Appellants, who are engaged in the business of growing, packing
and marketing Florida avocados in interstate commerce, sued in a
Federal District Court to enjoin appellees, state officers of
California, from enforcing § 792 of the California Agricultural
Code, which prohibits the transportation or sale in California of
avocados containing less than 8% of oil by weight, against Florida
avocados certified as mature under federal regulations issued under
the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. They
contended that § 792 of the California statute, as so applied, was
unconstitutional, because, (1) under the Supremacy Clause, it must
be deemed displaced by the federal standard for determining the
maturity of avocados grown in Florida; (2) its application to
Florida avocados denied appellants the equal protection of the laws
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (3) its application
to them unreasonably burdened or discriminated against interstate
marketing of Florida avocados in violation of the Commerce Clause.
A three-judge District Court convened to hear the case denied an
injunction on the ground that the proofs did not establish that
application of § 792 to Florida avocados violated any provision of
the Federal Constitution.
Held:
1. Section 792 is not invalid under the Supremacy Clause,
because there is neither such actual conflict between the two
schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, nor
is there evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field.
Pp.
373 U. S.
141-152.
(a) The present record demonstrates no inevitable collision
between the two schemes of regulation, despite the dissimilarity of
the standards. Pp.
373 U.S.
142-143.
Page 373 U. S. 133
(b) The subject matter of the California regulation, while not
concerned with health or safety, is one traditionally within the
scope of the power of the States to prevent deception of consumers
in the retail marketing of foodstuffs. Pp.
373 U. S.
143-146.
(c) Neither the terms nor the history of the Federal
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 discloses a
congressional intent to displace traditional state powers to
regulate the retail distribution of agricultural commodities. Pp.
373 U. S.
146-152.
2. Section 792 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, because it does not work an irrational
discrimination between persons or groups of persons. P.
373 U. S.
152.
3. The findings of the District Court with respect to the effect
of § 792 upon interstate commerce cannot be reviewed, because of
substantial uncertainty as to the content of the record on which
those findings were predicated. Therefore, the judgment is reversed
in this respect, and the case is remanded to the District Court for
a new trial of appellants' contentions that § 792 unreasonably
burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce in Florida
avocados. Pp.
373 U. S.
152-156.
4. Since the appellants showed sufficient injury to warrant at
least a trial of their allegations, the District Court properly
refused to dismiss the complaint for want of equity jurisdiction.
Pp.
373 U. S.
157-159.
197 F.
Supp. 780, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 792 of California's Agricultural Code, which gauges the
maturity of avocados by oil content, prohibits the transportation
or sale in California of avocados which contain "less than 8
percent of oil, by weight . . .
Page 373 U. S. 134
excluding the skin and seed." [
Footnote 1] In contrast, federal marketing orders approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture gauge the maturity of avocados
grown n Florida by standards which attribute no significance to oil
content. [
Footnote 2] This case
presents the question of the constitutionality of the California
statute insofar as it may be applied to exclude from California
markets certain Florida avocados which, although certified to be
mature under the federal regulations, do not uniformly meet the
California requirement of 8% of oil.
Appellants in No. 45, growers and handlers of avocados in
Florida, brought this action in the District Court for the Northern
District of California to enjoin the enforcement of § 792 against
Florida avocados certified as mature under the federal regulations.
Appellants challenged the constitutionality of the statute on three
grounds: (1) that, under the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, the
California standard must be deemed displaced by the federal
standard for determining the maturity of avocados grown in Florida;
(2) that the application of the California statute to Florida-grown
avocados denied appellants the Equal
Page 373 U. S. 135
Protection of the Laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(3) that its application unreasonably burdened or discriminated
against interstate marketing of Florida-grown avocados in violation
of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8. A three-judge District Court
initially dismissed the complaint.
169 F.
Supp. 774. On direct appeal, we held,
Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S.
73, that the suit was one for a three-judge court under
28 U.S.C. § 2281, and presented a justiciable controversy to be
tried on the merits. After a trial, the three-judge court denied an
injunction against the enforcement of § 792 on the ground that the
proofs did not establish that its application to Florida-grown
avocados violated any provision of the Federal Constitution.
197 F.
Supp. 780. The District Court held for several reasons that the
Supremacy Clause did not operate to displace § 792: no actual
conflict existed between the statute and the federal marketing
orders; neither the Agricultural Act nor the marketing orders
occupied the field to the exclusion of the state statute, and
Congress had not ordained that a federal marketing order was to
give a license to Florida producers to "market their avocados
without further inspection by the states" after compliance with the
federal maturity test. 197 F. Supp. at 787. Rather, the court
observed, "[t]he Federal law does not cover the whole field of
interstate shipment of avocados," but, by necessary implication,
leaves the regulation of certain aspects of distribution to the
States. Further, the District Court found no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, because the California statute was applicable on
identical terms to Florida and California producers, and was
reasonably designed to enforce a traditional and legitimate
interest of the State of California in the protection of California
consumers. The District Court concluded, finally, that § 792 did
not unreasonably burden or discriminate against interstate commerce
in out-of-state
Page 373 U. S. 136
avocados -- that the 8% oil content test served, in practice,
only to keep off California grocers' shelves fruit which was
unpalatable because prematurely picked. This holding rested, in
part, on the conclusion that mature Florida fruit had not been
shown to be incapable of attaining 8% oil content, since only a
very small fraction of Florida avocados of certain varieties in
fact failed to meet the California test. [
Footnote 3]
Both parties have brought appeals here from the District Court's
judgment: the Florida growers urge in No. 45 that the court erred
in not enjoining enforcement of the state statute against
Florida-grown avocados; in No. 49, the California state officials
appeal on the ground that the action should have been dismissed for
want of equity jurisdiction, rather than upon the merits. We noted
probable jurisdiction of both appeals. 368 U.S. 964, 965. We affirm
the judgment in the respect challenged by the cross-appeal in No.
49. In No. 45, we agree that appellants have not sustained their
challenges to § 792 under the Supremacy and Equal Protection
Clauses. However, we reverse and remand for a new trial insofar as
the judgment sustains
Page 373 U. S. 137
§ 792 against appellants' challenge to the statute grounded on
the Commerce Clause. We hold that the effect of the statute upon
interstate commerce cannot be determined on the record now before
us.
The California statute was enacted in 1925. Like the federal
marketing regulations applicable to appellants, this statute sought
to ensure the maturity of avocados reaching retail markets.
[
Footnote 4] The District Court
found on sufficient evidence that, before 1925, the marketing of
immature avocados had created serious problems in California.
[
Footnote 5] An avocado, if
picked prematurely, will not ripen properly, but will tend to decay
or shrivel and become rubbery and unpalatable after purchase. Not
only retail consumers, but even experienced growers, have
difficulty in distinguishing mature avocados from the immature by
physical characteristics alone. [
Footnote 6] Thus, the District Court
Page 373 U. S. 138
concluded, "[t]he marketing of . . . [immature] avocados cheats
the consumer" and adversely affects demand for and orderly
distribution of the fruit. 19 F. Supp. at 783.
The federal marketing regulations were adopted pursuant to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601
et seq. The
declared purposes of the Act are to restore and maintain parity
prices for the benefit of producers of agricultural commodities, to
ensure the stable and steady flow of commodities to consumers,
and
"to establish and maintain such minimum standards of quality and
maturity . . . as will effectuate such orderly marketing of such
agricultural commodities as will be in the public interest,"
§ 2(3), 7 U.S.C. § 602(3). Whenever he finds that it would
promote these declared policies, the Secretary is empowered, upon
notice and hearing, to adopt federal marketing orders and
regulations for a particular growing area, § 8c(3), (4), 7 U.S.C. §
608c(3), (4). Orders thus proposed by the Secretary become
effective only when approved by a majority of the growers or
producers concerned, § 8c(8), (9), 7 U.S.C. § 608c(8), (9).
In 1954, after proceedings in compliance with the statute, 19
Fed.Reg. 3439, the Secretary promulgated orders governing the
marketing of avocados grown in South Florida. [
Footnote 7] The orders established an Avocado
Administrative Committee, composed entirely of South Florida
avocado growers and handlers. 7 CFR § 969.20. This Committee has
authority to draft and recommend to the Secretary various marketing
regulations governing the
Page 373 U. S. 139
quality and maturity of South Florida avocados. The maturity
test for the South Florida fruit is based upon a schedule of
picking dates, sizes and weights annually drafted and recommended
by the Committee and promulgated by the Secretary. [
Footnote 8] The regulations forbid picking
and shipping of any fruit before the prescribed date, although an
exemption from the picking date schedule may be granted by the
Committee. [
Footnote 9] The
regulations, drafted by the Committee and promulgated by the
Secretary, concern other qualities and physical characteristics of
Florida avocados besides maturity.
See 22 Fed.Reg. 6205, 7
CFR §§ 51.3050 51.3053, 51.3064. All regulated avocados, including
those shipped under picking date exemptions, must be inspected for
compliance with certain quality standards by the Federal-State
Inspection Service, a joint authority supervised by the United
States and Florida Departments of Agriculture.
Page 373 U. S. 140
Almost all avocados commercially grown in the United States come
either from Southern California or South Florida. The
California-grown varieties are chiefly of Mexican ancestry, and, in
most years, contain at least 8% oil content when mature. [
Footnote 10] The several Florida
species, by contrast, are of West Indian and Guatemalan ancestry.
West Indian avocados, which constitute some 12% of the total
Florida production, may contain somewhat less than 8% oil when
mature and ready for market. They do not, the District Court found,
attain that percentage of oil "until they are past their prime."
197 F. Supp. at 783. But that variety need not concern us in this
case, since the District Court concluded on sufficient evidence
that "poor shipping qualities and short retail store shelf life"
make it commercially unprofitable, regardless of the oil test, to
market the variety in California. On the other hand, the Florida
hybrid and Guatemalan varieties, which do not encounter such
handicaps, may reach maturity before they attain 8% oil content.
