A collective bargaining contract between an employer in a
business affecting interstate commerce and a union of its employees
reserved to the employer the right to discharge any employee for
unsatisfactory work and provided for compulsory, final and binding
settlement by arbitration of any dispute between the employer and
any employee; but it did not contain an explicit no-strike clause
applicable to such disputes. The employer discharged an employee
for unsatisfactory work, and the union called a strike to force the
employer to rehire him. The employer sued the union in a Washington
State Court for damages for business losses caused by the strike.
The trial court awarded a judgment in favor of the employer, and a
Department of the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. Without
petitioning that Court for a rehearing en banc, the union
petitioned this Court for certiorari, which was granted.
Held:
1. Under Washington law, the judgment below was a final judgment
of the State's highest court, and this Court has jurisdiction of
this case under 28 U.S.C. §1257.
Gorman v. Washington
University, 316 U. S. 98,
distinguished. Pp.
369 U. S.
98-101.
2. Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 197,
did not deprive the state courts of jurisdiction over this case.
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.
S. 502. P.
369 U. S.
101.
3. In a case such as this, incompatible doctrines of local law
must give way to principles of federal labor law. Pp.
369 U. S.
102-104.
4. Under federal labor law, a strike to settle a dispute which a
collective bargaining agreement provides shall be settled
exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration constitutes a
violation of the agreement, even when the agreement does not
contain an explicit no-strike clause. Pp.
369 U. S.
104-106.
57 Wash. 2d
95,
356 P.2d 1,
affirmed.
Page 369 U. S. 96
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner and the respondent (which we shall call the union
and the employer) were parties to a collective bargaining contract
within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act. The
contract contained the following provisions, among others:
"
ARTICLE II"
"The Employer reserves the right to discharge any man in his
employ if his work is not satisfactory."
"
* * * *"
"
ARTICLE XIV"
"Should any difference as to the true interpretation of this
agreement arise, same shall be submitted to a Board of Arbitration
of two members, one representing the firm and one representing the
Union. If said members cannot agree, a third member, who must be a
disinterested party, shall be selected, and the decision of the
said Board of Arbitration shall be binding. It is further agreed by
both parties hereto that, during such arbitration, there shall be
no suspension of work."
"Should any difference arise between the employer and the
employee, same shall be submitted to arbitration by both parties.
Failing to agree, they shall mutually appoint a third person whose
decision shall be final and binding. "
Page 369 U. S. 97
In May of 1958, an employee named Welsch was discharged by the
employer after he had damaged a new fork-lift truck by running it
off a loading platform and onto some railroad tracks. When a
business agent of the union protested, he was told by a
representative of the employer that Welsch had been discharged
because of unsatisfactory work. The union thereupon called a strike
to force the employer to rehire Welsch. The strike lasted eight
days. [
Footnote 1] After the
strike was over, the issue of Welsch's discharge was submitted to
arbitration. Some five months later, the Board of Arbitration
rendered a decision, ruling that Welsch's work had been
unsatisfactory, that his unsatisfactory work had been the reason
for his discharge, and that he was not entitled to reinstatement as
an employee.
In the meantime, the employer had brought this suit against the
union in the Superior Court of King County, Washington, asking
damages for business losses caused by the strike. After a trial
that court entered a judgment in favor of the employer in the
amount of $6,501.60. [
Footnote
2] On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by Department One of
the Supreme Court of Washington.
57 Wash. 2d
95,
356 P.2d 1.
The reviewing court held that the preemption doctrine of
San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.
S. 236, did not deprive it of jurisdiction over the
controversy. The court further held that § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185, could not
"reasonably be interpreted as preempting state jurisdiction, or as
affecting it by limiting the substantive law to be applied." 57
Wash. 2d at 102, 356 P.2d at 5. Expressly applying principles of
state law, the court reasoned that the strike was a violation
Page 369 U. S. 98
of the collective bargaining contract, because it was an attempt
to coerce the employer to forego his contractual right to discharge
an employee for unsatisfactory work. [
Footnote 3] We granted certiorari to consider questions of
federal labor law which this case presents. 365 U.S. 868.
We note at the outset a question as to our jurisdiction.
