Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
U.S. Supreme CourtWeems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
Weems v. United States
Argued November 30
December 1, 1909
Decided May 2,19I0
217 U.S. 349
A paramount governmental authority may make use of subordinate governmental instruments without the creation of a distinct legal entity, as is the case of the United States and the United States Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the Philippine Criminal Code of Procedure, a public offense need not necessarily be described in the information in exact words of the statute, but only in ordinary and concise language, so as to enable a person of common understanding to understand the charge and the court to pronounce judgment.
A charge describing the accused as a public official of the United States Government of the Philippine Islands and his offense as falsifying a public and official document in this case held sufficient. Carrington v. United States, 208 U. S. 1, distinguished.
The provision in Rule 35 that this court may, at its option, notice a plain error not assigned is not a rigid rule controlled by precedent, but confers a discretion exercisable at any time, regardless of what may have been done at other times; the court has less reluctance to disregard prior examples in criminal, than in civil, cases, and will act under the Rule when rights constitutional in nature or secured under a bill of rights are asserted.
Although not raised in the courts below, this court will, under Rule 35, consider an assignment of error made for the first time in this court that a sentence is cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution or of the similar provision in the Philippine bill of rights.
In interpreting the Eighth Amendment, it will be regarded as a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.
A provision of the Philippine bill of rights taken from the Constitution of the United States must have the same meaning, and so held that the provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments must be interpreted as the Eighth Amendment has been.
What constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment has not been exactly defined, and no case as heretofore occurred in this court calling for an exhaustive definition.
While legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted to remedy existing evils, its general language is not necessarily so confined, and it may be capable of wider application than to the mischief giving it birth.
The Eighth Amendment is progressive, and does not prohibit merely the cruel and unusual punishments known in 1689 and 1787, but may acquire wider meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice, and a similar provision in the Philippine bill of rights applies to long-continued imprisonment with accessories disproportionate to the offense.
While the judiciary may not oppose its power to that of the legislature in defining crimes and their punishment as to expediency, it is the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature has contravened a constitutional prohibition and in that respect, and, for that purpose, the power of the judiciary is superior to that of the legislature.
It is within the power of this court to declare a statute of the Penal Code defining a crime and fixing its punishment void as violative of the provision in the Philippine bill of rights prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.
In determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual as fixed by the Philippine Commission, this court will consider the punishment of the same or similar crimes in other parts of the United States, as exhibiting the difference between power unrestrained and that exercised under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice.
Where the statute unites all the penalties, the court cannot separate them, even if separable, unless it is clear that the union was not made imperative by the legislature; and, in this case, held that the penalties of cadena temporal, principal and accessories, under art. 56 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, are not independent of each other.
Where the minimum sentence which the court might impose is cruel and unusual within the prohibition of a bill of rights, the fault is in the law, and not in the sentence, and if there is no other law under which sentence can be imposed, it is the duty of the court to declare the law void.
Where sentence cannot be imposed under any law except that declared unconstitutional or void, the case cannot be remanded for new sentence, but the judgment must be reversed with directions to dismiss the proceedings.
In this case, the court declared § 56 of the Penal Code of the Philippine
Islands, and a sentence pronounced thereunder, void as violating the provision in the Philippine bill of rights contained in 5 of the act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, against the imposition of excessive fines and the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, insofar as being prescribed for an offense by an officer of the Government of making false entries in public records as to payments of 616 pesos, the punishment being a fine of 4,000 pesos and cadena temporal of over twelve years with accessories, such accessories including the carrying of chains, deprivation of civil rights during imprisonment, and thereafter perpetual disqualification to enjoy political rights, hold office, etc., and subjection besides to surveillance.
The history of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and cases involving constitutional prohibitions against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment reviewed and discussed in the opinion of the court and the dissenting opinion.
The facts, which involve the legality of § 56 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, and a sentence thereunder, under the guarantees against cruel and unusual punishments of the bill of rights of the Philippine Islands as expressed in the act of July 1, 1902, are stated in the opinion.