The District Court concluded, nevertheless, that § 792 did not
unreasonably interfere with their marketability, since these
species "attain or exceed 8% oil content while in a prime
commercial marketing condition," so that the California test was
"scientifically valid as applied to" these varieties.
The experts who testified at the trial disputed whether
California's "percentage of oil" test or the federal marketing
orders' test of picking dates and minimum sizes and weights was the
more accurate gauge of the maturity of
Page 373 U. S. 141
avocados. [
Footnote 11]
In adopting his calendar test of maturity for the varieties grown
in South Florida, the Secretary expressly rejected physical and
chemical test as insufficiently reliable guides for gauging the
maturity of the Florida fruit. [
Footnote 12]
I
We consider first appellants' challenge to § 792 under the
Supremacy Clause. That the California statute and the federal
marketing orders embody different maturity tests is clear. However,
this difference poses, rather than disposes of, the problem before
us. Whether a State may constitutionally reject commodities which a
federal authority has certified to be marketable depends upon
whether the state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress,"
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52,
312 U. S. 67. By
that test, we hold that § 792 is not such an obstacle; there is
neither such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation
that both cannot stand in the same area nor evidence of a
congressional design to preempt the field.
We begin by putting aside two suggestions of the appellants
which obscure, more than aid in, the solution of the problem.
First, it is suggested that a federal license or certificate of
compliance with minimum federal standards immunizes the licensed
commerce from inconsistent or more demanding state regulations.
While this suggestion draws some support from decisions which have
invalidated direct state interference with the activities of
interstate
carriers, 348 U. S. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc.,
Page 373 U. S. 142
348 U. S. 61, even
in that field of paramount federal concern, the suggestion has been
significantly qualified,
e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U. S. 440,
362 U. S.
447-448;
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S.
1;
cf. Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
289 U. S. 92. That
no State may completely exclude federally licensed commerce is
indisputable, but that principle has no application to this
case.
Second, it is suggested that the coexistence of federal and
state regulatory legislation should depend upon whether the
purposes of the two laws are parallel or divergent. This Court has,
on the one hand, sustained state statutes having objectives
virtually identical to those of federal regulations,
California
v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725,
730-731;
cf. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.
S. 144,
363 U. S.
156-157;
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.
S. 341, and has, on the other hand, struck down state
statutes where the respective purposes were quite dissimilar,
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 328 U. S. 152. The
test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or
the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can
be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the
field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different
objectives.
The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal
regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive
of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons --
either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no
other conclusion or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.
See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,
supra.
A
A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable, and
requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a
Page 373 U. S. 143
physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce,
cf. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.
S. 364,
204 U. S.
399-401;
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.
S. 373;
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U. S. 520.
That would be the situation here if, for example, the federal
orders forbade the picking and marketing of any avocado testing
more than 7% oil, while the California test excluded from the State
any avocado measuring less than 8% oil content. No such
impossibility of dual compliance is presented on this record,
however. As to those Florida avocados of the hybrid and Guatemalan
varieties which were actually rejected by the California test, the
District Court indicated that the Florida growers might have
avoided such rejections by leaving the fruit on the trees beyond
the earliest picking date permitted by the federal regulations, and
nothing in the record contradicts that suggestion. Nor is there a
lack of evidentiary support for the District Court's finding that
the Florida varieties marketed in California "attain or exceed 8%
oil content while in a prime commercial marketing condition," even
though they may be "mature enough to be acceptable prior to the
time that they reach that content. . . ." 197 F. Supp. at 783.
Thus, the present record demonstrates no inevitable collision
between the two schemes of regulation, despite the dissimilarity of
the standards.
B
The issue under the head of the Supremacy Clause is narrowed
then to this: does either the nature of the subject matter, namely,
the maturity of avocados, or any explicit declaration of
congressional design to displace state regulation require § 792 to
yield to the federal marketing orders? The maturity of avocados
seems to be an inherently unlikely candidate for exclusive federal
regulation. Certainly it is not a subject by its very nature
admitting only of national supervision,
cf. 53 U.
S. S. 144� v. Board of Port Wardens,
12 How.
299, 53 U. S.
319-320. Nor is it a subject demanding exclusive federal
regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to national
interests, cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,@
359 U. S. 236,
359 U. S.
241-244.
On the contrary, the maturity of avocados is a subject matter of
the kind this Court has traditionally regarded as properly within
the scope of state superintendence. Specifically, the supervision
of the readying of foodstuffs for market has always been deemed a
matter of peculiarly local concern. Many decades ago, for example,
this Court sustained a State's prohibition against the importation
of artificially colored oleomargarine (which posed no health
problem), over claims of federal preemption and burden on commerce.
In the course of the opinion, the Court recognized that the States
have always possessed a legitimate interest in "the protection of .
. . [their] people against fraud and deception in the sale of food
products" at retail markets within their borders.
Plumley v.
Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461,
155 U. S. 472.
See also Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.
S. 189,
192 U. S.
199-200;
Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman,
266 U. S. 497;
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501,
225 U. S.
525-529.
It is true that, more recently, we sustained a federal statute
broadly regulating the production of renovated butter. But we were
scrupulous in pointing out that a State might nevertheless -- at
least in the absence of an express contrary command of Congress --
confiscate or exclude from market the processed butter which had
complied with all the federal processing standards "because of a
higher standard demanded by a state for its consumers." A state
regulation so purposed was, we affirmed, "permissible under all the
authorities." [
Footnote 13]
Cloverleaf
Page 373 U. S. 145
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.
S. 148,
315 U. S. 162.
That distinction is a fundamental one, which illumines and
delineates the problem of the present case. Federal regulation by
means of minimum standards of the picking, processing, and
transportation of agricultural commodities, however comprehensive
for those purposes that regulation may be, does not of
itself import displacement of state control over the distribution
and retail sale of those commodities in the interests of the
consumers of the commodities within the State. Thus, while
Florida may perhaps not prevent the exportation of federally
certified fruit by superimposing a higher maturity standard,
nothing in
Cloverleaf forbids California to regulate their
marketing. Congressional regulation of one end of the stream of
commerce does not,
ipso facto, oust all state regulation
at the other end. Such a displacement may not be inferred
automatically from the fact that Congress has regulated production
and packing of commodities for the interstate market. We do not
mean to suggest that certain local regulations may not unreasonably
or arbitrarily burden interstate commerce; we consider that
question separately,
infra, pp.
373 U. S.
152-154. Here, we are concerned only whether partial
congressional superintendence of the field (maturity for the
purpose of introduction of Florida fruit into the stream of
interstate commerce) automatically forecloses regulation of
maturity by another State in the interests of that State's
consumers of the fruit.
Page 373 U. S. 146
The correctness of the District Court's conclusion that § 792
was a regulation well within the scope of California's police
powers is thus clear. While it is conceded that the California
statute is not a health measure, neither logic nor precedent
invites any distinction between state regulations designed to keep
unhealthful or unsafe commodities off the grocer's shelves and
those designed to prevent the deception of consumers. [
Footnote 14]
See, e.g., Hyrade
Provision Co. v. Sherman, supra; Plumley v. Massachusetts,
supra. Nothing appearing in the record before us affords any
ground for departure in this case from our consistent refusal to
draw such a distinction.
C
Since no irreconcilable conflict with the federal regulation
requires a conclusion that § 792 was displaced, we turn to the
question whether Congress has nevertheless ordained that the state
regulation shall yield. The settled mandate governing this inquiry,
in deference to the fact that a state regulation of this kind is an
exercise of the "historic police powers of the States," is not to
decree such a federal displacement "unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress,"
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U. S. 218,
331 U. S. 230.
In other words, we are not to conclude that Congress legislated the
ouster of this California statute by the marketing orders in the
absence
Page 373 U. S. 147
of an unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect. We
search in vain for such a mandate.
The provisions and objectives of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
bear little resemblance to those in which, only last Term, we found
a preemptive design in
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.
S. 297. In the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act involved
in that case, Congress had declared "uniform standards of
classification and inspection" to be "imperative for the protection
of producers and others engaged in commerce and the public interest
therein." 7 U.S.C. § 511a. The legislative history was replete with
references to a need for "uniform" or "official" standards which
could harmonize the grading and inspection of tobacco at all
markets throughout the country. Under the statute, a single set of
standards was to be promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture,
"and the standards so established would be the official standards
of the United States for such purpose." S.Rep. No. 1211, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1.
Nothing in the language of the Agricultural Adjustment Act --
passed by the same Congress the very next day [
Footnote 15] -- discloses a similarly
comprehensive congressional design. There is but one provision of
the statute which intimates any purpose to make agricultural
production controls the monitors of retail distribution -- the
reference to a policy of establishing such "minimum standards of
quality and maturity and such grading and inspection requirements .
. . as will effectuate . . . orderly marketing . . . in the public
interest." 7 U.S.C. § 602(3). That language cannot be said, without
more, to reveal a design that federal marketing orders should
displace all state
Page 373 U. S. 148
regulations. By its very terms, in fact, the statute purports
only to establish minimum standards.
Other provisions of the Act, and their history, militate even
more strongly against federal displacement of these state
regulations. First, the adoption of marketing agreements and orders
is authorized only when the Secretary has determined that economic
conditions within a particular growing area require federally
supervised cooperation among the growers to alleviate those
conditions. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1), (2). Moreover, the relief afforded
the growers is to be temporary; "the Secretary is directed to cease
exercising such powers" when "the circumstances described . . . no
longer exist." H.R.Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. And,
consistently with these terms, the Secretary himself has
characterized the marketing agreements as essentially "self-help
programs" instituted and administered by the farmers involved. This
view has recently been elaborated by the Secretary:
"The Act itself does not impose regulations over the marketing
of any agricultural commodity. It merely provides the authority
under which an industry can develop regulations to fit its own
situation and solve its own marketing problems."
