Petitioners, which provide data processing services to
businesses generally, challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the
Currency permitting national banks, such as respondent bank, as an
incident to their banking services, to make data processing
services available to other banks and bank customers. The District
Court dismissed the complaint, holding that petitioners lacked
standing to bring the suit, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. Petitioners have standing to maintain the action. Pp.
397 U. S.
151-156, 157.
(a) Petitioners satisfy the "case" or "controversy" test of
Article III of the Constitution, as they allege that the banks'
competition causes them economic injury. Pp.
397 U. S.
152-153.
(b) The interest sought to be protected by petitioners is
arguably within the one of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute, and petitioners are "aggrieved" persons under § 702
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Pp.
397 U. S.
153-156,
397 U. S.
157.
2. Congress did not preclude judicial review of the Comptrollers
rulings as to the scope of activities statutorily available to
national banks. Pp.
397 U. S.
156-157.
406 F.2d 37, reversed and remanded.
Page 397 U. S. 151
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners sell data processing services to businesses
generally. In this suit, they seek to challenge a ruling by
respondent Comptroller of the Currency that, as an incident to
their banking services, national banks, including respondent
American National Bank & Trust Company, may make data
processing services available to other banks and to bank customers.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing of
petitioners to bring the suit.
279 F.
Supp. 675. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 406 F.2d 837. The
case is here on a petition for writ of certiorari, which we
granted. 395 U.S. 976.
Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as
such. One generalization is, however, necessary, and that is that
the question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered
in the framework of Article III, which restricts judicial power to
"cases" and "controversies." As we recently stated in
Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83
101,
"[I]n terms of Article III limitations on federal court
jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether
the dispute sought to be
Page 397 U. S. 152
adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."
Flast was a
taxpayer's suit. The present is a
competitor's suit. And while the two have the same Article
III starting point, they do not necessarily track one another.
The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise. There can be no doubt but that petitioners have
satisfied this test. The petitioners not only allege that
competition by national banks in the business of providing data
processing services might entail some future loss of profits for
the petitioners, they also allege that respondent American National
Bank & Trust Company was performing or preparing to perform
such services for two customers for whom petitioner Data Systems,
Inc., had previously agreed or negotiated to perform such services.
The petitioners' suit was brought not only against the American
National Bank & Trust Company, but also against the Comptroller
of the Currency. The Comptroller was alleged to have caused
petitioners injury in fact by his 1966 ruling, which stated:
"Incidental to its banking services, a national bank may make
available its data processing equipment or perform data processing
services on such equipment for other banks and bank customers."
Comptroller's Manual for National Banks � 3500 (October 15,
1966).
The Court of Appeals viewed the matter differently, stating:
"[A] plaintiff may challenge alleged illegal competition when as
complainant it pursues (1) a legal interest by reason of public
charter or contract, . . .
Page 397 U. S. 153
(2) a legal interest by reason of statutory protection, . . . or
(3) a 'public interest' in which Congress has recognized the need
for review of administrative action and plaintiff is significantly
involved to have standing to represent the public. . . ."
406 F.2d at 842-843. [
Footnote
1]
Those tests were based on prior decisions of this Court, such as
Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.
S. 118, where private power companies sought to enjoin
TVA from operating, claiming that the statutory plan under which it
was created was unconstitutional. The Court denied the competitors'
standing, holding that they did not have that status
"unless the right invaded is a legal right, -- one of property,
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege."
Id. at
306 U. S.
137-138.
The "legal interest" test goes to the merits. The question of
standing is different. It concerns, apart from the "case" or
"controversy" test, the question whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question. Thus, the Administrative
Procedure Act grants standing to a person "aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. §
702
Page 397 U. S. 154
(1964 ed., Supp. IV). That interest, at times, may reflect
"aesthetic, conservational, and recreational," as well as economic,
values.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 616;
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 334-340, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-1006. A
person or a family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment
values sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203. We
mention these noneconomic values to emphasize that standing may
stem from them as well as from the economic injury on which
petitioners rely here. Certainly he who is "likely to be
financially" injured,
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U. S. 470,
309 U. S. 477,
may be a reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues
of the public interest in the present case.
Apart from Article III jurisdictional questions, problems of
standing. as resolved by this Court for its own governance, have
involved a "rule of self-restraint."
Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U. S. 249,
346 U. S. 255.
Congress can, of course, resolve the question one way or another,
save as the requirements of Article III dictate otherwise.
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.
S. 346.
Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of
the class of people who may protest administrative action. The
whole drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved "persons" is
symptomatic of that trend. In a closely analogous case, we held
that an existing entrepreneur had standing to challenge the
legality of the entrance of a newcomer into the business, because
the established business was allegedly protected by a valid city
ordinance that protected it from unlawful competition.