Although the judgment before us has been certified as that of the
Supreme Court of Washington, this case was actually heard and
decided by Department One of that court, consisting of five of the
nine members of the full court. Since the union could have filed a
petition for rehearing en banc but did not do so, the argument is
made that the judgment before us was not "rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had," and that the
judgment is one we therefore have no power to review. 28 U.S.C. §
1257. This argument primarily rests upon
Gorman v. Washington
University, 316 U. S. 98, which
held that, in view of the structure of Missouri's judicial system,
a separate division of the Supreme Court of that State was not the
highest state court in which a decision of a federal question could
be had. [
Footnote 4] It is
evident, however, that the law governing rehearings in the Supreme
Court of Washington is quite unlike the particularized provisions
of Missouri law which led this Court to dismiss the writ in
Gorman.
Page 369 U. S. 99
As the opinion in
Gorman pointed out, the Constitution
of the State of Missouri expressly conferred the right to an en
banc rehearing by the Supreme Court of Missouri in any case
originally decided by a division of the court in which a federal
question was involved. It was this provision of the state
constitution which was the basis for the conclusion in
Gorman that the State of Missouri did not regard a
decision by a division of the court as the final step in the state
appellate process in a case involving a federal question. "[T]he
constitution of Missouri," it was said, "has thus provided in this
class of cases for review of the judgment of a division. . . ." 316
U.S. at
316 U. S.
100.
By contrast, a rehearing en banc before the Supreme Court of
Washington is not granted as a matter of right. The Constitution
and statutes of the State of Washington authorize its Supreme Court
to sit in two Departments, each of which is empowered "to hear and
determine causes, and all questions arising therein." [
Footnote 5] Cases coming before
Page 369 U. S. 100
the court may be assigned to a Department or to the court en
banc at the discretion of the Chief Justice and a specified number
of other members of the court. [
Footnote 6] The state law further provides that the
decision of a Department becomes a final judgment of the Supreme
Court of Washington, unless within 30 days a petition for rehearing
has been filed, or a rehearing has been ordered on the court's own
initiative. [
Footnote 7]
We can discern in Washington's system no indication that the
decision in the present case, rendered unanimously
Page 369 U. S. 101
by a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court of Washington,
was other than the final word of the State's final court. [
Footnote 8] This case is thus properly
before us, and we turn to the issues which it presents.
One of those issues -- whether § 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 deprives state courts of jurisdiction over
litigation such as this -- we have decided this Term in
Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502. For
the reasons stated in our opinion in that case, we hold that the
Washington Supreme Court was correct in ruling that it had
jurisdiction over this controversy. [
Footnote 9]
Page 369 U. S. 102
There remain for consideration two other issues, one of them
implicated but not specifically decided in
Dowd Box. Was
the Washington court free, as it thought, to decide this
controversy within the limited horizon of its local law? If not,
does applicable federal law require a result in this case different
from that reached by the state court?
In
Dowd Box, we proceeded upon the hypothesis that
state courts would apply federal law in exercising jurisdiction
over litigation within the purview of § 301(a), although, in that
case, there was no claim of any variance in relevant legal
principles as between the federal law and that of Massachusetts. In
the present case, by contrast, the Washington court held that there
was nothing in § 301 "limiting the substantive law to be applied,"
and the court accordingly proceeded to dispose of this litigation
exclusively in terms of local contract law. The union insists that
the case was one to be decided by reference to federal law, and
that, under applicable principles of national labor law, the strike
was not a violation of the collective bargaining contract. We hold
that, in a case such as this, incompatible doctrines of local law
must give way to principles of federal labor law. [
Footnote 10] We
Page 369 U. S. 103
further hold, however, that application of such principles to
this case leads to affirmance of the judgment before us.
It was apparently the theory of the Washington court that,
although
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U. S. 448,
requires the federal courts to fashion, from the policy of our
national labor laws, a body of federal law for the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements, nonetheless, the courts of the
States remain free to apply individualized local rules when called
upon to enforce such agreements. This view cannot be accepted. The
dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive
principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area
covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is inherent in the
process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of
Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind
covered by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal
labor policy.
More important, the subject matter of § 301(a) "is peculiarly
one that calls for uniform law."
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 250 U. S. 566,
250 U. S. 569;
see Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.