United States Department of Agriculture, Marketing Agreements
and Orders, AMS-230 (rev. ed.1961), 3.
See also United
States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment 1937-1938
(1939), 71.
Second, the very terms of the statute require that the Secretary
promulgate marketing orders "limited in their application to the
smallest regional production areas" which he finds practicable, and
the orders are to "prescribe such different terms, applicable to
different production areas and marketing areas" as will serve to
"give due recognition to the differences in production and
marketing"
Page 373 U. S. 149
between those areas. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(11). While this language is
not conclusive on the question before us, it indicates that
Congress contemplated -- quite by contrast to the design embodied
in the Tobacco Inspection Act -- that there might be widespread
regional variations in the standards governing production and
processing. Thus, avocado growers in another region could, for
example, propose -- and the Secretary would presumably adopt --
maturity regulations which would gauge the marketability of the
fruit not by the calendar, as do the South Florida rules, but by
the color of the skin, or the texture and color of the seed-coat,
or perhaps even by oil content. Thus, if the Congress of 1935
really intended that distribution would be comprehensively governed
by grower-adopted quality and maturity standards, and all state
regulation of the same subject would be ousted, it does not seem
likely that the statute would have invited local variations at the
production end, while saying absolutely nothing about the effect of
those production controls upon distribution for consumption.
A third factor which strongly suggests that Congress did not
mandate uniformity for each marketing order arises from the
legislative history. The provisions concerning the limited duration
and local application of marketing agreements received much
attention from both House and Senate Committees reporting on the
bill. Though recognizing that the powers conferred upon the
Secretary were novel and extensive, both Committees concluded:
"These and other restrictive provisions are . . . adequately
drawn to guard against any fear that the regulatory power is so
broad as to subject its exercise to the risk of abuse."
H.R.Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7; S.Rep. No. 1011,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3. The Committee Reports also discussed §
10(i), 7 U.S.C. § 610(i), which authorized federal-state
cooperation
Page 373 U. S. 150
in the administration of the program, and cautioned
significantly:
"Notwithstanding the authorization of cooperation contained in
this section, there is nothing in it to permit or require the
Federal Government to invade the field of the States, for the
limitations of the act and the Constitution forbid federal
regulation in that field, and this provision does not indicate the
contrary. Nor is there anything in the provision to force States to
cooperate. Each sovereignty operates in its own sphere, but can
exert its authority in conformity, rather than in conflict, with
that of the other."
H.R.Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23; S.Rep. No. 1011,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15. Thus, the revealed congressional design
was apparently to do no more than to invite farmers and growers to
get together, under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture,
to work out local harvesting, packing and processing programs, and
thereby relieve temporarily depressed marketing conditions. Had
Congress meant the Act to have in addition a pervasive effect upon
the ultimate distribution and sale of produce, evidence of such a
design would presumably have accompanied the statute, as it did the
Tobacco Inspection Act,
see Campbell v. Hussey, supra. In
the absence of any such manifestations, it would be unreasonable to
infer that Congress delegated to the growers in a particular region
the authority to deprive the States of their traditional power to
enforce otherwise valid regulations designed for the protection of
consumers.
An examination of the operation of these particular marketing
orders reinforces the conclusion we reach from this analysis of the
terms and objectives of the statute. The regulations show that the
Florida avocado maturity standards are drafted each year not by
impartial experts in Washington or even in Florida, but rather by
the South
Page 373 U. S. 151
Florida Avocado Administrative Committee, which consists
entirely of representatives of the growers and handlers concerned.
It appears that the Secretary of Agriculture has invariably adopted
the Committee's recommendations for maturity dates, sizes, and
weights. [
Footnote 16] Thus,
the pattern which emerges is one of maturity regulations drafted
and administered locally by the growers' own representatives, and
designed to do no more than promote orderly competition among the
South Florida growers. [
Footnote
17]
This case requires no consideration of the scope of the
constitutional power of Congress to oust all state regulation of
maturity, and we intimate no view upon that question. [
Footnote 18]
Page 373 U. S. 152
It is enough to decide this aspect of the present case that we
conclude that Congress has not attempted to oust or displace state
powers to enact the regulation embodied in § 792. The most
plausible inference from the legislative scheme is that the
Congress contemplated that state power to enact such regulations
should remain unimpaired.
II
We turn now to appellants' arguments under the Equal Protection
and Commerce Clauses.
It is enough to dispose of the equal protection claim that we
express our agreement with the District Court that the state
standard does not work an "irrational discrimination as between
persons or groups of persons,"
Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U. S. 464,
335 U. S. 466;
cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.
S. 106. While it may well be that arguably superior
tests of maturity could be devised, we cannot say, in derogation of
the findings of the District Court, that this possibility renders
the choice made by California either arbitrary or devoid of
rational relationship to a legitimate regulatory interest. Whether
or not the oil content test is the most reliable indicator of
marketability of avocados is not a question for the courts to
decide; it is sufficient that, on this record, we should conclude,
as we do, that oil content appears to be an acceptable criterion of
avocado maturity.
More difficult is the claim that the California statute
unreasonably burdens or discriminates against interstate
Page 373 U. S. 153
commerce because its application has excluded Florida avocados
from the State. Although Florida and California were competitors in
avocado production when the statute was passed in 1925, the present
record permits no inference that the California statute had a
discriminatory objective. [
Footnote 19] Nevertheless it may be that the continued
application
Page 373 U. S. 154
of this regulation to Florida avocados has imposed an
unconstitutional burden on commerce, or has discriminated against
another State's exports of the particular commodity. Other state
regulations raising similar problems have been found to be
discriminatory or burdensome notwithstanding a legitimate state
interest in some form of regulation -- either because they exceeded
the limits necessary to vindicate that interest,
Dean Milk Co.
v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, or
because they unreasonably favored local producers at the expense of
competitors from other States,
Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U. S. 511.
Such a state regulation might also constitute an illegitimate
attempt to control the conduct of producers beyond the borders of
California,
cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.
S. 761,
325 U. S.
775.
The District Court referred to these precedents, but
nevertheless concluded that the California oil content test was not
burdensome upon, or discriminatory against, interstate commerce.
197 F. Supp. at 786-787. However, we are unable to review that
conclusion or decide whether the court properly applied the
principles announced in these decisions, because we cannot
ascertain what constituted the record on which the conclusion was
predicated. Much of the appellants' offered proof consisted of
depositions and exhibits designed to detail both the rejection of
Florida avocados in California and the oil content of Florida
avocados which had met the federal test, but which might
nonetheless have been excluded from California markets.
Page 373 U. S. 155
The parties' own assumptions concerning the content of the
record are in irreconcilable conflict: the appellants have argued
the case on the apparent assumption that the depositions and
exhibits were admitted before the District Court; the appellees, on
the other hand, have assumed both in their briefs and in oral
argument that the disputed evidence
was not admitted. This
lack of consensus is altogether understandable in light of the
confusion created by the District Court's evidentiary rulings. The
appellees objected to the introduction of the disputed materials on
several grounds, both during and after the trial. The court
expressly reserved its rulings on the issue of admissibility, and,
after the entry of its order on the merits of the case, made a
supplemental "ruling on evidentiary matters" in which it stated
that the disputed exhibits and depositions "are not admitted into
evidence, but have been considered by the Court as an offer of
proof by the plaintiffs. . . ." The earlier memorandum of the court
explained that it would "assume,
arguendo, that the
exhibits and depositions offered by plaintiffs are all admissible."
197 F. Supp. at 782. If this was intended to mean that appellants
would not have made out a case for relief even were the evidence to
be admitted, then there would have been no need to rule on
admissibility.
But we are unable to determine, just as the parties were unable
to agree, whether the District Court viewed the evidence in that
posture. [
Footnote 20]
Page 373 U. S. 156
Thus, the only evidence which would seem to support an
injunction on the ground of burden on interstate commerce has never
been formally admitted to the record in this case. For this Court
to reverse and order an injunction on the basis of that evidence
would be, in effect, to admit the contested depositions and
exhibits on appeal without ever affording the appellees an
opportunity to argue their seemingly substantial objections.
[
Footnote 21] To assume the
admissibility of the evidence under these circumstances would be to
deny the appellees their day in court as to a disputed part of the
case on which the trial court has never ruled, because its view of
the law evidently made such a ruling unnecessary.
Cf. Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.
S. 525,
356 U. S. 533;
Fountain v. Filson, 336 U. S. 681;
Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.
S. 571. On the other hand, to affirm the District Court
would require us to make equally impermissible assumptions as to
the state of the record.
Cf. Florida v. United States,
282 U. S. 194,
282 U. S.
215.
For these reasons, we conclude that the judgment must, to the
extent appealed from in No. 45, be reversed, and the case remanded
to the District Court for a new trial of appellants' Commerce
Clause contentions. We intimate no view with respect to either the
admissibility or the probative value of the disputed evidence, or
of any other evidence which might be brought forth by either party
concerning this aspect of the case.
Page 373 U. S. 157
III
In No. 49, the state officers cross-appeal on the ground that
the District Court should have dismissed the action for want of
equity, rather than for lack of merit. Their contention is that
there was insufficient showing of injury to the Florida growers to
invoke the District Court's equity jurisdiction. We reject that
contention, and affirm the judgment insofar as it is challenged by
the cross-appeal.
In
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, we
held that, because of the Florida growers' allegations that
California officials had consistently condemned Florida avocados as
unfit for sale in California,
"thus requiring appellants [the Florida growers] -- to prevent
destruction and complete loss of their shipments -- to reship the
avocados to and sell them in other States,"
it was evident that
"there is an existing dispute between the parties as to present
legal rights amounting to a justiciable controversy which
appellants are entitled to have determined on the merits."
