1-110 (1977). Thus, even if
the line between these States and Texas, West Virginia, and
Washington, is "subtle rather than gross,"
ante at
445 U. S. 279,
the most that one can say is that 7 of the 50 States punish the
commission of four or fewer felonies with a mandatory life
sentence.
[
Footnote 2/16]
See, e.g., Del.Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 4214, 4215 (1975
and Supp. 1978) (mandatory life sentence for one who has committed
two felonies and commits a third specified felony involving
violence or the threat of violence); Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83
(Supp. 1979) (mandatory life sentence for one who commits three
felonies, at least one of which is violent).
[
Footnote 2/17]
See, e.g., N.M.Stat.Ann. § 31-18-17 (Supp. 1979)
(Persons who have committed two felonies punishable by at least one
year in prison receive four years' additional sentence upon the
commission of a third felony and eight years upon the commission of
a fourth felony); Wis.Stat. § 939.62 (1977) (Persons who have
committed one felony within 5 years may be sentenced to 10 years'
additional sentence upon the commission of an offense punishable by
a term greater than 10 years).
[
Footnote 2/18]
See, e.g., D.C.Code § 22-104a (1973) (Persons who
commit three felonies may be sentenced to life); Idaho Code §
19-2514 (1979) (Persons who have committed three felonies may
receive a sentence ranging from five years to life). Statutes that
permit the imposition of a discretionary life sentence for the
commission of three felonies are fundamentally different from the
statute under review in this case. In a discretionary jurisdiction,
the question at sentencing is whether a three-time felon has
engaged in behavior other than the commission of three felonies
that justifies the imposition of the maximum permissible sentence.
In such a jurisdiction, therefore, other evidence of dangerousness
may justify imposition of a life sentence. In Texas, a person
receives a mandatory life sentence merely because he is a
three-time felon.
[
Footnote 2/19]
A State's choice of a sentence will, of course, never be
unconstitutional simply because the penalty is harsher than the
sentence imposed by other States for the same crime. Such a rule
would be inconsistent with principles of federalism. The Eighth
Amendment prohibits grossly disproportionate punishment, but it
does not require local sentencing decisions to be controlled by
majority vote of the States. Nevertheless, a comparison of the
Texas standard with the sentencing statutes of other States is one
method of "assess[ing] contemporary values concerning the
infliction of a challenged sanction."
Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. at
428 U. S. 173
(opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). The relevant
objective factors should be considered together and, although the
weight assigned to each may vary, no single factor will ever be
controlling.
[
Footnote 2/20]
The proportionality principle was incorporated into the bill
after the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony that a
sentencing authority considering the punishment due a dangerous
special offender should
"examine each substantive offense and make some determination
based upon the gravity of that offense as to the ultimate maximum
which seems to be wise."
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
205 (1969) (testimony of Professor Peter W. Low of the University
of Virginia School of Law).
See Katkin, Habitual Offender
Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 Buffalo L.Rev. 99, 118 (1972).
[
Footnote 2/21]
The American Law Institute proposes that a felon be sentenced to
an extended term of punishment only if he is a persistent offender,
professional criminal, dangerous mentally abnormal person whose
extended commitment is necessary for the protection of the public,
or "a multiple offender whose criminality was so extensive that a
sentence of imprisonment for an extended term is warranted." ALI,
Model Penal Code § 7.03 (Prop.Off.Draft 1962). The term for a
multiple offender may not exceed the longest sentences of
imprisonment authorized for each of the offender's crimes if they
ran consecutively.
Ibid. ,Under this proposal the
petitioner could have been sentenced up to 25 years.
Ante
at
445 U. S.
269.
The American Bar Association has proposed that habitual
offenders be sentenced to no more than 25 years, and that "[a]ny
increased term which can be imposed because of prior criminality
should be related in severity to the sentence otherwise provided
for the new offense." The choice of sentence would be left to the
discretion of the sentencing court. ABA Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.3
(App. Draft 1968).
[
Footnote 2/22]
In
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (1970), the Fourth
Circuit also applied the Eighth Amendment to hold that rape may not
be punished by death. This Court reached the same result seven
years later in
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.
S. 584 (1977).
[
Footnote 2/23]
The Fourth Circuit also has held that a sentence of eight years
for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, given to a felon
previously convicted of manslaughter and breaking and entering, was
not disproportionate under 18 U.S.C. § 3575.
United States v.
Williamson, 567 F.2d 610, 616 (1977).
See 445
U.S. 263fn2/20|>n. 20,
supra, and accompanying
text.
[
Footnote 2/24]
The District Courts in the Fourth Circuit also have applied the
Eighth Amendment carefully. Although one District Court has held
that a sentence of 48 years for safecracking is constitutionally
disproportionate,
see Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F.
Supp. 376 (WDNC 1978), other District Courts have found no
constitutional infirmity in the disenfranchisement of convicted
persons,
Thiess v. State Board, 387 F.
Supp. 1038, 1042 (Md.1974) (three-judge court), a 5-year
sentence for distributing marihuana,
Queen v.
Leeke, 457 F.
Supp. 476 (SC 1978), and a 5-year sentence for possession of
marihuana with intent to distribute that was suspended for 20 years
on condition of payment of a $1,500 fine and nine months in jail.
Wolkind v. Selph, 473 F.
Supp. 675 (ED Va.1979.)
Supreme Courts in two States within the Fourth Circuit have
upheld as constitutional a 20-year sentence for a person convicted
of burglary who had a prior conviction for armed robbery,
Martin v. Leverette, ___ W.Va. ,
244
S.E.2d 39, 43-44 (1978), and a life sentence for murder,
Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 420,
215 S.E.2d
883, 884 (1975).
[
Footnote 2/25]
The Court concedes, as it must, that a mandatory life sentence
may be constitutionally disproportionate to the severity of an
offense.
Ante at
445 U. S. 274,
n. 11. Yet its opinion suggests no basis in principle for
distinguishing between permissible and grossly disproportionate
life imprisonment.