S. 148,
315 U. S.
167-169. The possibility that individual contract terms
might have different meanings under state and federal law would
inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation
and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party
could be certain of the rights which it had obtained or conceded,
the process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably
more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract
provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two
or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing
the contract. Once the collective bargain was
Page 369 U. S. 104
made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation
under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong
disputes as to its interpretation. [
Footnote 11] Indeed, the existence of possibly
conflicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties'
willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral
or judicial resolution of disputes.
The importance of the area which would be affected by separate
systems of substantive law makes the need for a single body of
federal law particularly compelling. The ordering and adjusting of
competing interests through a process of free and voluntary
collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to
promote industrial peace. State law which frustrates the effort of
Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that process thus
strikes at the very core of federal labor policy. With due regard
to the many factors which bear upon competing state and federal
interests in this area,
California v. Zook, 336 U.
S. 725,
336 U. S.
730-731;
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U. S. 218,
331 U. S.
230-231, we cannot but conclude that, in enacting § 301,
Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to
prevail over inconsistent local rules.
Whether, as a matter of federal law, the strike which the union
called was a violation of the collective bargaining contract is
thus the ultimate issue which this case presents. It is argued that
there could be no violation in the absence of a no-strike clause in
the contract
Page 369 U. S. 105
explicitly covering the subject of the dispute over which the
strike was called. We disagree.
The collective bargaining contract expressly imposed upon both
parties the duty of submitting the dispute in question to final and
binding arbitration. [
Footnote
12] In a consistent course of decisions, the Courts of Appeals
of at least five Federal Circuits have held that a strike to settle
a dispute which a collective bargaining agreement provides shall be
settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration
constitutes a violation of the agreement. [
Footnote 13] The National Labor Relations Board
has reached the same conclusion. W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B.
1040. We approve that doctrine. [
Footnote 14] To hold otherwise would obviously do
violence to accepted principles of traditional contract law. Even
more in point, a contrary view would be completely at odds with the
basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral
process as a substitute for economic warfare.
See United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.
S. 574.
Page 369 U. S. 106
What has been said is not to suggest that a no-strike agreement
is to be implied beyond the area which it has been agreed will be
exclusively covered by compulsory terminal arbitration. Nor is it
to suggest that there may not arise problems in specific cases as
to whether compulsory and binding arbitration has been agreed upon,
and, if so, as to what disputes have been made arbitrable.
[
Footnote 15] But no such
problems are present in this case. The grievance over which the
union struck was, as it concedes, one which it had expressly agreed
to settle by submission to final and binding arbitration
proceedings. The strike which it called was a violation of that
contractual obligation.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The strike was terminated by a temporary injunction issued by
the state court.
[
Footnote 2]
The amount of damages is not in issue here.
[
Footnote 3]
The court noted that the unreported memorandum opinion of the
trial judge indicated a theory of liability based upon tort, rather
than contract, liability. The appellate court said, however:
"From the pleadings, the theory is established that the
respondent was injured by the appellant's breach of contract, and
this theory is clearly supported by the record. Therefore, the rule
that the judgment of the trial court will be sustained on any
theory established by the pleadings and supported by the proof is
applicable."
57 Wash. 2d at 103, 356 P.2d at 6.
[
Footnote 4]
See also Osment v. Pitcairn, 317 U.S. 587.
[
Footnote 5]
Article IV, § 2 of the state constitution provides, in pertinent
part,
"The legislature may increase the number of judges of the
supreme court from time to time and may provide for separate
departments of said court."
Revised Code of Washington, § 2.04.120, provides:
"
Two departments -- Quorum. There shall be two
departments of the supreme court, denominated respectively
department one and department two. The chief justice shall assign
four of the associate judges to each department and such assignment
may be changed by him from time to time:
Provided, That
the associate judges shall be competent to sit in either department
and may interchange with one another by agreement among themselves,
or if no such agreement be made, as ordered by the chief justice.