362 U.S. at
362 U. S. 85-86.
In view of our mandate in
Jacobsen, therefore, the
District Court necessarily assumed jurisdiction and heard the case
on its merits.
Cf. United States v. Haley, 371 U. S.
18.
Even on the present ambiguous record, we think that the Florida
growers have demonstrated sufficient injury to warrant at least a
trial of their allegations. In the California officials' briefs
below, it was conceded that the Florida growers had suffered damage
in the amount of some $1,500 by reason of the enforcement of the
statute. Before the bar of this Court, it was conceded that the
State, in objecting to the growers' proffered evidence, did not
dispute the claim that some shipments of Florida avocados had, in
fact, been rejected by California for failure to comply with the
oil content requirement. Indeed, the
Page 373 U. S. 158
State conceded in its pleadings before the trial court that
rejections of Florida avocados had averaged in recent years as much
as 6.4% of the total shipments of Florida fruit into California.
While these concessions were not corroborated by statistical proofs
at trial, and thus do not form an adequate basis for the entry of a
final injunction, they nevertheless supplied an adequate basis,
apart from the requirement of our remand, for the District Court's
proceeding to trial on the merits.
In addition, it is clear that the California officials will
continue to enforce the statute against the Florida-grown avocados,
for the State's answer to the complaint declared that these
officials
"have in the past and now stand ready to perform their duties
under their oath of office should they acquire knowledge of
violations of the Agricultural Code of the State of
California."
Thus, the District Court, both on the pleadings before it and in
light of our opinion in
Jacobsen, properly heard the
remanded case on the merits, and did not err in refusing to dismiss
for want of equity jurisdiction.
The cross-appellants rely upon the court's finding of fact that
"[p]laintiffs have neither suffered nor been threatened with
irreparable injury." This finding was, however, adopted pursuant to
that court's prior opinion, which stated that
"[p]laintiffs' monetary losses as a result of the rejected
shipments are not clearly established, but, at most, do not appear
to be over two or three thousand dollars."
197 F. Supp. at 783-784. We read this finding as importing no
more than the District Court's view that whatever harm or damage
the Florida growers might have suffered fell short of the
"irreparable injury" requisite for the entry of an injunction
against enforcement of the statute.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for a new trial limited to appellants'
Page 373 U. S. 159
claim in No. 45 that the enforcement of § 792 unreasonably
burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. In the
respect challenged by the cross-appeal in No. 49, the judgment is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 49,
Paul, Director of the Department of
Agriculture of California, et al. v. Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc., et al., also on appeal from the same Court.
[
Footnote 1]
Avocados not meeting this standard may not be sold in
California.
Id., § 784. Substandard fruits are "declared
to be a public nuisance," and they may be seized, condemned, and
abated.
Id., § 785. Violators may be punished criminally,
id. § 831 ($50 to $500 fine or imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both), and by civil penalty action,
id. § 785.6 (market value of fruits).
[
Footnote 2]
The orders are approved by the Secretary pursuant to § 8c of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608c. The basic marketing
agreement provisions were initially adopted, in substantially their
present form, in the 1935 amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, 49 Stat. 750, 753-761. These sections were reenacted in 1937,
50 Stat. 246, as the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,
virtually unchanged. Concerning the reasons for the reenactment,
and the extent of the changes,
see United States
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment 1937-1938
(1939), 72-73.
[
Footnote 3]
The evidence in the record concerning the actual effect of the
California maturity test upon Florida avocados is sketchy, at best.
The appellants introduced only one witness, a marketing expert in
the United States Department of Agriculture, who testified
concerning the relative scientific and other merits of the federal
and California maturity tests. He gave no testimony concerning the
actual impact of the California regulation upon shipments from
Florida. One of appellees' witnesses at trial made cursory
references to the fact that California inspectors had rejected and
excluded some Florida shipments, but there was no testimony
concerning the dates and quantities of any rejections. In a motion
for dismissal and an accompanying affidavit before the District
Court, the appellees presented certain figures concerning the
percentage of Florida avocados which failed to comply with the
California regulation during the years 1954 through 1957. There
was, however, neither data for years after 1957 nor statistical
proof at the trial which would corroborate these summary
figures.
[
Footnote 4]
See Roche, Regulations for Marketing Avocados in
California, in California Avocado Assn.1937 Yearbook (1937), 88-89,
concerning the purpose of the California oil test statute. It has
not been contended that the purpose of this statute is to ensure a
certain caloric or nutritional value in avocados which reach the
consumer. No health issue has been raised in this case.
See 197 F. Supp. at 785-786.
[
Footnote 5]
See also Church and Chacer, Some Changes in the
Composition of California Avocados During Growth (U.S.Dept. of
Agriculture Bull. No. 1073, 1922), 2; Hodgson, The California
Avocado Industry (Calif.Agricultural Extension Service Circular No.
43, 1930), 54-55; Hodges, Immature Avocado Selling Illegal, 111
Pacific Rural Press, Apr. 3, 1926, p. 435. And for a discussion of
the particular problems encountered in the marketing of immature
avocados in California,
see Roche,
supra,
note 4 at 88-89.
[
Footnote 6]
The nature of the avocado and its ripening process make it very
difficult for any but the expert to gauge its maturity, and an
avocado which may appear satisfactory at the time of purchase may
later fail to ripen properly because it was prematurely picked.
See, e.g., Ruehle, The Florida Avocado Industry (Univ. of
Fla.Agr.Expt.Stations Bull. No. 602, 1958), 69; Avocado Maturity
Tests, 37 California Citrograph, Dec. 1951, p. 87; Roche, Look Out
for Immature Avocados, 87 California Cultivator, Nov. 2, 1940, p.
590; Church and Chacer
supra, note 5 at 2.
[
Footnote 7]
This order is applicable only to avocados grown in the South
Florida growing area. The California growers have not adopted a
federal marketing order or agreement.
[
Footnote 8]
The findings of the United States Department of Agriculture,
contained in its order determining what terms should be contained
in the avocado regulations, were that the marketing of immature
fruits increases consumer resistance and materially impairs the
marketing of the entire crop, that there was no satisfactory
physical or chemical test for determining maturity, and that
maturity can satisfactorily be determined by the picking date/size
method. Handling of Avocados Grown in South Florida, 19 Fed.Reg.
2418, 2424-2425.
Each year since 1954, the Secretary has issued maturity
regulations fixing the dates upon which each variety of Florida
avocados may be picked and shipped.
See, e.g., 27 Fed.Reg.
5135-5136, 6705, 8264-8265, 9174-9175, 10090-10091.
[
Footnote 9]
Section .53 of the regulations, 7 CFR § 969.53, provides that an
exemption certificate shall be granted to a grower
"who furnishes proof, satisfactory to the committee, that his
avocados of a particular variety are mature prior to the time such
variety may be handled under such regulation."
Such a certificate authorizes the recipient to "handle" the
certified fruit,
i.e., to "sell, consign, deliver, or
transport avocados within the production area or between the
production area and any point outside thereof. . . ." 7 CFR §
969.10.
[
Footnote 10]
See Traub et al., Avocado Production in the United
States (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Circular No. 620, 1941), 6.
Occasionally, however, even California growers have experienced
difficulty in meeting the oil content requirement, and sizable
shipments have had to be destroyed.
See Demand for
Avocados, 74 California Cultivator, Feb. 8, 1930, p. 167; Roche,
Look Out for Immature Avocados, 87 California Cultivator, Nov. 2,
1940, p. 590; California Avocado Assn. 1937 Yearbook (1937),
88.
[
Footnote 11]
Compare Hodgson, The California Avocado Industry
(Calif. Agricultural Extension Service Circular No. 43, 1930),
39.
[
Footnote 12]
See 19 Fed.Reg. 2418, 2424-2425;
compare
Harding, The Relation of Maturity to Quality in Florida Avocados,
67 Florida State Horticultural Society Proceedings, 276 (1954).
[
Footnote 13]
It is true that the statute involved in the
Cloverleaf
case provided that federal law was not intended to displace state
laws "enacted in the exercise of [the States'] police powers. . .
." 32 Stat. 193, 21 U.S.C. § 25. But this proviso was presumably
intended to do no more than recognize explicitly an accommodation
between federal and state interests to which Congress and the
decisions of this Court have consistently adhered. Nor did the
Court's deference to state regulation rest upon this congressional
proviso. Rather, the Court simply considered it a well settled
proposition that a State may impose upon imported foodstuffs "a
higher standard demanded . . . for its consumers."
[
Footnote 14]
It might also be argued that the California statute, having been
designed to test the maturity only of
California avocados,
bears no rational relationship to the marketability of
Florida fruit. Such a contention would seem untenable,
however, in the face of the District Court's express finding of
fact, supportable on the testimony before it, that
"[a] standard requiring a minimum of 8% of oil in an avocado
before it may be marketed is scientifically valid as applied to
hybrid and Guatemalan varieties of avocados grown in Florida and
marketed in California."
And there is considerable dispute as to the oil content of
Florida avocados which have been certified as mature under the
federal regulations.
See note 21 infra.
[
Footnote 15]
The marketing agreement provisions were enacted among the 1935
amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 49 Stat. 750,
753-761. These amendments were accepted by Congress the day
following the enactment of the Tobacco Inspection Act, 49 Stat.
731-735.
[
Footnote 16]
Although the Manager of the Avocado Administrative Committee
stated in his deposition (which was neither formally admitted nor
excluded by the District Court) that the Secretary had occasionally
rejected orders recommended by the Committee, he insisted that, as
to maturity regulations, "the Secretary has always followed the
Committee's recommendations."
