The twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1780 confers
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court from final judgments
and decrees in any suit in the highest court of law or equity of a
state in which a decision in the suit could be had in three classes
of cases: first, where is drawn in question the validity of a
treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United
States and the decision is against their validity; secondly, where
is drawn in question the validity of a statute of or an authority
exercised under any state on the ground of their being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States and the
decision is in favor of such, their validity; thirdly, where is
drawn in question the construction of any clause of the
Constitution or of a treaty or statute of or commission held under
the United States and the decision is against the title, right,
privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party
under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or
commission. The section then goes on to provide that no other error
shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such
case as aforesaid than such as appears upon the face of the record
and immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity
or construction of the said Constitution, treaties, statutes,
commissions, or authorities in dispute.
In the interpretation of this section of the act of 1789, it has
been uniformly held that to give this Court appellate jurisdiction,
two things should have occurred and be apparent in the record:
first that someone of the questions stated in the section did arise
in the court below, and secondly that a decision was actually made
thereon by the same court in the manner required by the section. If
both of these do not appear on the record, the appellate
jurisdiction fails. It is not sufficient to show that such a
question might have occurred, or such a decision might have been
made in the court below. It must be demonstrable that they did
exist, and were made.
It has been decided that it is not indispensable that it should
appear on the record in
totidem verbis or by direct add
positive statement, that the question was made and the decision
given by the court below on the very point, but that it is
sufficient if it is clear from the facts stated, by just and
necessary inference, that the question was made and that the court
below must, in order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by
it, have come to the very decision of that question as
indispensable to that judgment.
A review of the cases of
Owings v. Norwood's
Lessee, 5 Cranch 344, 2 Cond. 275;
Smith v.
State of Maryland, 6 Cranch 281, 2 Cond. 377;
Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 3 Cond. 575;
Inglee v.
Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363, 4 Cond. 155;
Miller v.
Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311,
17 U. S. 315, 4
Cond. 465;
Williams v.
Norris, 12 Wheat. 117,
25 U. S. 124, 6
Cond. 462;
Hickie v.
Starke, 1 Pet. 98;
Willson
v.
Page 35 U. S. 369
Black Bird Creek Marsh Association, 2 Pet. 245,
27 U. S. 250;
Satterlee v.
Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380;
Harris v.
Dennie, 3 Pet. 292,
28 U. S. 302;
Craig v. State of
Missouri, 4 Pet. 410;
Fisher
v. Cockerel, 5 Pet. 256;
New
Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 224.
In order to bring a case for a writ of error or an appeal to the
Supreme Court from a court of the highest jurisdiction of any of
the states within the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, it
must appear on the face of the record 1st, that some one of the
questions stated in that section did arise in the state court; 2d,
that the question was decided by the state court, as required in
the same section; 3d, that it is not necessary that the question
should appear on the record to have been raised, and the decision
made in direct and positive terms,
ipsissimis verbis, but
that it is sufficient if it appears by clear and necessary
intendment that the question must have been raised and must have
been decided in order to have induced the judgments; 4th, that it
is not sufficient to show that a question might have arisen or been
applicable to the case unless it is farther shown on the record
that it did arise and was applied by the state court to the
case.
In 1829, John Randell, Junior, the defendant in error,
instituted an action of covenant against the Chesapeake &
Delaware Canal Company, in the Superior Court of the State of
Delaware, on certain articles of agreement entered into between him
and the defendants relative to the making of a canal to unite the
waters of the River Delaware with those of the Chesapeake Bay, and
to pass through the States of Delaware and Maryland. The Chesapeake
& Delaware Canal Company were incorporated by laws passed by
the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland, and the board of
directors of the company was established in the City of
Philadelphia.
The declaration alleged sundry breaches of covenant on the part
of the defendants, and after various pleadings and demurrers, and
issues of fact, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff on some of
the demurrers, and an inquisition of damages awarded. The parties
went to trial on some of the issues of fact, which were found for
the plaintiff, and on 26 January, 1834, the jury found a verdict
for the plaintiff for $229,535.79, upon which a judgment was
entered by the court.
Upon this judgment, the plaintiff, on 6 June, 1834, issued a
writ of attachment, under the laws of the State of Delaware, for
the collection of part of the amount of the same, and of the costs,
which was served on Thomas P. Crowell as the garnishee of the
Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company. The same proceedings took
place in the case of Richard Shoemaker.