The chief justice may sit in either department and shall preside
when so sitting, but the judges assigned to each department shall
select one of their number as presiding judge. Each of the
departments shall have the power to hear and determine causes, and
all questions arising therein, subject to the provisions in
relation to the court en banc. The presence of three judges shall
be necessary to transact any business in either of the departments,
except such as may be done at chambers, but one or more of the
judges may from time to time adjourn to the same effect as if all
were present, and a concurrence of three judges shall be necessary
to pronounce a decision in each department:
Provided, That
if three do not concur, the cause shall be reheard in the same
department or transmitted to the other department, or to the court
en banc."
[
Footnote 6]
Revised Code of Washington, § 2.04.150, provides:
"
Apportionment of business -- En banc hearings. The
chief justice shall from time to time apportion the business to the
departments, and may, in his discretion, before a decision is
pronounced, order any cause pending before the court to be heard
and determined by the court en banc. When a cause has been allotted
to one of the departments and a decision pronounced therein, the
chief justice, together with any two associate judges, may order
such cause to be heard and decided by the court en banc. Any four
judges may, either before or after decision by a department, order
a cause to be heard en banc."
[
Footnote 7]
Revised Code of Washington, § 2.04.160, provides:
"
Finality of departmental decision -- Rehearings. The
decision of a department, except in cases otherwise ordered as
hereinafter provided, shall not become final until thirty days
after the filing thereof, during which period a petition for
rehearing, or for a hearing en banc, may be filed, the filing of
either of which, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall
have the effect of suspending such decision until the same shall
have been disposed of. If no such petition be filed the decision of
a department shall become final thirty days from the date of its
filing, unless during such thirty-day period an order for a hearing
en banc shall have been made: . . . Whenever a decision shall
become final, as herein provided, a judgment shall issue
thereon."
[
Footnote 8]
See Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
324 U. S. 548,
324 U. S.
551-552. In recent years we have, without challenge,
reviewed on their merits several cases decided by a Department of
the Washington Supreme Court in which no petition for rehearing en
banc had been filed.
See, e.g., McGrath v. Rhay,
364 U. S. 279;
Ross v. Schneckloth, 357 U. S. 575;
United States v. Carroll Construction Co., 346 U.S.
802.
[
Footnote 9]
Since this was a suit for violation of a collective bargaining
contract within the purview of § 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, the preemptive doctrine of cases such as
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.
S. 236, based upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board, is not relevant.
See Local
4264, United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352
(C.A.10th Cir.);
Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard
Oil Co., 235 F.2d 401 (C.A.3d Cir.);
see generally Lodge
No. 12, District No. 37, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron
Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (C.A.5th Cir.);
Plumbers &
Steamfitters Union, Local 598 v. Dillion, 255 F.2d 820
(C.A.9th Cir.);
International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 181 v. Dahlem Const. Co., 193 F.2d 470 (C.A.6th Cir.).
As pointed out in
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368
U.S. at
368 U. S. 513,
Congress "deliberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective
agreements
to the usual processes of the law.'" See
also H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 52,
U.S.Code Cong.Service 1947, p. 1135. It is, of course, true that
conduct which is a violation of a contractual obligation may also
be conduct constituting an unfair labor practice, and what has been
said is not to imply that enforcement by a court of a contract
obligation affects the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. to remedy
unfair labor practices, as such. See generally Dunau,
Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems, 57 Col.L.Rev. 52.
[
Footnote 10]
Of the many state courts which have assumed jurisdiction over
suits involving contracts subject to § 301, few have explicitly
considered the problem of state versus federal law.
McCarroll
v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45,
60, 315 P.2d 322, 330, held that federal law must govern.
Accord: Local Lodge No. 774, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 186 Kan. 569,
352 P.2d
420;
Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. United Brick and
Clay Workers, Local 702, 339
S.W.2d 933, 935-936 (Ky.Ct.App.). Other courts have found it
unnecessary to decide the question, because they found no conflict
between state and federal law on the issues presented.
Karcz v.
Luther Mfg. Co., 338 Mass. 313, 317,
155
N.E.2d 441, 444;
Springer v. Powder Power Tool Corp.,
220 Or. 102, 106-107,
348 P.2d
1112, 1114;
Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis.2d 264,
277, 99 N.W.2d 132, 100 N.W.2d 317, 318 (on motion for rehearing).