[
Footnote 17]
Significant with regard to the essentially local nature of the
orders and their administration is the testimony in a deposition
(on the admissibility of which the District Court did not rule) of
the supervising inspector of fruits and vegetables of the Federal
and State Agricultural Inspection Service for the South Florida
district:
". . . these regulations from time to time are subject to change
at the direction of the Avocado Administrative Committee. Whenever
they do change them, Mr. Biggar, the manager of the Avocado
Administrative Committee, immediately furnishes the inspection
service with copies of the effective rules and changes. There are
times when they change them, and when they change them, I am the
first man to get the changed regulations, because I have to see
that the inspectors get the revised regulations issued by the
Avocado Administrative Committee."
For further evidence that the avocado marketing agreement was
undertaken chiefly as a "self-help program," designed only to
regulate South Florida production and ensure maturity of the
produce from that growing area,
see Krome, The Federal
Avocado Marketing Agreement, 67 Florida State Horticultural Society
Proceedings 268 (1964).
[
Footnote 18]
Compare, e.g., Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v.
Washington, 270 U. S. 87;
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115.
See generally Note, Federal Inspection Legislation -- A
Partial Remedy for Interstate Trade Barriers, 53 Harv.L.Rev. 1185
(1940).
Nor have we any occasion to consider the possible applicability
to the Supremacy Clause issue of the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 341,
since neither party has made any reference to that statute either
before the District Court or in this Court.
[
Footnote 19]
The District Court assumed that, in 1925, California growers
faced no meaningful competition from Florida growers. I t appears,
however, that the Florida industry was well developed when the
California industry was in its infancy,
see Collins, The
Avocado, A Salad Fruit From the Tropics (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture
Bureau of Plant Industry, Bull. No. 77, 1905), 35-36. Not only does
there appear to have been vigorous competition between Florida and
California producers for all markets in 1925,
see Popenoe,
The Avocado -- California vs. Florida, 61 California Cultivator,
Nov. 3, 1923, p. 459, but, in some years during the 1920's, the
Florida production exceeded that of California.
See Traub,
supra, note 10 at
2.
See generally Hodgson,
supra, note 5 at 60, 82-83.
The passage of the California statute was immediately and
vigorously protested by Florida producers, and a United States
Senator from Florida filed an informal complaint with the
Department of Agriculture,
see, e.g., California Avocado
Law Unfair to Florida: New Pacific Coast Maturity Standards
Practically Ban All Shipments from this State, 32 Florida Grower,
Nov. 7, 1925, pp. 4, 22.
See also id., Nov. 21, 1925, p.
15. Even in California, there was contemporaneous recognition that
passage of the statute severely restricted the access of Florida
growers to the markets at least of Northern California,
see Hodgson, The Florida Avocado Industry -- A Survey II,
66 California Cultivator, June 26, 1926, pp. 721, 743.
And
see 80 American Fruit Grower, Feb. 1960, p. 64.
On the other hand, there have been suggestions that neither the
adoption nor the application of the California statute reflected
any discriminatory or anticompetitive purpose. In some years,
California growers themselves experience great difficulty meeting
the oil content requirement, and sizable shipments must be
destroyed --
see Demand for Avocados, 74 California
Cultivator, Feb. 8, 1930, p. 167; Roche, Look Out for Immature
Avocados, 87 California Cultivator, Nov. 2, 1940, p. 590;
California Avocado Assn., 1937 Yearbook (1937), 88 -- even though
the oil content of mature California avocados in good years runs
substantially above 8%,
see Traub,
supra,
note 10 at 6-8. Moreover,
the California Growers' Association has regarded its ability to
market Florida fruit during the months when California fruit is not
available as strengthening, rather than weakening, its own market
position.
See Fourteenth Annual Report of the General
Manager of the Calavo Growers of California (1937), 20. Plainly the
questions indicated by these conflicting materials can be resolved
only at a trial fully developing the Commerce Clause issue.
[
Footnote 20]
At the very close of the trial, two of the three members of the
court offered inconsistent views when appellees' counsel asked for
clarification concerning the status of appellants' disputed
depositions and exhibits. One member of the court replied that
"your objections stand to every word that is in these depositions
here," while another responded, "[t]hey are all in evidence subject
to your objections, and the Court will rule on them when it makes
its ruling in the case, if it is necessary."
[
Footnote 21]
Specifically, appellees offered to show that, in measuring the
oil content of avocados, the Florida experimental test procedures
did not employ the same equipment as is used in California, the
former, so it was contended, extracting less oil than the
California equipment would obtain from the same avocado. They
claimed that the average variation amounted to a failure of the
Florida equipment to remove 2.9% of the oil from the fruit, and,
further, that the Florida results were erratic. In addition,
appellees asserted that the avocados used in the Florida
experiments were not representative of the graded, sized, and
inspected fruit that appellants would normally market.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE CLARK join, dissenting in No. 45.
This is the second time this case has come before the Court. In
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen,
362 U. S. 73, the
case was here for review of dismissal of the complaint for want of
jurisdiction. The Court reversed and remanded for trial, and the
case is now here on the merits, after the three-judge District
Court refused to enjoin the appellee state officers from enforcing
§ 792 of the California Agricultural Code against the appellant
growers.
197 F.
Supp. 780,
probable jurisdiction noted, 368 U.S. 964,
965. In view of the Court's disposition of the matter today, it is
probable that this case like a revenant will return to us within
another few Terms, with a still more copious record.
Appellants grow, package, and market Florida avocados in
interstate commerce, subject to the applicable provisions of § 8c
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608c,
and the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated
thereunder. An average of 6.4% of the Florida avocados shipped to
California each year are barred for failure to satisfy the
requirements of California Agricultural Code § 792, [
Footnote 2/1] which
Page 373 U. S. 160
provides, in pertinent part, that
"all avocados, at the time of picking, and at all times
thereafter, shall contain not less than 8 percent of oil, by weight
of the avocado excluding the skin and seed. [
Footnote 2/2]"
Appellants based their claim for relief upon the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause,
and the Supremacy Clause. Since we in the minority have concluded
that the Agricultural Adjustment Act and regulations promulgated
thereunder leave no room for this inconsistent and conflicting
state legislation, we reach only the Supremacy Clause issue.
The California statute was enacted in 1925, when, according to
the District Court, practically all the avocados in the United
States came from that State. 197 F. Supp. at 782. The purpose of
this legislation was to prevent the marketing of immature avocados,
which never
Page 373 U. S. 161
ripen properly, but decay or shrivel up and become rubbery and
unpalatable after purchase by the consumer. [
Footnote 2/3]
Ibid. The effect of marketing
immature avocados is to "cheat the consumer," and thus have "a bad
[economic] effect upon retailers and producers as a whole, since it
increases future sales resistance" against buying avocados.
Id. at 783.
In 1925, when the state law was enacted, most of the avocados
grown in California were, as they are at the present time, from
trees derived from Mexican varieties. Such avocados contain at
least 8% oil when mature. The Florida avocado growers, however, the
only substantial competitors of the California growers, 197 F.
Supp. at 787, n. 8, depend in substantial part on trees of
non-Mexican parentage. The Florida avocados involved here, hybrid
and Guatemalan varieties, may reach maturity and be acceptable for
marketing, at least under federal standards, prior to reaching an
8% oil content. [
Footnote 2/4]
Page 373 U. S. 162
There is expert opinion to the effect that the best gauge of
maturity is the percentage of oil contained in the fruit.
Id. at 783. California has adopted that physical-chemical
test in § 792. There is also expert opinion that the best test of
maturity is the date on which the fruit is picked, and its size and
weight at such time.
Ibid. The United States Secretary of
Agriculture has adopted that test for measuring maturity of
avocados for ripening, and has specifically rejected as
unsatisfactory all physical and chemical tests. Handling of
Avocados Grown in South Florida, 19 Fed.Reg. 2418, 2424-2425
(Dept.Agr.Dkt. No. AO-254). The District Court found the California
oil test to be of the latter type.
I
The Agricultural Adjustment Act, § 8c, 7 U.S.C. § 608c, provides
that, whenever the Secretary "has reason to believe that the
issuance of an order will tend to effectuate the declared policy"
of the Act, which is
"to establish and maintain such minimum standards of quality and
maturity . . . [for fruit] in interstate commerce as will
effectuate . . . [the] orderly marketing of . . . agricultural
commodities as will be in the public interest,"
§ 2(3), 7 U.S.C. § 602(3), he shall give notice for and hold a
hearing upon a proposed order. In the case of fruits, § 8c(6)(A)
provides that the Secretary may limit or provide methods for the
limitation of quality of produce "which may be marketed in or
transported to any or all markets in the current of interstate or
foreign commerce . . . ," or affecting commerce, during any
specified period.
Orders proposed by the Secretary under this statute become
effective only when approved by a majority of the affected growers.
See § 8c(8)-(9). In 1954, the Secretary held hearings and
found that a majority of the South Florida avocado growers favored
imposition
Page 373 U. S. 163
of quality and maturity standards for avocados pursuant to a
marketing order promulgated under the Act. 19 Fed.Reg. 3439.
[
Footnote 2/5] The order,
id. at 3440 3443, as amended, 7 CFR § 915.1-.71 (formerly
§§ 969.1-969.71), establishes an Avocado Administrative Committee,
comprised of South Florida avocado growers and shippers, with the
power to recommend marketing regulations to the Secretary relating
to quality and maturity standards and prohibiting the marketing of
substandard fruits. [
Footnote 2/6]
It
Page 373 U. S. 164
is specifically contemplated in § .51 that such maturity
standards be based on a picking date schedule, and other tests are
rejected as unsatisfactory. Section .53 provides that exemption
from the regular picking date regulations of § .51 be allowed for
portions of avocado crops of particular varieties when they are
proved to be mature prior to the prescribed picking date. [
Footnote 2/7] All regulated avocados,
including those with so-called picking date exemption certificates,
must be inspected by the Federal-State Inspection Service, a United
States Department of Agriculture and Florida Department of
Agriculture joint service, and be certified as meeting the
prescribed quality and maturity standards before they may be
marketed. § .54. [
Footnote 2/8] At
various times, other regulations governing Florida avocados have
been issued which include more specific quality standards.