The defendants respectively appeared, and pleaded that they
had
Page 35 U. S. 370
no goods or effects, rights or credits of the company in their
hands at the time of the attachments, or at any time after. The
cases came on for trial on these pleas and issues, according to the
laws of Delaware, and the parties agreed to a statement of
facts.
In the suit against Thomas P. Crowell, the agreed facts were as
follows:
"John Randell, Jr., recovered a verdict of a jury in the said
court against the said company, on 25 January, 1834, and then and
there obtained judgment in the said court against the said company
for damages and costs of suit, amounting together to the sum of
$229,535.79. The pleadings, record and proceedings in the said
suit, from the declaration to the judgment inclusive, are referred
to, and form a part of this case."
"A writ of attachment was issued upon said judgment for the
collection of the damages and costs aforesaid, on 6 June, A.D.
1834, returnable to the November term of the same year. The said
writ was served upon the said Thomas P. Crowell in the county
aforesaid at the Delaware tide lock, who was summoned by the
Sheriff of Newcastle County as garnishee of the Chesapeake &
Delaware Canal Company, on 15 June, 1834. At the same time, the
said Thomas P. Crowell was arrested by virtue of the above
mentioned capias, being No. 34 to November term of said court, A.D.
1834, at which time and place the said defendant (the said Thomas
P. Crowell, to-wit) having appeared and given bail, and being put
to plead at the election of the said plaintiff under the said act
of assembly, pleaded that he had no goods, chattels, rights,
credits or effects of the said the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal
Company in his hands, custody, or possession at the time of the
attachment laid or at any time after. On this plea the plaintiff
hath joined issue, and this is the question now submitted to the
court for its decision."
"On 28 January, A.D. 1834, a resolution was passed by the board
of directors of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company in the
following words -- that is to say: "
"Resolved, that hereafter no tolls be collected on the line of
the canal on any vessel, cargo or other article passing through the
canal, until the said vessel, cargo or other article on which the
said tolls may be levied or charged, shall have entered the basin
at the western end of the canal, excepting only such vessels, cargo
or other article as may not pass through the canal to the said
basin. "
Page 35 U. S. 371
"This resolution has never been printed by the said company, nor
hath any notice whatever thereof been given to the said John
Randell, Jr., until this time. It is admitted that the said
resolution was adopted for the purpose of preventing the said John
Randell, Jr., from attaching the tolls of the said company by
virtue of the said judgment, or otherwise availing himself of the
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Delaware, for the
collection of his said judgment."
"The defendant at the time of the service of the said writ of
attachment and capias upon him was, hath ever since been, and still
continues to be the master of the schooner Hiram, the said schooner
being in his hands and possession during that time as the master of
the same, and owner of the said schooner. The said vessel passed
through the Chesapeake & Delaware canal, with a cargo from
Philadelphia to Richmond, on 16 June, A.D. 1834. The amount of
tolls on the several cargoes of the said schooner demanded for
passage through the said canal between 16 June, and the return day
of the said writ, was $96.28 cents, lawful money of the United
States of America, and was paid in the City of Philadelphia, to S.
Griffiths Fisher, an officer appointed by the said president and
directors of the said the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company,
to receive and collect tolls at their office in the City of
Philadelphia, by a certain Joseph Hand, the freighter of the said
schooner; after service of said attachment and capias, and after
the said vessel had passed through the canal as aforesaid, but
before the return of the said writs."
"The said attachment and capias were served upon the said
defendant in Newcastle county, at the time of his offering to pass
through the said canal at the Delaware tide lock, with the said
vessel and cargo, and previous to the vessel passing through the
same, to-wit, on 15 June, A.D. 1834. The said tide lock was, when
the said canal was opened for navigation on 17 October, A.D. 1829,
established by the president and directors of the said company, as
a place for the receipt of tolls in the said canal; and a collector
of tolls has always been appointed to reside at that place; and a
certain John Willson was, at the time of issuing said attachment,
and has ever since been such collector at said tide lock."
"The printed paper hereunto annexed, marked with the letter
A,
Page 35 U. S. 372
is a true copy of the regulations to be observed by vessels
navigating the Chesapeake & Delaware canal, adopted by the
board of directors of the said company, with the rates of toll for
navigating the said canal, the same having been signed by the
president and secretary of the said company, and published by order
of the president and directors thereof, and it is agreed shall be
taken as a part of the case, except so far as they had been altered
by the resolution of 28 January above set forth."