It bears noting, however, that these courts and others,
e.g.,
Connecticut Co. v. Division 425, Street, Electric Railway
Employees, 147 Conn. 608, 622-623, 164 A.2d 413, 420, have
carefully considered applicable federal precedents in resolving the
litigation before them.
[
Footnote 11]
As one commentator has said:
"Words in any legal document are ambiguous, but the body of law
which grows up in an area through decision helps to dispel this
ambiguity. The existence of two bodies of law which cannot be
accommodated by any conflict of laws rule, however, is calculated
to aggravate, rather than to alleviate, the situation."
Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. of Chi.L.Rev.
542, 557.
[
Footnote 12]
It appears that this would be true whether the dispute be
considered as a "difference as to the true interpretation of this
agreement" or as a difference "between the employer and the
employee" under Article XIV of the contract.
See p.
369 U. S. 96,
supra. The union not only now concedes that the dispute as
to Welsch's discharge was subject to final and binding arbitration,
but, indeed, after the strike, the dispute was so arbitrated.
[
Footnote 13]
See Local 25, Teamsters Union v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230
F.2d 576, 583-584 (C.A.1st Cir.);
United Construction Workers
v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 876-877 (C.A.4th Cir.);
Labor Board v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589, 592
(C.A.5th Cir.);
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d
346, 351 (C.A.6th Cir.);
Labor Board v. Sunset Minerals,
211 F.2d 224, 226 (C.A.9th Cir.).
[
Footnote 14]
Deciding the case as we do upon this explicit ground, we do not
adopt the reasoning of the Washington court. Insofar as the
language of that court's opinion is susceptible to the construction
that a strike during the term of a collective bargaining agreement
is
ipso facto a violation of the agreement, we expressly
reject it.
[
Footnote 15]
With respect to such problems, compare
United Mine Workers
v. Labor Board, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 257 F.2d 211,
with
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (affirmed on this
question by an equally divided Court,
361 U.
S. 459), for differing interpretations of an identical
contract.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
The petitioner local union and the respondent company entered
into a written collective bargaining agreement containing an
express provision for the arbitration of disputes growing out of
differences as to the proper application of the agreement in the
following terms:
"Should any difference arise between the employer and the
employee, same shall be submitted to arbitration by both parties.
Failing to agree, they shall mutually appoint a third person whose
decision shall be final and binding."
The Court now finds -- out of clear air, so far as I can see --
that the union, without saying so in the agreement, not only agreed
to arbitrate such differences, but also promised that there would
be no strike while arbitration of a dispute was pending under this
provision. And on the
Page 369 U. S. 107
basis of its "discovery" of this additional unwritten promise by
the union, the Court upholds a judgment awarding the company
substantial damages for a strike in breach of contract.
That the Court's decision actually vacates and amends the
contract that the parties themselves had made and signed is shown,
I think, by the very face of that original contract. The
arbitration provision covering disputes growing out of the
application of the contract immediately follows another quite
different arbitration provision -- one covering disputes "as to the
true interpretation of this agreement" in the following terms:
"Should any difference as to the true interpretation of this
agreement arise, same shall be submitted to a Board of Arbitration
of two members, one representing the firm, and one representing the
Union. If said members cannot agree, a third member, who must be a
disinterested party shall be selected, and the decision of the said
Board of Arbitration shall be binding.
It is further agreed by
both parties hereto that during such arbitration, there shall be no
suspension of work."
(Emphasis supplied.) In view of the fact that this latter
provision contains an explicit promise by the union "that during
such arbitration, there shall be no suspension of work," it seems
to me plain that the parties to this contract, knowing how to write
a provision binding a union not to strike, deliberately included a
no-strike clause with regard to disputes over broad questions of
contractual interpretation and deliberately excluded such a clause
with regard to the essentially factual disputes arising out of the
application of the contract in particular instances. And there is
not a word anywhere else in this agreement which indicates that
this perfectly sensible contractual framework for handling these
two different kinds of disputes was not
Page 369 U. S. 108
intended to operate in the precise manner dictated by the
express language of the two arbitration provisions.