Chicago v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. R. Co.,
Page 397 U. S. 155
357 U. S. 77,
357 U. S. 83-84.
In that tradition was
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,
390 U. S. 1, which
involved a section of the TVA Act designed primarily to protect,
through area limitations, private utilities against TVA
competition. We held that no explicit statutory provision was
necessary to confer standing, since the private utility bringing
suit was within the class of persons that the statutory provision
was designed to protect.
It is argued that the
Chicago case and the
Hardin case are relevant here because of § 4 of the Bank
Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U.S.C. § 1864,
which provides:
"No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other
than the performance of bank services for banks."
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in
Arnold
Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1153, that, by reason of §
4, a data processing company has standing to contest the legality
of a national bank performing data processing services for other
banks and bank customers:
"Section 4 had a broader purpose than regulating only the
service corporations. It was also a response to the fears expressed
by a few senators that, without such a prohibition, the bill would
have enabled 'banks to engage in a nonbanking activity,' S.Rep. No.
2105, [87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-12] (Supplemental views of Senators
Proxmire, Douglas, and Newberger), and thus constitute 'a serious
exception to the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks
to banking.' (Supplemental views of Senators Muskie and Clark). We
think Congress has provided the sufficient statutory aid to
standing even though the competition may not be the precise kind
Congress legislated against. "
Page 397 U. S. 156
We do not put the issue in those words, for they implicate the
merits. We do think, however, that § 4 arguably brings a competitor
within the zone of interests protected by it.
That leaves the remaining question, whether judicial review of
the Comptroller's action has been precluded. We do not think it has
been. There is great contrariety among administrative agencies
created by Congress as respects "the extent to which, and the
procedures by which, different measures of control afford judicial
review of administrative action."
Stark v. Wickard,
321 U. S. 288,
321 U. S. 312
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The answer, of course, depends on
the particular enactment under which review is sought. It turns on
"the existence of courts and the intent of Congress as deduced from
the statutes and precedents."
Id. at
321 U. S.
308.
The Administrative Procedure Act provides that the provisions of
the Act authorizing judicial review apply "except to the extent
that -- (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1964
ed., Supp. IV).
In
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S.
48,
349 U. S. 51, we
referred to "the generous review provisions" of that Act, and, in
that case, as well as in others, (
see Rusk v. Cort,
369 U. S. 367,
369 U. S.
379-380) we have construed that Act not grudgingly, but
as serving a broadly remedial purpose.
We read § 701(a) as sympathetic to the issue presented in this
case. As stated in the House Report:
"The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory when they
relate to administrative agencies, any more than in other cases. To
preclude judicial review under this bill, a statute, if not
specific in withholding such review, must, upon its face, give
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it.
Page 397 U. S. 157
The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial
review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review."
H.R.Rep. No.1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 41.
There is no presumption against judicial review and in favor of
administrative absolutism (
see Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U. S. 136,
387 U. S.
140), unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme.
Cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation
Board, 320 U. S. 297.
We find no evidence that Congress, in either the Bank Service
Corporation Act or the National Bank Act, [
Footnote 2] sought to preclude judicial review of
administrative rulings by the Comptroller as to the legitimate
scope of activities available to national banks under those
statutes. Both Acts are clearly "relevant" statutes within the
meaning of § 702. The Acts do not, in terms, protect a specified
group. But their general policy is apparent, and those whose
interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation
of the Acts are easily identifiable. It is clear that petitioners,
as competitors of national banks which are engaging in data
processing services, are within that class of "aggrieved" persons
who, under § 702, are entitled to judicial review of "agency
action."
Page 397 U. S. 158
Whether anything in the Bank Service Corporation Act or the
National Bank Act gives petitioners a "legal interest" that
protects them against violations of those Acts, and whether the
actions of respondents did in fact, violate either of those Acts,
are questions which go to the merits, and remain to be decided
below.
We hold that petitioners have standing to sue, and that the case
should be remanded for a hearing on the merits.
Reversed and remanded.
[For opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN,
see post, p.
397 U. S.
167.]
[
Footnote 1]
The first two tests applied by the Court of Appeals required a
showing of a "legal interest." But the existence or nonexistence of
a "legal interest" is a matter quite distinct from the problem of
standing.
Barlow v. Collins, post, p.
397 U. S. 159. The
third test mentioned by the Court of Appeals, which rests on an
explicit provision in a regulatory statute conferring standing, and
is commonly referred to in terms of allowing suits by "private
attorneys general," is inapplicable to the present case.
See
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.
S. 470;
Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694,
vacated on suggestion of mootness, 320 U.S.
707.
[
Footnote 2]
Petitioners allege that the Comptroller's ruling violates the
National Bank Act, Rev.Stat. § 5136, 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh, which
provides that national banks have power to exercise "all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking."
We intimate no view, under the decisions rendered today here and
in
Barlow v. Collins, supra, on the issue of standing
involved in No. 835,
National Association of Securities Dealers
v. SEC, and No. 843,
Investment Company Institute v.
Camp, now pending on petitions for writs of certiorari.