[The material regulations in the paper A, established 4
February, 1833, were the following:
1. No vessel shall enter the canal without first coming to
anchor or making fast to the piers at least one hundred feet from
the outer locks.
2. Masters of vessels shall, before entering the first lock,
present to the collector a manifest of cargo, so arranged as to
enable him readily to calculate their tolls. And in order to guard
against frauds, the collectors are authorized to require the cargo
to be landed for examination, if they shall see cause to suspect
the correctness of the manifest.
5. The tolls shall always be paid at the first lock passed by a
vessel, and upon payment thereof, the master shall receive a pass
bill, on which shall be noted the amount of tolls paid, and the
precise time of entering.
7. If any vessel shall pass through the canal without fully and
honestly paying the prescribed tolls, either of the collectors is
authorized by law
"to seize such vessel, wherever found, and sell the same at
auction for ready money; which, so far as is necessary, shall be
applied towards paying said tolls, and all expenses of seizure and
sale."
And to enforce the penalties.
21. The officers and agents of the company are fully authorized
by law to enforce obedience to the foregoing regulations; and they
are required so to do.
22. No person is allowed to interfere with the agents or
officers of the company in the performance of their duties on the
canal. Should reasonable ground of complaint occur against such
officers or agents, either by unnecessary delays or improper
conduct, it will be immediately redressed, on information being
lodged at either of the offices of the company.]
"It is further agreed, that the sloop Robert and James, the
defendant being then and there the master, and having the
direction
Page 35 U. S. 373
thereof, passed through the Chesapeake & Delaware canal with
a cargo from Port Deposit to Philadelphia, on 18 June, 1834, and
three several times afterwards, to-wit, on 26 June, 1834, on 16
October, 1834, and on 5 November, 1834, between that day and the
return day of the said writ of attachment. Copies of the pass bills
given to the said defendant on these occasions, were annexed."
"The amount of tolls on the several cargoes of the said sloop,
demanded for passage through the said canal by the Chesapeake &
Delaware Canal Company at their lock at the western end of the
canal in the State of Maryland and there paid by the said Thomas P.
Crowell, master of the said sloop, between the said 18 June and the
return day of said writ, was $74.44 cents lawful money of the
United States of America."
"The acts of the Legislatures of Delaware, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania relative to the said the Chesapeake & Delaware
Canal, and the several supplements thereto are referred to, and
made part of this statement of facts."
"It is agreed that in many cases since the resolution of 28
January, 1834, above set forth, tolls for the passage of vessels
and their cargoes through the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal, from
the eastern end of said canal, in the State of Delaware, to the
western end thereof, in the State of Maryland, were received by
some agent appointed by the president and directors of the said
company, at their office, in the City of Philadelphia, and were
paid by the owners or captains, or by the agents of said owners or
captains, to the officers or agents of said president and directors
of said company at said office."
"It is further agreed, that independently of the tolls so
attached, and all other tolls of the said company attached by the
said John Randell, Jr., a sufficient amount of tolls was always
left in their hands, not attached, to repair and keep in order the
said canal, their locks, and other works necessary thereto, and to
keep the same navigable; also to defray the expenses of the
collection of tolls, including the salaries of all their
officers."
"It is further agreed, that the said canal, the construction of
which was commenced on 15 April, 1824, was completed and open for
navigation on 17 October, 1829."
"It also further agreed that previous to the rendition of the
judgment above named, obtained by John Randell, Jr., against the
said
Page 35 U. S. 374
canal company, that the tolls were collected in the canal at the
respective toll houses located at Delaware city and Chesapeake
City, from the captains and masters of vessels passing through the
said canal, but the counsel for the said defendant protests that
said captains and masters were not personally liable to the said
company for the said tolls so paid by them. If upon the foregoing
statement of facts the court shall be of the opinion that John
Randell, Jr., the above named plaintiff, is entitled to judgment
against the defendant as garnishee of the said the Chesapeake &
Delaware Canal Company, upon the plea of
nulla bona, then
judgment to be rendered for the said plaintiff for the sum of
$96.28, and if the court should be of the opinion that the said
John Randell, Jr., is not entitled to judgment against the said
defendant, on the aforesaid statement of facts, the judgment to be
entered for the said defendant."
The following extracts from the laws of Maryland and Delaware
were made part of the case:
Extract from Delaware law, passed February, 1832.