See 22 Fed.Reg. 6205, 7 CFR §§ 51.3050-51.3053, 51.3058.
These quality standards require that the fruit be "mature," for all
grades of avocados, but, as in the case of the main order, they do
not refer to oil content. [
Footnote
2/9] Since 1954, each year, the Secretary has issued
Page 373 U. S. 165
maturity regulations fixing the dates when and minimum sizes at
which the various varieties of Florida avocados may be packed and
shipped. [
Footnote 2/10] 3 These
regulations are recommended by the committee, pursuant to 7 CFR §§
915.50-915.51, approved by the Secretary after consideration and
modification if necessary, 7 CFR § 915.52(b), and published in the
Federal Register, after which they have the force of law.
California Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.
S. 534,
355 U. S.
542-543;
Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson,
316 U. S. 481,
316 U. S. 484;
Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.
S. 342,
251 U. S.
349.
II
The ultimate question for the Court is whether the California
law may validly apply to Florida avocados which the Secretary or
his inspector says are mature under the federal scheme. We in the
minority believe that it cannot, for, in our view, the California
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52,
312 U. S. 67.1
[
Footnote 2/11]
Page 373 U. S. 166
The central and unavoidable fact is that six out of every 100
Florida avocados certified as mature by federal standards are
turned away from the California markets as being immature, and are
excluded from that State by the application of a maturity test
different from the federal measure. Congress empowered the
Secretary to provide for the orderly marketing of avocados, and to
specify the quality and maturity of avocados to be transported in
interstate commerce to any and all markets. Although the Secretary
determined that these Florida avocados were mature by federal
standards and fit for sale in interstate markets, the State of
California determined that they were unfit for sale by applying a
test of the type which the Secretary had determined to be
unsatisfactory. We think the state law has erected a substantial
barrier to the accomplishment of congressional objectives.
We would hesitate to strike down the California statute if the
state regulation touched a phase of the subject matter not reached
by the federal law and a claim were nevertheless made that such
complementary state regulation is preempted,
compare Campbell
v. Hussey, 368 U. S. 297,
with Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501. But
here, the Secretary has promulgated a comprehensive and pervasive
regulatory scheme for determining the quality and maturity of
Florida avocados, pursuant to the statutory
Page 373 U. S. 167
mandate to "effectuate orderly marketing of such agricultural
commodities." He prescribes in minute detail the standards for the
size, appearance, shape, and maturity of avocados. Inspection
procedures and, for violation of the regulations, criminal and
civil sanctions are provided. No gap exists in the regulatory
scheme which would warrant state action to prevent the evils of a
no-man's land -- at least in relation to the issues presented in
this case.
Compare International Union v. Wisconsin Board,
336 U. S. 245,
336 U. S. 254.
No aspects of avocado maturity are omitted under the federal
regulations. [
Footnote 2/12] Any
additional state regulation to "supplement" federal regulation
would
pro tanto supplant it with another scheme, thereby
compromising to some degree the congressional policy expressed in
the Act. [
Footnote 2/13]
Page 373 U. S. 168
By contrast, in
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.
S. 341, upon which appellees seek to rely, the federal
agricultural regulatory scheme was partial and incomplete. It was
contended that § 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, by its own
force, preempted application of the California Agricultural Prorate
Act. The Court held that, since no marketing order concerning the
affected commodities had been promulgated under § 8c, and since the
Act's policies therefore must be deemed by the Secretary not to be
effectuated by entry into the field, it followed that there was no
preemption:
"It is evident, therefore, that the Marketing Act contemplates
the existence of state programs at least until such time as the
Secretary shall establish a federal marketing program. . . ."
Id. at
317 U. S. 354.
[
Footnote 2/14] In the case at
bar, of course, the Secretary has entered the field with his own
comprehensive regulatory program, with which the state program
conflicts.
Nor does the California statute further a distinctive interest
of the State different from the one which the federal scheme
protects.
Compare Huron Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.
S. 440;
Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen,
322 U. S. 202.
There is no health interest here. The question
Page 373 U. S. 169
is, as the District Court recognized, 197 F. Supp. at 782-783, a
purely economic one: the marketing of immature avocados, which do
not ripen properly after purchase by the consumer, but instead
shrivel up and decay, has a substantial adverse effect on consumer
demand for avocados. According to the testimony of appellees'
expert from the California Department of Agriculture, § 792 was
"deemed to be necessary by representatives in the industry due to
deplorable marketing conditions" -- the sale of immature avocados,
which was severely "damaging the reputation of the industry by
providing consumers with undesirable avocado fruits." Despite the
repeated suggestions to this effect in the Court's opinion, there
is no indication that the state regulatory scheme has any purpose
other than protecting the good will of the avocado industry -- such
as protecting health or preventing deception of the public --
unless as a purely incidental by-product. Similar findings on
damage to the industry because some growers marketed immature
avocados are contained in the United States Department of
Agriculture order which preceded the issuance of the federal
regulations. 19 Fed.Reg. at 2419, 2424. These two regulatory
schemes have precisely the same purpose, which is purely an
economic one; they seek to achieve it, however, by applying
different tests to the same avocados.
We also believe that the purpose and objective of Congress and
of the marketing order promulgated under its authority call for the
application of uniform standards of quality, even absent the total
occupation of the field by the federal regulatory scheme.
See
Guss v. Utah Board, 353 U. S. 1;
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Lack of uniformity tends to
obstruct commerce, to divide the Nation into many markets. When
produce is accepted or rejected in different localities depending
upon local vagaries, the flow of commerce is inevitably
interrupted, hindered, and diminished. In recognition of this need
for uniformity,
Page 373 U. S. 170
Congress stated at the outset of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act:
"It is declared that the disruption of the orderly exchange of
commodities in interstate commerce . . . destroys the value of
agricultural assets which support the national credit structure . .
. and burden [s] and obstruct[s] . . . commerce."
"It is declared to be the policy of Congress . . . to establish
and maintain such minimum standards of quality and maturity and
such grading and inspection requirements for agricultural
commodities . . . as will effectuate . . . orderly marketing. . .
."
§§ 1, 2, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602. The language of the statute is
buttressed by the Committee Reports, H.R.Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 22; S.Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15,
where it is said in explanation of § 10(i) that the Secretary is
authorized to negotiate with state authorities in order to secure
their voluntary compliance in carrying out the declared policy of
the Act of uniformity of regulatory programs.
The contention is made that § 8c(11) negatives the policy
declaration that uniformity is sought by the Act. That section
directs the Secretary to issue orders limited to as small a
geographic region as practicable in order to insure that due
recognition be accorded to local conditions of soil, climate, and
the like. This provision recognizes that, while uniformity at the
market-end of the flow of commerce may be necessary to prevent
burdens on commerce in produce, nationwide uniformity may be
neither necessary nor desirable at the production end of the flow
of commerce. It may be, as the Court suggests, that the Secretary
might find for other avocado growing regions, if there were any,
that different tests furnished the most convenient index of
maturity for those avocados. But it
Page 373 U. S. 171
does not follow from this premise that the statutory scheme will
permit equally varied standards in the Nation's various market
places. Section 8c(11) does not contemplate such regional
variations, nor would they comport with the statutory purpose. It
may not obstruct or burden commerce to admit avocados into commerce
on diverse bases in different parts of the country; any individual
grower in that situation would face but one standard. But it does
burden commerce and frustrate the congressional purpose when each
grower faces different standards in different markets. To slip from
permissible nonuniformity at one end of the stream of commerce to
permissible nonuniformity at the other end thus is to read the
statute too casually and gloss over the congressional purpose,
which expressly was to facilitate marketing in and transportation
to "any and all markets in the current of interstate commerce."
It is also suggested that the use of the term "minimum
standards" indicates a lack of desire for uniformity. This reads
too much into a phrase, for it is a commonplace that, when the
appropriate federal regulatory agency adopts minimum standards
which, on balance, satisfy the needs of the subject matter without
disproportionate burden on the regulatees, the balance struck is
not to be upset by the imposition of higher local standards.
See, for example, Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
236 U. S. 439. And
when the cumulative operation of more strict local law is to be
continued in such circumstances, despite the congressional balance
struck, Congress has so provided in express terms. For example, in
Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U. S. 247,
331 U. S. 255,
it was noted that the federal statute provided that
"nothing in this section or section 4b shall be construed to
impair any State law applicable to any transaction enumerated or
described in such sections."
See, to the same effect,
Plumley
v. Massachusetts,
Page 373 U. S. 172
155 U. S. 461;
Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.
S. 148,
315 U. S.
161-162.
Nothing in the Act, marketing order, or legislative history
shows any congressional intention to accommodate or permit state
controls inconsistent with federal law or marketing orders issued
thereunder. The authorization contained in § 10(i) to seek the
cooperation of state authorities in pursuit of the goal of uniform
standards of quality and maturity carries no implication that state
standards contrary to the federal are to stand. The Secretary was
not directed to defer to any State. The fact is that he did work
out a cooperative scheme with the State of Florida where the
avocados involved in this case are grown. These avocados, which
California rejected, were jointly inspected by federal and state
authorities applying the same standards in order to move mature
avocados into the stream of interstate commerce. To read into an
authorization to the Secretary to cooperate with the States a
direction that he cooperate with, or that his regulatory scheme
defer to, not only the State directly affected by a marketing order
but every other State in which avocados might be sold would clearly
frustrate the federal purpose of the orderly marketing of avocados
in interstate commerce.
