Petitioner, a manufacturer and distributor of bakery products,
obtained a state court injunction against a union's picketing of
retail stores that handled petitioner's products. Subsequently an
unfair labor practice complaint based on the same conduct of the
union was issued under the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and the Regional Director of the Board petitioned a
Federal District Court under § 10(
l) of the Act for an
injunction restraining the picketing by the union pending final
adjudication by the Board. The Board sued in the same court to
enjoin petitioner from enforcing the state court injunction.
Held:
1. Under 28 U.S. C. §1337, the District Court had jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the Board's suit as a "civil action or
proceeding" arising under an Act of Congress "regulating commerce."
P.
347 U. S.
504.
2. The District Court's injunction against enforcement of the
state court injunction was "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and was authorized by a
specific exception to the prohibition of that section against
federal courts staying state court proceedings. Pp.
347 U. S.
504-506.
204 F.2d 848 affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner manufacturers and distributes bakery products in
California. A union sought unsuccessfully to
Page 347 U. S. 502
organize its employees. Thereupon, the union sought to enlist
the aid of purchasers and consumers of petitioner's products.
Agents of the union requested retail stores not to handle
petitioner's products and stated that, if they continued to do so,
a picket line would be set up. Some stores acquiesced; others did
not. The union placed pickets at the entrances of the latter
stores, with the result that many deliveries were interrupted and
some employees of other employers refused to cross the picket
lines.
Petitioner made two counter moves. First, it filed suit for an
injunction against the union in the California courts. A few days
later, it filed a charge of an unfair labor practice against the
union with respondent. Each had as a basis the same conduct of the
union.
On April 7, 1952, the California court issued a preliminary
injunction against the union, banning all picketing of retail
stores. On May 14, 1952, the Regional Director of respondent
concluded, after investigation, that, insofar as the conduct of the
union involved merely an appeal to customers and to the public in
general, it was lawful under the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, 49 Stat. 449, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 151
et
seq., but that it was unlawful insofar as it induced or
encouraged employees of employers other than petitioner to refuse
to perform services at the picketed places. The Regional Director,
acting on behalf of the General Counsel, issued an unfair labor
practice complaint against the union on that limited basis. On the
same day, he petitioned the Federal District Court for an
injunction restraining such conduct of the union, pending final
adjudication by the Board, as required by § 10(
l) of the
Act. [
Footnote 1]
Page 347 U. S. 503
Simultaneously with the filing of the § 10(
l) petition
against the union, the Board filed suit in the same District Court,
asking that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing the state court
injunction. The District Court concluded that the conduct of the
union, in the respects stated, was
Page 347 U. S. 504
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board, and that the
action of the state court invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Board and the District Court. It accordingly granted the relief
prayed for. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 204 F.2d 848. The case
is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari limited to the
following question:
"In view of the fact that exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter was in the National Labor Relations Board
(
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S.
485), could the Federal District Court, on application
of the Board, enjoin Petitioners from enforcing an injunction
already obtained from the State court?"
346 U.S. 936.
I. The District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter,
because this is a "civil action or proceeding" arising under an Act
of Congress "regulating commerce." 28 U.S.C. § 1337. The National
Labor Relations Act is a law "regulating commerce" (
Labor Board
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1), and here, as in
American Federation of Labor v.
Watson, 327 U. S. 582,
327 U. S. 591,
the rights asserted arise under that law.
II. In absence of a command of the Congress to the contrary, the
power of the District Court to issue the injunction is clear.
Federal courts seek to avoid needless conflict with state agencies,
and withhold relief by way of injunction where state remedies are
available and adequate.
See Alabama Public Service Commission
v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U. S. 341. But
where Congress, acting within its constitutional authority, has
vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a subject
matter and the intrusion of a state would result in conflict of
functions, the federal court may enjoin the state proceeding in
order to preserve the federal right.
See
Public
Utilities
Page 347 U. S. 505
Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.
S. 456,
317 U. S.
468-470;
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.
S. 503,
321 U. S.
510-511.
Cf. American Federation of Labor v. Watson,
supra, at
327 U. S.
593-595. Congress, however, has provided that
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments."
28 U.S.C. § 2283.
We do not stop to consider the many questions which have been
propounded under this newly worded provision of the Code. [
Footnote 2] One alone suffices for this
case. For we conclude that the injunction issued by the District
Court was "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction," and thus
permitted under the exceptions specifically allowed by
Congress.
The state court injunction restrains conduct which the District
Court was asked to enjoin in the § 10(
l) proceeding
brought in the District Court by the Board's Regional Director
against the union. In order to make the § 10(
l) power
effective, the Board must have authority to take all steps
necessary to preserve its case. If the state court decree were to
stand, the Federal District Court would be limited in the action it
might take. If the Federal District Court were to have unfettered
power to decide for or against the union, and to write such
decree
Page 347 U. S. 506
as it deemed necessary in order to effectuate the policies of
the Act, it must be freed of all restraints from the other
tribunal. To exercise its jurisdiction freely and fully, it must
first remove the state decree. When it did so, it acted "where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction".
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 10(
l) reads as follows:
"Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), of (C)
of section 8(b), the preliminary investigation of such charge shall
be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except
cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which
it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or
regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable
cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should
issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any district
court of the United States (including the District Court of the
United States for the District of Columbia) within any district
where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is
alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or
transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the
final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon
the filing of any such petition, the district court shall have
jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any
other provision of law:
Provided further, That no
temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice unless a
petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the
charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining
order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will
become void at the expiration of such period. Upon filing of any
such petition, the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon any person involved in the charge and such person, including
the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by
counsel and present any relevant testimony:
Provided
further, That, for the purposes of this subsection, district
courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization
(1) in the district in which such organization maintains its
principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly
authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or
protecting the interests of employee members. The service of legal
process upon such officer or agent shall constitute service upon
the labor organization and make such organization a party to the
suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure
specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section
8(b)(4)(D), 61 Stat. 149, 29 U.S.C. § 160(
l)."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 2283 took the place of former § 265 of the Judicial
Code, which provided:
"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the
United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except
in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."
In view of our ruling, we find it unnecessary to consider
whether, apart from the specific exceptions contained in § 2283,
the District Court was justified in enjoining this intrusion on an
exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Cf. Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U. S. 503,
321 U. S.
510-511.