"Be it enacted, that in case any master, shipper or agent shall
fraudulently present to the collector of tolls, or other agent of
the canal company, a false manifest or account of cargo of any
vessel or boat about passing through the canal, or give a false
statement of the tolls thereon, or otherwise attempt to defraud in
the said tolls, on conviction thereof before any justice of the
peace for Newcastle County, he or they so convicted, after paying
to the canal company the toll due, and the cost of ascertaining the
same, shall forfeit and pay double the amount of tolls so charged,
on which the fraud had been attempted; one moiety of said
forfeiture shall inure to the person giving information and
prosecuting the offense to conviction, the other moiety to inure to
the State of Delaware."
Extract from Maryland law, passed December, 1831.
"Be it enacted, &c., that if any master or agent of any
vessel or boat shall fraudulently present to the collector of
tolls, or any other agent of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal
Company, a false manifest or account of cargo of any vessel or boat
about passing through the canal, or give a false statement of the
toll thereon, or otherwise attempt to defraud in the said tolls, on
conviction thereof before any justice of the peace of this state,
he shall incur the penalty of twenty dollars, to be recovered
before some justice of the peace as small debts are recovered,
one-half to the informer giving information
Page 35 U. S. 375
and prosecuting the offender to conviction, and the other half
to the state."
On this agreed statement the case was certified to the court of
errors and appeals for argument and decision; and in October, 1835,
the court decided that the defendant had goods and chattels,
effects and credits, &c., of the company in his hands, at the
time of the attachment laid in his hands, and before the return
thereof, amounting to $95, and judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff.
The record and proceedings were remanded to the Superior Court
of the State of Delaware, and the defendants prosecuted this writ
of error.
The case of Richard Shoemaker differs from that of Thomas P.
Crowell only in this, that in his case it was necessary for the
court to decide, in order to render judgment for the plaintiff,
that the voluntary payment of toll by the master of a vessel to a
person appointed by the directors of the company to receive said
toll in Philadelphia was, under the facts stated in this case, a
fraud on the attachment laws of the State of Delaware and on the
jurisdiction of its courts; and especially fraudulent, and
therefore void, as against a judgment creditor of the company
seeking satisfaction of his debt in that state, according to the
attachment laws thereof, and the court so decided.
Page 35 U. S. 391
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Superior Court of the State of
Delaware, to revise the judgment of the court of errors and appeals
of the said state; the record of which judgment had been remanded
to the superior court of the same state.
A motion has been made to dismiss the suit for want of
jurisdiction upon the ground that there is nothing apparent upon
the record to bring the case within the revising power of this
Court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20. That section confers appellate jurisdiction in this Court
from final judgments and decrees in any suit in the highest court
of law or equity of a state in which a decision in the suit could
be had in three classes of cases: first, where is drawn in question
the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised
under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity; secondly, where is drawn in question the validity of a
statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the
ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such
their validity; thirdly, where is drawn in question the
construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty or
statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the
decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption
specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of
the said Constitution, treaty, statute
Page 35 U. S. 392
or commission. The section then goes on to provide that no other
error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any
such case as aforesaid, than such as appears upon the face of the
record, and immediately respects the beforementioned questions of
validity or construction of the said Constitution, treaties,
statutes, commissions or authorities in dispute.
In the interpretation of this section of the act of 1789, it has
been uniformly held, that to give this Court appellate jurisdiction
two things should have occurred and be apparent in the record:
first, that someone of the questions stated in the section did
arise in the court below, and secondly that a decision was actually
made thereon by the same court, in the manner required by the
section. If both of these do not appear on the record, the
appellate jurisdiction fails. It is not sufficient to show that
such a question might have occurred, or such a decision might have
been made in the court below. It must be demonstrable that they did
exist, and were made. The principal, perhaps the only, important
difficulty which has ever been felt by the Court has been in
ascertaining in particular cases whether these matters (the
question and decision) were apparent on the record. And here the
doctrine of the Court has been that it is not indispensable that it
should appear on the record,
in totidem verbis, or by
direct and positive statement, that the question was made and the
decision given by the court below on the very point, but that it is
sufficient, if it is clear, from the facts stated, by just and
necessary inference, that the question was made, and that the court
below must, in order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by
it, have come to the very decision of that question as
indispensable to that judgment.