We would not, as appellees would have it and as the majority
appears to suggest, construe § 10 as limiting the power of the
Secretary under § 608c to the issuance of marketing orders which
are complementary to, and not inconsistent with, state regulation.
[
Footnote 2/15] The suggestion
that
Page 373 U. S. 173
the Secretary cooperate with the States should be viewed as was
a very similar authorization to the same government official in
Rice v. Chicago Board of Trade, 331 U.
S. 247. There, the statute provided that the Secretary
of Agriculture "may cooperate with any department or agency of the
Government, any State . . . or political subdivision thereof." A
unanimous Court remarked that this provision supported
"the inference that Congress did not design a regulatory system
which excluded state regulation not in conflict with the federal
requirements,"
but it was careful to note that
"it would be quite a different matter if the Illinois Commission
adopted rules for the Board which either violated the standards of
the Act or collided with rules of the Secretary."
The conflict between federal and state law is unmistakable here.
The Secretary asserts certain Florida avocados are mature. The
state law rejects them as immature. And the conflict is over a
matter of central importance to the federal scheme. The elaborate
regulatory scheme of the marketing order is focused upon the
problem of moving mature avocados into interstate commerce. The
maturity regulations are not peripheral aspects of the federal
scheme.
Compare International Assn. of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617. On
the contrary, in the Department of Agriculture order which
Page 373 U. S. 174
preceded issuance of the avocado regulations, it was found that
the marketing of immature avocados was one of the principal
problems, if not the principal problem, faced by the industry, and
that these regulations should be adopted to solve this problem,
which was demoralizing the industry. 19 Fed.Reg. at 2419, 2424.
[
Footnote 2/16] The conflict
involved in this case therefore cannot properly be deemed "too
contingent, too remotely related to" (356 U.S. at
356 U. S. 621)
the policy and purpose of the Act to call for requiring the
inconsistent state scheme to defer or be accommodated to the
federal one.
California nevertheless argues that it should be permitted to
apply its oil test cumulatively with the federal test to insure
that only mature avocados are offered in its markets. The Court
accepts this contention as "a well settled proposition," in the
name of
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.
S. 148, and the uncited "all the authorities," which
appear to be nonexistent,
ante p.
373 U.S. 144 and n. 13. There are at
least three answers to this contention. [
Footnote 2/17] First, it ignores the limitations of the
8% oil test as applied to the inherently less oily Florida
avocados, which the District Court indicated were "acceptable prior
to the time that they reach that content." As applied to California
avocados, the 8% oil figure leaves an ample tolerance for
individual variation, but it is otherwise as applied to the less
oily Florida varieties. Second, if the argument is that the federal
test is unsatisfactory, and that the California test is a better
one -- as it would appear to be in view of the reliance on "a
higher standard,"
Page 373 U. S. 175
which, in this case, means only a more accurate standard,
because no one asserts that some avocados can be less highly mature
than others, and therefore ripen less fully -- it must be
remembered that the Secretary, to whom Congress delegated its
power, made a legislative finding in his order adopting the picking
date-size method of determining maturity and specifically rejecting
physical chemical tests of the California type. That finding cannot
be impeached collaterally in this proceeding. Adopting one maturity
test, rather than another "is a legislative, not a judicial,
choice," and its validity
"is not to be determined by weighing in the judicial scales the
merits of the legislative choice and rejecting it if the weight of
evidence presented in court appears to favor a different
standard."
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U. S. 177,
303 U. S. 191.
See Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co.,
318 U. S. 218;
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.
S. 144. Neither California nor this Court has any place
second-guessing the wisdom of Congress or its delegate. Third,
Congress did not limit its interest to the picking of avocados, nor
even to their transportation in commerce to markets in other
States. It expressly declared its intention to regulate the
maturity and quality of produce "which may be marketed in . . . any
and all interstate markets." Congress sought to regulate marketing
from the beginning through the end of the stream of commerce in
order to eliminate impediments at any part of that stream. The
Court ignores the plain words of the statute in concluding that the
California law does not frustrate the federal scheme.
Even if the California oil test were an acceptable test for the
maturity of the Florida avocados, which the Secretary found it was
not, the cumulative application of that test solely for the purpose
of a second check on the maturity of Florida avocados, solely to
catch possible errors in the federal scheme, would prove only that
the particular
Page 373 U. S. 176
avocados actually tested (and thereby destroyed) were immature,
and it would not justify the rejection of whole lots from which
these samples came. If Florida avocados are to be subjected to this
test, the alternatives are to leave the California market to the
California producers (at least, to producers of Mexican varieties)
or else, in order to avoid the hazard of rejection, to leave the
Florida avocados on the trees past the normal (and federally
prescribed) picking date, thereby shortening the post-picking
marketing period and thus frustrating the federal scheme aimed at
moving avocados mature under federal standards into all interstate
markets. [
Footnote 2/18] A
reasonable balancing of the state and federal interests at stake
here requires that the former give way as too insubstantial to
warrant frustration of the congressional purpose.
We have, then, a case where the federal regulatory scheme is
comprehensive, pervasive, and without a hiatus which the state
regulations could fill. Both the subject matter and the statute
call for uniformity. The conflict is substantial -- at least six
out of every 100 federally certified avocados are barred for
failure to pass the California test [
Footnote 2/19] -- and it is located in a central
portion of the federal
Page 373 U. S. 177
scheme. The effect of the conflict is to disrupt and burden the
flow of commerce and the sale of Florida avocados in distant
markets, contrary to the congressional policy underlying the Act .
The State may have a legitimate economic interest in the subject
matter, but it is adequately served by the federal regulations, and
this interest would be but slightly impaired, if at all, by the
supersession of § 792. [
Footnote
2/20]
In such circumstances, the state law should give way; it
"becomes inoperative and the federal legislation exclusive in its
application."
Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.
S. 148,
315 U. S. 156.
Accord, McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.
S. 115;
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.
S. 538. The conclusion is inescapable that the
California law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the congressional purposes and objectives, and that the
California law and
Page 373 U. S. 178
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as supplemented by the
regulations promulgated thereunder, cannot be reconciled, and
cannot consistently stand together. [
Footnote 2/21] The Court should not allow avocados
certified as mature under the federal marketing order to be
embargoed by any State because it thinks that they are immature. We
would therefore reverse with instructions to grant the injunction
requested.
[
Footnote 2/1]
There is no question in this case as to whether the California
oil content law keeps out of California Florida avocados which pass
the federal test. In their motion to dismiss and the accompanying
sworn affidavit below, the appellee state officers gave 6.4% as the
average rejection figure per year, over a four-year period, basing
the percentage on the official records of the California Department
of Agriculture. Rejections reached a high of 16.4% in the 1955-1956
season. It is hard to understand the Court's refusal to consider
the figures because of the way they entered the record.
See
ante, p.
373 U. S. 136
and n. 3, and p.
373 U. S. 157.
We believe appellees' sworn statements as to the State's official
records are properly before the Court now, and that, in any event,
they will come into the record shortly, since it is clear that, on
remand, the same data will come in via deposition. If the majority
actually has any doubt on this score, and believes that accepting
as a fact that California rejects six out of every 100 Florida
avocados as immature would have an effect on the result, it should
remand for further findings on preemption, as it does on burden on
commerce. The same papers below, and the opinion of the District
Court, 197 F. Supp. at 783, reveal that about 5% of the appellants'
shipments to California have been rejected for failure to attain
the 8% oil content required under California law. The record is
silent on the
in terrorem effect of the California law on
interstate commerce in Florida avocados, and we therefore do not
consider it here.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Avocados not meeting this standard may not be sold in
California, are "declared to be a public nuisance," and they may be
seized, condemned, and abated. Violators may be punished criminally
and by civil penalty action.
See ante, p.
373 U. S. 134,
at n. 1.
[
Footnote 2/3]
It is not contended that the purpose of the 8% minimum oil
content requirement is for the purpose of insuring a high caloric
or other nutritional content in the fruit. No health issue has been
raised in this case.
Cf. 197 F. Supp. at 785-786. Nor has
it been contended at any stage of the proceedings that the
statutory purpose is directly to protect local consumers from
fraudulent and deceptive practices; moreover, there is no evidence
to support that view.
[
Footnote 2/4]
"Mexican varieties of avocados contain (generally speaking) the
highest oil content of any varieties, when mature. Hybrid varieties
attain the next highest oil percentages, and West Indian the
lowest. Hybrid varieties generally attain oil content in excess of
8% if left on the trees long enough, but they do not necessarily
attain such an oil content by the time that they may be marketed
under the Florida Avocado Order. They are mature enough to be
acceptable prior to the time that they reach that content,
according to plaintiffs' witnesses."
197 F. Supp. at 783.
While it would appear to be theoretically feasible to determine
the proper oil content to gauge maturity for each different variety
of avocado, this is highly impracticable, as the District Court
pointed out; over 40 varieties of avocado are marketed in Florida.
Id. at 785.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The findings of the United States Department of Agriculture,
contained in its order determining what terms should be contained
in the avocado regulations, were that the marketing of immature
fruits increases consumer resistance and materially impairs the
marketing of the entire crop, that there was no satisfactory
physical or chemical test for determining maturity, and that
maturity can satisfactorily be determined by the picking date-size
method. Handling of Avocados Grown in South Florida, 19 Fed.Reg.
2418, 2424-2425 (Dept. of Agr.Dkt. No. A254).
California has a statute similar to the federal law, the
California Marketing Act, Cal.Agr.Code §§ 1300.10-1300.29, which
allows the Director of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders
when a majority of the affected handlers or producers assent.