The defense offered for the Court's rewriting of the contract
which the parties themselves made is that to allow the parties' own
contract to stand "would obviously do violence to accepted
principles of traditional contract law," and "be completely at odds
with the basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the
arbitral process." I had supposed, however -- though evidently the
Court thinks otherwise -- that the job of courts enforcing
contracts was to give legal effect to what the contracting parties
actually agree to do, not to what courts think they ought to do. In
any case, I have been unable to find any accepted principle of
contract law -- traditional or otherwise -- that permits courts to
change completely the nature of a contract by adding new promises
that the parties themselves refused to make in order that the new
court-made contract might better fit into whatever social,
economic, or legal policies the courts believe to be so important
that they should have been taken out of the realm of voluntary
contract by the legislative body and furthered by compulsory
legislation.
The mere fact that the dispute which brought about this strike
was subject to "final and binding" arbitration under this contract
certainly does not justify the conclusion that the union
relinquished its right to strike in support of its position on that
dispute. The issue here involves not the nature of the arbitration
proceeding, but the question of whether the union, by agreeing to
arbitrate, has given up all other separate and distinct methods of
getting its way. Surely, no one would suggest that a provision for
final and binding arbitration would preclude a union from
attempting to persuade an employer to forego action the union was
against, even where that action was fully within the employer's
rights under the contract. The same principle supports the right of
the
Page 369 U. S. 109
union to strike in such a situation for historically, and, as
was recognized in both the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, the strike
has been the unions' most important weapon of persuasion. To say
that the right to strike is inconsistent with the contractual duty
to arbitrate sounds like a dull echo of the argument which used to
be so popular that the right to strike was inconsistent with the
contractual duty to work -- an argument which frequently went so
far as to say that strikes are inconsistent with both the common
law and the Constitution.
The additional burden placed upon the union by the Court's
writing into the agreement here a promise not to strike is
certainly not a matter of minor interest to this employer or to the
union. The history of industrial relations in this country
emphasizes the great importance to unions of the right to strike,
as well as an understandable desire on the part of employers to
avoid such work stoppages. Both parties to collective bargaining
discussions have much at stake as to whether there will be a
no-strike clause in any resulting agreement. It is difficult to
believe that the desire of employers to get such a promise and the
desire of the union to avoid giving it are matters which are not
constantly in the minds of those who negotiate these contracts. In
such a setting, to hold -- on the basis of no evidence whatever --
that a union, without knowing it, impliedly surrendered the right
to strike by virtue of "traditional contract law" or anything else
is to me just fiction. It took more than 50 years for unions to
have written into federal legislation the principle that they have
a right to strike. I cannot understand how anyone familiar with
that history can allow that legislatively recognized right to be
undercut on the basis of the attenuated implications the Court uses
here.
I do not mean to suggest that an implied contractual promise
cannot sometimes be found where there are facts and circumstances
sufficient to warrant the conclusion
Page 369 U. S. 110
that such was the intention of the parties. But there is no
factual basis for such a conclusion in this case, and the Court
does not even claim to the contrary. The implication of a no-strike
clause which the Court purports to find here -- an implication
completely at war with the language the parties used in making this
contract as well as with the normal understanding of the
negotiation process by which such contracts are made -- has not
been supported by so much as one scrap of evidence in this record.
The implication found by the Court thus flows neither from the
contract itself nor, so far as this record shows, from the
intention of the parties. In my judgment, an "implication" of that
nature would better be described as a rigid rule of law that an
agreement to arbitrate has precisely the same effect as an
agreement not to strike -- a rule of law which introduces
revolutionary doctrine into the field of collective bargaining.
I agree that the Taft-Hartley Act shows a congressional purpose
to treat collective bargaining contracts and agreements for
arbitration in them as one important way of insuring stability in
industrial production and labor relations. But the fact that we may
agree, as I do, that these settlements by arbitration are desirable
is no excuse whatever for imposing such "contracts," either to
compel arbitration or to forbid striking, upon unwilling parties.
That approach is certainly contrary to the industrial and labor
philosophy of the Taft-Hartley Act. Whatever else may be said about
that Act, it seems plain that it was enacted on the view that the
best way to bring about industrial peace was through voluntary, not
compelled, labor agreements. Section 301 is torn from its roots
when it is held to require the sort of compulsory arbitration
imposed by this decision. I would reverse this case and relegate
this controversy to the forum in which it belongs -- the collective
bargaining table.