Although this has been the course of the decisions in this Court
as to the extent and exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
the judgments and decrees of state courts, yet it is apparent from
the arguments on the present occasion as well as from those which
have been addressed to us on several other late occasions that a
different impression exists at the bar and that it has been
supposed that a much wider latitude of interpretation of the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 has been adopted
by the court. To correct, at least as far as in us lies, this
mistaken notion, we shall now proceed to review the various
decisions which have heretofore been made on this subject.
The earliest case is
Owings v. Norwood's
Lessee, 5 Cranch 344.
Page 35 U. S. 393
In that case it clearly appeared, that the construction of a
treaty was before the state court, and that it was decided that the
right of the party was not protected by the treaty. This Court
affirmed the decision of the state court. The next case was
Smith v.
Maryland, 6 Cranch. 281. In that case it was
contended that the court had no jurisdiction, because the cause
turned exclusively upon the confiscation laws of Maryland, and that
no question relative to the construction of the treaty of peace,
did or could occur. But upon the facts stated on the record, the
only title asserted by the original plaintiffs was founded on the
confiscation acts of Maryland, and the only title set up by the
original defendant was for a British alien, protected by the treaty
of peace. If that title was so protected, then the plaintiffs were
not entitled to the relief sought by the bill; if otherwise, then
the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree. The state court decided
that the plaintiffs were so entitled, and therefore necessarily
decided against the treaty as a protection. The jurisdiction was
maintained by this Court upon this posture of the facts, and the
decision of the state court was afterwards affirmed. But the court
said that in order to decide upon the main question, it was
indispensable to ascertain what the nature of the title was, to
which the treaty was sought to be applied.
The next case was
Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 305,
14 U. S. 355.
There, the original case came before the Court upon an agreed
statement of facts, upon which the state court gave judgment
against the original defendant. That judgment was upon a writ of
error reversed by this Court, and when the cause came afterwards
before this Court upon a second writ of error, the objection was
taken that the original case was not within the twenty-fifth
section of the Judiciary Act. Upon this occasion the Court, after
stating the material facts in the agreed case, said
"It is apparent from this summary explanation that the title
thus set up by the plaintiff might be open to other objections; but
the title of the defendant in error [against which the state court
had decided] was perfect and complete, if it was protected by the
treaty of 1783. If, therefore, this Court had authority to examine
into the whole record and to decide upon the legal validity of the
title of the defendant, as well as its application to the treaty of
peace, it would be a case within the express purview of the
twenty-fifth section of the act, for there was nothing in the
record upon which the court below could have decided but upon the
title as connected with the treaty. And if the
Page 35 U. S. 394
title was otherwise good, its sufficiency must have depended
altogether upon its protection under the treaty. Under such
circumstances, it was strictly a suit where was drawn in question
the construction of a treaty and the decision was against the title
specially set up or claimed by the defendants. It would then fall
within the very terms of the act."
The next case was
Inglee v.
Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363, 4 Cond. 155, where a motion
was made to dismiss the writ of error upon the ground that there
was nothing apparent upon the record which brought the case within
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under the twenty-fifth
section of the act of 1789. The Court was of this opinion, and
accordingly dismissed the writ of error.
The next case was
Miller v.
Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311,
17 U. S. 315, 4
Cond. 465. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of
the Court, said:
"It does not appear from the record that either the
constitutionality of the law of Pennsylvania or any act of Congress
was drawn in question. It would not be required that the record
should in terms state a misconstruction of an act of Congress or
that an act of Congress was drawn in question. It would have been
sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction of the cause that the
record should show that an act of Congress was applicable to the
case. This is not shown by the record."
The language used in this last sentence has been often cited as
if it imported that if an act of Congress was shown to be
applicable to the case, although it was not in fact applied by the
decision of the state court, it would sustain the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. That was certainly not the
understanding of the Chief Justice or of the Court. The case of
Miller v. Nicholls was decided in the state court upon an
agreed statement of facts by which it appeared that Nicholls was a
debtor both to the United States and to the State of Pennsylvania,
and the question raised was whether the United States, or the State
of Pennsylvania was entitled to certain money of Nicholls, then in
court, as the creditor of Nicholls. The United States claimed it in
virtue of the priority given by the act of 3 March, 1797, ch. 74.