Id., § 1300.16(a). The purpose of the Act is to restore
and maintain adequate purchasing power for California agricultural
producers, establish orderly marketing, provide uniform grading,
develop new and larger markets and maintain present markets for
produce grown within the State, eliminate trade barriers which
obstruct the free flow of such produce to the market, and permit
the issuance of marketing orders which assure stabilized and
orderly distribution of produce.
Id., §§ 1300.10, 1300.29;
Brock v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.
App. 2d 594, 598, 241 P.2d 283, 286. The Director promulgated
an avocado marketing order in 1960, and it has been upheld as valid
in the state courts.
Child v. Warne, 194 Cal. App.
2d 623, 15 Cal. Rptr. 437.
[
Footnote 2/6]
This is the customary method of administering marketing orders
under the Act.
See, e.g., 7 CFR §§ 905.51, 906.39, 907.51,
907.63, 908.51, 908.63, 909.51, 909.52, 910.51, 910.65, 911.51. In
the case of the avocado order,
supra, 373
U.S. 132fn2/5|>note 5, the Department specifically
determined that this would be the appropriate method to administer
the regulatory program. 19 Fed.Reg. at 2422-2423.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Section .53 provides that such exemption shall be granted under
procedural rules approved by the Secretary. Section .52(b) would
appear to provide for review of particular determinations before
the Secretary, taken by a party aggrieved thereby or taken by the
Secretary
sua sponte. Exemption under § .53 is allowed
only from the picking date-size standards prescribed under §
.51(a)(1), and not from other regulations such as quality (§
.51(a)(2)), container and packaging (§ .51(a)(3)), or grading and
labeling (§ .51(a)(4)). And inspection by the Federal-State
Inspection Service for these standards and those set out as the
terms and conditions of advance release under § .53 is, of course,
required.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Violation of the order is punishable by a fine of from $50 to
$500. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(14). Violations of regulations may also be
made punishable by the Secretary by a penalty not to exceed $100. 7
U.S.C. § 10(c).
[
Footnote 2/9]
These regulations and others, 7 CFR §§ 51.3055-51.3069, govern
in exhaustive detail the size and shape of avocados, their color,
skin condition, stem length, and the manner in which they may be
shipped.
[
Footnote 2/10]
27 Fed.Reg. 5135-5136, 6705, 8265, 9175, 10091; 26 Fed.Reg.
3692, 4928, 5418-5419, 6429, 7694, 8663; 25 Fed.Reg. 5476, 7712,
8903, 9170, 9888; 24 Fed.Reg. 1152, 3105, 4050, 4828, 5824-5825,
6904, 7354, 8444, 9123, 9262; 23 Fed.Reg. 1025-1026, 4351-4352,
5477, 6318, 7344, 7943, 8047, 9056, 9689; 22 Fed.Reg. 3652,
4251-4252, 5680, 6746, 7173-7174, 7357-7358, 8118; 21 Fed.Reg.
3307-3308, 3488, 6329-6330; 20 Fed.Reg. 3427, 4178-4179, 6699-6700,
7876, 8328-8329, 8688; 19 Fed.Reg. 4404-4405, 4601, 4862, 5469,
5966, 5967, 6368, 6604, 6625, 7477. Similar orders have been issued
from time to time concerning maturity of imported avocados.
See, e.g., 25 Fed.Reg. 5445; 24 Fed.Reg. 4134, 4829, 5825,
5996; 23 Fed.Reg. 4352, 6027; 22 Fed.Reg. 3957; 21 Fed.Reg.
4257.
[
Footnote 2/11]
"There is not -- and, from the very nature of the problem, there
cannot be -- any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a
universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act
of Congress. This Court, in considering the validity of state laws
in the light of . . . federal laws touching the same subject, has
made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to;
occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability;
inconsistency; violation; curtailment, and interference. But none
of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test, or
an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there
can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary
function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this
particular case, Pennsylvania's law
stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52,
312 U. S. 67.
(Emphasis added.)
Compare ante, p.
373 U. S.
141.
[
Footnote 2/12]
We do not imply that these regulations governing the fitness of
avocados in terms of maturity would preclude application of local
regulations concerning, for example, bacteria content or DDT
content.
Cf. Huron Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.
S. 440. Neither health regulation nor safety
considerations,
cf. Lyons v. Thrifty Drug Stores
Co., 105 Cal. App.
2d 844, 234 P.2d 62, are involved in this case. And there is no
finding that there is anything fraudulent, deceptive, or
unmarketable about a Florida avocado which is mature enough to be
introduced into interstate commerce under a federal certificate
evidencing its quality.
Compare Plumley v. Massachusetts,
155 U. S. 461,
155 U. S. 472,
quoted
ante, p.
373 U.S.
144.
[
Footnote 2/13]
It was suggested that there is a gap in the federal scheme
through which immature avocados may enter commerce bearing an
exemption certificate issued "seemingly . . . in the unfettered
discretion of the growers' own Committee." This contention omits
the requirement of § .53 that exemption from the normal picking
date-size provisions be allowed only to avocados inspected and
proved mature because they satisfied special maturity tests
prescribed under procedures approved by the Secretary, and the fact
that such avocados carry a federal certificate as to maturity and
quality. It also omits the Secretary's general review power over
regulatory determinations provided by § .52(b). No contention has
been made that actual abuses have occurred under the exemption
certificate provisions, nor has any basis upon which they may be
anticipated been suggested.
[
Footnote 2/14]
It also came out, by representation of the Solicitor General as
amicus curiae before this Court, that the Department of
Agriculture had collaborated in drafting the state raisin program,
and had taken other actions which
"must be taken as an expression of opinion by the Department of
Agriculture that the state program is consistent with the policies
of the Agricultural Adjustment and Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Acts."
Id. at
317 U. S. 358.
Hence, in holding
"We find no conflict between the two acts [state and federal],
and no such occupation of the legislative field by the mere
adoption of the [federal] Act, without the issuance of any order by
the Secretary putting it into effect, as would preclude the
effective operation of the state act,"
the Court expressly declared,
"We have no occasion to decide whether the same conclusion would
follow if the state program had not been adopted with the
collaboration of officials of the Department of Agriculture."
Id. at
317 U. S.
358
[
Footnote 2/15]
We note that § 1300.24(b) of the California Agricultural Code
contains a provision similar to federal § 10(i):
"The director is hereby authorized to confer with and cooperate
with the legally constituted authorities of other States and of the
United States for the purpose of obtaining uniformity in the
administration of Federal and State marketing regulations, licenses
or orders, and said director is authorized to conduct joint
hearings, issue joint or concurrent marketing orders, for the
purposes and within the standards set forth in this act, and may
exercise any administrative authority prescribed by this act to
effect such uniformity of administration and regulation."
Under the reasoning suggested to us, the California law should
be construed not to apply to Florida avocados marketed under a
federal order.
And see Oil Workers Union v. Missouri,
361 U. S. 363,
361 U. S. 370;
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.
S. 740,
315 U. S. 746;
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.
S. 270,
309 U. S. 277;
Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118,
250 U. S.
122.
[
Footnote 2/16]
"Probably the most important single factor of quality is that of
maturity." 19 Fed.Reg. at 2424.
[
Footnote 2/17]
To the extent that this contention is to be understood to be
limited to "all the authorities" supporting "a higher standard for
consumers," we have already indicated, pp.
373 U. S.
168-169,
supra, that the California law is not
aimed at consumer protection, but at avocado grower protection.
[
Footnote 2/18]
The avocado may remain hard and in perfect condition on the tree
for some time after reaching maturity, for the fruit does not
soften until after it is picked. But the harvesting and shipping of
fruit which has reached the fullest possible degree of maturity on
the tree is not recommended. The seed may sprout while the fruit is
on the tree or the fruit may ripen so rapidly after harvesting that
it cannot be shipped satisfactorily. Ruchle, The Florida Avocado
Industry, 70 (Univ. of Fla. Agr. Expt. Sta. Bull. No. 602, 1958);
Wolfe, Toy and Stahl, Avocado Production in Florida, 83 (Ruchle
rev. ed., Fla. Agr. Ext. Serv. Bull. No. 141, 1949).
[
Footnote 2/19]
There is no indication in the record as to how many Florida
avocados are kept out of the California market by the prudence of
growers and handlers who voluntarily avoid the risks of the
California oil test. Nor are we advised as to whether other States
have adopted avocado legislation, so that the cumulative burden on
commerce is further increased. In any event, 6% is a not
insubstantial figure in terms of restraints upon commerce.
[
Footnote 2/20]
It is suggested that the regulations involved here are "simply
schemes for regulating competition among growers . . . initiated
and administered by the growers and shippers themselves." From this
proposition, it is in some way reasoned that "the self-help
standards of this marketing program" should not be deemed to
preclude application of state law which conflicts with and
interferes with the operation of the comprehensive federal
marketing program. The "simply" part of the proposition overlooks,
however, the fact that these are the Secretary's regulations,
promulgated under congressional authority. It also overlooks the
Secretary's extensive supervisory powers, and his statutory duty
under 7 U.S.C. § 602(3) to insure that regulations be carried on
"in the public interest." And no case has been cited to us which
indicates that the delegation to the regulatees of the power to
propose regulations in the first instance violates any provision of
general law.
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.
S. 341,
317 U. S. 352;
Sunshine Anthracite Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.
S. 381;
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op.,
307 U. S. 533,
307 U. S.
577-578;
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S.
1,
306 U. S. 16;
Johnson Co. v. Securities Exchange Comm'n, 198 F.2d 690,
695 (C.A.2d Cir.).
[
Footnote 2/21]
And see Castle v. Hayes Lines, Inc., 348 U. S.
61;
First Iowa Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
328 U. S. 152;
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1;
Dumont Labs. v.
Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (C.A.3d Cir.). The suggestion,
ante, p.
373 U. S. 141,
that the doctrine of
Gibbons v. Ogden is limited to
carriers is unwarranted in view of such cases as
First
Iowa.