But it did not appear in the statement of facts that Nicholls was
then in a state of insolvency, and if he was not then the priority
of the United States did not attach -- or in other words, the act
of Congress was not applicable to it. It is to this state of the
facts that the language of the Chief Justice was addressed. He
added, "had the fact of insolvency appeared upon the record, that
would have enabled
Page 35 U. S. 395
this Court to revise the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania." And why, it may be asked? Because upon the statement
of facts, the state court must, under these circumstances, have
misconstrued the act of Congress or disregarded it, for otherwise
they would not have given the judgment which was sought to be
revised.
That this is the true explanation of this case does not admit of
controversy. In the very next case,
Williams
v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117,
25 U. S. 124, 6
Cond. 462, where this very expression in
Miller v.
Nicholls was relied on in argument to establish the position
that it is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction that the
record should showed that an act of Congress was applicable to the
case, the Chief Justice gave the very explanation of it which is
now insisted on, and added
"Had the record shown that this was a case of insolvency, so
that an act of Congress applied to it, that act must have been
misconstrued or its obligation denied, when the court decreed the
money to Pennsylvania, and the Court was of opinion that the act
could not be evaded by the omission to refer to it in the judgment
or to spread it on the record."
In the case of
Williams v. Norris, this Court dismissed
the writ of error because it was not stated on the record that the
constitutionality of the act of Tennessee set up in that case was
drawn in question. In
Fisher v.
Cockerill, 5 Pet. 258, the case of
Miller v.
Nicholls was again cited and commented on by The Chief
Justice, and the same explanation of the decision was recognized
and enforced, and, because the facts did not appear on the record,
which would bring the case within the terms of the twenty-fifth
section of the act of 1789, the writ of error in
Fisher v.
Cockerill, was also dismissed.
But to proceed with the other cases in their chronological
order, the next case was
Hickie v.
Starke, 1 Pet. 98. There, a motion was made to
dismiss the writ of error for the want of jurisdiction. Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court dismissing
the writ of error, said:
"In the construction of that section [the twenty-fifth], the
Court has never required that the treaty or act of Congress under
which the party claims who brings the final judgment of a state
court into review before this Court should have been pleaded
specially or spread on the record. But it has always been deemed
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case that the
record should show a complete title under the
Page 35 U. S. 396
treaty or act of Congress, and that the judgment of the court is
in violation of that treaty."
The next case was
Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Company, 2 Pet. 245,
27 U. S. 250.
In that case, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in delivering the opinion of the
Court sustaining the jurisdiction, said:
"We think it impossible to doubt that the constitutionality of
the act [of Delaware] was the question and the only question, which
could have been discussed in the state court. That question must
have been discussed and decided. This Court has repeatedly decided
in favor of its jurisdiction in such a case.
Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, Miller v. Nicholls, and
Williams v. Norris,
are expressly in point. They establish as far as precedents can
establish anything that it is not necessary to state in terms on
the record that the Constitution or a law of the United States was
drawn in question. It is sufficient to bring the case within the
provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the Judicial Act if the
record shows that the Constitution or a law or a treaty of the
United States must have been misconstrued or the decision could not
have been made, or, as in this case, that the constitutionality of
a state law was questioned and the decision was in favor of the
party claiming under such law."
The next case was
Satterlee v.
Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380,
27 U. S. 410,
where Mr. Justice Washington, in delivering the opinion of the
Court sustaining the jurisdiction, after citing prior cases,
said:
"If it sufficiently appears from the record itself that the
repugnancy of a statute of a state to the Constitution of the
United States was drawn into question or that that question was
applicable to the case, this Court has jurisdiction of the cause
under the section of the act referred to, although the record
should not in terms state a misconstruction of the Constitution of
the United States or that the repugnancy of the statute of the
state to any part of that Constitution was drawn into
question."
But he immediately adds as explanatory of his remarks, and to
correct their generality:
"Now it is manifest from this record not only that the
constitutionality of the statute of 8 April, 1826 was drawn into
question and was applicable to the case, but that it was so applied
by the judge and formed the basis of his opinion to the jury that
they should find in favor of the plaintiff if in other respects she
was entitled to a verdict. It is equally manifest that the right of
the plaintiff to recover in that action depended on that
statute."
The next case was
Harris v.
Dennie, 8 Pet. 292,
33 U. S.
302,
Page 35 U. S. 397
where the Court, in answer to the objection of a want of
jurisdiction, because it did not appear upon the record that any
question within the twenty-fifth section arose in the state court
upon the special verdict, said:
"It has been often decided in this Court that it is not
necessary that it should appear in terms upon the record that any
such question was made. It is sufficient if, from the facts stated,
such a question must have arisen and the judgment of the state
court would not have been what it is if there had not been a
misconstruction of some act of Congress or a decision against the
validity of the right, title, privilege, or exemption set up under
it."
The next case was
Craig v. State of
Missouri, 4 Pet. 410, in which Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall, in affirming the jurisdiction of the Court, said:
"To give jurisdiction to this Court, it must appear in the
record: 1. that the validity of a statute of the State of Missouri
was drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States; 2. that the decision was in
favor of its validity."
And again:
"There has been a perfect uniformity in the construction given
by this Court of the twenty-fifth section of the Judicial Act. That
construction is that it is not necessary to state in terms in the
record that the Constitution or a treaty or law of the United
States has been drawn in question or the validity of a state law on
the ground of its repugnance to the Constitution. It is sufficient
if the record shows that the Constitution or a treaty or law of the
United States might have been construed, or that the
constitutionality of a state law must have been questioned, and the
decision has been in favor of the party claiming under such
law."
In
Fisher v.
Cockerill, 5 Pet. 255, the cases of
Harris v.
Dennie and
Craig v. State of Missouri were reviewed
and the doctrine stated therein confirmed, and Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall, after that review, added:
"We say, with confidence that this Court has never taken
jurisdiction unless the case, as stated in the record, was brought
within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the Judicial
Act."
In
Davis v.
Packard, 6 Pet. 41,
31 U. S. 48; MR.
JUSTICE THOMPSON said:
"It has also been settled that in order to give jurisdiction to
this Court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, it
is not necessary that the record should state in terms that an act
of Congress was in point of fact drawn in question. It is
sufficient if it appears from the record that an act of Congress
was applicable to the
Page 35 U. S. 398
case and was misconstrued, or the decision in the state court
was against the privilege or exemption specially set up under such
statute."
In
New Orleans v. De
Armas, 9 Pet. 224, where the suit was dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, The Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion
of the Court, said:
"We can inquire only whether the record shows that the
Constitution or a treaty or a law of the United States has been
violated by the decision of the state court. To sustain the
jurisdiction of the court in the case now under consideration, it
must be shown that the title set up by the City of New Orleans is
protected by the treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States, or
by some act of Congress applicable to that title."
These are all the cases, it is believed, in which the
construction of the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act has
been made matter of controversy, and they extend over a period of
more than twenty-five years. They exhibit an uniformity of
interpretation of that section which has never been broken in upon.
They establish, so far as a course of decision can establish, the
propositions already stated in the early part of this opinion. The
period seems now to have arrived in which the Court should, upon a
full review of all the cases, with a view to close, if possible,
all future controversy on the point, reaffirm the interpretation
which they have constantly maintained. It is that to bring a case
within the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, it must
appear upon the face of the record 1st, that some one of the
questions stated in that section did arise in the state court; 2d,
that the question was decided by the state court, as required in
the same section.; 3d, that it is not necessary that the question
should appear on the record to have been raised, and the decision
made in direct and positive terms,
ipsissimis verbis, but
that it is sufficient if it appears by clear and necessary
intendment that the question must have been raised and must have
been decided in order to have induced the judgment; 4th, that it is
not sufficient to show that a question might have arisen or been
applicable to the case unless it is farther shown on the record
that it did arise and was applied by the state court to the
case.
If with these principles in view we examine the record before
us, it is very clear that this Court has no appellate jurisdiction.
No question appears to be raised or decision made by the state
court within the purview of the twenty-fifth section. The statement
of
Page 35 U. S. 399
facts upon which the judgment against the garnishee (the
plaintiff in error) was given presents no question as to the
constitutionality of the laws of Delaware relative to garnishees
and no right set up by the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company
under their charters which has been infringed in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. So far as we can perceive from
the record, the judgment had no reference to any constitutional
question whatsoever, but proceeded upon general principles of law
applicable to cases of garnishment. If indeed we were compelled to
draw any conclusion, it would be that the judgment proceeded upon
the ground stated at the bar, that the payment of the tolls for
which the plaintiff was held liable as garnishee was a meditated
fraud upon the garnishee laws of Delaware and a violation of the
charters and by-laws of the company. But it is unnecessary for us
to draw any such conclusion, since there is a total absence from
the record of any question and decision which would give this Court
jurisdiction.
The judgment of the court is that the suit must be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.
